The Hadrami Arabs of Ambon

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The Hadrami Arabs of Ambon

An Ethnographic Study of Diasporic Identity Construction
in Everyday Life Practices

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To Bapak-Ibuk

in rememberance of
your love, wisdom, and strength

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Note on transliteration of Arabic and Indonesian terms

For Arabic terminology, I have used the transliteration system of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies,* but diacritical marks have been omitted for simplification. Arabic technical terms are lowercase and italicized except the words Qur'an, Hadith, Sunna, and Shari'a. Also, the words Sada and 'Alawi are not lowercase or italicized. In addition, personal names, place names, names of political parties and organizations, as well as the titles of books, journals, and articles are mostly rendered in local spellings. For plural forms of Indonesian and Arabic words, I have simply added 's', such as *negeris* and *munsibs* respectively. I have also maintained certain plural Arabic words, such as Sada, *masakin*, and *qabail* that may indicate both plural and singular forms. Furthermore, diphthongs ىَ and وَ are written as ai and au, such as Husain and Hadramaut respectively.

Chapter 1: Introduction

1. Introduction

Around eight o'clock in the morning on February 8, 2015, Malika was in hurry to get on a minivan waiting for her in front of the lodge where she was staying in Tarim, Yemen. She almost forgot to put on the face veil her nephew had bought for her as it was considered improper for women in Hadramaut to go outside without completely covering their body. She had arrived in the Yemeni town of Tarim a few days earlier after a long journey from Ambon and then Jakarta in Indonesia, to Sana'a, Mukalla, and finally Tarim in Yemen. Malika had yet to get used to covering her head and abiding with local rules of female comportment: the heat in Hadramaut bothered her and she regretted the restriction of movement of women, who spent most of their time in the domestic sphere. While being grateful for the opportunity to stay in Hadramaut for a while, Malika felt grateful that her permanent home is in Indonesia.

February 8 was the first of several days during which Malika and her fellow travellers from Indonesia visited various sites in northern Hadramaut. Every time the party arrived at the site of a shrine of a holy man, the tour leaders gave instructions about proper conduct and the rites to be carried out there. Malika performed the customary rituals at every shrine. Before leaving a shrine, the participants and their tour leaders documented every moment by taking many pictures of themselves or what is now popularly called 'selfies' or 'wefies'. Collecting water, sand, or stones surrounding the tombs was another part of concluding the visit. Malika herself filled empty plastic bottles with water or sand intending to bring them back home to Indonesia to use them as medicines for her eldest daughter's illness.

Malika is a descendant of a Hadrami family that migrated to Ambon in the nineteenth century. The fragment above gives an impression of her first pilgrimage tour to Hadramaut, a region with which she identifies as being the land where her forefathers originate from but also a land to which she feels a stranger in comparison to her own everyday life on Ambon. Malika and many other descendants, particularly those from Sada (from the Arabic singular: *sayyid*, descendants of the Prophet) families, whom I met during the tour that Malika made, had no intention to return to Hadramaut for good. Rather, they returned on temporary trips as pilgrims in search of *baraka*, divine blessing, or as students in the pursuit of religious knowledge.

Visiting saint shrines in Hadramaut, as Malika did, is only one of many diasporic practices of the Hadramis in Ambon. Other Hadrami Arabs of Ambon pay similar diasporic return visits but with the main purpose to reunite with

immediate family members with whom they had lost contact over time. Such diasporic returns imply that although there was a long period of disconnection between the country of the forefathers' origin and the country of the migrants' settlement after the emergence of nation-states (Freitag 2003; Freitag and Clarence-Smith 1997), a diasporic consciousness remains alive among some descendants of Hadrami migrants today. This does not mean, however, that diasporic senses of belonging to Hadramaut are the same for all Hadrami diasporas throughout time. Hadramis that have converted to Shi'ism, for example, tend to prefer to visit Iran rather than Hadramaut. Also, Hadramaut in the collective memory of contemporary diasporic Hadramis who wish to make a return journey to it, is quite a different place now than it was at the time their ancestors left. Morever, not all Hadramis living in the diaspora share similar views of what constitutes Hadramaut culture today. Therefore, Hadramaut as an imaginary homeland is also a contested homeland, and as much a space of imagination as a space of contestation.

The aforementioned description of Malika's diasporic return journey to Hadramaut reflects one of the main points addressed in this dissertation, which is an ethnographic study of present-day descendants of the Hadrami Arab migrants in Ambon and their articulations of diasporic identity through everyday life practices. In other words, the research tries to discern how diasporic identity is played out in everyday life by individuals who identify themselves or are identified by others as Hadrami Arabs or descendants of migrants from Hadramaut in the southern part of Yemen.

More specifically, the focus in this dissertation is on how religion informs the everyday performance of diasporic identity. The history of the Hadrami Arabs who migrated to the Indonesian Archipelago in the late eighteenth up to the early twentieth century is often regarded as a success story in terms of transnational economic, political, and religious engagement. One of the main factors contributing to this success is often perceived to be their shared Muslim identity with mainstream Indonesian society on the one hand, while preserving a distinct, Hadrami cultural identity on the other. This specific combination of claiming sameness and difference simultaneously provided them with social and symbolic capital that enabled them to develop and maintain networks both in local settings and in their country of origin. However, while the emphasis on a distinct cultural identity facilitates integration into the host-societies in some contexts, in other situations it can also hamper full integration. The active maintenance of a distinct cultural identity as Hadrami Arabs in Indonesia is shaped by social, political and religious developments both in Hadramaut and in local contexts.

Particularly the drawing on Islam as a cultural and religious source has played a major role both in the construction of a distinct cultural identity and in local social integration processes. Interestingly, the emergence of Islamic

reform movements in the beginning of the twentieth century added a new dimension to the transnational religious positioning of diasporic Hadrami Arabs. The symbolic dominance of Sada Hadramis, who claim descent from the Prophet Muhammad, was increasingly questioned and challenged by local reformist Muslims from both within and outside the Hadrami community.

To investigate the situation of present-day descendants of the Hadrami migrants it is crucial to build upon this historical context to understand changes as well as continuities in their ethno-religious identity making and their social relations to a larger society. This study, thus, aims at understanding the interplay between ethnicity and religion in the construction of diasporic identity and the social integration of present-day descendants of Hadrami Arab migrants to Ambon.

To a considerable extent, the relevance of this study lies in the context of Ambon itself. As will be sketched in the section on the literature review, although Ambon was an important destination for Hadrami migration during the colonial era, it remains largely neglected in the literature on Hadrami diaspora. Similarly, the contemporary situation of the Hadrami descendants in Ambon has hardly received any attention so far. It is important to fill this lacune, since the socio-economic and the ethno-religious historical context of Ambon differs significantly from other places in the Indonesian Archipelago where Hadramis have settled, thus providing a unique situation to investigate how local social structures have shaped the diasporic identity construction of descendants of the Hadrami migrants there. Moreover, as a site of two contesting religious communities and multiple ethnic groups that experienced recent communal conflicts between Muslims and Christians (1999-2002), post-conflict Ambon provides a special context in the dynamics of the formation of a diasporic identity by Hadrami Arabs, especially concerning their articulation of religious identity.

Another innovative dimension of this study concerns the focus on gender identity construction. As it were men who first migrated and carved themselves a new niche in the places where they settled, the Hadrami diasporic life and identity have been gendered in specific ways. Women were mostly located in the domestic sphere and were responsible for the socialization of new generations and transmitting the Hadrami identity to them. As came to the fore in the opening fragment to this chapter about Malika's journey to Hadramaut, some Hadrami women in the present-day diaspora play a significant role in shaping Hadrami diasporic consciousness through return visits to Hadramaut and other diasporic practices. Given the socio-political changes coupled with advances of travel and communication technologies, the twenty-first century allows not only hyper-connectivity between diasporic people in different regions with the homeland and each other, but also positions women as the significant Hadrami 'other' within, who

thus insert their own ways of to make sense their diasporic life through specific diasporic practices. In order to understand this diasporic trajectory, the female perspective needs to be equally taken into account. This study therefore aims specifically to contribute to the production of knowledge and insights into the views and practices of Hadrami women in Ambon.

In the remainder of this introduction, I will provide a literature review and a theoretical framework and will conclude by giving an account on what aspects and concepts this research wishes to contribute.

2. Literature Review

The study of the Hadrami diaspora began in the late nineteenth century, pioneered by some Dutch scholar-officials, notably L.W.C van den Berg (1886) and C. Snouck Hurgronje (Gobee and Adrianse 1959). Yet, Hadrami communities in the diaspora have become popular subjects of study only since the mid-1990s, as a response to the rise in diaspora studies in general. A large number of publications ranging from historical to anthropological studies have been dedicated to this subject. An analysis of diasporic identity construction among the Hadramis in the diaspora, thus, has been of much interest.

An important early volume edited by Ulrike Freitag and William G. Clarence-Smith (1997) discusses the wave of the Hadrami migration in the Indian Ocean as a result of economic adversity and political unrest in Hadramaut in the nineteenth century. In this volume, the scholars argued that the Hadramis had a distinctive feature as a transnational community who maintained a shared lineage, which enabled them to develop trans-local/national networks and to play a significant role in politics, economy and religion. In a similar vein, Linda Boxberger addresses the dynamics of the socio-political structure and religio-political contestation in Hadramaut, and also provides a historical analysis of the Hadrami emigration to the Indian Ocean as a result of economic and social-political instability within the region (2002). In her monograph on Hadrami diaspora in the Indian Ocean, Freitag (2003) further developed the argument on the relationship between kinship ties and the roles of the Hadramis in political, economic, and social changes both in their host-societies and countries of origin. Freitag suggests that the Hadrami identity has been shaped by various political changes in the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods.

Similarly, a volume edited by Huub de Jonge and Nico Kaptein (2002) discusses the migration of Arabs and their roles in Islamic proselytization, trade, and politics in Southeast Asia. The emphasis of this volume is on different patterns of the Arab migration before and after the massive wave of the Hadrami migration in the nineteenth century. The volume suggests that the

formation of a diasporic identity among the Hadrami migrants was shaped by colonial policies issuing social segregation between the Hadramis and other groups in the Indies. The recent edited volume by Noel Brehony (2017) touches upon politics, identity and migration of Hadrami communities. The volume discusses several issues concerning both past and present situations of the Hadramis in Yemen and in various diasporas in the Indian Ocean.

The debate on the relationship between cultural identity maintenance and the integration or assimilation of Hadramis in diasporic contexts is explicitly described in the collected studies of Ahmed Ibrahim Abushouk and Hassan Ahmed Ibrahim (2009). Abushouk and Ibrahim concluded that the Hadramis did not assimilate fully in the host-societies as they maintain a certain degree of cultural identity.

Building on an interest in the Hadrami community in the Netherland East Indies, Natalie Mobini-Kesheh (1999) carried out research on the changing patterns of identity within the community in the Indies around 1900-1942. With a special focus on an Islamic reform organization, al-Irshad, Mobini-Kesheh argues that the early decades of the twentieth century were a period of *nahda*, awakening, as a way to make progress, for the Hadrami community in the Indies by three aspects, namely the adoption of modern, western style methods of organization, education, and publication.

In his *The Graves of Tarim* (2006), Engseng Ho combines a historical and an ethnographic study of the Hadrami diaspora in the Indian Ocean by focusing on their genealogy and mobility. He argues that genealogy plays a significant role in preserving the Hadrami identity in the diaspora especially for those of Sada origin. By analyzing some Hadramis' early writings, Ho studies Hadrami identity construction through cultural production, such as poetry, biography, history, law, novels, and prayers. He argues that these texts cannot be understood solely by patrilineality, as the genealogies seem to claim but also depend on contingencies that the diaspora overseas is confronted with. His central argument lies in the concept of hybridity (creole), in which the Hadrami societies have developed a distinct creole Malay speaking Hadrami-Malay community in Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore, which was different from both host and home societies. Using the same concept of hybridity, in his *Becoming Arabs* Sumit K. Mandal (2018) examines transregional ties and hybridity underlying modern Asian identities by focusing on the formation of Arab identities in the Malay world. Mandal pointed out that the formation of Arab identities among the Hadrami migrants and their descendants resulted from European racial segregation policies. He further argued that although causing constraints, colonial policies did not fully hamper the formation of fluid identities of the Arabs, as the Arabs were successful in establishing transregional networks between homeland and diaspora, and also beyond.

Apart from functioning as cultural capital in building transregional and transnational networks, religious identity is also an important means for the Hadramis to gain access to the colonial politics. One example is Sayyid 'Uthman (1822-1914), the most eminent Muslim scholar of his time who provided Islamic guidance to the Muslim community and at the same time served as advisor in the colonial government. By scrutinizing the biography of Sayyid 'Uthman (1822-1914), Nico Kaptein (2014) focuses on this modern scholar's view on the position of Islam in the colonial state and other responses to his view from other Muslim scholars in both national and international levels.

Drawing upon the discussion on identity of Hadramis in the diaspora, Leif Manger (2010) conducted a comparative study on the Hadramis in various diasporas. The study shows the socio-cultural dynamics that characterize the lives of Hadramis in Southeast Asia, India, and East Africa in terms of their successful adaptation to changing circumstances and their preservation of a certain degree of a cultural identity of their own. The research's central argument is a call for looking at many historical processes that allow a variety of experiences and changes within the Hadramis in their diaspora places.

Studies on the Hadrami Arabs in present-day Indonesia cover a range of subjects such as Islamic roles, kinship networks, integration, renewed links to the homeland and gender. In her research on the Arab community in Sasak, Lombok, for example, Kendra Clegg (2005) argues that the Arabs enjoyed a respected status because they played a more considerable role in delivering and maintaining Islamic religious traditions than in other social and economic practices. Frode F. Jacobsen (2009) studied kinship ties between the Hadramis in Bali, Surabaya, Lombok and Sumbawa. He suggests that the dynamics between Hadrami communities in these different areas were not only related to internal distinctions between Sada and non-Sada groups but also to differences in the interpretation of Islam and in everyday life practices. Jacobsen concludes by stating that the Hadramis did not fully assimilate to local societies but maintained some elements of a distinct cultural identity.

Somewhat to the contrary, in her research on the Sada families in Jakarta Yasmine Zaki Shahab (2005a; 2005b) contends that the practice of endogamy among the Arabs, particularly among Sada families in Jakarta, has not impeded their assimilation process within local society since they have proven themselves as leading figures in many public aspects, especially in Islamic missionary. In a similar argument, Ummu Hafizhah (2007) postulates that despite the prevalence of *kafa'a* marriage system based on the compatibility or equality between partners in marriage among the Arabs in Gresik, they have made a significant contribution on material cultures, such as language, dress, and art, and religious rituals, which led to social integration with other local communities.

The characteristics of Hadrami Arabs in Medan were studied by Chalida Fachrudin (2005). Fachrudin discusses the role of Hadramis in trade and their relationship with their (fore) fathers' homeland in Hadramaut and other neighboring countries. The author sketches how the social and political changes after the Second World War influenced the lives of Hadramis in some countries including those in Medan, especially their kinship networks which were restricted to Medan and Java.

A study on Hadramis in the eastern part of Indonesia, especially in the provinces of Central Sulawesi, Gorontalo, North Sulawesi and North Maluku was carried out by Martin Slama (2011). In that study he discusses translocal networks among the Hadramis in the regions. Besides, in an earlier work Slama examines how connections between Indonesia and Hadramaut have been renewed in the recent decades (2005). Another issue he has touched upon is about Hadrami women in their participation in the public life (2012) and their marriage practice (2014). In another work, Johan Heiss and Slama (2010) relate genealogy to the process of Hadrami migration and the construction of hierarchy and identity among Hadramis. In addition to persons and ideas travelling along genealogical networks from Hadramaut to Indonesia, they investigate long-distance flows originating from Middle Eastern centres of Islamic learning, or Islamic reformism, which was used to question a genealogically based social hierarchy.

A number of recent studies on Hadramis in Indonesia specifically focus on gender relations. A dissertation on the Arabs in Jakarta by Kunthi Tridewiyanti (2009) emphasizes the linkage in marriage practices of the Arab community and those of other ethnic communities between the Indonesian legal system on one hand, and specific gender constructions on the other hand. Tridewiyanti argued that the Indonesian legal system has adopted a legal pluralism in which several legal systems coexist. Although she relates the practice of endogamy and *kafa'a* to the construction of gender, she does not elaborate further on gender inequality on the basis of the marriage practice. This topic was picked up by Hamka Siregar (2009), who further developed a more explicit study on gender inequality within the Sada community. Findings of his research on the Sada community in Pontianak, West Kalimantan suggest that the practice of *kafa'a* maintained by the Sada community in Pontianak limits the freedom of women. The coercive acceptance of this marriage system by women of Sada families has resulted in unhappy marriages. Siregar argues that this was not only due to a lineage cultural pattern as such, but that certain economic and political interests also played a pivotal role in the maintenance of the marriage tradition.

In a similar vein, M. Adlin Sila (2005) analyzed the practice of *kafa'a* in the Sada community in Cikoang, South Sulawesi, by taking a socio-psychological perspective. The importance of notions of honor and shame rooted in the

cultural patterns, motivated this marriage practice according to Sila. The fear for loss of dignity and the shame that the family would be confronted with prevented daughters from being permitted to marry a man of non-Sada origin. In his more comprehensive study on the Sada community in Cikoang, Sila (2015) examines the role of descendants of Sayyid Jalaluddin al-'Aidid in both their religious development and social integration with the society in Indonesia.

Likewise, the Sada descendants become special subjects of Ismail Fajrie Alatas' studies (2008; 2011; 2014; 2016a; 2016b; 2016c). In his studies, Alatas examines the Sada descendants with traditionalist backgrounds and their role in Islamic missionary in Indonesia (2008; 2016c), their relationship with the homeland (2011; 2016b) and the diaspora (2011; 2016a), as well as the significance of religious rituals, such as *haul* (annual commemoration of a deceased person) and pilgrimage to local shrines (2014). Alatas argues that recognized claims of descent to the Prophet Muhammad continues to allow Sada identity to function as important cultural capital contributing to the success of the formation of the community of followers as well as the formation and maintenance of religious authority both in the homeland and diaspora.

There is a book on the contributions of the Hadramis in economy and society across the Indian Ocean (Alatas 2010) and an annotated bibliography that offers an interdisciplinary paradigm of the study of the Hadrami communities in Southeast Asia (Samad 2010). These two books published by the National Library of Singapore include various fields of studies and publications.

Despite this rich documentation of the lives of diasporic Hadrami communities and and practices, very little has been published on the Arabs in Central Maluku. In one article William G. Clarence-Smith (1998) suggests that the role of the Arabs in gaining economic success in the nineteenth century was considerable, but unfortunately his sketch remains rather brief and fragmented. Another article, written by Roy Ellen (1996) delineates the economic activities of the Arab community in the Geser-Gorom Islands. He elaborates on the economic role of this Arab community in the local economy and on its business networks during the last two decades of the New Order in a brief section of his monograph's On the Edge of Banda Zone (Ellen 2003).

Most historical studies emphasize the roles of the Hadramis in the economy, politics, and religion, and their maintenance of cultural identity as well as their orientation towards the country of origin, particularly before the emergence of nation-states, and the weakened links afterward. Some recent ethnographic studies, however, have indicated that renewed links between Hadramaut and Indonesia have been revitalized since the mid-1994 (Knysh 2001; Slama 2005; Ho 2006; Jacobsen 2009; Alatas 2008 [2016b]).

Another relevant line of the research concerns the variety of Islamic identities among the Hadramis. Most of the previous studies have identified changing patterns within the Hadramis in the diaspora in relation to their Islamic identity as a result of the Islamic reform movement. The impact of this reform movement features in the dispute between Alawi-Irshadi (Sada vs non-Sada) in the beginning of the twentieth century, which led to a stereotype of traditional versus modernist/reform Islam. This stereotype is still used by some authors in recent ethnographic studies, which tend to regard Sada and non-Sada as two bounded groups with different contesting ideological orientations (Jacobsen 2009; Heiss and Slama 2010; Slama 2014). In fact, several authors have shown that the impact of the Iranian Revolution on Shi'ite proliferation in contemporary Indonesia is remarkable (Marcinkowski 2008; Zulkifli 2013; Formichi and Feener 2015; Rijal 2017). As a consequence, more diversity of identities among the Hadramis can be observed.

In line with the above mentioned works, in my study I discuss the Hadrami diaspora in Ambon from an anthropological perspective against the background of historical develeopments. The description of historical contexts of the Hadrami migration both in the homeland and hostland as coming to the fore in literature on the subject, is combined with stories of my infomants reflecting the collective memories of the present-day Hadrami descendants on their forefathers' migration, while description on the present situation of the Hadramis is related to the Hadramis' performance in many social fields in local public life. Besides, my study touches upon the issue how diasporic identity construction is strongly related to gender relations. Here, I will distinguish between Sada and non-Sada groups in how the *kafa'a* marriage system is applied in practice. I will in particular study the link between *kafa'a* and gender inequality in marriage by linking conceptions of honor and shame that are linked to the practice of *kafa'a* to anthropological reflections on the concept of taboo. In relation to the religious identity among the Hadrami descendants, my study will analyze changes and continuities in religious orientations both within Sada and non-Sada groups. This variety of religious denominations that are addressed will include Sunnism and Shi'ism, as well as divisions within each of these orientations, such as traditionalism and neo-traditionalism, Salafism and neo-Salafism, moderate and conservative Twelver Shi'ism, all of which have shaped the dynamics of the present-day Hadramis and their competition over religious authority. Last but not least, I will address the recent renewed links between Hadramaut and Ambon, and I will zoom in on the effects of the communal conflicts between Muslims and Christians between 1999 and 2002.

3. Objectives

Building upon the broad ranch of research on the Hadramis in the diasporas that I have outlined above, my research consists of an ethnographic study of the Arab community in which I provide a contextualized analysis of how the descendants of Hadrami Arabs in Ambon articulate their identity through everyday life practices. The aim of my emphasis on everyday life practices in relation to diasporic identity construction is to examine in what circumstances and situations the Hadramis claim and play out one or more specific social identifications as part of a group or a diasporic community. The focus in this study is much more on the level of individual research subjects than on a group/community level, the latter of which is used as a category of analysis in order to locate the individuals in their social positions.

On a concrete level, the study thus aims at making a contribution to filling the gap of knowledge on the diaspora of the Hadrami Arabs in the diaspora, especially in Eastern Indonesia. On a more meta-level, this research relates to the intersectionality of ethnicity, religion, class and gender in the construction of identity. In order to avoid essentialism and to emphasize ongoing processes of identification, a constructivist approach will be adopted, which will be elaborated in theoretical framework below.

4. Theoretical Framework

4. 1 Diaspora: Meanings and Elements

Diaspora is an old concept, whose uses and meanings have undergone significant change within academic disciplines since the 1970s (Baubok and Faist 2010). In more recent years, it has increasingly been used interchangeably with the concept 'transnationalism' (Baubok and Faist 2010). The term 'diaspora' often refers to any group, community or population regarded 'deterritorialised' or 'transnational' that originally comes from a land other than which the group currently lives, and whose social, economic and political networks cross the borders of nation-states or span the world (Vertovec 1997, 277).

As used in conceptual frameworks, the term 'diaspora' has no a unified meaning (Hall 1990; Safran 1991; Bhabha 1994; Clifford 1994; Cohen 1997; Gilroy 1997; Vertovec 1997; Sheffer 2003; Kokot, Tölölyan, and Alfonso 2004; Reis 2004; Brubaker 2005; Carment and Bercuson 2008; Dufoix 2008; Chivallon and Alou 2011). William Safran (1991) conceptualizes diaspora in terms of several criteria as referring to those who: have been dispersed from a particular centre to two or more places; continue to have a collective memory about the origin or homeland and believe that the homeland is their ideal

home and have a desire to return; continue to the preservation of the homeland; have been committed to the preservation of the homeland; maintain a strong bond with the same members of diaspora; have a trouble of relations with the host-societies and feel partly alienated from the societies. Similarly Gabriel Sheffer (2003) defines diaspora as a social political formation that is the product of either voluntary or forced migration, and whose members consider themselves as belonging to the same ethno-national origin and who permanently live as minorities in one or several countries. Likewise, Robin Cohen (1997) classifies diaspora into four basic types: forced migration, labour, imperial policies, and trade, as well as adding two more criteria: first, in regard to causes of dispersal, diaspora can include both forced and voluntary dispersal, such as trade or economic purposes; second, although despite a sense of solidarity with co-ethnic members in various places, there is possibility for the diaspora community to have a good relation with the host-countries.

Contradictory to previous scholars, Stuart Hall defines diaspora as 'the recognition of the heterogeneous experiences of identity, "which lives and through, not despite, difference; by hybridity."' (Hall 1990, 235). In a similar vein, James Clifford conceives of diaspora as various transnational networks created from multiple belongings that include practices of both accommodation with and resistance to host-societies as well as their norms (Clifford 1994, 307-308). Michele Reis (2004) divides diaspora into classical (Jewish and Armenian), modern (slave and colonial), and contemporary. She argues that contemporary modalities of diaspora are the product of a postcolonial, globalized world. Diaspora is characterized by fragmentation, dislocation, and an ongoing transnational communication. Dispersal to overseas territories does not imply a decisive break with the homeland, and the uprooting of the members of a diasporic group is not permanent. Meanwhile, Carment and Bercuson (2008) takes diaspora as a broad category of a transnational population that includes migrants and their first and second generation-descendants, expatriates, refugees, students, and guest workers.

In regard to those various conceptualizations, Steven Vertovec (1997) classified diaspora as referring to three categories of meaning: diaspora as a social form, diaspora as a type of consciousness, and diaspora as a mode of cultural production. Diaspora as a social form gives much reference to the Jewish experience associated with forced dispersion, but also includes voluntary dispersal or migration. Diaspora as a social form emphasizes an identified group characterized by a 'triadic relationship': a strong connection to co-ethnic members of a diaspora community around the world and to the homeland, but a weak connection to the host-land (Vertovec 1997, 278-279). Diaspora as a type of consciousness focuses more on 'a variety of experience, a state of mind, and a sense of identity' marked by 'a paradoxical nature' and

'awareness of multilocality', such as being 'home away from home' or 'here and there' (Vertovec 1997, 281-282). Diaspora as a mode of cultural production is defined as the constant production and reproduction of transnational social and cultural phenomena. It emphasizes the fluidity of identities which are called syncretic, creole, hybrid, translated, cut and mix, or alternate (Vertovec 1997, 289).

Although diaspora has several meanings, there are three core elements that remain widely understood to be constitutive of diaspora: dispersion in space, original homeland orientation, and boundary maintenance (Brubaker 2005). In regard to these three elements, older and newer notions differ in how they conceptualizing these elements. For the first element, dispersion, older notions refer to forced dispersal rooted in the experience of Jews, Armenians, Greeks, but also more recently of Africans and Palestinians. Newer notions refer to any kind of dispersal. This thus includes trade diasporas, such as that of the Chinese, or labour migration diasporas, such as those of the Turkish and the Mexicans (Cohen 1997).

Concerning the second element, the orientation on a real or imagined 'homeland' as an authoritative source of value, identity, and loyalty, a significant shift can be discerned in recent discussions. Older notions strongly emphasized this criterion. For example what Safran (1991) conceptualizes as diaspora is that four of the six criteria specified to concern on the orientation to a homeland. Clifford (1994), however, has criticized what he called the 'centered' model of Safran and others, in which diasporic communities are by definition 'oriented by continuous cultural connections to a (single) source and by a teleology of 'return'. In other words, older notions clearly imply a return to an (imagined) homeland (Safran 1991) or to homeland oriented projects intended to shape a country's future by influencing it from abroad or by encouraging return there. Newer notions replace return with dense and continuous linkages across borders, as in the migration-development nexus (Faist 2008). These newer views do not remain focused on the imagery of origin and destination, but rather include countries of onward migration, and emphasize lateral ties. Wider use of the orientation dimension also relate it to diasporic experiences of all mobile persons as 'trans-national' (Appadurai 1996). Some also take non-territorial imagined homeland into account, such as a global Islamic *umma* (community).

The third element is boundary-maintenance, which is defined as the preservation of a distinctive identity vis-à-vis a host-society. Older notions emphasize the importance of boundaries for collectivities that do not have 'their own' territorial polity (Amstrong 1976, 384-397). Newer notions, however, emphasize hybridity, fluidity, creolization and syncretism (Hall 1990; Bhabha 1994; Gilroy 1997; Chivallon and Alou 2011). This trend is

especially characteristic of the literature on transnationalism, which tended to fuse in recent years with literature on diaspora.

There is thus a tension in the literature between boundary-maintenance and boundary-erosion (Brubaker 2005). The third aspect/element is closely related to the incorporation or integration of migrants into the countries of settlement. Older notions implied that members of diaspora do not fully integrate socially, politically, culturally, into the host-countries, making and maintaining boundaries vis-à-vis the majority groups. Assimilation would mean the end of diaspora, whether ethnically or religiously defined. In contrast, newer notions imply boundary-erosion and emphasize fluidity of identity coined as 'hybridity'. In fact, both notions imply that members of diaspora do not fully assimilate into the host-society but maintain a sense of distinct cultural identity (Baubok and Faist 2010, 12). The older notions are a modern, centered, political, and territorial, while the newer notions are a post-modern, deterritorialized, emancipatory and cultural (Dufoix 2008, 10). There are thus tensions between older and newer notions. First, newer usages refer to any kind of dispersal and blur the distinctions between various kinds of cross-border mobility. Second, the emphasis on return has been replaced by circular exchange and transnational mobility. Third, while both older and newer usages emphasize that diasporic groups do not assimilate in host-societies, more recent discussions go beyond the idea of cultural distinctiveness and focus on processes of cultural innovation. This raises a question whether migrant integration and maintaining cultural distinctions may coexist (Baubok and Faist 2010).

Recent academic debates in Hadrami studies reflect the different notions of diaspora that have been developed in diaspora and cultural studies in general. Most of the scholars argue that the Hadramis exemplify a diasporic community that preserves a distinct cultural identity vis-à-vis host societies. However, they differ in their definition of this cultural distinctiveness. Some identify Hadramis as having 'a dual (ethnic-religious) identity' (for example Abushouk and Ibrahim 2010), others prefer to use a notion of creole or hybrid identity in order to overcome an issue on cultural variations (ethnic mixture) while claiming the same identity (Feener 2004; Ho 2006; Slama 2005; Alatas 2011 & 2016b; Mandal 2018) or a 'transnational' one (see Freitag 2003). Instead of choosing one over another, Leif Manger (2010) avoids of typologizing a diasporic community, such as Cohen's *Global Diaspora* (1997), or essentializing diaspora as social form (Safran 1991). Rather, he emphasizes heterogeneity of lived experiences and intersectionality of many historical processes and forms of agency.

Following Manger's suggestion, I build my study upon an actor-oriented approach that locates meanings and practices within the actors' constructions. This allows for studying both continuity and change in the identity of the

diasporic community and its members. By adopting this approach my aim is to get more insights into the commonalities and differences in the experiences of individuals in different (historical) contexts as well as to understand the complexity of multiple senses of belonging and of multiple ideas of home. In this regard, I found some conceptions of a few specific scholars on diaspora particularly useful for my study. For instance, Rogers Brubaker (2005) suggests to overcome what he calls 'groupism' and essentialism by treating diaspora as a category of practice, as a claim, a project, and as a stance, by studying empirically the degree and form of support for a diasporic project among members of its putative constituency, and exploring to what extent, and in what circumstances, those claimed as members of putative diasporas actively adopt or at least passively sympathize with the diasporic stance' (Brubaker 2005, 13). Another suggestion I find particularly useful is that of Vertovec (1997) who proposes the concept of 'multicultural competences' or 'crossing and moving' that refers to the ability of individuals not only to create syncretic forms, but also to enact and improvise upon some cultural and linguistic systems. To do justice to the complexity of identities, Rima Berns-McGown (2007-2008) proposes a broad definition of diaspora as a space of imagination and of balancing two connections: a connection to the host-states and a connection to the country of origin (real or mythic homeland), and a balance between a specific community connection and a connection to the wider communities.

Furthermore, in order to overcome the binary position between assimilation/social integration to the host-societies/states and cultural distinctiveness, I consider Peggy Levitt and N. Glick Schiller's concept of 'simultaneity of connection' fruitful to study the complex ways or multi-layered of attachment and belonging among transnational members, including diasporic groups (Levitt and Glick-Schiller 2004; Glick-Schiller 2005). Levitt and Glick-Schiller argue that the incorporation of individuals into nation-states and the maintenance of transnational connections are not opposed to each other. In other words, the concept 'simultaneity' tries to see the experience of individuals (migrants or their descendants) living simultaneously within and beyond the boundaries of a nation-state (Levitt and Glick-Schiller 2004, 1006). This simultaneity is enacted through two different, interlinked actions: transnational ways of being and ways of belonging. Transnational ways of being concern 'the actual social relations and practices that individuals engage in rather than to the identities associated with their actions'. Transnational ways of belonging is defined as practices that signal conscious identifications or emotional connection to a particular group or people who are elsewhere. These ways of belonging are enacted through 'not symbolic but concrete, visible actions that mark belonging'. Individuals within transnational social fields may combine these two transnational ways differently in particular

contexts, and they may shift from one way to another depending on the context (Levitt and Glick-Schiller 2004, 1010; Glick-Schiller 2005, 458-459).

4.2 Identity as Identification

Identity is an ambiguous concept because it bears many meanings, ranging from psychological to sociological and anthropological points of view. The word is often used to refer both to a process and to an outcome of that process. It is used to specify someone's specific features or characteristics, and it is used to explain different kinds of identification processes. Because of this broad meaning, some scholars avoid using the term 'identity' and use alternatives in order to describe identity without becoming too vague, too essentialist or too fluid and flexible (Jenkins 1996; Brubaker and Cooper 2000; Verkuyten 2005).

Jenkins states that identity is a dynamic concept that stands for complex and various processes. He emphasizes the process of identity construction, which he calls 'identification'. Identity is for a great deal about the perception of similarities and differences and works through interaction with others. Both Richard Jenkins (1996) and M. Verkuyten (2005) stress that it is a basic human need to 'have an identity'. The process of identity construction or 'identification' stands for a process whereby individuals identify with or separate themselves from others on an individual or a collective level. Individual and collective identification processes cannot be separated. They are, in fact, interwoven and affect each other. Both identification processes can only come into being through interaction, and they are related to power relationship (Jenkins 1996; Verkuyten 2005).

Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper (2000) stick to the term 'identity'. They identify three clusters of identity, namely: (1) identification and categorization; (2) self-understanding and social location; and (3) commonality, connectedness, and groupness. The first cluster refers to the process by which people identify, characterize, and locate themselves vis-à-vis others, situating themselves in a narrative, or placing themselves in a category, in any kind of context. The second cluster denotes to 'situated subjectivity', or an emotional and cognitive understanding of an individual and his or her position and relations to the outside world. The third cluster refers to the process whereby individuals express their personal feeling of belonging to a particular group and their feelings of difference or antipathy towards others.

I borrow the notion of identification from Jenkins (1996), Verkuyten (2005), and the three clusters of identity from Brubaker and Cooper (2000) for this research since identification and categorization both on individual and collective levels simultaneously involve similarity or commonality within a group and differentiation from others. The three clusters of identity

distinguished by Brubaker and Cooper also refer to processes of inclusion and exclusion and boundary making. Both internal and external processes of group identification are central to this study.

4.3 Ethnicity

As there is a debate on the issue whether we can speak of a distinct cultural identity of the Hadramis in the diaspora, a discussion on the term 'ethnic identity' seems to be relevant here. A common debate on ethnic identity concerns whether it is based on common descent or shared culture. Fredrik Barth and his colleagues in the seminal work *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* (1969) sought to signify ethnic boundaries rather than the cultural content of ethnic collectivities. Barth argues that the focus in the study of ethnicity should focus on the 'ethnic boundary that defines the group and not the cultural stuff that it encloses' (Barth 1969, 15). Barth argued that what categorizes as an ethnic group is what people regard significant, and thus it is not so much about the content of cultural features (Barth 1969, 14). However, Barth later realized that the cultural stuff does matter. Within the contested positions on the question of ethnicity I have used an approach that is closer to T.H. Eriksen (1992; 1997; 1998) and Jenkins (1995; 1997), who both build on and responded to Barth's approach. Eriksen's understanding of ethnicity focuses on interactional aspects. He argues that cultural differences between ethnic groups are not necessarily decisive features of ethnicity unless they are made so in social interaction. Jenkins suggests that ethnicity and culture are not what people have or belong to but ''...complex repertoires which people experience, use, learn and do in their daily lives, within which they construct an on-going sense of themselves and an understanding of their fellows. Ethnicity, in particular is best considered as an ongoing process of ethnic identification" (Jenkins 1997, 14).

Therefore, taking insights from Eriksen and Jenkins, I approach ethnicity in terms of socially constructed 'similarity' and 'difference' with some reference to culture and putative claims of common descent. Moreover, this study takes as a point of departure that these processes of similarities and differences are not exclusively enacted in political claims but also in the realm of everyday existence. Avoiding taking either a primordialist approach to ethnicity which assumes ethnicity as fixed at birth and cannot be changed, lost or transformed, and an instrumentalist approach which assumes ethnicity as far from fixed' or fluid, I have found taking the constructivist position useful. The constructivist approach combines primordial and instrumental approaches to argue that any kind of identity is never the result of a single action of an individual but always the result of interaction between the individual and the outside world. In other words, ethnicity is the product of

social processes rather than a cultural given, made and remade rather than taken for granted, chosen depending on circumstances rather than ascribed through birth. Yet, since culture, and thus cultural identity is embodied, individuals can experience their ethnic identity as a given that defines who they are and which cannot be changed, or only at a great cost. Furthermore, the discourse on ethnicity bears parallels with other social identification processes such as religious, social, and gender identification.

4.4 Multiple Social Identities and Intersectionality

The problem of conceptualizing diaspora lies in categorizing individuals into one particular group and a single sense of belonging. However, like non-diasporic individuals, people from diasporic communities bear multiple social identities in several social categories, such as ethnicity, religion, class, gender, and others. The descendants of the Hadrami migrants in my study have complex ways of constructing identity boundaries not only in terms of ethnic identifications, but also in terms of Islamic denominational ones, class membership (Sada and non-Sada), gender, and other collectivities, which all more or less intersect in their construction of diasporic identity. Sociological identity theory has posited that people possess multiple identities because they occupy multiple roles, are members of multiple groups, and claim multiple personal characteristics (Burke and Stets 2009, 4). Although this identity theory concerns the interrelation of these multiple identities in social relations, reference to the dynamics of power relations which are embedded in social relations and may create hierarchy and inequality in the construction of these multiple identities is made less explicit. In this respect, I found that intersectionality theory as it is developed in feminism studies fruitful to analyze the multidimensional and complex articulation of forms of social division and identity which involve power relations in different societal arenas (Brah and Phoenix 2004; Yuval-Davis 2006; Anthias 2008a[2008b][2013]).

There is no a unified approach to intersectionality (Crenshaw 1989[1991]; Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1983 [1992][2011]; Brah 1996). Critics as well as supporters to intersectionality from recent different academic disciplines are various (eg.; Gimenez 2001; Brah and Phoenix 2004; Buitelaar 2006; Yuval-Davis 2006; Hancock 2007; Davis 2008; Ferree 2009; Erel et al. 2011; Levine-Rasky 2011; Lutz et al. 2011; Taylor et al. 2011). It is not my purpose to review all these approaches. Rather, I will use intersectionality in a broad sense to underscore the significance of certain social categories or divisions that may interlock in the production of the social relations and identities in people's lives. Intersectionality theory emphasizes that these social categories or divisions do not 'add up' but are rather mutually constitutive, in the sense that they are affected by and affect each other (Brah

and Phoenix 2004; Anthias 2008a[2008b][2013). The interlocking of social categories depends on concrete social relations in different societal arenas and historical processes, so that some social categories may interlock in a certain setting but not in another setting or in a period of time but not in another time. As Floya Anthias (2013) argued, this position is important in order to go beyond a focus on intersectional categories as such without looking at the broader social landscape of power and hierarchy. I consider Anthias's suggestion useful in understanding how the active maintainance of diasporic identity in the different historical processes is shaped by a broader social landscape of power and is played out in concrete social relations and practices. In adopting an intersectionality approach in this study I pay attention to the structural dimensions and constructivist dimensions of how Hadramis in Ambon are being positioned and position themselves in various networks of concrete social relations.

5. Research Question(s)

The central question of this research is: how do ethnicity and religion intersect in individual and collective constructions of identity of present-day Hadrami Arab descendants in Ambon and how does this process of identity construction relate to their positions in Ambonese socio-economic, political and religious power constellations? This central research question will be addressed by seeking answers to the following sub-questions:

a. How do Hadrami Arabs actively claim and maintain their ethnic identity in everyday practices? (e.g. dress, speech, food habits, marriage patterns, rituals & festivals)
b. How do they present their sense of (multiple) belongings in individual and collective self-narratives and practices, and what (wishes for) concrete relations with the country of origin do they have?
c. What kind of Islamic discourses and practices do they engage in and how do these relate to their claims of (multiple) belonging?
d. What kind of local religious, social, economic and political networks do they participate in and how do these networks extend over various ethnic and religious communities both within and outside Ambon?

6. Research Methods

This PhD. dissertation is first and foremost based on ethnographic research. Data for this ethnography are mainly gathered through fieldwork consisting of interviews and participant observation. For documenting data, besides notes, I took photos and made audio and visual recordings.

I conducted fieldwork in Ambon for nine months, from September 2014-May 2015. I lived in a rented room owned by Ambonese family of Chinese origin in a Christian neighbourhood in Kota Ambon. This was not the first time I spent in Ambon. I had lived for two years around January 2011- July 2013 in a boarding house in a Muslim neighbourhood in Batumerah when I started to work as lecturer at State Institute of Islamic Studies, IAIN, of Ambon. In Batumerah Atas, I had rented a room from a family of Hadrami Sada origin for three months and for the rest of 1,5 years I moved in as a boarder in a local Ambonese family. While boarding with a Sada family, I had no idea that the family was related to my later research subjects. My preliminary knowledge of the Arabs in Ambon is based on my small research project funded by the IAIN of Ambon around November-December 2011 and July-December 2012. The aim of the preliminary research was to examine the role of the Arabs in Islamic developments in Ambon, and I used my observations and findings from this project to further investigate the main topic of this PhD. dissertation. In addition, prior to my moving to the Netherlands for the PhD. project, in April-June 2013, I conducted a small survey on the political activities of the Arab descendants in Ambon by interviewing forty-six people from different clans. I included the findings of the survey in the topic of the political engagement of the Hadrami Arab descendants in the local politics in this study.

My fieldwork was mainly based in Ambon and I spent much of the time doing field research in this area. As diasporic space is 'a space of connections to multiple sites' (Berns-McGown 2007-2008), to conduct a research on diaspora, conducting multi-sited fieldwork in order to understand diasporic networks: links to the (real or imagined) homeland, to the wider society, and to the same community in other diasporas, is an issue that is considered increasingly in anthropological discussions of diaspora (Kokot, Tölölyan, and Alfonso 2004, 5). I have therefore also conducted multi-sited fieldwork by following the flow of the Hadramis to some places. Using a kinship network analysis, I found that the Hadrami Arabs in Ambon are related to the Hadramis in other Maluku Islands as well as other regions in Indonesia. I visited some other islands in Maluku, such as Seram, Buru, Banda, Kei, and Ternate, as well as Papua (particularly Fak-Fak) and Java, particularly Jakarta, in order to trace this kinship relation. Furthermore, I joined a group of Hadramis who went on pilgrimage to Hadramaut for two weeks from February 5-21, 2015.

On Ambon I attended small and big, private and public religious gatherings or preachings organized by Shi'ite, Sunni traditionalist and Salafi groups. Such small gatherings and preachings are usually held once or twice a week in different places, such as at a follower's house, an office building, or a mosque. To accommodate the numerous attendees, public preachings and festivities, such as *maulid al-nabi,* the commemoration of the Prophet's birthday, and *'ashura*, the commemoration of the martyrdom of Husain one of

the Prophet's grandsons on the tenth day of the Islamic new year, are usually held in a big mosque or an open area such as a sports field. Apart from such religious activities, I also attended cultural feasts, such as weddings and a funeral. I attended two wedding parties (one in Ambon and the other in Tual) and a funeral of a Sada woman in a special cemetery for Prince Diponegoro's offspring in Ambon. Likewise, during fieldwork in Hadramaut, I participated as a pilgrim in religious rituals at the shrines, and also attended other religious activities there, such as in *hauls* (annual commemorations of a deceased person), *maulids* and other festivities. Besides, I attended sessions of a religious course in Dar al-Zahra school. Moreover, although I had my own room to rent during my field research, I conducted participant observation by staying with some Arab families, especially in Ambon, Buru, Tual, and Hadramaut. In this way, I could participate in the daily activities of some Hadramis, such as eating, praying, chatting (gossiping) or watching TV.

Doing participant observation offered me the possibility to engage a lot in 'small talk' and informal interviews, either in shops, houses, or cafes. I benefitted as much as possible from opportunities to have casual conversations with my informants because I soon noted that in such informal and more 'natural' situations, despite the fact the people I talked with knew that I was there to do research which explained my interest, they felt more relaxed and were more easily ready to share information than in formal interviews.

Nevertheless, I have also conducted a significant number of more formal interviews. For such more formal appointments, I used in-depth semi-structured interview formats as this method gave me the flexibility to gain more insight by posing follow-up questions when some ideas come up during the conversation. Many of my informants were reluctant to have the interviews recorded, so that I did a lot of note taking during the interviews rather than record them. I interviewed men and women aged between twenty and eighty, belonging (or making claims to belong) to one of the forty Hadrami clans. I interviewed more people from some clans than from some other clans as some are bigger and consist of more families than others. This is due to emigration process of the Hadramis from which strata and clans migrated most, but also to different marriage practices (exogamy, endogamy, and *kafa'a*) that have resulted in a different number of the families in each clan.

There are several key-informants with whom I have worked more closely. Among these key-informants were some individuals with whom I had a very good 'click' and who on the basis of our mutual appreciation were willing and capable to cooperate more intensively. Other key informants possess much knowledge about the Hadrami community or occupy leading positions in socio-religious foundations or organizations. In general, for my interviews I tried as much as possible to speak to individuals from different occupations,

both those belonging to the elite and those of the non-elite. I also interviewed some Indonesians of Hadrami origin in Hadramaut, as well as the present and former principals of Dar al-Zahra school in the city of Tarim in Hadramaut (see list of informants/interviewees in Appendix 3). Besides interviewing Hadramis, I also interviewed some local people of non-Hadrami origin.

The issue concerning the researcher's access to knowledge in the field research is closely linked to their identity as insider or outsider, which is associated with subjectivity-objectivity matters. My multiple identities are important factors in shaping my field research. As I am an Indonesian Muslim, I share with my informants part of my social identity in terms of religion and citizenship. Does that mean I am an insider? I would say I am partly insider and partly outsider. It might be true that I may have had a more access to knowledge than other foreign researchers of non-Muslims as my informants could speak Indonesian fluently and I could join in some religious rituals, such as prayers. Yet, I also have other identities that I do not share with my informants in terms of culture and my personal identities or preferences. I was not born in Ambon; I prefer Javanese food and I have no Hadrami origin as far as I know. A recurring question that many informants posed me during our interviews was whether I am *jama'a* (literally meaning 'congregation'), part of the community of Arabs. Considering those frequently asked questions, I could imagine that my Hadrami interlocutors might have been more open in their answers if I had been part of their community. Besides my non-Arab identity, my position as a researcher was probably further complicated by the fact that I was affiliated with a university in a foreign, European country. Why a European university would be interested in financing my research was a conundrum to my informants, as it was to my own relatives for that matter. This may have contributed to possible reservations that certain informants may have had in talking to me. I can only speculate whether their concern about the reasons behind my own investment in the project and that of the organization supplying my grant would have been different if another party had sponsored my research.

In general, of course, becoming research subjects can be a sensitive issue; while some people like the attention, others do not wish to be an object of investigation. Many of my research subjects, for instance, were reluctant to be interviewed formally. Some even cancelled an appointment or asked me to interview somebody else. A cousin of mine, who is a follower of a religious preacher of Sada origin in Java, even suspected me to be a Western intelligence agent, especially after I had been on a fieldtrip to Hadramaut.

The last relevant aspect of my identity that is likely to have had in impact on my rapport with informants and hence the information they shared with me, is related to my gender. Being a female researcher in the field research was challenging as in certain places, like in Hadramaut, I was confronted with

restrictions regarding opportunities to speak with men and ask their perspectives. On a more personal note, I encountered some situations in the field both in Hadramaut and Indonesia, which made me feel insecure as a woman. In other situations, for example in my conversations with women or attending female meetings, my gender helped me to develop a good rapport with my interlocutors. Therefore, being an insider-outsider is always relative and contextual, depending on which part of one's identity is dominant in a specific situation. Apart from that, conducting my fieldwork as such involved the whole set of my personal and social identities, intersecting each other to shape my social relations with my research subjects and the kind of knowledge accessed and produced in the research.

A third influential category besides my gender and position as non-Hadrami that impacted my fieldwork and the kind of information that people shared with me concerns my religious identity. As Ambon experienced serious communal conflicts between Muslims and Christians between 1999-2002, subsequently living in two different neighbourhoods (Muslim and Christian areas) made me aware of how my social identity as a Muslim has affected my research, especially in terms of comfort and safety in the field. I found that the conflicts have caused considerable trauma in the two religious communities and they continue to be suspicious of each other. When my Hadrami informants, friends or colleagues asked me where I stayed on Ambon, they were often surprised to hear that I lived in a Christian neighbourhood and many told me to be careful. The people in the area where I rented my room similarly stated that it was courageous of me as a Muslim to live in a Christian neighbourhood. I learned that some suspected that I might be 'spy' sent by central Muslim authority in Jakarta.

Another challenge regarding getting access to knowledge concerned not only my identity as researcher but also the various locations or field sites that I tried to cover. The transportation system in Ambon and between Ambon and the rest of Indonesia is underdeveloped in comparison to that in Java, and I experienced how difficult it is to go to certain places in Maluku when I made my multiple trips to follow the flow of my informants to the places that mattered to them. My travels from Ambon to other islands and to Hadramaut were actually quite adventurous and probably made me aware of the hardship that Hadrami migrants must have met on their journeys in former times, although I certainly was more privileged than they by enjoying modern means of travel, such as flying. Taking a boat as I used it when visiting Seram, Buru, and Banda is still the main means of transportation for the local people in Maluku to cross-islands. Wandering around in Hadramaut was more challenging, not only in terms of the means of transportation and travelling as a woman, but also because of the climate, food, people, and cultural practices that I was unfamiliar with, and because of the tensions I experienced due to the

political conflict ravaging Yemen which had just turned violent before I came. While causing some anxious moments at Sana'a airport, the violence had not yet reached Hadramaut at the time of my visit.

7. The Structure of this Study

This dissertation consists of seven chapters. After this first, introductory chapter in which I presented a problem analysis of the research, my research objectives, questions, methods, a literature review and a theoretical framework, and present the structure of the study, the second chapter describes the history and collective memories concerning that history of the Hadrami migration to Ambon. The main purpose of the first part on this historical sketch is to understand the historical processes that have affected the formation of a diasporic Hadrami identity. This historical part falls into three sections. The first section deals with the push-and pull-factors of Hadrami migration, the second section discusses the specific patterns of the migration that can be discerned, and the third section describes colonial policies and their impacts on the Hadramis. Episodes from the collective memory about the Hadrami migration from the perspective of the present-day descendants are discussed in the second part of the chapter, which aims at understanding links between collective memory, identity and power in the construction of diasporic identity.

Chapter three provides a general overview of the present-day Hadrami descendants in Ambon. This chapter aims to sketch general patterns of the lives of today's Hadramis' and to locate them into a particular social structure of Ambon. Chapter three is divided into several parts, addressing social groupings, spatial distribution, economic activities and political affiliations, as well as everyday life practices related to issues such as language, food habits, and dress.

Chapter four focuses on kinship, marriage, and gender in order to examine the ways in which the Hadramis engage in variously situated practices of kinship relations. In particular, I ask how these kinship practices affect gender relations among the Hadramis and the social reproduction of diasporic identity construction. The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part sketches the kinship system, zooming in on the relationship between patrilineal descent, kin terms, genealogy, and the naming system. The second part discusses the different trends in marriage patterns of Sada and non-Sada, as well as their views on the *kafa'a* system and its impact on gender relations.

Chapter five sketches the religious developments within the Hadrami community in Ambon in order to understand continuity and change in religious beliefs and practices among the Hadramis. Before zooming in on

Hadrami the community in Ambon, the chapter provides a general picture of traditional religious authority and its contestation within the Hadramis in the diaspora. Next, it examines past and present religious contestations in which Hadramis in Ambon have been involved. Lastly, it analyzes the Hadramis' engagement in religious activities and their contribution to religious development in Ambon.

In chapter six, I discuss the orientation of the Hadramis toward their ancestral homeland. This chapter has three parts: the context in which the renewed connection between Hadramaut and Ambon emerged, the impact of the restored links on the revitalization of diasporic identity, and Hadramaut as a contested imaginary homeland. In the final chapter, I take stock by discussing the findings of the research in relation to the central research question and I formulate suggestions for potential follow-up research.

Chapter 2: History and the Hadrami Migration to Ambon in Collective Memory

1. Introduction

This chapter presents the history of the Hadrami migration to Ambon and how this history features in the collective memory of Hadramis in Ambon. The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part concentrates on the historical overview of the migration of Hadramis. The main purpose of this historical sketch is threefold. First, it aims to understand how social, political, economic, and cultural contexts of the homeland (Hadramaut) and the host-land (Ambon) have affected the migration of the Hadramis to Ambon. Second, the goal is to grasp the intricate web of power relations between different (ethnic, religious) groups in Ambon in the colonial times and how these power relations was related to the position of Hadramis within the wider Ambonese society during that period. Third, the purpose of the first part of the chapter is to underline how modes of colonial rule contributed to the construction of an ethno-religious identity among the Hadrami migrants in Ambon, which continues to inform the identity of present-day Hadrami descendants.

The second part of this chapter deals with the Hadramis' collective memory about the migration to Ambon. This aims at understanding how present-day Hadrami descendants construct their own social representation of history or a collective past through perceptions and 'collective memory'. 'Collective memory', also referred to as 'social memory', is defined as all kinds of ideas that self-declared members of a certain collective accept, generate, and maintain about the group's past (Halbwachs 1992). Drawing from the concept of 'collective memory' developed by Maurice Halbwachs (1992), Jan Assmann (1997) and Paul Connerton (1989; 2009), combined with the concept of invented tradition by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (1983), this part of the chapter investigates the links between collective memory, identity and power. It will be argued that the representation of the past (by insiders mostly referred to as 'tradition') in the present is often used to seek and maintain a particular power interest.

In general, this chapter does not aim at presenting a comprehensive exposition of the history of the Hadrami migration to Ambon, but rather sketches a general overview of the Hadrami migration combining oral narratives and historical records. This will allow us to relate the 'limited' historical data on the past, which I have gathered from secondary sources, to the representation of that past in the stories of present-day Hadramis in Ambon.

2. The Hadrami Migration to Ambon

An initial contact between the South Arabian Peninsula and Indonesia cannot be precisely determined. Historians argue that as early as the seventh century C.E. regular contacts between South Arabia and the Indonesian Archipelago appear to have existed through trade. From the thirteenth century onwards, small Arab settlements in major trading centres in the archipelago were present (Natalie Mobini-Kesheh 1999, 21). Concerning Maluku, some Portuguese accounts mention that a small number of the Arab residents before the Portuguese came to the islands in the early sixteenth century. According to these accounts, during the visit of the Jesuit Priest Francis Xavier in Ternate in 1547, Arabs had built an alliance with royal families in the Kingdom of Ternate. Francis Xavier is reported to have converted to Catholicism a number of nobles, including an Arab of Sada origin (Aritonang and Steenbrink 2008, 50). Similarly, a century later when the Dutch arrived at Banda Naira in 1599, Arab merchants were already present. Following the massacre of the indigenous Bandanese in 1621, the Dutch depended heavily on both Chinese and Arab traders to fill economic niches. Ternate and Banda became two important areas in Maluku, which were visited on a regular basis by some Arab merchants. However, as in other parts of the archipelago before the eighteenth century, these Arabs in Maluku cannot be specifically identified as Hadramis (Mobini-Kesheh 1999, 21).

The first substantial waves of Hadramis migrating to Indonesia occurred in the latter half of the eighteenth century. These Hadrami migrants initially settled in the northern tip of Sumatra, Aceh and then began to form colonies in other areas such as Palembang and Pontianak. Substantial Hadrami settlements emerged on the coasts of Java in the 1820s and in the eastern part of the archipelago in the 1870s onwards (Natalie Mobini-Kesheh 1999, 21; Jacobsen 2009, 15). Although the Arab traders in Maluku became more visible during the second English occupation of 1810-17, probably only a few of them settled permanently (Ellen 1996, 239). In 1826, there were only two Arab families in Ambon, called Shaikh Ali and Shaikh Djoban (Leirissa 2000, 247).

Being part of a network of traders from maritime-oriented societies, a substantial number of the Hadrami traders came to Maluku in the course of the nineteenth century. The first wave of Hadrami migration to Maluku occurred in the second half of the nineteenth century, particularly after the gradual liberalization of the economy from the late 1840s onwards, coupled with the introduction of the steamer in the 1850s. The Arab traders from the western part of Indonesia, particularly from Java, began to settle in Maluku and soon outnumbered the Chinese from Manila. A second wave of the migration occurred after the growth of steam ship transportation from Arabia after the

opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. During this period, increasing numbers of Arabs came to many islands of Indonesia by steamer (Clarence-Smith 1998, 35).

In the context of Hadrami emigration to Maluku, two points should be emphasized here: first, Hadramis in Maluku have not necessarily come directly from Hadramaut, but may first have resided in the western part of Indonesian Archipelago; second, as in many various parts of the Indonesian Archipelago, economic motives appear to have been the most important factor for Hadrami migration to Maluku. However, religious motives regarding an Islamic mission should not be underestimated. In many cases, Islamic missionary work in Indonesia was undertaken by Muslim traders, including Hadrami traders (De Jonge and Nico Kaptein 2002; Warnk 2010, 130). In order to understand the factors contributing to the migration of Hadramis to Ambon, the following sub-sections will present the socio-political, and economic contexts of both homeland and host-land.

2.1 Hadramaut: Social Structure, Political Unrest and Economic Scarcity



Figure 2.1: Map of Hadramaut. Source: http://www.paleophilatelie.eu/country/quaiti.html. Accessed September 22, 2016.

Geographically, Hadramaut is located in the southern part of Arabian Peninsula, on the border with the Empty Quarter, al-Rub al-Khali, a large area of desert to its north (Mobini-Kesheh 1999, 17). It has two basic geographical

features (Bujra 1971, 1). The first is an area immediately behind the coast consisting of a range of mountains whose rugged peaks rise to 5,000 feet. This range is the beginning of a vast and dry plateau (*jol*), with a mean height of 2,500 feet, which extends northwards for about 150 miles. Consisting of two parts in the North and the South, the plateau area makes up almost 90% of the land area of Hadramaut. The northern plateau is more barren, desolate, and more sparsely populated than the southern part. About half of the tribesmen in Hadramaut are from the southern plateau. The second basic physical feature is the *wadi* (dry river bed, valley, or channel) system which separates the two plateaus. The main valleys include Wadi Hadramaut, Wadi Du'an, Wadi Al-Ein, and Wadi Amd. The valley system makes up less than 10 % of the total area of Hadramaut, but it is densely populated, about one third of the estimated total population in the 1960s lived there. Wadi Hadramaut is the most densely populated of all the main valleys. It contains skyscraper towns, such as Shibam, Sa'yun, and Tarim (Bujra 1971, 1).

In terms of economic resources, Hadramaut has had to cope with limited agricultural produce due to a limited agricultural land and an extreme climate (Bujra 1971; Boxberger 2002; Freitag 2003). The agricultural area in the *wadis* depends entirely on occasional floods resulting from rainfall. The rainwater goes down from the plateau to the valleys. Agricultural areas are located in the valleys, where the infrequent flows of rainwater from the plateaus is collected and constitutes the only source of date-palm cultivation in the *wadis*. The infrequent rainfall over the plateau and the *wadi* system can result in prolonged droughts, exacerbating the agricultural resources and the low productive quantity of the land. The limited agricultural resources and vegetation in Hadramaut also should cater for the domestic animals, such as camels, cattle, donkeys, sheep, and goats (Bujra 1971, 2-3).

In terms of social structure, particularly before the emergence of South Yemen as a modern-nation state in 1967 Hadramaut was a highly stratified society (Mobini-Kesheh 1999, 26-27). The Hadrami society was based on ascriptive status or descent, which determined one's position in social, economic, political, and religious aspects (Bujra 1971, 9; Serjeant 1977, 226-247; Boxberger 2002, 17-37; Freitag 2003, 41-42). The highest rank was that of the Sada, descendants of the Prophet, who were unarmed and occupied a high religious position. The second layer consisted of the *mashaikh* and *qabail*. The former were descendants of a prominent religious elite who could not claim the status of the prophetic lineage, thus occupying the second rank for their religious status. The latter were tribesmen, who acted as protectors of the tribes and the society against outsiders and rival parties, and thus had the capacity to bear weapons. The third level was occupied by the *masakin,* the sedentary poor, and the *du'afa,* or weak, who were unable to claim a prominent status from their ancestors. Slaves were also included in this rank.

While the *masakin* and *du'afa* were free natives, slaves were considered to be non-Arab people. Although leaders during the emergence of a modern socialist state in 1967 tried to abolish the ascriptive social system, in the first decade of the socialist state the ascriptive social system was still the main framework for political action in the Hadramaut towns (Bujra 1971, 9).

For many centuries, political instability characterized Hadramaut as there was no central government (Jacobsen 2009, 8). The political instability endured through a series of political feuds between tribes attempting to conquer the area, from the small dynasties in the thirteenth century to the Kathiri sultanate in the sixteenth century. Such skirmishes diminished after the British colonial intervention, followed by the establishment of the People's Republic of South Yemen in 1968. During the British intervention, the region was divided into two major regional powers: the Kathiri controlling the main *wadis*, and the Qua'iti controlling the coastal parts. In the beginning of the 1990s, political wars of a wider scope occurred, involving the state and the northern state of Yemen and resulting in the unification of both states in 1990 (Dresch 2000). Following the Arab upheaval in 2011 and the Houthi rebellion in 2014, Yemen has faced violent political unrest, which threatens the unity of its state and has dire consequences on many domains of life in all regions of Yemen including Hadramaut (Bonnefoy and Kuschnitizki 2015; 'Ūzi 2015; Abdo 2017; Heinze 2018).

The economic scarcity and political instability that characterized Hadramaut are the main factors that have contributed to the Hadrami emigration to the Indian Ocean region. Pressure on natural resources in Hadramaut and continuous tribal feuds and social unrest pushed the Hadramis to seek their fortunes abroad, especially to the Indian Ocean region (Ho 1997; Riddel 1997). Connections between the Hadramis and the Indian Ocean region through economy had been built since about the fifth century BC. The economic networks experienced a revival in the course of Islamic formation in the seventh century after facing a decline in preceding centuries (Mobini-Kesheh 1999, 17). In later times, increased opportunities for international trading, following the colonization effort of the Ottomans, Dutch and British, enticed many people to travel abroad as traders, missionaries or both (Freitag 1997; Manger 2010). Following the Mongol conquest of Baghdad in 1258 Hadramis got involved in long distance trade across the Indian Ocean through the port of Aden (Ho 2006). Routes across the Indian Ocean became attractive routes for labour migration in the beginning of the nineteenth century (Jacobsen 2009, 11).

2.2 Ambon as a Trade Hub in Colonial Times

Figure 2.2: Map of Ambon-Lease Islands.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ambon_Island. Accessed September 22, 2016.

The historical context of Ambon as an emerging port city during Dutch colonial times is very significant to understand the migration and settlement of Hadrami Arabs in Ambon.[1] Being well known as islands producing cloves, nutmeg, and mace, Maluku was located at the crossroads of two major ancient trading routes: east-west from Sumatra to Banda Islands and north-south from the Philippines to Timor. It had established contacts with Malay, Javanese, Chinese, Indian, and Arab traders prior to the arrival of the Portuguese (Hulsbosch 2014, 20). Chinese contacts with Maluku date back from at least in the first millennium B.C (Ellen 2003, 5), while by the thirteenth or fourteenth century most of the traders transporting Indonesian spices to Europe were Muslims from South Asia and the Middle East (Brown 2003, 31). Arab and Sulawesi traders are said to have continued to transport spices until the late

[1] The term 'Ambon' is used to demarcate five different categories: 1. the name of the island; 2. the administrative subdivision of the southern part of Maluku; 3. the residency in Central Maluku; 4. the port town situated on Ambon Island; 5. the indigenous inhabitants of the residency (see Leirissa 2000, 620). These indigenous inhabitants of Ambon may cover some areas in Central Maluku such as Ambon-lease Islands (Ambon, Haruku, Saparua, and Nusalaut), and islands of southern and western Seram and Buru (see Chauvel 1990, 1). From all categories, I use the term Ambon in the first four categories interchangeably in order to emphasize a historical importance of the area within Maluku Islands especially after Ambon became an emerging port centre during the colonial times.

fifteenth century. Intensive contacts between Muslims traders from Arab and Malay (Javanese) origin have probably influenced the Islamization of the northern Maluku's Kingdoms in the second half of the fifteenth century (Andaya 1993, 132; De Graaf 1977, 20; Brown 2003; Abdurrahman 2008).

Before the European intrusion in the sixteenth century, the world's clove production came from the small northern islands of Maluku, while nutmeg and mace were originally produced in Banda Islands in Central Maluku (Hulsbosch 2014, 19). With the increasing global demand for spices from Southeast Asia, by the fifteenth century, cloves and nutmeg were not just harvested, but also being planted in Maluku (Ellen 2003, 5). Thus, Ternate and Banda in Maluku had already become the world's major spice production before the European hegemony.

The emergence of Ambon town was the result of Portuguese interest in having the spice monopoly in Maluku and of their broken alliance with the Ternaten sultanate in the North (Knaap 1991, 105). Having failed to establish cooperation with the local Islamic powers of the Ternate sultanate's vassal state on the Leihitu Peninsula on Ambon Island the Portuguese turned to Leitimur Peninsula where they established Ambon town, which consisted predominantly of Christian inhabitants (Andaya 1993). The town was taken over by the Dutch in the early seventeenth century after defeating the Portuguese. In the seventeenth century, Ambon emerged as one of the three important trading centres in Maluku along with Banda and Ternate (Ellen 2003) and it was the centre of colonial administration in Central Maluku until 1819 (Leirissa 2000). During the VOC (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie), and Dutch governance, the town served as an important trading port linking eastern ports such as Ternate, Banda, and Makasar, with Java and beyond the archipelago. As it developed into a commercial port in eastern Indonesia, Ambon also became a major commerce centre in eastern Indonesia and attracted foreign traders from Java, Sulawesi, China, Arab and India (Knaap 1991; Leirissa 2000). During the height of Dutch colonial power, the capital Ambon in Central Maluku was considered one of the main central Dutch port centers, along with Ternate-Tidore and Banda (Ellen 2003, 10 & 136; Warnk 2010, 128).

The changing geo-political and economic position of Ambon as both an administrative and port centre in eastern Indonesia during the Dutch colonial era accounted for its attracting foreign traders in search for economic fortune in the region more generally, and Hadramis more specifically. By the mid-nineteenth century, Ambon was a major commercial centre of Arab traders. In 1850, it was reported that Arabs were arriving in Ambon in greater numbers each year. The increasing interest of the Hadramis, especially traders among them, in Ambon appears to be related to the opening of the port towns such as Ambon, Ternate, Kayeli (Buru Island), and Banda in 1854 as the Arabs began

to play a dominant role in certain aspects of the local economy in this period (Leirissa 2000, 625). Their fierce competitors were Chinese traders, who had settled in the region earlier, while the trade positions of Christian inhabitants of Ambon as other competitors had weakened. By 1856, the Arabs had taken over trade, at the expense of both Chinese and Europeans (Clarence-Smith 1998). Their economic success led to the rise of leading Arab families. These Arab families included the Attamimy family, the Bahasoan family, the Basalamah family, and the Lapary family (Lerissa 2000, 628). The families of al-Amudi, Ba'adillah, al-Saqqaf, and al-Habshi were also among the wealthy Arab families successful in their trade in Maluku (Clarence-Smith 1998; Spyer 2000).

The position of Ambon as a Dutch political and economic centre in eastern Indonesia also contributed to the increasing number of the Hadramis settling in the region. According to colonial statistics, the number of the Hadrami migrants in Indonesia rose dramatically in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. From the mid-nineteenth until mid-twentieth centuries, the number of the Hadrami migrants increased from 7,768 to 80,000. The Hadrami migrants spread in thirty-six residencies around the archipelago, the biggest colonies of which were unevenly distributed in Java, Sumatra, and Kalimantan. In eastern Indonesia, the major Arab colonies resided in Maluku residencies such as Ambon, Ternate, and Manado (Van den Berg 1886, 103-109).

Table 2.1: Number of Arabs in Maluku residencies

Residencies	1859	1870	1885	1905	1915
Ambon -Ambon -Saparua -Banda, Seram, Aru	53	170	444	875 (518)	n.a
Ternate -Ternate -Bacan -New Guinea[2]	23	66	111	368 (52)	n.a
Manado -Manado -Gorontalo -Non-Minahasa	11	17	147	819 (543)	1,600
Total	87	253	702	3,175	

Source: Clarence-Smith (1998, 34)

[2] New Guinea was the region later included in the 1905 statistics. The Hadrami residents in New Guinea are said to have come from Maluku, who travelled to west coasts of New Guinea to trade from 1880 onward. The Hadramis from Maluku were said to have contributed to the Islamization of the western part of New Guinea in the early twentieth century (Warnk 2010, 128).

Table 2.1 above shows that Arabs seem to be more present in Ambon than other parts of Maluku residential areas. Ambon residency during the Dutch colonial government covered vast regions in southern part of the Maluku Islands of Ambon-Lease, Seram, Buru, Banda, Kei, and Aru. From 1859 to 1905, the total number of Arab residents in Ambon residency increased from 53 to 1,393 people. This increase was partly related to a changing demography of Arabs, which more and more also comprised descendants born in marriages with local women. Unlike the British colonial census in Malay-Singapore, the Dutch colonial census in 1885 included both the number of Arabs who were born in Hadramaut and those who were born in the Indonesian Archipelago (Van den Berg 1886, 103-109). Compared to previous years, the statistics in 1885 (table 2.2) shows the inclusion of Arab women born in Maluku, who might have been the product of intermarriage between the Arabs and the non-Arab women. These women could have been mainly of mixed Arab and Ambonese, Chinese, or Malay-Indonesian origin as many of my informants have both local and non-local origins (see chapter 4 section 4.3.1).

Table 2.2: Census of Ambon in 1885

Ambon residency	Born in Hadramaut		Born in the Dutch East Indies			Total
	Male	Children	Male	Female	Children	
Ambon	25	3	26	33	105	192
Saparua	5	-	4	10	19	38
Banda	63	1	26	19	95	204
Other areas	1	-	1	2	6	10
Total						444

Source: Van den Berg (1886, 109)

Tables 2.1 and 2.2 provide only a limited clue on which different social groups (clans) within the Hadramis settled in Ambon during the colonial era. Relying on the statistical data also gives tentative clues concerning Hadramis descent claims about belonging. Like other diasporas in Indonesia (Ho 2006; Jacobsen 2009; Heiss and Slama 2010) and in Hadramaut (Hopkins and Ibrahim 1997; Rodionov 2006), genealogical claims on noble descent are very important to understand the present-day generation of Hadramis and their social relationships in Ambon today. In the last section to this chapter, I will illustrate this by presenting the migration stories of two informants of Sada and non-Sada descent. Social groups within the Hadramis (clans and strata) will be further addressed in chapter 3 and 4.

2.3 Patterns of Hadrami Migration: Occupation, Origin, Social Class, and Gender

Different Hadrami migration patterns can be discerned to various Indonesian regions including Ambon. A first pattern is based on the occupation of those who migrated. Most Hadrami migrants worked as shop assistants or small traders for a relative or acquaintance already residing in the colony. As soon as they earned sufficient capital they would become an independent trader and earn their money as middlemen, buying imported goods from large European firms and reselling them to other traders or Indonesian consumers. They were engaged in trading various commodities such as textiles, and manufactured goods such as watches, iron, and steel, middle eastern goods such dates, ghee, prayer beads, and books, or engage in local trade, for example of livestock such as horses (Mobini-Kesheh 1999, 22).

The textual evidence Mobini-Kesheh provides is confirmed in the stories of my informants. Many of them told me that their fathers or (great) grandfathers had come to join their uncles or fathers who had preceded them in coming to Maluku. This illustrates the importance to Hadrami descendants of having knowledge about their family migration stories from Hadramaut. A recurring topic in their stories was that once they had become successful in trade after some periods of time, the first migrants returned to their home villages in Hadramaut and took younger male family members with them upon returning to Indonesia. The more experienced migrants, as those from the second generation onward, preferred to work with their own clan members. Besides wishing to help one's own group, choosing to work with clan members was based on mutual trust and commitment. Also, not yet having a family to take care of in the home country young unmarried men could be expected to devote themselves wholeheartedly to the migration project. The capacity to include more kinsmen to take a part in the burgeoning enterprises of the host-land demonstrates the economic success in the host-society resulting in an ever-growing Hadrami male movement between their homeland and host-land.

A second migration pattern is related to the origin of the Hadramis. Van den Berg (1886) argues that most of the Hadramis settling in the Indian Ocean came from the interiors of Hadramaut, while those who migrated to closer areas like Africa and India were mostly from coastal areas. The migrants in the archipelago mostly came from interiors under the Kathiri territory, stretching between Shibam and Tarim (Mobini Kesheh 1999, 22).

There are indications that migration within Hadramaut seems to have preceded migration to other parts of the world; some clans which are supposed to originate from the interiors or the coasts could be found in the other regions as well (Arai 2004). In the *Graves of Tarim* (2006), Ho argues

that the prominence of the Sada groups in Hadramaut also reflects in-and out-movement of elite members of the Hadramis, which has contributed to the structuring of the Hadrami society and the spread of their religious belief in Hadramaut. Of the Hadrami descendants in Ambon whom I interviewed, only a few were able to specify where in Hadramaut their forefathers came from. They mentioned, for instance, Huraydah, 'Inat, and Say'un, regions which are located in the interiors of Hadramaut. In this regard, although a general trend in the social origins of the Hadrami migrants can be distinguished, the significance to the descendants of Hadrami migrants of exact categorization should not be overestimated.

Class and elite membership also shaped Hadrami migration patterns. In the early period of migration, especially before the nineteenth century, those who travelled to Indonesia came mainly from the Sada group, the highest stratum in Hadramaut and possessing much wealth. In the middle of the nineteenth century, many Hadramis of various social classes, including poor and isolated people, also began to travel (De Jonge 2002). During this period, Hadrami migration was no longer dominated by Sada, but equally included groups of lower strata such as *mashaikh* and *qabail*. A Dutch report in the early twentieth century states that about 75 % of the Hadrami migrants were traders who possessed their own money, while 18 % had the guaranteed support of family already resident in the colony, and 7 % arriving without capital (Mobini-Kesheh 1999, 22). The figures show that the vast majority of migrants came from families who possessed some money or had family connections in the archipelago. The poorer Hadramis tended to migrate to the closest destinations, like the Red Sea and East African coastal regions (Boxberger 2002, 40).

Although some Hadramis from the lowest strata participated in the migration, their existence cannot be clearly figured out today. This is due to a common claim among most of the Hadrami descendants, who regard themselves as part of the first (Sada) and second categories (*mashaikh-qabail*) within Hadrami social hierarchy (see chapter 3 section 3.2). In this regard, particularly in relation to non-Hadrami communities, descendants of the Hadramis, either Sada or non-Sada, commonly emphasize a high status of their Arab identity in general. They feel honored to be part of the globalized Arab diaspora. While they tend to emphasize patrilineal links to Hadramaut, claims of belonging to respected local families in Ambon through matrilineal links also occur. Regardless whether they are based on patrilineal or matrilineal links, the stories of my informants indicate that most of the Hadrami descendants maintain an ideal image of their family records. I will address descent further in chapter 3 and 4.

Gender also plays a significant role in the patterns of Hadrami migration in the Indian Ocean. The majority, if not all, first generation migrants to

Indonesia were men (Van den Berg 1886). Most of these first migrants who left Hadramaut were married (Mobini-Kesheh 1999). They left their wives and family members behind in order to seek a good fortune in a fertile land of Indonesia. As the Hadrami men married local women in the new land, from the second generation onwards Hadrami families in the diaspora consisted of both male and female descendants. By practicing out-marriage in the host-land, the Hadrami male migrants formed a new 'Hadrami' community in their new home country, which can be seen from the colonial statistics in table 2.2, which shows the statistics of female Hadrami descendants in 1885. The stories of my informants mostly confirm that migration of Hadramis was predominantly a male affair. The existence of the Hadrami community until today is thus the result of an ongoing particularly gendered construction of group identity which privileges Hadrami men's social mobility by mingling with non-ethnic members and at the same time domesticating Hadrami women in their social relations (see chapter 4 section 4.3).

3. Colonial Rule and Its Impact on Hadramis

Like other colonies in Indonesia, during the colonial era Ambon was a stratified society based on racial-religious segregation. Segregation policies based on social categories of race and religious beliefs had been initially introduced by the Portuguese, and were later continued by the Dutch colonial regime.

As a centre of the Europeans' stronghold in Maluku, especially in the towns during the colonial times, Ambon had a heterogeneous population classified into three vertically organized ethnic groups: European, Foreign Oriental, and indigenous (Knaap 1991, 119). The categories of each group slightly varied over time, depending on in- and out- movement of the people in the town. In the beginning of the Dutch VOC, the first category comprised Europeans and their descendants, *mestizo* (those mixed of European fathers and Asian or local women). The second category consisted of foreign migrants from China, while the third category was mixed, but mainly of Malay-Indonesian origin such as Ambonese, *mardijkers* or freed slaves, and ese. In the late seventeenth century, almost two thirds of the population in Ambon town were of Malay-Indonesian origin, while the rest were of European and Chinese (Knaap 1991, 118).

In the beginning of the nineteenth century the Dutch reorganized the town dwellers after the Pattimura rebellion in 1818. In this period, the Dutch forced the population to live in homogeneous quarters that were organized on the basis of race and religious affiliation. The Dutch appointed a chief in each quarter. The Christian community was represented by the Europeans and

Ambonese, while the Muslim community was mainly of Chinese and Malay-Indonesian origin. Unlike those in Ternate, the Chinese in Ambon were Muslims (Leirissa 2000, 628). In a Muslim quarter, leadership over *moorsche burgers* (Muslim citizens) comprising Buginesse, Malay and Javanese, and Chinese were frequently given to the Chinese, such as the families of Kyat, Djin, and Tan. Some of my Arab informants have maternal relations with Muslims of Chinese origin, such as Kiat, Tan, and Niou (see chapter 4 section 4.3.1). My informant Hasnan (67 years old) who originally is of Chinese origin told me that there are other Chinese families, such as Yongken, Oei, Ayuba, Liem, and Ambon, who have been Muslims for several generations.[3] In a later period, the Chinese formed a separate religious-ethnic enclave (Leirissa 2000, 628).

The configuration of Muslim *burgers* or citizens changed during the colonial times. During the VOC times, they only included migrants of Chinese and Malay-Indonesian origin, while in the period of the British interregnum and then the Dutch governance they also included native inhabitants and Arab traders (Leirissa 2000, 629). This citizenry expansion was as a result of urbanization and of a colonial policy to grant villagers a *burger* status. This policy attracted both Muslims and Christians to Ambon Island to work and settle in the town. Until the 1930s, the majority of the population in Ambon town was Christian. Muslim inhabitants predominantly had a migration background and consisted mostly of non-Ambonese Indonesian and 'Foreign Orientals' (Chauvel 1990, 3).

By the time Hadramis settled in Ambon, the town dwellers were still categorized in terms of ethnic and religious affiliation: Europeans, Christian *burgers,* Chinese, Arabs, and other Muslim *burgers* (Leirissa 2000, 620). This regulation was officially regulated under article 109 of Dutch government in 1854, which applied a two-tier system: ethnic Indonesians and foreign Asians (mostly those of Chinese, Japanese, or Arab origin) made up one group, and Eurasians, indigenous people with European status, and Europeans made up the other group (Hulsbosch 2014, 28).

As urban dwellers including these foreign traders were assigned separate quarters on the basis of ethnic and religious groupings, each group had its own head called *kapitein* (Leirissa 2000, 621).[4] During the colonial times, leadership within the Arab community was assigned to the non-Sada families of Basalamah, al-Zagladi, and Bahasoan in 1866, 1939, and 1941 respectively (Bahfdullah 2010, 190). I was able to interview descendants of these three

[3] Interview with Hasnan, May 3, 2015.

[4] *Kapitein* was a high-ranking government position in the colonial civil administration in Indonesia and other Malay regions. The holder of the post exercised various degrees of power and influence, from legal jurisdiction over his own ethnic group/community to ceremonial precedence for community leaders. This post existed in different ethnic groups, such as Arabs, Chinese and Indians (Buxbaum 1967, 151-153).

families of Arab chieftainship in Ambon. Interestingly, the descendants, who are mostly third or fourth generation of non-Sada origin, could not provide me with information regarding their grandfathers' activities in Ambon. They explained that photographs and other documents regarding their grandfathers have been lost, either during wars or political conflicts or because the family members had already long ago moved out of their grandfather's houses.

3.1 Religious Segregation and Discrimination

The Dutch colonial policies based on racial and religious difference have had an enormous impact on religious segregation and tensions within Ambonese society. Eventually, Muslims and Christians have become the two dominant religious groups in Ambon. Rivalry between the two religious communities initially came to the fore in a political context, particularly in the competition between foreign and regional powers. While the Europeans brought Christianity to Maluku, the local kingdoms of Maluku exercised their influence through Islam as their official religion. Both these local and foreign powers used religion to seek support and allegiance from the larger Ambonese society in order to gain political and economic supremacy (Andaya 1993).

The colonial segregation policies based on religion are reflected in the residential organization (Leirissa 2000, 622). During the last colonial times, the majority of the Ambonese lived in the 81 *negeris* (village based on local customs) and 12 *burgerkampongs* (state-founded village), mostly dotted around the coast. The *negeris* are either Muslim (26 villages) or Christian (55 villages). These *negeris* date from the mid-seventeenth century, when the Dutch forced the Ambonese out of their mountain settlements down to the coast, where the population and the clove cultivation could be more easily controlled. The segregation of the Ambonese population in Christian and Muslim *negeris* (villages) also reflects the process of conversion that centred respectively in Muslim areas of Leihitu Peninsula and the Portuguese foothold in Leitimur Peninsula during the sixteenth century (Chauvel 1990, 4). The majority of Muslim villages on Ambon Island today are located in the Leihitu Peninsula in the northern part of Ambon, while the Christian villages are in the southern part, the Leitimur Peninsula.

During the Dutch colonial times, the government gave a preferential treatment of local Christians over Muslims. As Christian converts, local Christians enjoyed European status. Together with other European inhabitants and Eurasians, the local Christian converts were the main actors engaged in the administration, military, and commerce. In terms of education policies, the Christians enjoyed more Dutch education than their Muslim fellow citizens. Public religious schools in Ambon for Christians had been already introduced in the Portuguese and their number increased during the Dutch era. In the

middle of the nineteenth century, following the separation of Church and school, a modern Dutch educational system was introduced in Christian areas in 1871, and only much later in Muslim enclaves. The Dutch also recruited many Dutch soldiers, Koninklijke Nederlands-Indische Leger (KNIL) from Christian community (Chauvel 1990).

As a result of Dutch differential treatment, from 1886 onward there was fierce competition between Christians (both Protestant and Catholic) and Muslim missionaries in South Maluku. In this period, the Dutch government supported Christian missionary works to counter Islamic propaganda (Broersma 1936, 32). As the Christians got closer to the Dutch, their everyday performance began to resemble that of the Dutch. The close ties between the Christian Ambonese and the Dutch did not only come to the fore in terms of socio-economic status and political power, but also through embodied performance, such as dress style (Hulsbosch 2014, 25), and as well as language. The legacy of the colonial preferential treatment of Christians over Muslims in terms of education, economy, employment, and the military resulted in a political divide that continues to characterize relations between Muslims and Christians today. Most recently, it resulted in violent communal conflicts between Muslims and Christians between 1999 and 2002.[5]

3.2 Colonial Policies and Arab Identity

In his *Imagined Communities,* Benedict Anderson (1991) points to the contribution of the colonial state to the imagining of history and power in the construction of a particular cultural identity, which formed the basis of a 'nation'. Through three institutions of colonial power: census, maps, and museums, a particular imagined identity emerged. In fact, ethnic-racial classifications that were employed by earlier colonial regimes, underwent a systematic quantification from the 1870s onward. The colonial census classified the population based on regions, languages, monuments, and other factors. Late colonial regimes, frequently attempted to fuse ethnicity and religion together, ethnizing religious communities and religionizing ethnic communities (Anderson 1991, 244-258).

[5] Officially the communal conflicts ended in 2002 with the peace treaties called Malino II between Christians and Muslims in Maluku. Yet, in practice they continued in different regions. For instance, in Ambon there were conflicts between 19 December 1999-25 April 2005/6, while a conflict in South East Maluku lasted for a year (1999-2000). This difference is related to the role of customary law (*adat, pela-gandong*) which was stronger in the Southeast Maluku rather than in Central Maluku (Thorburn 2008). *Pela-gandong* is a concept of inter-village alliance between Muslims and Christians based on claiming to putative common descent. It is usually used to settle conflicts between villagers who are within the *pela* treaty (Bartels 1977).

Anderson's analysis of the impact of colonial regimes on the construction of identities can be recognized in Ambon as well. In the Dutch colonial statistics, the Hadramis were classified under a sub-category of 'Arabs' within a broader category of 'Foreign Orientals' (Van den Berg 1886, 103-109). The identification of the Hadramis and their descendants in Indonesia and Ambon as 'Arabs' remains a dominant identity marker until today (see chapter 3-6).

As part of the Dutch racial policy, separate living and travel pass policies (*wijken stelsel* and *passen stelsel*) were issued at the end of the nineteenth century. Like other foreign orientals, the Arabs, most of whom Hadramis, were subject to all kinds of stipulations that restricted their freedom of movement inside the colony. One measure that restricted their freedom of movement was the regulation of living in separate quarters and needing a travel pass when leaving one's place of residence for business or family visits. This regulation was to ensure the social order within local society by protecting it from foreign influences, especially the pan-Islamic movement. The fear of the Dutch colonial government concerning the role of Hadramis in spreading pan-Islamism from Middle East, which might provoke local revolts against the Dutch, is one of the main reasons for issuing the policy. This pass regulation was accordingly applied more harshly to the Hadramis than to other minorities, such as the Chinese. Forced settlement and segregation were perpetuated until 1919 (De Jonge 1993, 77-78 [2002, 223-225]). These modes of colonial rule marked the end of a full assimilation process of the Hadramis in the diaspora (Abushouk and Ibrahim 2009, 4).

Although the emergence of a sense of 'Arabness' among the Hadramis and their descendants in Indonesia can thus to a significant extent be attributed to the colonial ethnic-racial policies, it is difficult to establish exactly how these policies affected the freedom of movement and social integration of the Hadramis in Ambon. What we do know, is that in economic terms, the policies did not seem to hamper the Arabs' commercial activities very gravely (Clarence-Smith 1998). Together with European, Chinese and Malay traders, the Arabs became one of the prominent players in the economy of Maluku. Due to the 1866 reorganization of colonial administration in Maluku by abolishing the central government of Maluku in Ambon that had been established in 1817, many Dutch families who had been engaged in trade left Ambon. Their place in commercial business was replaced by a new generation of Chinese and Arab traders. One of the lucrative businesses was shipping. Many sailing vessels in Ambon were owned by the Arabs and the Chinese (Leirissa 2000, 629). In a certain period in the late nineteenth century, the economic role of Arabs was more dominant than that of the Chinese (Clarence-Smith 1998, 32). In this sense, the Dutch and the local society in Maluku depended on the Arabs for their economic contribution to filling particular economic niches (Ellen 1996; 2003).

Theoretically, the segregation policy based on a *wijken stelsel,* quarter system, required that each category of the colonial subjects lived in a separate quarter. However, in practice different patterns of Arab settlements existed around Maluku. In some regions such as Ternate and Buru, the Arabs lived together with other Muslim groups, while in Banda and Dobo they lived separately in their own quarter. In Christian towns like in Manado and neighbouring Kema, the Arabs lived together with other Muslims in a Muslim quarter (Clarence-Smith 1998, 34). In the Christian town of Ambon, the Arabs could also live side by side with other Muslim communities, excluding the Chinese, who had been living in their own special quarter since the beginning of the Dutch VOC (De Graaf 1977, 138-139).

When visiting my informants in their homes, I learned that some descendants of Hadrami migrants still live in the old settlements today. Other informants lived scattered around the Ambon town. Interestingly, one of my informants told me that he had never heard about a special Arab quarter in Ambon and claimed that no particular Arab quarter as such had existed. Apparently, for the families of these Hadramis, collective memories about previous living arrangements in Ambon was not relevant for sustaining an Arab identity in the same way as descent and the actual migration stories are.

This makes sense, as inter-ethnic marriage and shared religion have been two important channels that contributed to a relative degree of social integration between Hadramis and other ethnic groups in Ambon. As reflected in other regions in Indonesia (Jacobsen 2009), an exogamy trend appeared in the first Arab generation in Ambon, while endogamy became the trend from the second generation onward. Although the second Arab generation seems to be more strictly endogamous in their marriage choices, this is only true for its female descendants. Many men of the second generation continued to marry non-Arab Muslims. As mentioned earlier, during the Dutch colonial times, through intermarriage with the more prestigious families who resided in the town of Ambon, Muslim traders—Arabs and Chinese —maintained close links with the *negeris* or villages (Chauvel 1990, 4). This was confirmed by many of my informants, and is addressed by the narrators of the first and second example in the Hadrami migration stories that I will present here below, who were related to families of village headmen.

The other factor of social alliance is religion. Sharing the position of a minority religious group of Muslims that was being confronted with the same colonial discrimination policies, may have led the Hadramis to prioritize their shared religious and political plight with other Muslims groups over their ethnic differences. Religious affiliation thus functioned and continues to function as a form of social and cultural capital in bridging (ethnic) differences and connecting the Hadramis with other Muslim communities of different ethnic groups. Social solidarity of Muslims regardless of their ethnic

differences comes to the fore, for example, in their religious activities. The Hadramis and other Muslim groups, to some extent, together established Islamic education and organized religious rituals in the oldest mosque called Jami' Mosque, which was built around 1860 (see further figure 3.2 page 61). Also, the succession of a religious *imam* (leader) in the mosque in Ambon was never ethnically dominated by a particular ethnic group, but varied over time (Leirissa 2000). In this context, the Dutch segregation policies affected a social integration process only to a certain extent.

4. Collective Memories of the Hadrami Migration



Figure 2.3: Photograph of Ali b. Hasan b. Haider al-Hamid,
Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar's grandmother's father.
Source: a private collection of Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar

In the previous sections I have sketched how the formation of collective identity among the Hadrami migrants at a particular intersection of ethnicity, religion, class, gender, has been shaped by cultural, economic, socio-political factors both in the homeland and the diaspora, as well as by global power dynamics. In this section, I will focus on the collective memories of the present-day generation of Hadrami descendants about their forefathers' migration. I will do so by discussing two specific narratives that were shared with me by a Sada and a non-Sada narrator respectively. The first story was

told me by Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar (43 years old)[6], who is currently the head of the branch of the organization Rabita al-'Alawiyya in Maluku (see chapter 4 pages 118-121). I got to know Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar through a colleague of mine at the IAIN of Ambon, who introduced me to Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar on October 2012 when I did my preliminary research on Arabs in Maluku. Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar told me the story about his forefathers' migration when I came to visit his house in Wara Kebun Cengkeh Batumerah Atas on November 24, 2014.

> I am from the Bin Shaikh Abu Bakr family, and so I am from the fifth generation. I am told that my great-great grandfather was from 'Inat in Hadramaut. When he came to Ambon, he married a daughter of Habib Ali (see figure 2.3), whose wife was the grand-daughter of Prince Diponegoro. My forefathers in Arabia were well-known for their Islamic knowledge. They came to the archipelago because they intended to teach Islam, and not to trade. They did not come alone but together with other *mashaikh* (people of non-prophetic descent, Istiqomah). I am the descendant of the Prophet through his grandson, Husain, from whom our first ancestor from Hadramaut, Isa al-Muhajir descended. I have heard it claimed that the descendants of the Prophet's grandson, Husain, died during the Karbala war. But this is not true because one of his sons, Zain al-'Abidin, stayed alive. Most of the descendants of the Prophet's grandson Husain migrated to Asia, while his brother, descendants of Hasan went to Tunisia, Marocco, and Libya. I heard in other stories that the preachers from Hadramaut went to regions all around Indonesia under the guidance of their (fore) fathers. In my family's case, before they departed to Indonesia, they already knew the name of their destination. In former times, these preachers taught Islam with profound knowledge, spirituality, and character so that Islam was easily accepted. Our ancestors came together with many people including their relatives and followers/servants. And yes, in many regions they married women of locals including women from kings' family. Well, that is why we are so integrated, compared to the Chinese.

The first narrator above mentions teaching Islam as the main motive of his great great grandfather to migrate to the Indonesian Archipelago. The narrator of the second story Umar Attamimy (63 years old), a former member of the management board of al-Hilal foundation (1999-2012), whom I interviewed in his office similarly emphasizes religious motives for his great grandfather to migrate. Between the lines, however, it becomes clear that the family was also very successful in trade:

[6] Please note that a rule I protect the privacy of my informants by giving them pseudonyms. I make an exception for well-known public figures such as Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar who talked to me in their capacity of their public role.

> I am from the Tamim family from Hadramaut. Our great-grand father first came to East Java, then moved to Sulawesi, and finally settled in Maluku. I don't know when he came, but I am the fourth generation. Because my great grandfather did not bring his wife from Hadramaut, he married a local woman, that is why we use the term *akhwal* to address our mothers' family. Our great grandfathers did not just marry women of lower status, but married daughters of local kings. That is why we are also descendants of local kings. This is different from the Chinese, who like to marry within their own clans. My great grandfathers married four local women from different parts such as Bugis, Buton, Ambon, and Fak-Fak. The main reason they came here was to propagate Islam. Unlike the colonials, our forefathers converted locals peacefully. That is why Islam was spread quickly and easily in the archipelago (Indonesia). It is said that Bani Tamim, the Attamimy family, was considered to be a wealthy family in Maluku because the family had storage business houses both off-shore and on-shore. That is why later on many people of the Attamimy clan came to Maluku since they heard about the success of our family members here. The Attamimy tribe consists of more than 200 clans, and they resided in Hadramaut long before those of the Ba'Alawi (the Prophet's descendants, Istiqomah) tribe. We are unlike the Chinese, you know, they are more distant to the locals (Umar Attamimy, October 8, 2014).

The narratives above are two among many other similar narratives of present-day Hadramis in Ambon who convey their perception of their forefathers' migration. As part of 'collective (social) memory', the narratives underline the significance of transmission of the collective past through several generations within the Hadrami community and the influence of contemporary discourses and practices. In other words, the narratives show how both past and present discourses and practices have shaped the collective representations of the Hadrami migrants in the eyes of the present-day generation.

Since the two narratives present the perspectives of a Sada and a non-Sada descendant, they give us an impression of how both groups remember their collective past, or more precisely: what aspects they consider important to tell audiences such as myself as researcher and probably also their own descendants. As the first example is narrated by a person claiming descent from the Prophet or Sada, and the second is by a non-prophetic descendant or non-Sada, besides similarities in positioning themselves within a broader social configuration, the narratives also point to the diversity within the Hadrami community and an ongoing power struggle between the two groups.

Migration stories are an important means of gendered diasporic identity making for the Hadrami community in Ambon. In both narratives the role of the male Hadrami migrants in identity making in host-societies comes to the fore; the first migrants that are said to have made their journeys to Maluku were all men. This central role in the process of identity making in host-

societies of the male Hadrami migrants shapes the way migration stories are told by present-day Hadrami descendants. Unlike a gender regime in the present day Hadramaut, where strict gender segregation regulations are applied, in Ambon I was able to speak with both male and female members, and with members of both elder and younger generation in the Arab families.

Although both male and female Hadrami descendants have an equal opportunity to speak about their family history, it is no coincidence that the narrators of the stories presented were male; in fact, I found that it is mostly male Hadramis who seem to be a reference group to tell family stories. In terms of age, the older generation in the Arab families have more authority to tell migration stories than the younger generation as the elderly are supposed to be more experienced and more knowledgeable. Significantly, however, I noted that in many cases, old Arab women tended to leave this matter to younger male family members unless there was no male member left in the family. Thus, the authority to transmit collective memories and thus contribute to the ongoing process of identity construction among Arab families on Ambon depends on one's social position on the basis of one's gender, age, and religious knowledge. Non-Sada groups tend to be more flexible in this respect than the Sada, who consider their family history a sacred history. To share the Sada's history with outsiders is the privilege of a particular person, who is mostly male and highly regarded, such as being a religious expert or belonging to the elderly.

In line with Michel Foucault's analysis of power-knowledge relations (1978) and the concept of hegemony by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985), this practice illustrates how transmitting knowledge about the past is connected to who has the authority to define what constitutes the historical truth and what its consequences are. Authority, then, is to be understood as the power to interpret and define what counts as relevant stories and interpretations of the past (see Langenbacher, Niven, and Wittlinger 2013, 44).

Apart from some qualifications in terms of gender, age, and authority mentioned above, Sada and non-Sada descendants of the Hadrami migrants make more or less similar claims concerning their family status; they commonly emphasize the high status of their Arab identity. The narratives presented above, for example, are not so much different in terms of content or in style. Both narrators present their (fore) fathers, the first migrants in their family history, as noble and wealthy families navigating their way in a foreign land with much capital in their disposal. Their narratives reflect a symbolic reference to what Tomas Gerholm (1977, 152) calls 'tribalism' which includes tribal idioms such as lineage (genealogy), honor, and social status.

As will be further argued in chapter 4, Arab tribalism tends to be present more strongly among present-day generation if its family members maintain endogamy (in-marriage) and/or *kafa'a* (compatibility or equality between

partners in marriage). Marriages based on *kafa'a* regulations, especially by descent are a very important source for and marker of social honor, which has had considerable impact on social relations, including kinship ties, among the Hadramis themselves, and between the Hadramis and other non-Hadramis in the region. The more out-marriages occur in the family, the more broken stories on their Arab family migration story will be. This is particularly the case when female family members have married out. It struck me that Hadrami families in Ambon tend to talk more proudly about their degree of Arabness when most of their family members are married within their own clans.

The two narratives also illustrate ethnic boundary making by differentiating Hadrami descendants from other groups in Ambon. Like the narrators of these stories, Hadrami descendants often compare themselves explicitly to other ethnic groups such as Malay, Ambonese, Chinese, and European. Although they differentiate between themselves and other ethnic groups, religion and ethnicity intersect in how they relate to other groups. Hadrami, Malay, and some Ambonese are considered to constitute one religious community, while Chinese and European are considered foreign.

Collective memories about European colonialism handed down to the present Arab generation are often connected to the way the European powers struggled to conquer the colonies with both military force and religious missionary work. Highlighting the endeavors of forefathers to bring Islam to the island and contrasting peaceful religious conversion by the Arabs with forced religious conversion by the Europeans is a recurrent theme in the migration stories of my informants. The narrators thus tend to highlight the more noble intention (purpose) of emigration and distinguish it from having to make a living in the foreign land as a vehicle for doing so. Most of them agree that their (fore) fathers engaged in trade in order to survive, but they make sure to present economic motives as subordinate to religious ones to account for their ancestors' emigration.

As the two narratives illustrate, Islamization has become a central topic of the present-day Hadramis' narratives about the main objective of Hadrami migration to Maluku. The selection of a certain kind of narrative regarding the past is thus related to how group identity or 'we' should be presented to outsiders as well as to insiders as orientations in a long-term project of how next generations should behave in the future (Langenbacher, Niven, and Wittlinger 2013, 44).

There is more to the foregrounding of the role of Islamic missionary work, however. Both stories presented here were narrated by Sunni followers, and both narrators argued that the Hadrami migrants spread Sunni teachings and practices to the local population. Abdurahman Assagaf, a thirty-five-year-old

convert of Sada origin from Sunni to Shi'a and currently the head of a Shi'ite organization in Maluku, challenged such representations in his story:

> If you look at the Islamic rituals of Ambonese Muslims, you may notice that these are very much the legacy of Shi'ite teachings. You will see that celebrating *maulids* is very common here…well, we don't want to speak about this. Our forefathers propagated the teachings very gently and concealed themselves as Sunnis because we don't want the rest of us (*ahl al-bayt*, the Prophet's family) to be executed and we cannot practice our beliefs anymore (Abdurrahman Assagaf, March 25, 2015).

My Shi'ite informant's statement above hints at religious contestations among the Hadramis as well as among other Muslims groups that will be further discussed in chapter 5. What is relevant to my argument here is that such religious divisions among the Hadrami descendants also affect the ways the present-day Hadramis narrate their history.

Furthermore, in many of the stories that I was told, the Chinese often figure as an ethnic reference point to compare the ways in which the Arab migrants succeeded in assimilating themselves in local society. Many of the Arab descendants point out that their forefathers married local women and that the Hadramis are therefore more inclusive than the Chinese. While this might be true in many Chinese communities around Indonesia, most of the Chinese migrants in Ambon during the Portuguese and Dutch eras were Muslims and married local women (Leirissa 2000).

As has been stated earlier, migration narratives such as the two discussed here cannot be treated as historical facts, but they are part of an oral tradition through which memories of the past are kept alive among the present-day Hadrami community. Although the narratives cannot be regarded as a testimony of facts, they provide clues that reflect general norms and values adopted by the Hadramis. These norms are linked to the social, cultural, economic and political dimensions that shaped the historical context in which the Hadramis are embedded.

5. Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to shed light on the history and collective memories about the migration of the people from Hadramaut in the southern part of Arabian Peninsula to Ambon. I have done so by discussing both historical studies and narratives of the present-day Hadrami generation of Ambon that represent collective memories about the early Hadrami migrants. The historical studies were used to outline the relations between the contexts of the homeland and host-land, as well as global and regional economic-political constellations that effected on the Hadrami emigration in the course of the nineteenth to the early twentieth centuries. At the same time, social

representation of the collective past through oral narratives among the present-day descendants of the Hadrami Arab migrants were used to examine the relations between collective memory, identity and power, and to argue that the representation of the collective past in the present is often used to seek and maintain a particular power interest.

In the historical sketch of the Hadrami migration I have demonstrated how push-and pull-factors of the Hadrami emigration to Ambon are interlinked with the social, political, economic, and cultural contexts of both the home- and the host lands. Civil wars and economic scarcity of the homeland and the opportunities offered by the host land pushed and pulled the Hadramis to emigrate. Besides trade, the Hadrami migrants were also engaged in Islamization in the host country. Present-day Hadrami descendants tend to emphasize Islamization over economic motives. Such claims, I have argued, function to differentiate both between Hadrami migrants and other groups in Maluku society, as well as between Sada and non-Sada groups within the Hadrami community. Furthermore, the combination between the legacy of a highly stratified social structure in the homeland and the Dutch segregation policies in the host-land contributed to the rise among the Hadrami migrants of a heterogeneous ethno-religious identity as being 'Arabs' and 'Muslims' that continues to inform self-presentations of the present-day generation of Hadramis.

Keeping alive collective memories about the Hadrami migration history through story telling such as illustrated in the two narratives discussed here, is one of the diasporic identity practices through which present-day Hadramis continue to be oriented towards Hadramaut as an authoritative source of value, identity, and loyalty.

Today's Hadramis identify themselves as being part of the larger Arab and Muslim society through patrilineal descent. Yet, they also recognize their maternal relations to local society (Ambonese Malay). The heterogeneous ethno-religious identity of the Hadramis is complicated further by hierarchical descent claims (Sada and non-Sada) as well as by Islamic divisions in the community (Sunni and Shi'ite). Despite being far from a unified identity group, the present-day Hadrami community shares a heritage that is passed down from one generation to another and that is actively maintained and reshaped through 'collective memories' embedded in both the perception, as well as some commemorative rituals and bodily practices (see chapter 4, 5 and 6). Narratives about Hadrami migration have thus shaped the construction and maintenance of a heterogeneous 'imagined' Hadrami community until today.

The Hadrami Arab descendants constitute what Anat Feldman (2015, 171-189) calls 'a modern ethno-religious community of memory'. What characterizes such a community of memory is that very little 'identity marking' is visible in the public sphere; Hadramis in general do not necessarily dress in

a particular manner that differentiates between them and the general population of Ambonese society. This confirms Stuart Hall's argument that diaspora is comprised of ever-changing representations which provide an 'imaginary coherence' for a set of malleable identities, and can be held together or re-created, to some degree, through the mind, through cultural artifacts, and through a shared imagination (Hall 1990, 516). The performance of diasporic identity in everyday life will be discussed in detail in the following chapters, in which I will analyze how Hadramis are embedded in and relate to the wider Maluku and Indonesian society through their occupations, livelihoods, political interests, and education.

Chapter 3: A Survey of the Present-Day Hadrami Arab Descendants in Ambon

1. Introduction

The chapter sketches a general overview of the present-day Hadrami Arab descendants in Ambon. It aims at mapping their general life patterns and their positions in the specific social structure in Ambon society. Thus, insights will be provided in continuities and changes in Hadrami social identity among today's generation of diasporic Hadrami in Ambon. On a meta level, it will shed light on the interplay between local and translocal dynamics in the 'identity work' of diasporas as they position themselves and are being positioned as citizens of a certain category.

In the first place, I will address the internal heterogeneity of the descendants of the Hadrami migrants in Ambon, which is due not in the last place because of the persistence of traditional Hadrami social stratification. Although it no longer reflects the division of labor and other social activities as it did in the past, this traditional Hadrami social stratification has not lost its value for today's generation altogether. In the perception of the present-day Hadrami descendants of Ambon, Hadrami identity is still partly based on particular Hadrami practices, most notably patrilineal descent reckoning. At the same time, local cultural elements are incorporated into the formation of a diasporic identity as a result of engagement in the wider local community in fields such as education, social organizations, economy, politics, and other everyday life practices. In this context, it is important to pay particular attention to the fact that the formation of a distinct Hadrami identity depends for a considerable extent on marriage options, comportment in daily life and the transmission of certain values by female members of the community. Therefore, particular attention will be paid to the ways in which Hadrami women have not only played a specific role in the dynamics of the Hadrami community in the diaspora, but also in the creation of a new sub-culture within the Hadrami community which differs from cultural practices in the homeland.

In the second place, the sections that follow will demonstrate that engagement in local social fields and the incorporation of the cultural elements from various contexts have contributed to the emergence of multiplicity in the 'social identity' among the Hadrami descendants. In other words, regardless of internal differentiation based on clans, the community of the Hadrami descendants today can be categorized as a 'soft culture' community, which allows a relative flexibility of social meanings, values, and organizations (Appadurai 1997, 90). The 'soft culture' model allows such a community to engage in various social networks, which may include different social customs

and beliefs without fear of losing its distinct ethno-religious identity (Feldman 2015, 182). To demonstrate how this plays out on the ground, the following aspects will be addressed: descent categorization, family distribution, spatial living arrangements, economic occupation, political engagement, and other everyday life practices concerning language, food, and dress.

2. Social Groups within the Community of Hadrami Descendants

2.1 The Sada and non-Sada Distinction

> The tribal ideology seems to survive under present-day conditions as an affirmative philosophy, justifying access and claims of traditional role incumbents to values and resources that are furnished by a new and different system. (Kruse 1979, 394)

This section will address the role of traditional Hadrami social stratification, particularly the distinction between Sada and non-Sada in (sub)group identifications. This stratification continues to inform social and family life within the Hadrami community in the diaspora, particularly in Ambon today. The section aims at understanding in what ways the social stratification is maintained by the Hadramis in their social relations and how they use it to seek power and influence within the broader local society of Ambon.

Traditionally, Hadramaut was considered a stratified society, based on a complex system of hereditary rules, a combination between religion and tribal their occupational functions in the society (Hartley 1961; Bujra 1971; Serjeant 1977; Camelin 1997; Boxberger 2002). Although there is no agreement among scholars working on social stratification of Hadramaut concerning the issue which descent status of a group has a higher status than other descent groups, they do agree on several categories of occupation in the social hierarchy (Hartley 1961; Bujra 1971; Camelin 1997; Serjeant 1977; Boxberger 2002).

The first category had a religious function. It consisted of the Sada, who claim descent from the Prophet, and the *mashaikh*, who claim descent from well-known and prominent Hadrami scholars and holy men of the past, but no prophetic descent. The Sada and *mashaikh* have similar roles in society, which were attributed to their religious authority. They controlled religious institutions, rituals and ceremonies, and also played a central part in mediating intertribal conflicts. Although the *mashaikh* were considered inferior to the Sada in terms of descent, they could play roles with higher status than the Sada in certain places of Hadramaut (Camelin 1997).

The second category was an aristocracy and which had a military-like function. It consisted of the *qabail*, tribesmen who claimed descent to the eminent founding ancestors of their respective tribes such as Qahtan. The

function of this group was bearing arms and defending the honor of a certain territory during a war. The group included the kin and close family of those who occupied these positions. Those who claim descent of *qabail*, are considered to belong to the same dynasty. When the early modern state of South Yemen was founded, this category filled the state apparatus, which consisted of members from various descent groups. These groups were in the top hierarchy in certain places (Hartley 1961), while they occupied the second rank in other places (Bujra 1971).

The third category had a market-based function and was occupied by the *masakin* or *du'afa* (literally 'poor' and 'weak'). They were considered to be a residual category in terms of descent because they belonged neither to the line of the Prophet nor to that of Qahtan (people originating from the southern part of Arabian Peninsula, notably Yemen, and who are considered as pure Arabs) and did not have ancestors who were religious leaders. In society, they conducted menial jobs and worked as peasants, laborers, and servants. These groups were generally considered to be of the lowest rank (Bujra 1971). With the emergence of modern market, however, the category also included merchants who might come from a respected descent group and thus had a higher status in the social hierarchy (Hartley 1961).

Although there is no single social hierarchy that organizes the entire Hadramaut society (Hartley 1961; Bujra 1971; Camelin 1997; Serjeant 1977; Boxberger 2002), social stratification based on descent is still a very important aspect of the Hadramis both in Hadramaut and among Hadramis in the diaspora as I will demonstrate in subsequent chapters 4, 5 and 6.

Due to changing social and political circumstances in the early twentieth century, the traditional Hadrami social stratification was challenged both in the homeland and in the diaspora, albeit in different ways (Mobini-Kesheh 1999). The criticism on the social stratification was initiated by a group of newly emergent elite among the Hadramis in the diaspora (Mobini-Kesheh 1999; Freitag 2003). This criticism was formulated on the basis of a religious rationale among religious reformers, who were predominantly Hadramis of non-Sada background (Mobini-Kesheh 1999). The social reform based on a religious basis initiated by the Hadramis in the diaspora was exported back to the homeland, although for a long time it had little success there. The challenge of the traditional social stratification in Hadramaut gained a momentum only after the establishment of a modern state of South Yemen in 1967, which marked the beginning of the transformation from an old social structure to a modern one, in which social ascriptive strata were abolished. This transformation was initiated at an institutional level; it was a government regulation. In the diaspora, where such state intervention was absent, a similar transformation was the result of an Islamic reformist debate which contested religious status based on descent.

Despite the structural changes in Hadramaut from a traditional political system toward a modern order system, in practice, the old social structure was not completely abolished. In his research on modern Hadramaut and its relation to social stratification, Michael Rodionov (2006) argues that the system of traditional social strata has managed to survive, although it has lost some of its social and economic functions. Rodionov points out that de-stratification in the modern Hadramaut is a re-stratification in itself, due to the alteration of social roles and structures of certain strata. Rodionov's findings are in conjunction with other research results that point to the persistence of traditional social strata in the northern part of Yemen (Gerholm 1977; Kruse 1979), and various Middle Eastern countries in the modern era (Eisenstadt 1977). Eisenstadt argues that the persistence of the traditional social stratagem in the Middle Eastern societies can partly be attributed to the Islamic heritage. During my own short fieldwork in Hadramaut, especially in the town of Tarim in February 2015, I observed that many local people considered members of the Sada to have a high status. This appeared to be particularly the case in some places, such as Tarim, where traditionalist Sada groups are dominant.

The persistence of some basic practices on the basis of traditional Hadrami social hierarchy can also be observed in the present-day diaspora, particularly in Indonesia, where Hadrami descendants tend to identify themselves by distinguishing two general descent groups: Sada and non-Sada (Jacobsen 2009; Slama 2005). In the case of the Hadramis in Ambon whom I studied, the persistence of Hadramaut social strategy seems to confirm the outcomes of previous studies. Evidently, the Sada and non-Sada distinction, as expressed amongst others in using different terms of address, continues to play a role in the contemporary Arab community of Ambon. Hadramis in Ambon identify the following internal groupings: Sada and *mashaikh*, *habaib* and *non-habaib*, *dhurriyya* and *non-dhurriyya*. These identifications are organized in a social hierarchy that is articulated explicitly. A fifty-year-old Sada descendant, Faiza, for instance, stated about her own group: "Don't get it wrong. We are different from other Arabs… you see many Arabs here, but we are high Arabs because we are *habaib*… what I mean is: we are descendants of the Prophet".[7]

On the basis of my observations and interviews it becomes clear that although the distinction between Sada and non-Sada is no longer manifest in public sectors of life, such as the economic sector, it still regulates an important dimension of internal Hadrami social relations, most notably marriage. The persistence of social hierarchy by descent among the descendants of the Hadrami migrants of Ambon today has symbolical

[7] Interview with Faiza, October 17, 2014.

significance and is related to social status rather than referring to a social class. By the same token, the terms Sada and non-Sada have shifted symbolically from indicating an economic position to indicating a social status position.

Although social hierarchy within the community of Hadrami descendants still persists today, internal criticism also occurs. However, the many critiques delivered by non-Sada Hadramis do not result in a complete break from the traditional social stratification. By the same token, social hierarchy or power difference embedded in descent-based ranking still comes the fore in claims and counter-claims about family status of the present-day Hadrami generation. My informant Umar Attamimy (see chapter 2 pages 43-44) for example, narrated his origin as follows:

> We know the Prophet did not have a son and I doubt their claim (Sada's claim, Istiqomah)… Muslims are all the same, as long as we have the same religion… Yes, of course I am proud myself, you know Abu Bakr, the first Caliph of Muslim community, was from my clan. Our clan is also a well-known clan due to its courage in the war and we defended Islam in the early period. Our clan has settled in Arabia and has lived there in Hadramaut even longer than Ahmad bin Isa Al-Muhajir (the person considered to be the first ancestor of the Sada who migrated to Hadramaut, Istiqomah).[8]

Umar Attamimy's statement reflects an ambivalent stance. On one hand, he expresses an egalitarian view on the basis of a religious similarity and he states to believe in equality of all Muslims, by questioning a consistent use of patrilineal kinship system by the Sada. On the other hand, he still considers his descent status as superior, by criticizing the authenticity of the Sada identity as pure Arabs from a historical point of view and claiming himself to be an authentic Arab coming from a respected Arab family. A similar view was expressed by Hasan al-Kathiri, a seventy-five-year-old non-Sada and who holds an important position at an Arab organization of Ambon. Hasan al-Kathiri noted, "We are *qabail*, but from a royal family in Hadramaut because the Sultan in Hadramaut is from our clan… well, you know between us (non-Sada) we have different ranks too and you cannot even marry each other. That was during my father's era, now it is not existent".[9]

Despite claiming a high status, my informant's statement above reveals that there is a shift in the positioning among different groups of the non-Sada from accepting to be of lower social status than Sada to claiming equality. This is also marked by the fact that many of the non-Sada tend to claim their *mashaikh* status, which has a more positive status connotation. Although the non-Sada group criticizes the claim of a higher status by the Sada, some of the

[8] Interview with Umar Attamimy, October 8, 2014.
[9] Interview with Hasan al-Kathiri, May 19, 2015.

non-Sada accept this social hierarchy, especially those who are married into Sada families. In other cases I noted that the criticism toward the status of the Sada by the non-Sada concerns primarily hierarchal status claims, rather than the claim of being descendants of the Prophet. For example, a fifty-nine-year-old non-Sada, Ahmad, stated, "We are equal, aren't we? …in the Arab community, we have the *ahl al-bayt*, the Family of the Prophet. I myself respect them, especially those who prove themselves to acquire deep religious learning, good guidance and morality".[10] Ahmad's statement hints at a specific message by drawing boundary between highly knowledgeable Sada in terms of religion, and those who could claim the status of the Sada but who according to him do not qualify as such in terms of performing religious knowledge. By extension, his statement illustrates a general pattern according to which religious knowledge, particularly where it distinguishes lay and learned men, is an important source or cultural capital among Muslims.

To conclude this section on social hierarchy among Hadrami descendants, it should be pointed out that the relevance of the social hierarchy based on the distinction between Sada and non-Sada within the Hadrami community in Ambon should not be overestimated, and the same can be said about internal criticism on status claims. To assess their import in practice, we must have a closer look at concrete social relations between individual Sada and non-Sada family members as well as between them and other social groups of non-Hadrami descent. The extent to which traditional social hierarchy is accepted is shaped by the degree of relatedness through marriage between individuals from Sada and non-Sada families, in which *kafa'a*, compabiity between partners in marriage, with all kinds of version plays a part. Besides, acceptance of the traditional social hierarchy is also much related to the dynamics of power relationships between different individuals of Sada and non-Sada groups, and between them and the rest of the population in different social settings.

The following section will describe the Hadramis in their smaller units, namely that of clan and family, on the basis of Sada and non-Sada distinction.

2.2 Clan, Family and Generation

An exact number of Arabs and their descendants in Indonesia after its independence cannot be precisely estimated. This is mainly due to the state's policy of nationalization, which forbids dual citizenship. This citizenship policy, to some extent, forced the foreigners including Arabs and their descendants settling in Indonesia to embrace one nationality. After the fall of the New Order regime in 1998, censuses from Central Bureau of Statistics

[10] Interview with Ahmad, October 16, 2014.

(BPS) in Indonesia reveal quite a number of inhabitants with Arab citizenship mainly spread in several regions of Java (Shahab 2005a, 1). It is not clear whether inhabitants with Arab citizenship are Arab newcomers or old settlers as the data does not explain further details, although residents recorded as having Arab citizenship may well be citizens from any Arabic country who migrated to Indonesia in the later decades of the twentieth century.

In Ambon today, all Hadrami Arab descendants have Indonesian citizenship and have been residents of Ambon for more than one generation. Therefore, there are no census data that identify Indonesian citizens with Hadrami background. In the census, they are categorized as Muslim Indonesians. According to the 2012 census conducted by the BPS (BPS Maluku, 2013), the number of Muslims in Ambon regency constitutes approximately 125.169 inhabitants or 43% of the total population (305.827), while roughly 58 % of the population is registered as Christian (179.852). For the whole province of Maluku, the total Muslim population (52,54%) slightly exceeds that of the Christians (46,89%). Hence, together with citizens of other various ethnic backgrounds, the Arab community is lumped together under the category of Muslims.

According to Shahab (2005a, 1) to a certain extent we can identify the Hadramis in Indonesia by their physical and biological appearances and by their family names/surnames. For the Hadrami descendants of Ambon, identification based on physical appearance cannot be completely maintained because many of the descendants look 'mixed' or even completely local-Malay (Ambonese). I sometimes managed to recognize Arab descendants through some distinctive Arab physical characteristics, such as hair, face, nose, and skin, but many others I could not distinguish from the rest of the local population and my informants acknowledge that physical appearance as such is not a sound criterium to recognize Hadrami descent. This reflects the different degrees of intermarriage between the Hadramis and other groups in the local society (see chapter 4 in section 3.1). In contrast, the use of the family names continues to be a salient marker of Hadrami identity in Ambon, despite the fact that most ethnic groups in Indonesia do not use family names, with a few exceptions in some regions including Maluku (Rony 1970).

Nowadays, there are about forty Sada and non-Sada Hadrami clans in Ambon. The classification into Sada and non-Sada is based mostly on informants claiming membership to the Sada group and superiority over the other group. Their fixed classification of clan names into Sada and non-Sada categories are judged from a genealogical record dictated from the Sada organization Rabita al-'Alawiyya, whose headquarter is located in Jakarta (see chapter 4 pages 118-121). The list of the names of the descendants of the Prophet is circulated around Indonesia, both in printed papers and online. I noted that some Sada families in Ambon had copies of the list displayed in

wooden frames on a wall in their house. The very display of their genealogy is a statement about prophetic descent; the houses of non-Sada families that I visited were never decorated with family trees. Few people have memorized the names of all clans that belong to the Sada, so that the list also functions as a device to check who does and who does not belong. Members of the Sada who have less knowledge about who belongs to whom or who do not have a copy of the list, usually consult their group's experts (see chapter 4 section 2.3.1).

The Sada group in Ambon consists of the following clans:[11] al-Hamid, al-Saqqaf, Bin Shaikh Abu Bakr, al-Attas, al-Aydrus, Jamal al-Lail, Abu Futaim, al-Muhdar, Bafaqih, al-Habshi, Bin Yahya, Bin Tahir, al-Shatri, al-Zawawi, al-Mahdali, Bin Smith, Bin Aqil, Barakwan, al-Bar and al-Haddad. The other group, non-Sada, is represented by clans such as al-Kathiri, al-Tamimy, al-Amudi, Basalamah, Ba'adillah, Bamahri, Basharahl, Bahajay, Bamatraf, Bahwereis, Bahasoan, Bahalwan, Bakhmid, Bin Sheban, Shaban, Mardas, Najar, Hamdun, al-Zagladi, Bin Talib, al-Asiri, and Bamakhmid. Al-Hamid and al-Saqqaf are the two largest members of the Sada group, while al-Kathiri and al-Tamimy represent the two biggest clans of the non-Sada group.

The number of clans in Ambon varies from time to time. Some clans no longer exist while others are newcomers in the present-day context. According to my informant Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar (see chapter 2 page 43), Ba'bud, al-Mashur, al-Hinduan, and Bawazier are clans that no longer exist in Ambon. This does not mean that these clans do not exist in other regions. The Bawazir clan, for instance, is still prevalent in Java. Bin Syech Abubakar further claimed that the majority of the above mentioned Arab clans have lived in Ambon for several generations, except Barakwan, al-Bar and al-Haddad, who are considered to have come in a later period and presently only have a first generation in Ambon. The Barakwan and al-Haddad clans predominantly live in Java, and al-Bar is in Ternate.[12]

The colonial reports on Hadramis in Maluku reveal that Ambon Island represents the largest Hadrami distribution in Central Maluku residency (Van den Berg 1886, 109). This may still be valid today. During my fieldwork in Ambon I have come across people claiming to belong to the Arab clans

[11] Clans are one among classical units of division among the Arabs. Categorized along the lines: *sha'b* (people), *qabila* (tribe), *'amara* (sub-tribe), *batn* (clan), *fakhd* (kin), *fasila* (joint family), the classical units are flexible and vary according to time and space. This means that a smaller unit can shift into another larger unit, or the other way around, after a few generations due to a changing demography (Kruse 1979, 384).

[12] This statement is solely based on my informants´ accounts and observations which do not represent a historical evidence as I have not further explored (Dutch) archives, which may contain more information about the list of the Hadrami emigrants' clan names in the former times. For example, Van den Berg (1886) in his work only mentioned the list of the Hadrami clan names in Hadramaut, but did not give a detailed account of the emigrants´ clan names in Indonesia.

mentioned above. Other islands of Maluku such as Saparua (Siri Sori Islam), Seram (Manipa, Sawai, Wahai, Geser), Buru (Namlea), Banda (Banda Naira), South East Maluku (Tual and Aru) have significantly less Arab clans than Ambon.[13] There have, however, always been close contacts between the Hadramis living in Ambon and those living on other islands in the Maluku Islands and the wider Indonesian Archipelago.

The Hadrami community in Ambon is divided into roughly forty clans. Every clan consists of smaller units, which are called 'families', of which I estimate there are currently around 250 in Ambon. Some Hadrami families do not only consist of those affiliated by consanguinity (by birth) and affinity (by marriage), but also by co-residence. This means that the term 'family' is applied here on the basis of both nuclear and extended family structures.[14] It is not uncommon to find in one Hadrami family unit a husband, a wife, and children, who co-reside with a wife's or husband's parents or parents' siblings. I also found children who live with their uncle's family because their parents died. Also, in some cases single women choose to live with their brother's or sister's family, while in other instances they live by themselves.

As the Hadrami migration to the Indian Ocean, especially Indonesia, was a gradual process that began in the mid eighteenth century and lasted until the early twentieth century, present-day Hadrami descendants may come from different generation-descendants of the Hadrami migrants.[15] Historical evidence confirms my ethnographic data on this issue. The Hadramis I met range from being the second until the seventh generation of Hadrami migrants. In any case, the *wulayti*, or pure Hadramis (Hadrami migrants) can no longer be found, and all Hadramis identify themselves as *muwallads,* descendants. Those belonging to the second generation are very few. During my fieldwork, I only met two people from the second generation, and many of those belonging to the third generation were in their sixties or seventies.

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[13] In Saparua Island, there are several clans such as al-Saqqaf, al-Attas, al-Shatri, and Bakhmid who live in Siri Sori village. In Buru, clans such as al-Saqqaf, al-Hamid, al-Habshi, al-Attas, Abu Futaim, Bahasoan, al-Tamimy, al-Kathiri, and Bin Talib who mostly live in Namlea town, the capital of Buru regency. Seram, the biggest island of Maluku, comprises clans such as al-Aydrus, al-Kathiri, al-Mahdali, al-Hamid, Jamal al-Lail, Bafaqih, al-Attas, Bin Aqil, Buftaim, Bin Shaban, Bahasoan, Basalamah, and al-Tamimy, who are dispersed in several places namely Manipa, Latu, Masohi, Sawai, Wahai, Kwamar, Kefing, and Geser. Clans such as al-Saqqaf, Bin Shaikh Abu Bakr, Ba'adillah, and al-Kathiri are noticeable in Banda Naira, the capital of Banda Islands. In Southeast Maluku mainly in Tual and Aru clans such as al-Hamid, al-Habshi, al-Aydrus, al-Muhdar, al-Shatri, al-Zawawi, and al-Kathiri are very prominent.

[14] The 'family' and other kinship terms were firstly elaborated by Henry Lewis Morgan's study on *Kinship, Systems of Consangunity and Affinity of the Human Family* (1871).

[15] Generation here is defined as the gap between two consecutive generations, which typically ranges from 22 to 32 years (Coale 1972, 28-30).

3. Spatial Distribution

This section will shed light on how old and recent residential locations have impacted the Hadramis' social relations with other communities of Ambon by delineating the spatial distribution of Hadramis in the present, post-communal conflicts (1999- 2002) context.

3.1 Old Settlements



Figure 3.1: Map of Ambon Town, numbers 1-10 are where the Hadrami descendants live taken from Google map and elaborated by the author

The Hadrami descendants today are dispersed around Ambon Island, especially in the coastal areas in both Leitimur and Leihitu Peninsulas. Most of them live in the district of Kota Ambon, which is mainly located on Leitimur Peninsula, and they are dispersed in all sub-districts around Kota Ambon, except in Leitimur Selatan. Although the Arab dwellings are distributed over almost all sub-districts along the coast, the main settlements concentrate in the city center, stretching the northern shores of the Leitimur Peninsula. Places such as Pantai Pasar (or popularly called Lorong Arab), Silale-Waihaong, Jalan Baru, Diponegoro, Batumerah Dalam and Tantui are where we find the current residences of the Arab descendants (see figure 3.1). Other current residences outside the town are mainly situated in Air Salobar, Kota Jawa, Wayame, Laha, Larike and Hila.

Many of my informants who currently live in places such as Pantai Pasar, Silale, Jalan Baru, Diponegoro, and Batumerah Dalam claim that their house already belonged to their parents and grandparents, which seems to indicate that these areas could be old Hadrami settlements. In addition, there are two other old residences around the town that are no longer inhabited by Arab families today. These places are located in the adjacent quarters of Anthony Rhebok and Paradijs. Anthony Rhebok is where the Arab-initiated foundation called al-Hilal is situated (see al-Hilal in chapter 5 section 3.2). Between Anthony Rhebok and Paradijs is where the al-Hilal-initated mosque, an-Nur, is located (see further figure 5.2 on an-Nur mosque page 169). Some Hadramis I met claimed that their former residences, which they had inherited from their parents (grandparents), were located in Anthony Rhebok and Paradijs. According to them, their families moved to other places during communal conflicts between Muslims and Christians between 1999 and 2002. Before the conflicts, some families of Najjar, al-Tamimy, Mardas, Bahajay, Banama, Bahasoan, al-Aydrus, al-Asiri, Basalamah, Bahwereis were said to have lived in these two places. My informants added that their former houses were sold to the Chinese, who have turned them into shops, restaurants and cafes.

On the basis of my rough sketch of the Hadrami old settlements, a relationship between Hadrami residential distributions and economic and religious activities becomes apparent. Historically, trade and religious activities were interlinked in the Hadrami diaspora (Freitag and Clarence-Smith 1997; Freitag 2003; Ellen 2003). The fact that old settlements of Hadrami migrants spread around the harbor, the main market, and city center, suggests that trading activities played a significant role in the pattern of settlement in this area. In addition, the settlements are not only located near the harbor, but also close to the oldest mosque of Kota Ambon called Masjid Jami'[16], which in former times functioned as the main mosque (see figure 3.2).[17] My informants from the Jamal al-Lail family claimed that their grandfather(s) were among the respected *imams* of the oldest mosque in former times. In this mosque, the main *imam* of Hadrami migrants is said to have played a significant role in Islamic missionary work.

The stories of my informants suggest that the old Hadrami settlements were concentrated not only around the city center, but also outside the city

[16] This mosque is said to have been constructed in the second half of the nineteenth century (around 1860) by a rich merchant from Sumatra, Abdul Qadir Hatala. An Interview with a management board member of the mosque, Munir, March 11, 2015.

[17] The term 'main mosque' means that it is the mosque where the religious activities of the whole Islamic community in the district are centralized. After Indonesia's Independence the state under the religious affairs department has intervened in its managements such as the allocation of a budget and the appointment of the *imam*. Today, the main mosque al-Fatah is situated next to the oldest mosque.

center of Ambon. Outside the city center Arab families have lived in several places, namely Air Salobar, Kota Jawa, Laha, Larike and Hila. According to my informants, their families have been residents of these areas since their (great) grandparents settled there. They also claimed to be part of local noble families in the villages or related to families of the local headmen. In this regard, despite the salience of economic and religious aspects related to cultural dimensions, kinship ties as a result of intermarriage become another important aspect of the spatial distribution of Hadrami families. I will address this matter further in chapter 4.

Figure 3.2: Jami' Mosque (photographed by the author)

3.2 New Settlements in Post-Conflicts Ambon

Ambon has recently faced communal conflicts between Muslims and Christians from early 1999 up to the signing of the peace treaties called Malino II on February 13, 2002 (Hasan 2005, 2009). However, on a small scale the conflicts continued after the peace treaty. When I lived in Ambon in October 2011, I experienced a riot between Muslims and Christians from different villages in the town of Ambon. Fortunately, the local authorities managed to contain the riot, and it did not spread to other areas. Nonetheless, several people were killed and houses were destroyed during the riot.

Although various accounts circulate on how the communal conflicts started, it is widely reported that both Muslim and Christian groups began to attack each other after an initial confrontation between a Christian minibus (ind. *angkot*) driver and either a drunk, a Muslim conductor, or some Buginese

youths close to a bus terminal in the town on January 19, 1999, the day of Eid al-Fitr, an Islamic holiday concluding the fasting month of Ramadan. On the same day this incident occurred, there were confrontations between Muslims and Christians from the neighbouring villages of the town, Batumerah and Mardika. Incidents then spread to other areas, where both Muslims and Christians launched attacks and counter-attacks by burning properties (e.g houses and shops), as well as trying to attack religious worship buildings (churches, mosques). Such attacks were mostly based on rumors that properties and mosques or churches of their religious fellows in other areas were already burnt. As the conflict escalated, these confrontations could not be handled by police officers, who were not in full force because of it being a national holiday. In the first year of the conflicts, the actors involved were mostly local people, but in the second year later (2000), Islamic hard-liners from Java came to Ambon to help the Ambonese Muslims fight the Christians. According to some people, the arrival of these Islamic fighters from Java has considerably exacerbated the conflicts. Others consider these Islamic fighters to be heroes.

Although different studies on the communal conflicts in Ambon emphasize different factors that caused them, it is widely agreed that they were the result of a combination of socio-political and economic to cultural factors. The first factor is overpopulation and unemployment among the Ambonese people. This factor is rooted in the migration, either forced or voluntary, of non-Ambonese people, namely Javanese (from Java) and Buton, Bugis, and or called BBM (from Sulawesi), around 1970s to 1990s. The migrants who came to work in the agricultural and informal economic sectors did well and many amassed property (lands and houses), while the Ambonese people in the middle-lower class had difficulties finding jobs and getting access to their already sold lands. Following the triggering clash between a Christian Ambonese and a Muslim Bugis, the conflicts were first seen as a conflict between indigenous and non-indigenous people, and the conflicts became a moment to displace non-Ambonese people and to reclaim economic resources and also some customary communal lands. As the conflicts escalated and turned into a conflict between two religious communities, political competition between Christian and Muslim communities further fuelled the violence. This factor is related to a long-term of religious politization rooted in the Dutch colonial policies on social segregation and religious discrimination, which privileged Christians over Muslims in access to political and economic resources such as positions in the administration and military force. This communal politization along religious lines in the access to political and economic resources continued after the independence of Indonesian state until before the outbreak of the conflicts in 1999. Furthermore, the conflicts cannot be separated from a broader context of the socio-political changes in the

country. The fall of the New Order regime led to a transformation from an authoritarian to a democratic era, and from a centralization to a decentralization policy. This transformation offered different groups of people opportunities to renegotiate access to the state, to gain economic resources, or to spread particular ideological influences. This socio-political situation, thus, also contributed to the conflicts (Gos 2000; Bertrand 2002; Van Klinken 2007; Bertrand 2008; Davidson 2009; Adam 2010; Duncan 2013; Bräuchler 2005; Schulze 2017).

Over the course of four years and even longer, these conflicts caused thousands of deaths and many properties of both Muslims and Christians being destroyed. It also caused traumas, and mutual hatred and distrust between Muslims and Christians. The conflicts have substantially affected the social structure of the Ambonese society (Bertrand 2002; Van Klinken 2007; Bertrand 2008; Davidson 2009; Adam 2010; Duncan 2013, Bräuchler 2015; Schulze 2017). During the conflicts, there were about 60.000 internally displaced persons (IDP) in Ambon, 25 % of whom fled to places outside Maluku, while the rest remained in Ambon (Adam 2008). Arab descendants were among the displaced people, especially those whose residences were located in the border area with Christian settlements or in the predominantly Christian quarters. In order to mitigate the conflicts and prevent further casualties, resettlement and relocation of internally displaced people was undertaken on the basis of ethno-religious differences (Adam 2008[2010a]; Adam and Peilouw 2008). As a result, the Ambonese society is now restructured along communal lines. Muslims and Christians live segregated in their own quarters, a situation which resembles the former Dutch policy on social segregation during the colonial era.

Being composed of mixed religious communities, the city center of Ambon was one of the main areas where many Arab families together with residents of other origins were forced to move out during the conflicts (Adam 2010a; Adam and Peilouw 2008). Batumerah Atas became one of the main centers for the relocation of Muslims inside Ambon, as the upper part of Batumerah village, Batumerah Atas, lies in the interior, bordered by the Christian upper village Soya. Before the conflicts, both Muslim and non-Muslims lived there, although the majority population was Muslim.[18] During my 2014-2015 fieldwork and my previous two-year stay in Batumerah Atas between 2011 and 2013, I observed how on the one hand Batumerah Atas kept developing into a homogenous religious area, while on the other reinforcing its ethnic diversity. In post-conflict Ambon, this area has become densely populated by Muslim migrant communities of various ethnic backgrounds, coming from

[18] In the first year of the conflicts, 700 Christian households in Batumerah fled to other Christian areas, such as Karang Panjang (Adam 2008, 4).

Sulawesi, Ambon, Kei, Java, and other regions. I noticed that most of the migrant communities tended to live with those of similar ethnic origin, with the exception of Arabs, who were a minority among the other ethnic groups and lived dispersed throughout the area.[19] According to my informants, many Arab families from the city center moved to Batumerah Atas. During my fieldwork, there were about 40 Arab families living in the area, many of whom had resided there long before the outbreak of the conflicts.

During the 1999-2002 conflicts, many Arab descendants left Ambon either temporarily or permanently. According to my informants, some of their family members moved to Java, particularly to Surabaya, Probolinggo, Malang, and Jakarta. A few of them moved to Kalimantan and Sulawesi. Some returned to Ambon when the situation returned back to normal, while others decided to stay in new places permanently. The return of people a few years after the conflicts is confirmed by the recent census by the BPS; the total population in the administrative Sirimau sub-district where Batumerah is situated has witnessed a 50% increase between 2007 (105.010) and 2012 (160.808). Sirimau, in fact, is the most densely populated sub-district area in the district of Kota Ambon today. Almost half of the total population lives in this sub-district in the Kota Ambon.

Considerations to leave Ambon either temporarily or permanently differ from one person to another. The considerations are related to factors such as family support, conflict trauma, profession, and other practical matters. Many informants could easily move to Java because they had relatives there who offered them temporary residence and support. In many cases, some family members would move out, while others stayed in Ambon in order to look after the family property. Among my informants there were people who were witnesses or victims of the conflicts. Feelings of insecurity induced them to sell all their possessions and move to other islands. This is the case, for example, of

[19] Clashes between different ethnic groups have happened, something that I witnessed myself near the neighbourhood I lived. Tensions between communities are not only based on ethnicity, but also on different religious ideas, which can be seen in social arenas (public sphere). I noticed, for example, that many former Islamic fighters who came from Java during the conflicts now live in a specific quarter. According to the local people, before the conflicts Christians inhabited this quarter. In this quarter, we can now find a mosque surrounded by houses of the former families of the *jihadist* group, all female adult members of which wear a *niqab* (a form of enveloping black cloak and face veil). Some local Muslim residents saw this Islamic group as intruders, provocateurs, and even propagators of foreign religious ideas, while others were very thankful to the group for to its assistance during the conflicts. Adherents of a neo-Salafi ideology live side by side with people who have different Islamic life styles, yet the different groups compete each other in the public sphere such as in the organization of education. I noted religious schools affiliated with competing Islamic ideologies in this area. After the peace treaty, the *jihadist* Salafi group has turned into a more quietist Salafism (see neo-Salafism in chapter 5 section 3.3.1).

some families living in Anthony Rhebok and Paradijs, a place where the al-Hilal foundation and the orphanage foundation called Melati al-Khairat were formerly located (see chapter 5 section 3.2 and section 4.2). None of the families live in these places anymore as they mostly moved to Java and sold their properties to Chinese businessmen. Rina, a seventy-year-old non-Sada descendant, told me that during the first day of the outbreak of the conflicts the houses of Arabs were attacked by un-known people, allegedly Christians. She had heard from members of the families living there how they could not sleep at night and decided to leave the house, hoping to return home when the situation was deemed relatively secure, but finally selling their houses because of what seemed to be unending conflicts.[20]

Not all Hadrami Arab families left Ambon. Especially those engaged in trade stayed. Some of my informants, for example, stated that they would think twice before moving because they had gained a substantial success with their business in Ambon. For them, Batumerah Atas is the best place to reside. In some cases, people kept half of their properties in the town by renting them to other businessmen while buying new properties in Batumerah Atas. Other informants stated that they could not leave Ambon because of their responsibilities in the government office. During the most intense phase of the conflicts, these informants were accompanied and guarded by the army or by police officers on their way to the work.

The 1999 – 2002 communal conflicts in Ambon have affected the Hadramis in several respects. The first concerns the resettlement of some Hadramis in Ambon resulting in changing relationships with broader co-religious communities, especially Muslims of Ambon. According to some informants, there was no Arab quarter in Ambon like the kind of Arab quarters you find in most of the towns in Java in former times. Indeed, there are only references to clearly demarcated Arab quarters for Dobo and Banda in Maluku (Clarence-Smith 1998). Some Arabs who used to live in the town in houses inherited from their grandparents told me that they used to have Ambonese Christian neighbours and that their relations with neighbours was good until the outbreak of the conflicts. This means that due to the conflicts the social interaction between members of different religious communities has diminished, while new space opened up for encounters between members of co-religious communities of different ethnic groups, namely between the Arabs and Muslims of other origins.

Another result of the 1999-2002 conflicts is that the social boundaries between different categories of citizens in Ambon have been fortified. These boundaries are reasserted not only by ethnicizing religion or religionizing ethnicity, but also by ethnicizing people or a group of the community as a

[20] Interview with Rina, March 10, 2015.

strategy in a political project to claim particular resources, such as land tenure and political positions (Adam 2008 [2010a][2010b]). The Hadramis are among the victims of this ethnicization as they were accused of being non-indigenous Ambonese, despite the fact that they were born in Ambon and that their families have lived in Ambon for generations. This ethnicization project was, for example, taken as an issue during heated campaigns of the 2013 general governor election in Maluku, which will be discussed in the section of political engagement.

A last consequence of the conflicts that should be mentioned is the emigration of some Hadramis and their reconnection with other Hadramis in other major diasporic centers of Indonesia and in the homeland. As mentioned above, the religious conflicts pushed many Hadramis to leave Ambon and resettle in other areas, mainly in places where they found family support. Their resettlement outside Ambon, mainly Java, has affected their strong ethno-religious sentiment as Hadramis. As a result, we can observe a revived interest in their heritage and the traditions from the homeland, as I will discuss in chapter 6.

4. Economic Positions and Activities

This section describes the engagement of the present-day Hadramis of Ambon in economic activities. Paying attention to this economic dimension is important in order to understand not only the Hadramis' present economic role in society and its impact on their social relations with a broader Ambonese society, but also the impact of the local social structure on the participation of the Hadramis in the labor market. In this section I will also reflect on configurations of the Hadrami women's participation in the economic production and its impacts on shifts in gender role divisions within the Hadrami community.

4.1 From Commerce to Other Sectors of the Labor Market

Today, the Hadramis with all kinds of professions participate in the labor market. This seems to suggest a decline of the Hadramis' interest in commercial activities and a growing interest in other economic sectors. This change in economic activities is related to changing socio-political contexts.

During the colonial era, access to public sectors, education and employment were the privilege of local Christians. After the Indonesian independence, 'Foreign Orientals', particularly Hadramis and local Muslims in Ambon also gained access to modern education and positions in the government (Chauvel 1990). The opening of public sectors provided Muslims, including the Hadramis, access to wider public sectors. As a consequence, the

commercial sector is no longer the main domain of Hadramis' economic activities.

Today, the Hadramis engage in the same variety of many jobs as other Ambonese people. They are employed in both formal and informal economic sectors. Many work in building construction, communication, financing, business services, manufacture industry, and other fields. In these sectors, they work either as employers or as employees. Many others work in formal public sectors such as the education sector, government offices, law firms, justice offices, health care centers, military offices, and others. In all of these economic sectors, they occupy different levels of positions in their workplace, from middle-lower, to middle-upper ranks.

The capacity of the Hadramis to participate in the public sector and their influential positions in certain institutions is due to their generally high educational level. Although some older generations of Hadramis have a lower level of education, many of younger generations hold a university degree, having graduated in various fields of study in local, national and even overseas universities. Some of them also hold doctoral degrees. For instance, Muhammad Attamimy (59 years old), a younger brother of my informant Umar Attamimy, and Haikal (46 years old) have doctoral degrees from Islamic universities in Java. The former is from a non-Sada family and the latter is from a Sada family. Many of my younger informants tended to study general sciences rather than Islamic studies. Pattimura University, for example, the oldest State University of Maluku located in Poka Ambon, produces many alumni of Arab descent. Some Hadramis have pursued their education outside Ambon, such as Sulawesi and Java because these two islands have more different universities and colleges. Among those interested in Islamic knowledge, some have a degree from the relatively new Islamic institute called IAIN (State Institute of Islamic Studies) in Ambon while a few others studied in Middle Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Hadramaut.

Because of their high educational level, many Hadramis have access to various domains in the public sector, especially in the formal economic field. Most of my informants who work in formal public sector are well educated, holding a university degree in various fields. In total, about half of my informants, both men and women, worked in the public sector.

Apart from the changing socio-political context and the accessibility of the public sector, the participation of Hadramis in the wider economic sectors is also related to their interest in having access to power, economic resources, political influence, and social status. In many cases, I noted that for my informants holding a certain job in the government is not only a means to accumulate economic capital, but that it was also valued for the access such positions might provide to symbolic capital (see Bourdieu 1984), such as prestige and honor, as well as political power.

For example, my informant Anisa (67 years old), who is of non-Sada origin from an al-Kathiri family, expressed her disappointment when her daughter failed to get a position in the government as follows:

> Yes, for sure I wanted my kids to prosper… all of my daughters work, except one. I tried to help my daughter to get a job in the governor's office where I work, but I did not manage to help her because the position offer was limited and finally taken by a family member of an official of a higher rank, and I will retire soon.[21]

Anisa's statement illustrates how acquiring a position in the government is not only very competitive, but also demands collusion in which personal connections easily overrule personal qualities. Many of my informants viewed a government position not only as a way to enhance their social status in the society, but also a good opportunity to gain access to wealth and power in the public domain. Apparently, some Hadramis do very well in this respect: I met or was told about several who held strategic positions in the government. At the time of my fieldwork, significant positions in the land affairs department were held by members of Bin Smith and al-Aydrus families and influential positions in the governor's office were wielded by members of an al-Saqqaf family as were some positions in other departments.

The second factor that contributes to the decline in commercial activities among present-day Hadramis is related to cultural practices, particularly those related to marriage and inheritance. Polygamy is still practiced by some Muslims, including Hadramis. Such polygamous marriages result in the distribution of a person's wealth among the many heirs after their death. Alif (57 years old), from a polygamous Sada family, said that one of the main reasons for selling the family's properties is related to having to provide all family members with their share of the inheritance:

> My father owned a cloth shop in Gotong Royong Market.[22] Most of the Arabs owned cloth shops in this market and in A.Y Patty street. I also helped my father in his shop. But I did not follow his career as a merchant because I was accepted to work in the department of land affairs. There are a few Arab shops in Ambon now. This is because the inheritance should be distributed to the family members and the people sold their assets. A grandfather collected wealth and his grandchildren use it up… now most of the traders in the shopping center are Buginesse and Chinese.[23]

[21] Interview with Anisa, January 17, 2015.
[22] Gotong Royong market is a former main market in the city center, and is not longer existent as it has been turned into a modern shopping center called Ambon Plaza or popularly called Amplaz located in Sam Ratulangi street.
[23] Interview with Alif, April 19, 2015.

The reference in Alif's statement to the arrival of new competitors in the trading activities points to the third factor that explains why engaging in commerce is being replaced by seeking other professions. Today, the Hadrami Arabs are confronted with fierce economic competitors, such as those of Chinese, Bugis, Buton, Padang, and merchants of Java origin. The majority of these new merchants came to Ambon in the 1970s, especially after the transmigration programme promoted by the Indonesian government. After that, many migrants both forcefully and voluntarily came to Ambon until the outbreak of the 1999-2002 communal conflicts between Christians and Muslims. Some locals told me that the dominance of these new migrants in the informal economic sector predates the conflicts, and has grown ever since. During my fieldwork, these merchants specialized in specific commodities. For example, the Buginese are in a clothing business; the Butonese in agricultural cash crops, particularly fruit and vegetables; the Padang in restaurant food; and the Javanese in ready food sold on wheels.

The decline of the Hadramis' interest in commercial activities is a combination of all interrelated factors mentioned above. It has not disappeared altogether, however; many Hadramis still engage in various commercial activities operating, to some extent, in kinship-based economic networks, as will be discussed below.

4.2 Commerce: Kinship-Based Economic Networks

During the colonial era Hadrami migrants in the diaspora, including in Maluku, played an important role in economic activities, especially in trade and shipping (Clarence-Smith 1998). This also comes to the fore in many of the family stories my informants shared with me; most of them stated that their (fore)fathers used to be merchants, often without specifying what they traded.

Today, the Hadrami descendants have more various jobs and no longer engage predominantly in trade. For instance, one can now find many Hadramis working in the service sector by opening advertising companies, travel agencies, restaurants, and hotels. Many of those still involved in trade engage mainly in intermediary trading activities by operating small and medium scale shops. They purchase and sell a wide range of different commodities, such as groceries, traditional snacks, staple foods, cloth, perfume, jewelry, cosmetics, drugs, shoes, bags, construction materials, electronic devices, and traditional handcrafts. The commodities they trade in are, in fact, sold by retailers of other origins, such as Chinese, Buginese, Butonese, and others. This differs considerably from Hadrami trading strategies in the past. For example, Hisham, a sixty-seven-year-old non-Sada, recalled the following childhood memory:

> I remember around the 1960s, helping my grandfather sell clothes when I was kid… In the 1960s, we could specify what the Arabs and the Chinese traded. At that moment, the Arabs sold clothes, while the Chinese sold staple foods. From the 1980s onwards, this differentiation no longer existed. My father and grandfather were cloth merchants.[24]

Hisham's recollections of Hadramis concentrating on specific commodities during certain periods, and that the differentiation of commodities between the Hadramis and the Chinese traders ended before the 1980s, is confirmed in Roy Ellen's research on economic network in East Seram conducted around the same period (Ellen 2003).

Figure 3.3: Making Pearl Handcraft (photographed by the author)

At the time of my fieldwork, many shops in Kota Ambon owned by the Arabs were located in the city center and in the two main markets, Mardika and Batumerah. In the city center, there were about thirty shops belonging to Hadrami families, eight of which possessed by Sada families. Most of these shops were family-run businesses. Many of them were inherited from one generation to another, while others were newly established. Two shops, Zafaya and Biam, for example, were owned by two brothers of a Bamahri family. The Zafaya shop sold all kinds of things, such as Muslim dress, cosmetica, soap, perfume, while Biam only sold cloth especially Muslim dress. Jamu Nikmat and Hidayah were shops run by a Bakhmid family, specializing in traditional snacks

[24] Interview with Hisham, November 14, 2014.

and cookies. Al-Hamid and Bin Shaikh Abu Bakr families were the main perfume chain-shop owners; their shops called Dunia Parfum and Sumber Wangi were scattered around several areas around the city center. Traditional handicraft makers were specialized of members of different al-Saqqaf families of Batumerah (see figure 3.3 above).

Some successful Hadrami families have been able to expand their business from a one-sided focus on a specific product to other commercial activities. Among these successful Hadrami traders was a Shaban family, who run the Wayame shop. The Shaban family not only trades in electronic devices, but also in material construction and real estate, besides owning a minimarket and a hotel. The success of the family's commercial activities even extends into the educational sector.

Similar to the Shaban family's expanding economic activities, was a commercial enterprise run by Ajib (67 years old) from a non-Sada family. Ajib was a construction businessman in Ambon. He was architect and builder of two Islamic buildings, namely a four-storey building of Darussalam University, and of an old building of the main mosque, Al-Fatah, in Ambon. According to Ajib, he had the opportunity to learn from his father's main commerce in a construction material shop in Tual, and expanded his parents' business by opening a construction project company.[25]

Significantly, the economic networks of Hadrami traders continue to operate on a kinship based mode. For example, my informant Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar (see chapter 2 page 43), an owner of Salim Shop in Silale, told me how his business operates:

> I usually order perfumes every month via phone calls. I order them in Surabaya. I do not have to go there. I know the salesman through my brother in-law and my family. Sometimes I just purchase from my brother in-law here if he still has much in stock. As for clothes, my wife's business, she purchased them from Malang through her family… no, I did not go myself because I just asked people that I have known very well in the harbor to deliver the good.[26]

Similarly, my informant Hasan al-Kathiri (see page 54), an owner of a shop for staple foods in Batumerah, told me about his business:

> I asked my youngest son in Tual to operate this business. I purchased honey from Yemen, then I distributed it to several shops, here in my shop (Ambon), in my son's (in Tual), and in the shops of my relatives in Jakarta… oh now I don't need to go to Yemen to purchase it, I just call my cousin, a son of my step-sister in Bahere Hadramaut.[27]

[25] Interview with Ajib, January 13, 2015.
[26] Interview with Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar, January 2, 2015.
[27] Interview with Hasan al-Kathiri, Januari 11, 2015

The two statements above illustrate how the ways some Hadramis engage in commercial activities today are mediated by a modern means of communication that has facilitated their kinship-based economic networks. By the same token, some of the Hadramis today still operate their economic networks based on kinship ties with other Hadramis in other diasporic centers of Indonesia and in their forefathers' homeland.

4.3 Commerce: Economic and Religious Motives

The decline that can be observed in commercial activities of Hadramis does not mean that the interest in commerce has disappeared altogether. While some do shift their interest, others are motivated to plunge into new commercial activities and setting up new enterprises. For example, Fathur (33 years old) from a Sada family, set up an advertising agency in 2010. He told me the story of how he ended up in the business when I visited him in his home on November 4, 2014:

> My father worked in the flight business, and I followed his trajectory by studying in a university majoring in flight management in Java. But I realized I did not like to work in the flight business, and I returned here. I started this advertising company because I liked working with my computer. When I came back here it was not easy to find an event organizer specializing in advertisements in Ambon among the Muslim community. So far, I have received orders from people organizing music concerts, seminars, or conferences.

Like Fathur, Muhammad Rifki al-Hamid (33 years old), a young Sada preacher started a pilgrimage tour service in Ambon called ar-Rahmah in 2010. Ar-Rahmah is both the name of his religious foundation, and the name of a commercial enterprise established by Muhammad Rifki al-Hamid. One of the ar-Rahmah's main commercial activities is offering pilgrimage tour services to Mecca and to Hadramaut. This pilgrimage is arranged by several travel agencies in Ambon and other areas such as Java. Ar-Rahmah also has its own shop, which sells products such as cosmetics, Muslim attire, and religious booklets. This shop is mainly managed by Muhammad Rifki al-Hamid's wife (see figure 3.4). At the time of my fieldwork in 2015, the couple possessed only one shop located in Silale. They told me more recently that they have decided to open another shop in the shopping mall as part of promoting their business to a wider circle, especially to Muslims from the middle-upper class.

Figure 3.4: the ar-Rahmah foundation's office and shop
(photographed by the author)

Running pilgrimage tour services is not a new commercial activity for the Hadramis in the diaspora; during the colonial era many Hadramis became important agents for the pilgrimage to Mecca (Freitag 2003, 226-227). What is new about today's pilgrimage tour services arranged by the Hadramis in the diaspora is not the business itself but the expansion to include other routes or destinations in the pilgrimage tour package, most specifically journeys to Hadramaut. Including visits to Hadramaut in the pilgrimage tour business is not merely an economic activity for the Hadramis, but it also signifies the renewal of connections between the homeland and the old diasporic centers, as well as the revival of a (neo) traditionalist movement in the diaspora, as I will demonstrate in chapter 6.

Comparing their commercial activities, Fathur seems to be motivated by economic reasons, while for Muhammad Rifki al-Hamid religious motives predominate. Yet, commercial activities like those of Fathur and many others are not devoid of religious motives.[28] Many of my informants expressed similar views on their engagement in commerce by stating that they wanted to follow the path of the Prophet to conduct trade for a living. Some added that they had opted for running a business because it gave them control over their own time, which allowed them to perform their daily prayers.

[28] Obviously, vice versa the pilgrimage business is not devoid of commercial interests.

The diversity of economic activities, ranging from formal economic into informal sectors nowadays shows the ability of the Hadrami descendants to adapt to the changing labor market in society and their capacity to integrate into the local economic structure.

4.4 Hadrami Women and their Participation in the Workforce

Much research on the Hadramis in the diaspora specifically focuses on the role of the male members in the economic sphere (Freitag and Clarence Smith 1997; Clarence-Smith 1998; others). This raises the question concerning women's activities and gendered spatial practices in everyday life among present-day Hadrami descendants. This section describes how Hadrami women in Ambon are active in both the public and private sphere.

Indonesian women's participation in the public sphere is shaped by different gender orders that operate side by side in Indonesia, particularly that of the state, local regional norms, and various religions (Robinson 2009). As a consequence, in daily life Indonesians navigate and improvise upon various systems that regulate the gendered use of space. Despite a religious ideal of women's seclusion in the homes, for example, in practice many women participate in public spaces. They do so particularly in the economic sphere, where many of them work either as main breadwinners or to support the family income generated by their male kin. The 2014 World Bank's report on Indonesia reveals that women's participation in the formal workforce was 51,4 percent, while men's reached 80 percent (see Garcia et.al 2015, 8). Although women are more generally active in services, such as in the health sector, educational sector, social sector or as cleaners in restaurants, hotels and private homes, quite a number of women are engaged in the industry sector (Garcia et.al 2015, 8).

On an ideological level, however, many Indonesians still locate women in their traditional roles of housewives and mothers. Thus, many women face double sets of responsibilities, by participating both in public arenas and undertaking nearly all domestic roles. This general pattern, which characterizes in Indonesia as a whole, can also be recognized on Ambon. During the 1999 - 2002 communal conflicts, many men lost their jobs, as a consequence of which many women were forced to enter the economic sphere in order to support their family (Adam 2008; Adam and Peilouw 2008). I have come across quite some women who engage in economic activities while at the same running the family home, since childcare and household chores are considered the exclusive responsibility of women.

Of the Hadrami women I interviewed, many of them work either inside or outside the home. These women can be found working in the same economic sectors as their husbands or brothers. Most women who work outside the

home are workers in the public sector, either in state or private companies, while most home-based workers are independent entrepreneurs, who, for example, have opened shops in their own houses.

Although the Hadrami women of Ambon are part of the wider society of Ambon and Indonesia in general, in practice their access to and engagement in the public arena may vary from other groups and, of course, also between different individual families. Such differences are not in the last place related to how family members are brought up with a specific set of values and norms. Some women come from conservative families, while others have more liberal views. Some are from well-to-do families, while others are from poor families and are obliged to find a job to support their family. Engagement in the public arena thus depends on a configuration of relations between economic, social, and cultural capital.

How this may work out in practice can be illustrated by taking the example of Fariha, who was 65 years old when I met her. Fariha belongs to a non-Sada family and is one of the few medical doctors in the Hadrami community. She received her medical training at a university outside Ambon. Her husband, who is from a Bahalwan family, has the same profession as she. Fariha's parents were among the rich merchants in Ambon. The record of her family's success starts with her grandfather, who was not only a successful merchant but also occupied an influential political position as the first Arab leader or *kapitein* for the Arab community of Ambon. This leadership position was appointed by the Dutch authorities during the colonial era. In my interview with Fariha, she expressed her gratitude to her family and stated that she had been blessed with open-minded parents who had encouraged their daughter to obtain a good education.[29] Her engagement in the public sphere is thus a result of her access to modern education, matched by financial and mental support from her parents.

Not all parents share the attitude of Fariha's parents. There are many different views on the participation of Hadrami women in Ambon in the public sphere. In our discussions about these matters, some women stated that they enjoyed freedom and independency, while others spoke in terms of women's fate and traditional roles. Rahma, for example, a fifty-four-year-old woman from a Sada family, is a lecturer in the social-political department in Pattimura University. She reflected on her position as follows:

> I am very thankful of my position now. I know that many women from my community (Sada) on Java could not enjoy as much freedom as I have here. Many of them married at a very young age. Look, I graduated from a university, and I also have a good job…I don't feel that I need to restrict

[29] Interview with Fariha, December 20, 2014.

> myself here. I make many friends with different kinds of people, not only my own group.[30]

To be sure, there are Sada women in Java who work in the public sector.[31] Rahma's reference to the social restrictions that female members of Sada families face on Java therefore reflects her own memories of the time that she used to live in Java. I did not ask, but it could well be that Rahma's relative, like many Arabs on Java still do, live in special quarters. Rahma's statement also implies that many parents from Sada families in Java impose social restrictions on their daughters in order to keep them from deviating from the parents' traditions.

Someone with a similar feminist point of view as Rahma's is Rafa, a thirty-three-year-old Sada woman. At the time of my fieldwork, Rafa studied at the Pattimura University. She is one of the rare Hadramis who decided to pursue a career in journalism. Note the challenging, if not defensive note in Rafa's story about her exceptional choice:

> I feel free to choose what I want to be. You know, I am from a Sada family but my family cannot dictate me to be what I do not want. I know many families from my community (Sada) who are very conservative, even my own family (from father's side)…well, with my career, I get to know different people, different cases, including horrible events like the recent conflicts. I also often get home very late. In fact, I engage with more men than women. But that is the consequence with this job.[32]

Rafa's statement illustrates how a certain occupation available in the labor market may not only broaden social networks but may also help to break social restrictions in conservative families, a challenge which, as Rafa's story appears to suggest, one must be strong to take on.

While in Rafa's case it was obviously the profession itself that appealed to her, for many other Hadrami women occupational choices are first and foremost related to the need to raise money, either to support their family, or in order not to depend on family support. For instance, when I met a forty-eight-year-old non-Sada, Jasmin, she told me the following:

> I visit my family here, actually I work in Bula (East Seram). I tried to get a position here (Ambon), but I did not succeed. I am lucky anyhow to work as a civil servant. When I am retired, I will get a pension. So I do not have

[30] Interview with Rahma, December 7, 2014.
[31] Yasmine Zaki Shahab, for example, analyzed how many Sada women in Jakarta were well educated and had an opportunity to engage in the public arenas (Shahab 2005a). The author (Shahab) herself is a Sada descendant and has a professional career in academia.
[32] Interview with Rafa, September 13, 2014.

> to worry about anything when I am old, nor will I have to depend on my children's help.[33]

The statement above reflects how the opportunities that modern economic structures offer can change the relations between family members, bringing about new views on the merits or need of economic independence for women.

While the women whose career choices were discussed so far present themselves mostly in terms of being agents of change themselves, not all women with whom I discussed their jobs talked about them in terms of having made a voluntary choice. Some women reported social pressure from their husband's family to participate in the economic life of the family. This seems particularly the case when they have married up, that is, if the status of their parental family is lower than that of their husband's, which is often the case. Also, the pressure tends to be much higher in patrilocal families, where wives live with or nearby their in-laws, and far away from their parents' family. Thirty-eight-years-old Naura, for instance, confided to me:

> To be honest with you, I prefer taking care of my children to working outside the home. I have five kids now. Because I work, I employ a domestic assistant. In Java, we may choose to be at home. But my husband's family did not consider that a good option. The main reason for this is that I have a degree from abroad (Master in Islamic studies in Pakistan, Istiqomah) and many of my husband's sisters and cousins work in government offices. My husband's family thought I should share my knowledge to others as having a job outside, preferably one in the government, which is honourable. Fortunately, I could apply a job in a university here…yeah, with a help of my husband.[34]

Naura herself is of non-Sada origin. She was born in Jakarta where her parents still lived at the time that she shared her story with me. Marrying into her husband's family, she had to adapt to their views and practices as well as those that characterize Ambon's broader society. The kind of tension with in-laws that Naura alluded to in her story, I also observed in other cases in which lower status women married into Sada families.

Contrary to Naura's case, living up to high status family standards can also mean that wives are expected to stay at home rather than seek a job. Lubna Mauladawilah, a twenty-eight-years-old woman from a Sada family, told me that she did not find it very difficult to comply with the wishes of her husband's family. Indeed, there is a ring of pride in the way she expressed agreement with their more traditional view on gender relation roles:

> I want to serve my husband and future kids. …well, in the beginning, I considered taking a job in the government, but my husband did not allow

[33] Interview with Jasmin, May 23, 2015.
[34] Interview with Naura, January 15, 2015.

> me. So, I should respect and obey him. As a married woman, I no longer belong to my parents or myself but to my husband. Whenever I go outside, I should ask his permission. This is women's destiny, and that is what the religion asks us to do. I can still work now, even at home, as I and my husband started to open a shop a few years ago.[35]

Arguing from a religious point of view, Lubna Mauladawilah who is married to the founder of the ar-Rahmah (see pages 72-73) presents traditional gender roles in a positive light in the above quotation. She has found a satisfactory compromise by taking on a home-based job which allows her to contribute to her family's income, while at the same time living up to expectations of women's responsibilities in the domestic sphere. During my fieldwork in Ambon, Mauladawilah spent almost 2 years in Hadramaut for a religious training, which proved to be a transformative experience for her (see further chapter 6 pages 236-237). After she came back to Ambon I noted, for instance, that her view on traditional gender roles had become stronger. She also changed the way she looks and now wears a complete black *niqab* in public spaces. Also, she tries to restrict her social interaction with men. She does, however, still run the family's home-based shop. Mauladawilah's engagement with the modern economic sphere reflects how views on 'traditional' gender roles should not necessarily be perceived in terms of a rigid division between men generating incomes in the public sphere and women taking care of the domestic sphere. Even in the views of many conservative families women can engage in income generating activities, as long as they operate in gender segregated public spaces.

Few families hold as conservative views on gendered division of roles as those expressed by Lubna Mauladawilah here above. Indeed, many women who participate in the economic sphere do not seem to ponder on the issue if doing so compromises traditional gender roles. Also, it struck me that although having responsibilities both in domestic and public spaces can be quite demanding, most women do not talk about a 'double burden' in the way that women in western Europe often discuss the challenge of balancing a career and running a family. Obviously, having a domestic worker at home, which is quite common on Ambon and Indonesia in general, can make a big difference. I noted that many Hadrami women who worked outside the home, especially those who had full time jobs, employed domestic workers to take care of the children and do household chores. Some domestic workers live together in their employer's house, while others only come in for work. Those who live in are mostly related to the family, such as members from distant, poorer relatives.

[35] Interview with Lubna Mauladawilah, January 3, 2015.

Although most household chores are done by such domestic workers, the way these women perform their jobs is dictated by their female employer. The position of domestic workers are, thus, an extension of traditional gender roles undertaken by modern women, including Hadramis, who participate in the wider economic structure of Ambon in a contemporary era.

On the basis of my observations on and the stories aforementioned above, there is no clear distinction between Sada and non-Sada groups in the women's participation in the workplace in Ambon. Women from both groups have similar motivations to participate in the workplace. These motives may be related to economic factors, such as to contributing to an otherwise unsufficient family income or realizing a higher standard of living. Socio-cultural factors, however, such as seeking self-realization and independence may also play a role. Furthermore, Sada and non-Sada groups show resemblances in their diversity of views concerning gender relations, some expressing conservative views, while others taking a liberal stance. This diversity is in some respect linked to one's socio-cultural milieu in terms of family upbringing, social network, education, religious understanding and so on. By extension, both Sada and non-Sada groups have been able to adapt to the local structure of Ambonese society in relation to changing socio-economic configurations, in which contemporary women may have opportunities for self-realization in the public place. The participation of Hadrami women in the workplace is thus not specifically linked to their group identities as Hadrami Arab descendants, nor did I notice any significant internal differentiations between Sada and non-Sada.

The discussion of the stories some of individual present-day female descendants of Hadrami migrants to Ambon in this section demonstrates the importance of adopting the intersectionality approach that feminist scholars like Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis (1983; 1992; 2011) propose to study diasporic identity making. The above examples shed light on how the specific interplay of power relations related to social categories of ethnicity, religion, gender and class shape the aspirations of individual present-day Hadrami women and the options available to them. The stories also point to the importance of taking the wider historical and translocal contexts into account. The 1999-2002 communal conflicts and subsequent resettlement policies have had different implications for male and female Hadramis in Ambon. Also, the ways that networks between diasporic Hadrami families living in different areas are drawn on or developed create different situations for different categories of women. As Lubna Mauladawilah's story illustrates, the renewed translocal contacts of diasporic Hadramis with Hadramaut are yet another factor that creates new opportunities for women to develop themselves and new views on gender relations. A discussion of translocal and transnational

relations will recur in the next section, which focuses on the engagement of present-day Hadramis in politics.

5. Political Engagement

Taking involvement in local politics as a point of departure to study present-day Hadrami engagement with a broader local society, this section examines the participation of Hadramis in Ambon in local political parties. In particular, I will discuss how they use political participation as a means to seek power and influence in the local society. I will argue that their success in this regard depends to a considerable extent on skills to adapt to changing political contexts. The Hadramis have no unified political identity. The heterogeneous character of diasporic Hadrami communities also comes to the fore in their having different political affiliations. The multiplicity of political identities among Hadramis shows their adaptability to local politics and their ability to seek legitimate power and influence through different political vehicles.

5.1 The Politics of Hadramis in Indonesia: Adaptability and Heterogeneity

The engagement of Hadramis in Indonesian politics started as early as the establishment of modern Indonesian nationalist organizations in the beginning of the twentieth century. Around this period, some Hadramis joined an organization called Sarekat Islam (SI), Islamic Union. The Sarekat Islam was founded by a group of former Javanese batik traders in the Dutch East Indies around 1911/1912 as an attempt to empower local Muslim merchants, especially in the Batik industry, and to promote Islamic modernism. It first started as a social organization and later developed a political party and became the first Islamic party in 1921 (Noer 1973). Other Hadramis had different affiliations. In the later period of overt struggle for Indonesia's independence, the political divide among Hadramis was more obvious. This political divide centered around the issue of a 'homeland' and political loyalty. The struggle reached a peak with the establishment of the Persatuan Arab Indonesia, the Indonesia Arab Union (PAI), in the mid-1930s. The PAI was an organization set up by Hadramis born in Indonesia as a means to seek recognition within Indonesian politics. The journalist Abdurrahman Baswedan became PAI's leader.[36] Another central figure in the establishment

[36] One of the Abdurrahman Baswedan's grand children called Anies Baswedan, former rector of Paramadina University of Jakarta, is currently active in local politics. Anies Baswedan has become governor of Jakarta from 2017 up to present after defeating the other incumbent candidate, Basuki Cahaya Purnama, who is Christian from Chinese descent, in the 2017 governor election. The 2017 governor election of Jakarta gained

of PAI was a Hadrami from Ambon, named Muhammad Alamudi (Mobini-Kesheh 1999,128-145).

Since gaining independence in 1945, Indonesia has gone through enormous political changes and shifts in state regimes. The historical developments of Indonesia's post-independence politics are categorized by distinguishing three orders: the Old Order (1945-1968), the New Order (1966-1998), and the Reform Era (1998- at present). These three regimes have different political systems, ranging from authoritarian to democratic systems. Some political parties were active throughout all three regimes and were used to justify the existing regime and to accommodate other parties. Indonesian citizens, thus, have always been mobilized for and integrated into changing political systems. As a consequence, Indonesians have learned to live with a political divide between the elite and the mass population. Also, shifting allegiance from one party to another is considered acceptable behaviour.

Unfortunately, Hadrami participation in the political constellations during the three subsequent post-independence periods has not been studied systematically. Therefore, to understand the political engagement of Hadramis on the local scale of politics of Ambon, apart from a few historical studies, I must rely on the stories of my informants.

5.2 The Hadramis and Politics in Ambon

Upon Indonesia's independence, the majority of Hadramis adopted Indonesian citizenship. The period during and immediately after the struggle for Indonesian independence (1945-1949) was a critical period for local politics in Ambon in particular and the Maluku in general. This is due to the fact that Ambon was one of the few regions in Indonesia where local Dutch loyalists were present. The Ambonese people were divided into two major factions; those loyal to the Dutch and those loyal to Indonesia's independence fighters. This divide ran predominantly along religious lines; Ambonese Christians supported the Dutch, while the alliances of Muslims were with those who struggled for Indonesia's independence. In Maluku, these two factions were represented by two local parties; the Republik Maluku Selatan (the Republic of South Maluku, RMS) established on April 25 1950, and the Partai Indonesia Maluku (Indonesian Maluku Party, PIM) established August 17, 1946. The RMS

much attention from social and mass media (both national and international) because of several Muslim mass protests and rallies in Jakarta against the incumbent Christian governor. These mass protests demanded the incumbent governor to be arrested and put in jail because they accused him to have insulted Islam in one of his official speeches (see Tehusijarana 2018).

aimed at establishing an independent state of South Maluku, while the PIM wanted Ambon to become part of the Republic of Indonesia.[37]

While most Hadramis supported the PIM, some joined the RMS, as several of my informants told me. The PIM was launched on August 17, 1946. The board of the party consisted of eleven members, nine of whom Christian, two Muslim. The surname of one of the two Muslim PIM board members was 'Ambon'.[38] Other influential Muslims that were active were, amongst others, Hasan Bin Tahir and Said Bakhmid. The former was considered one of the radical activists of the PIM, and the latter was one of the board members in the Badan Penolong RI Yogya, the committee of Indonesian State Aid that was founded by the PIM leader (Pattikayhatu 1991, 50-71). According to Hadi Basalamah, a sixty-nine-year-old non-Sada descendant and former lecturer at the IAIN, the family name of 'Ambon' was originally an Arab clan which was transformed into a local clan in order to be assimilated into the local society. Basalamah could not tell me the original Arab name for the 'Ambon clan'.[39]

Should Basalamah's claim be right, H. Ambon, one of the PIM members, was an Arab descendant. When I talked to members of the Bin Tahir family, however, none of them knew about the above mentioned Hasan Bin Tahir, although his surname indicates that he was from an Arab clan. An Arab descendant that some informants did mention as being active in the PIM was Said Bakhmid. My informant Hasan al-Kathiri (see page 54) is a nephew of Said Bakhmid. He pointed out that his uncle was a political activist who fled to Surabaya and died there. Al-Kathiri further said that Said Bahkmid's engagement in the PIM made him a target of attacks from the other party who disliked his activism. It must be said, however, that even the relatives of Said Bakhmid, especially Said Bakhmid's daughter whom I met in Jakarta, have only very limited information about Bakhmid's political activism.[40] In this regard, it seems that most Hadrami descendants today have very little knowledge about the political engagement of their forefathers in Ambon.

5.2.1 The Period of Stability (1950-1966)

After the revolutionary era that culminated in Indonesia's independence in 1945, all political parties were nationalist in the sense that they presented themselves as serving the interests of the Indonesian state first and foremost. During the last term of president Sukarno (1955-1966), a multi-party system

[37] The divisive loyalties based on religious lines are not absolute, as there were some Muslims joining the RMS, and some Christians joining the PIM (see Chauvel 1990).
[38] They were E.Urbanus Pupellu, Y. Rehatta, Manuhuttu, Yan Taule, Tahitu, Wim Reawaru, O.T. Pattiwaru, Hamid bin Hamid, and H. Ambon. Hamid bin Hamid and H (Pattikayhatu 1991, 34).
[39] Interview with Hadi Basalamah, December 14, 2014.
[40] Interview with Tata, January 12, 2015.

was adopted. Many parties were founded, ranging from secular to Islamic parties.[41] One of the important parties that represented the interests of Muslims was the Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia or Masyumi (Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims), which had been founded on November 7, 1945. Initially it accommodated both modernist and traditionalist religious organizations, mainly represented by the Muhammadiyah[42] and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)[43] respectively. Later, the NU decided to leave and set up its own party to compete in the general election of 1955 with the Masyumi. The Masyumi was the biggest Islamic political party during this period. It ended second in the 1955 election right behind a secular party called PNI, Indonesian Nationalist Party (Noer 1973).

Some informants informed me that their fathers had been actively involved in the Masyumi, while the fathers of others were affiliated to other parties, such as the NU. Gaia, a non-Sada Hadrami of 68 years old, for example, stated:

> My father was involved in the Masyumi. He was the party secretary. It was a good party because it really struggled for the benefit of Islam. But we cannot find this kind of party anymore now. All of the parties collaborate with them (infidels, Istiqomah) even the so-called PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, the Prosperous Justice Party) [44] that claimed to be representative of Muslim community.[45]

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[41] I use secular versus religious instead of nationalist versus Islamic unlike many researchers who tend to classify the political parties since the majority of Indonesian Muslims have been able to reconcile religion and nationality in the sense that religion has no contradiction with nationality. For further reference see http://carniegeendowment.org/2013/10/24/Indonesia-s-political-parties-pub-53414 (accessed August 16, 2015).

[42] Muhammadiyah is the second largest Islamic organization in Indonesia with about 29 million members. It was founded in 1912 by the reformist thinker Ahmad Dahlan. It is considered to be the first national reformist-modernist religious organization in Indonesia which advocates *ijtihad,* individual interpretation of Qur'an and Sunna, as opposed to *taqlid*, following the traditional interpretations of the *'ulama* (Peacock 1978).

[43] Nahdlatul Ulama (literally translated as 'The awakening of Ulama', abbreviated as NU) is the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia with a traditionalist character. It was established on January 31, 1926, as a response toward the emergence of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia and Islamic modernism in Indonesia. It turned to be an Islamic political party, bearing the same name from 1952-1973 (Bush 2009).

[44] PKS is an Islamic party, firstly named as Partai Keadilan (the Justice Party) founded in 1998. Its establishment was influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt, and also regarded as an Islamist party because it calls for Islam to play a role in the public arenas. Yet, today the party becomes nationalist Islamist party as it conforms with Pancasila (official foundational philosophical theory of Indonesia) as an ideology and no longer pursues shari'a as a main goal (see Ufen 2009, 160-168).

[45] Interview with Gaia, November 10, 2014.

As far as I can assess on the basis of the stories of my informants, during this period, Hadramis did not seem to be involved in one specific party; each opted for a party that fit their own (ideological) interests best.

5.2.2 The Period of Development (1966-1998)

The Old Order era was marked by political chaos due to political frictions and rebellious movements. As a consequence, the government in the New Order (1966-1998) tried to control political parties and in 1973 merged many parties into three; Golkar (Party of the functional Groups), PDI (Indonesian Democratic Party), and PPP (United Development Party) in order to give a high priority toward a development programme. Although all three parties shared a nationalist character, the first two are secular and the last is religious (Islamic). Both modernist and traditionalist Muslim organizations were merged into the PPP before the NU decided to leave the PPP in 1984 and returned to its original platform as a religious organization exclusively (Bush 2009).

During this period, Hadramis appear to have been affiliated with different political parties. Most of my informants told me that they or their parents were involved in Golkar and PPP. None said to know of family members who had been active in the PDI. On an executive level, a Hadrami Sada descendant from an al-Saqqaf family even became mayor in the district of Ambon town for a short period in 1975 (see figure 3.5).

Figure 3.5: A portrait of S. Assagaf taken from Ambon public library's recollection of photographs of mayors in the district of Ambon town, and reproduced by the author

5.2.3 The Period of Reform (1998-now)

Since the collapse of the New Order in 1998, Indonesia has entered what is called a reform era. The emergence of the reform era is marked by changes in the state's policy concerning people's political participation in the election, and by a return to a multi-party system.

Therefore, nowadays many political parties are able to take part in parliamentary elections: 48 in 1999, 24 in 2004, and 38 in 2014. The parties have diverse outlooks, ranging from secular to religious ideologies. These parties comprise three older parties, such as Golkar, PDI (which then has become PDI-P, Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle), and PPP, and newer parties, such as Demokrat (Democratic Party), Nasdem (National Democratic Party), Gerindra (Great Indonesia Movement Party), Hanura (People's Conscience Party), PKB (National Awakening Party), PAN (National Awakening Party), and PKS (Prosperous Justice Party).[46]

Table 3.1: Arab Politicians

PARTIES	SADA	NON-SADA
GOLKAR	Said Assagaf Abdurrahman Assagaf Muhammad Assagaf	Husain Attamimy
PKS	Said Muzakir Assagaf Said Azhar Bin Tahir	Fahri al-Kathiri Saiful Ali al-Maskati Ahmad Bahwereis
PPP	-	Naser Jamal Bin Talib Ahmad Ba'adilla
PKB	-	Usman Attamimy
PAN	-	Vidad Bahwerais
PBR-HANURA	-	Uceng Mardas
DEMOKRAT	Rahman Bin Tahir	-
GERINDRA	Mardas al-Hamid	-

Today, many Hadramis are affiliated with political parties, be they secular or Islamic-based. Some even occupy important positions as table 3.1 shows. However, many others are only passive members or supporters of certain

[46] Among the secular parties are Golkar, PDI-P, Demokrat, Nasdem, Gerindra, Hanura, while the Islamic parties are PPP, PKB, PAN, and PKS. Although each Islamic party presents itself as an Islamic party, the PPP, PKB, PAN, and PKS have different major followers. The first two parties (PPP and PKB) are dominated by those of traditionalist orientation, while the last two parties have major followers from reformist Muslim groups (see further Bulkin 2013). http://carniegeendowment.org/2013/10/24/Indonesia-s-political-parties-pub-53414. Accessed August 16, 2015.

parties. Some of those who engage in politics seem to be loyal to one party, but others change their loyalty from one party to another, sometimes switching from a religious to a secular party or the other way around.

If we look at the figures of the provincial parliament seats of Maluku in the 2009 election, the PKS, as a new Islamic party, reached the fourth largest number of seats, preceded by secular parties such as PDI-P, Demokrat, and Golkar as indicated in the table below.

Table 3.2: The 2009 election in Maluku

NO	PARTIES	SEAT(S)
1.	PDI-P	9
2.	DEMOKRAT	8
3.	GOLKAR	7
4.	PKS	6
5.	HANURA	3
6.	PPP & PAN	2
7.	PKB, PBB, PBR	1
8.	GERINDRA, PNI, PELOPOR, PKPB, PKPI, PNBKI	1

It is important to note that some Arab descendants, among whom both Sada and non-Sada Hadramis, play an important role in the PKS party as can be seen in table 3.3. The PKS was the result of the transformation of PK (Justice Party) which was founded in 1998 but could not meet the electoral threshold in the 1999 election. As a new Islamic party inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood movement of Egypt, the PKS has gained much support from young Islamist cadres that have been mostly educated in secular universities (Ufen 2009, 160-168). In the context of Maluku, however, some of its eminent members of Arab origin have been educated in Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, such as Said Muzakkir Assagaf, Fahri al-Kathiri and Saiful Ali al-Maskati (see table 3.1). At the time of my interviews, the first two were members of parliament in the province and the last was a parliament member in the district of Kota Ambon. The first one is of Sada descendant, and the last two are of non-Sada origin.

While the Golkar and PKS have both Sada and non-Sada Hadrami adherents, only non-Sada are involved in the PPP. This configuration is congruent with political involvement of the Arab descendants in 2009 election as indicated in table 3.3.

Table 3.3: The 2009 Party Elections and Arab Voters in Ambon[47]

PARTIES	SADA	NON-SADA
GOLKAR	6	2
PDI-P	1	1
DEMOKRAT	1	1
PPP	1	8
PKS	8	1
PAN	1	1
PKB	-	1
PBR-HANURA	-	1
GOLKAR-PPP-DEMOKRAT	-	1
PKS-PPP	1	-
No idea	3	4
Total	23	23

Moreover, we should not exaggerate the gap between Sada and non-Sada groups that their political different preferences or the ideological differences of political parties seem to suggest. In 2005, direct elections for local government executives were launched. The elections, the first time that Indonesians directly chose their own local officials, complemented the success of the implementation of direct presidential elections in 2004. By extension, since 2005 there have been two types of general elections. The first is on a legislative level and the second is on an executive level. The first enables each political party to fight for its own sake while the second requires a strategy of coalition among the parties to secure both individual and collective interests. In this context, there is no real rivalry and enmity since the election system opens up the possibility for collaboration.

Both secular and religious parties are engaged in particular deals that depend on the local circumstances of the region where the election takes place. Certain secular and religious parties may work together in some regions but not in others. Certain parties formed coalitions with other parties in the first election but did not do so in the next. Since there are a similar number of secular parties and religious parties, one coalition can consist of several parties that have nothing to do with their ideological platform (religious versus secular). This pragmatic consideration should be understood on a

[47] Two months before the regional election for electing governor of Maluku (June 11, 2013), I made a general survey on the Arab political behaviours and forty-six persons of different clans were interviewed regarding political parties they elected in the 2004 and 2009 elections. As there are about forty clans in Ambon, on this survey I picked up every clan 1 respondent, except the following clans: 3 respondents in each of al-Saqqaf and al-Kathiri clans, and 2 in each of al-Hamid and al-Tamimy clans. This consideration is because the biggest population within the Hadrami descendants come from al-Saqqaf and al-Kathiri, followed by al-Hamid and al-Tamimy clans (see section 2.2).

practical level in order not to exaggerate different political blocks that come at surface.

The illustration below will give a better picture on how the involvement of Hadrami descendants and the ways coalitions were formed in the recent local executive election that was held on June 11, 2013.

Case 1: Elections and Party Coalitions

Said Assagaf was the Governor of Maluku for a period of 2013-2018 elected on June 11, 2013 (see table 3.1; figure 3.6). Said Assagaf is of Sada origin and a well-known bureaucrat who has been working in the local government for about thirty years. He has been an important leader of the Golkar party in Maluku since the late 1980s. He was elected as Deputy Governor in the local executive election in 2008 together with another candidate, the incumbent Governor Karel Albert Ralahalu. Ralahalu is an army general and affiliated with the PDI-P party. In 2013 the joint leadership of Assagaf and Ralahalu's came to an end. Since Ralahalu held the governorship for two periods, he was not eligible for next candidacy but his Deputy Governor, Assagaf, was eligible.

Figure 3.6: Poster of Said Assagaf's candidacy in the 2013 election in Maluku (photographed by the author)

On the eleventh of June 2013, Said Assagaf participated in the local election to become the next governor of Maluku. His running mate was a Christian politician who served as a Deputy Governor. After the 1999-2002 communal conflicts, one of the agreements in the peace treatises in Malino II was the implementation of a power balance between Christians and Muslims, especially in the highest layers of bureaucratic levels. This is the main reason

why a Christian member in the Golkar party was chosen as Assagaf's running mate for the Deputy Governor position. Other candidates also came in couples with Muslim and Christian backgrounds.

Since there were five candidates participating in this election, the Golkar party formed a coalition with six other parties. The other five candidates were, in turn, supported by other political parties that had also formed coalitions. PKS, PPP, and PAN that represent Islamic parties (with different ideological platforms) collaborated with secular parties such as Golkar, PNI-Marhaenisme, and other local parties for the candidacy of Said Assagaf and his running mate. This resembles the situation in the 2008 election, when Said Assagaf was the running mate of Karel Albert Ralahalu, and his candidacy was supported by different parties. Although Assagaf was affiliated with Golkar, his party (Golkar) did not support his candidacy in the 2008 election. PDI-P was one of the supporting parties with which Karel Ralahalu was affiliated. The PKS and PPP, which held many members of Arab descendant, did not back Said's candidacy in the 2008 either. The table above and the two tables here below of the 2008 and 2013 Maluku executive elections demonstrate that pragmatic considerations rather than ideological differences seem to be the most important criterion in pursuing interests and deal-making for the political parties.

Table 3.4: Candidates of the 2008 Maluku Executive Election

Names of Candidates	Acronym	Supporting Parties	Religious Background	Regional Background
Karel Ralahalu & Said Assagaf	RASA	PDI-P, PBR, PDK, PD, PPNUI, PKB, PKPI, PBB	Protestant & Muslims	Ambon & Banda/Ambon
Abdullah Tuasikal & Septunus Hematang	TULUS	PKS, PAN, PPD, PKPB	Muslim & Protestant	Haruku & Western Southeast Maluku
Aziz Samual & Lukas Uwurutaw	ASLI	PPP, PDS, Pelopor	Muslim & Protestant	Haruku & Western Southeast Maluku
Abdullah Latuconsina & Eduard Frans	MADU	Golkar	Muslim & Protestant	Haruku & Western Southeast Maluku

Table 3.5: Candidates of the 2013 Maluku Executive Election

Names of Candidates	Acronym	Supporting Parties	Religious Background	Regional Background
Abdullah Tuasikal-Hendrik Lewerissa	TULUS	Hanura, Gerindra, PKB, PBR, PKPI	Muslim & Protestant	Haruku & Ambon
Jacobus Puttileihalat-Arifin	BOBARA	Demokrat, 11 small parties (non-seat)	Protestant & Muslim	West Seram & Ambon
Abdullah Vanath-Martin Maspaitela	DAMAI	15 parties (non-seat)	Muslim & Protestant	East Seram & Ambon
Herman Koedoboen-Daud Sangadji	MANDAT	PDI-P	Protestant & Muslim	Southeast Maluku & Haruku
Said Assagaf-Zeth Sahurubua	SETIA	Golkar, PPP, PKS, PAN, PDS, PNI Marhaenisme, & Pelopor	Muslim & Protestant	Banda/Ambon & Ambon

Case 2: Kinship and Voting

The political choices of individual Hadrami descendants provide additional information about voting patterns. Two months before the election in June 11, 2013, I conducted a general survey on the Arab descendants' preferences for candidates running in the election, and during my fieldwork between September 2014 and May 2015 I interviewed some of them again. The table below provides an overview of the preferences stated before the election in 2013.

Table 3.5: The 2013 Election and Arab Voters in Kota Ambon

Names of Candidates	Sada	Non-Sada
Abdullah Tuasikal-Hendrik Lewerissa		
Jacobus Puttileihalat-Arifin Tapi Oyihoe		I
Abdullah Vanath-Martin Maspaitela		
Herman Koedoboen-Daud Sangadji		1
Said Assagaf-Zeth Sahurubua	13	6
CRITERIA	10	12
NO-IDEA	2	3

Interestingly, not all Hadrami descendants surveyed were forthcoming in mentioning the names of candidates they intended to vote for. Instead they provided some criteria for good leadership that met their demands. I surmise that they were worried that I might be a supporter of one of the candidates or at least have my own preferences. The most striking criteria that were mentioned by informants to vote for a certain candidate were related to what they designated as 'morality'. Morality in this context is translated into certain characteristics such as being just, capable, honest, sincere, empathic, uncorrupt, and having integrity. Notably, having the same religion is another important aspect that most interviewees mentioned. Fahira, a fifty-three-year-old non-Sada Hadrami, for instance, stated: "I choose a person whose integrity in public services has been proven. Also, he (Said Assagaf, Istiqomah) does not belong to them (Christians, Istiqomah)".[48]

This quotation illustrates the importance of strong social solidarity and identification with the broader Muslim community. Another significant factor informing people's voting practices is kinship ties. Many interviewees mentioned that their preferences for certain candidates were influenced by their family members' choices. The result of the survey indicates that Said Assagaf stood out as the most popular candidate among Hadrami descendants. Those willing to state their preferences belonged to the Sada group, and many of them were willing to reveal their preference for Said Assagaf.

One of the main influencing factors contributing to people's political orientation in the long run is the family in which they are embedded. Through early socialization within a family, children acquire a certain knowledge, habits and value orientations from their parents, as the following statement made by Dara, a twenty-three-year-old Sada. She noted: "We (in our family, Istiqomah) voted for the same party and the same candidate in the election. I just followed my father and other relatives".[49]

[48] Interview with Fahira, May 23, 2015.
[49] Interview with Dara, February 1, 2015.

The popularity of Said Assagaf among Hadramis in Ambon is not only based on the fact that he represents Muslim leadership, and that he is a member of an Arab family within the Sada group. What also counts is that he is the most familiar candidate since he lives in Ambon himself. He is thus more precisely a representative of Arab Muslims of the Ambon district while other candidates are perceived as representatives of different districts. In this case, familiarity of the candidate is an important reason for political choices and activities, as will come to the fore even more clearly in the next case.

Case 3: Loyalty and its Constraints

One day before the election in June 11, 2013, I went to Banda Naira, the capital of the Banda Islands, well known for their nutmeg plantations. This is also where Said Assagaf and his father were born. It took me about eight hours by ferry to travel from Ambon to Banda Naira. I was in the company of supporters of Said Assagaf who were going to Banda to launch a political campaign for him. One of them was a local businessman who had invested a large amount of money in this election. Apart from this businessman, a Christian lawyer from Ambon was sent by the winning election team from the Golkar party to monitor the process of the election. The political supporters of Assagaf were very confident that they would win the votes in Banda Naira although they realized that there was another strong candidate; the regent of central Maluku. As it turned out, the majority of the Bandanese would eventually vote for this regent. Hasna, a fifty-six-year-old non-Sada said: "Bib[50] failed to get many voters in Naira because he was not consistent in his speech. He told us that he came from Naira but in Ambon he said something different".[51]

Some other Arab descendants did not vote for Assagaf because they feared losing their jobs. An Arab woman of non-Sada origin (56 years old) who ran after a supporter of Said Assagaf apologized to him and stated, "You know that my husband is a school master. We have been living here for many years. He (the regent, Istiqomah) is a very powerful man. Everybody knows so. My husband and I are not young anymore. You should understand this".[52]

Apart from Said Assagaf and the regent, other candidates were executive leaders in their own regions, such as districts of West Seram, East Seram, and South East Maluku. Therefore, none of the candidates was a newcomer in politics. The control over a district in this election was, indeed, in the hands of these present rulers because none of the candidates reached less than 50 % of

[50] Bib is an abbreviation of *habib*, a popular call or nickname for a Sada descendant, in this case Said Assagaf. This abbreviation can be seen further in chapter 4 section 2.2 page 122.
[51] Interview with Hasna, June 13, 2013.
[52] Interview with Saima, June 13, 2013.

the voters in their own districts. The political mobilization was addressed at every level of society especially to those were employed in the government offices. Although civil servants were not forced to vote for a particular candidate or a party as was the case in the New Order era, their position was vulnerable and susceptible to political games. One of the most common practices in this game was to dispel a civil servant to a remote area or another island if the election results proved to be disappointing. In Banda, it was not Assagaf who won over voters but one of his rivals, the regent of Central Maluku, who apparently had more control on this constituency in his own district than Assagaf. In this regard, political power in local politics is distributed over many different layers of the government hierarchy, in which people in higher positions do not always have an absolute power and influence on the lower.

Case 4: The Internal Conflicts in the Hadrami Organization and Politics

The al-Hilal foundation was established by the Hadrami community in the middle of the 1940s (see further chapter 5 section 3.2). Recently, a dispute in this foundation erupted concerning its organization. Two parties were involved in this dispute, namely my informants Hadi Basalamah (see page 82) and Umar Attamimy (see chapter 2 pages 43-44). Basalamah had been general president of the foundation from 1999, while the executive leadership was given to Attamimy. Basalamah and the advisory board forced Attamimy to step down in 2012, accusing him of misusing the foundation to make a big profit for his own sake and selling one of the assets belonging to the foundation to Tong He, a Chinese businessman in Ambon. The property was located next to the office of the foundation in Anthony Rhebok street.

According to my informant Hasan al-Kathiri, one of the advisory members of the board called Salim told al-Kathiri that he had found out that one of the foundation's properties was sold to Salim's Chinese friend Tong He, who owned several shops and supermarkets in Ambon. Salim explained that he had discovered what had happened when he met Tong He in Ambon in 2012. Salim and al-Kathiri informed Hadi Basalamah about their discovery. Basalamah and other members of the board were convinced by Salim's story because the name of the foundation had been changed from Yayasan al-Hilal (al-Hilal Foundation) into Yayasan Wakaf al-Hilal (al-Hilal Waqf Foundation) and one of the consequences is that one of the foundation's assets changed owner. According to Hadi Basalamah, Attamimy had changed the name of the foundation from al-Hilal Foundation into al-Hilal Waqf Foundation on June 24, 2011 in front of a public notary. Basalamah further said that Attamimy had changed the name secretly without discussing it with other members of the board before selling the property. Having been betrayed by Attamimy,

Basalamah tried to undertake action by organizing several meetings and discussing the matter with other members of the board. Attamimy never attended these meetings, although Basalamah claimed that he had been invited. Attamimy himself claimed never having received any invitation. Furthermore, Attamimy stated that he had sold the foundation to allocate the money for operational expenses of the foundation's schools. According to Attamimy, he had made serious attempts to reform the foundation. The board decided to dismiss Attamimy from his position and bring the case to court.

Basalamah and the advisory board undertook a legal action in November 2012. Realizing that his transaction was taken to the court, Attamimy proposed to dissolve the old foundation in January 2013. The court agreed the proposal later that month. The legal counter-action was then made by Basalamah and his party to dissolve this court's decree. The legal action proposal was signed by Salim and all other members of the advisory board, which consisted of several prominent persons such as Said Assagaf, who was Deputy Governor of Maluku at that time (see page 88), and Rusdi Hasanusi, the religious leader of the main mosque Al-Fatah of Ambon, and a few others.

This case was brought to court before the local general election on June 11, 2013 in which one of the most prominent advisory members of the board Said Assagaf participated. During the governorship election, it transpired that Attamimy would not vote for Said Assagaf. Rather he supported the regent of West Southeast Maluku, Herman Koedoboen, who has a Christian background (see table 3.4).

The case above shows that the political choices of Hadramis are not necessarily or exclusively informed by communal sentiments, such as religious difference or ethnic similarity, but that they are embedded in interpersonal relationships between a voter and a candidate. Internal disputes among the members of a Hadrami organization such as the one described above occur regularly. They provide insights in the dynamics among members and in the way they deal with such problem by seeking support from other 'parties' who hold more power and influence, whatever their origin is.

Case 5: The involvement of *'Ulama*, Religious Rituals and Political Mobilization

Shortly before the governor election in 2013, a colleague at the IAIN who knew about my research among the Hadramis in Ambon asked me about the term *habib*. My colleague was also a member of the national branch of the MUI, the Indonesian Ulama Council,[53] where he was about to present a paper on 'Habib

[53] MUI is the Indonesian main body of religious clerics and scholars. It functions to produce *fatwas* or religious opinions, to give advise to the Muslims community on particular issues, as well as issue *halal* (allowed)-certification for products, such as

and Arab migration'. The significance of this was considerable, as it was related to Said Assagaf's candidacy. My colleague told me that one of the big issues for the wider Muslim community in Ambon that would be discussed at the meeting was that leadership in Maluku should not be given to non-Ambonese. Being indigenous versus non-indigenous has been an important political issue after the 1999-2002 communal conflicts, and now Said Assagaf was attacked by his political rivals as being non-indigenous.

Although there was no direct indication of the involvement of the *'ulama* in the political mobilization, the idea to raise the issue in the meeting shows their awareness of political issues and also a big fear among them, at least among those who supported Said Assagaf, that the issue of indigeneity might weaken his legitimacy as a candidate. In addition, members of the MUI were politically divided along ethnic lines, an issue that should be taken into consideration during the election. Since the MUI consists of diverse (ethnic) backgrounds in Maluku and represent many Muslim groups and organizations, my colleague needed evidence to defend his claim against his opposition.

Apart from the MUI case above, on Sunday afternoon on May 23, 2013 I attended a weekly religious ritual in the Melati al-Khairat foundation led by a Sada woman, Rugaya Alatas (75 years old). This prayer ritual was not only chaired by the hostess, Rugaya Alatas, herself but also by *imam* Rusdi Hasannusi of the main mosque al-Fatah. It turned out that the particular meeting I attended also contained elements of a political rally to stimulate the participants to vote for a particular candidate during the election. I had learned about the meeting just before it took place through Sadiq, a non-Hadrami who was 18 years old when I met him and who was one of the children living in this orphanage boarding house of the foundation.[54] Sadiq sent me a message a few hours before the meeting began and informed me that

food, cosmetic, pharmaceutical, and clothing. Established in 1975, it represents several Muslim organizations, such as Muhammadiyah, NU, and others, which are mainly Sunni organizations. Shi'ite and Ahmadiyya organizations are not included (Hosen 2003; Hasyim 2015; Boy 2017).

[54] I met Sadiq at the first time at the Melati al-Khairat foundation in March 2013, when I wanted to meet Rugaya Alatas. On that occasion, I did not succeed in talking to her. Since then, we exchanged phone numbers so that Sadiq could inform me about the time schedule of the regular activities including whether Rugaya Alatas would come or not. He was supposed to be a trusted person by Rugaya Alatas and other foundation managers. To my surprise, in February 2015, I met Sadiq in a boarding school in Hadramaut. He was among five students from Ambon sent by the ar-Rahmah foundation, led by my Sada informant, Muhammad Rifki al-Hamid (see pages 72-73), to study there. Sadiq himself has no Arab roots. Once he told me that he wanted to go the nursing academy, but I realized he changed his mind when I saw him studying in the school of Hadramaut.

there would be a special prayer ritual to celebrate a Nisfu Sha'ban.[55] When I arrived at the meeting, a large crowd of approximately two hundred women had already gathered. The participants were of various backgrounds, most of them non-Arab. Judging them by their physical appearance, clothes, make-up, accessories and jewelry, I surmise that many of them came from middle class families. Although all women wore Islamic dress, their clothes were of the latest fashion. I folded my legs and sat down on the rug like the other participants. I waited for some time and kept wondering why the ritual had not been started yet although the hall was already filled. Then the entrance of a specific woman attracted my attention. She wore a long purple dress combined with a large headscarf in the same color. Unlike most women, she had not attached her headscarf with a safety pin so that some of her hair was showing. People came forward to greet her, including the hostess. She then sat on the rug five meters from where I was sitting. I did not recognize her until an old lady sitting next to me told me that she was the wife of Deputy Governor of Maluku. I had not recognized her because on the photographs on banners in the streets or in advertisements in which she is shown next to her husband, she never wears a headscarf.

Apart from reciting the Fatiha and the Yasin, the first and 36th suras of the Qur'an, we also recited some *du'a* or supplication prayers to seek forgiveness for both the living and the deceased, particulary for the ancestors of the Alatas clan, to which Rugaya Alatas claims to belong. Particularly interesting in relation to the topic of this section is that throughout the ritual both Rugaya Alatas and the *imam* kept requesting the participants to also pray for the winning of Said Assagaf in the 2013 general election because the result of the first round-election was being counted as we were performing the ritual. The meeting ended by performing the *maghrib* or sunset prayer together, which was led by the *imam*.

What the cases above reflect is how political support and legitimacy is established through various channels, not in the least through religious channels. The *'ulama* are salient actors in local politics, especially in terms of mobilizing local voters and providing political candidates with normative legitimacy. Some Hadramis engaging in local politics also use these religious channels to seek and maintain their power. The case studies also illustrate, however, that ethnic affiliation may crosscut religious affiliation to support or hamper gaining the support of voters.

[55] Nisfu Sha'ban is the fifteenth day of the month of Sha'ban (the eigth month) of the Islamic calendar. It is believed that on this date, the Angels will deliver a person's record of deeds conducted in the previous year to God. Muslims are encouraged to pray and repent as much as possible on this occasion so that their bad deeds will be removed from the records and their bad conduct will be forgiven.

The case studies that I discussed in this section of Hadramis who are actively engaged in politics mainly concerned men (see table 3.1). This is not to suggest, however, that women are not politically active. As in other public fields, Hadrami women may participate in political parties as well, especially since in the context of reform era the Indonesian government has opened up the opportunity for women to participate in politics. The government has tried to reduce the gender imbalance in the legislative membership by issuing a policy of 30% quota for women in the parliamentary seats. Although women's participation in Indonesian politics is growing, the 30% electoral quota has not yet been realized. According to the 2018 BPS report, male politicians dominated the local parliamentary seats in Ambon in the 2013 general election (BPS 2018, 3-4). Only three out of the thirty-five legislative members in Ambon are women, all of whom from non-Hadrami families. I did, however, encounter several women in Ambon, both of Hadrami and other backgrounds, who are active members in political parties, although they have not yet gained any parliamentary seats. One of few examples I can mention here is Dila, a fifty-three-year-non-Sada entrepreneur, who was an active member of a secular party PDI-P during my fieldwork. Dira told me that she was very much interested in joining the party because of the party's profile and openness to female leadership. Besides, she was engaged in the party in order to secure and expand her commercial activities.[56] Another example is a cousin of the former Governor of Maluku Said Assagaf. Assagaf's cousin has been involved in the Golkar party, the same party in which Assagaf was engaged. During my fieldwork she managed to obtain a position as treasurer in the party. Unfortunately I did not manage to arrange meeting her myself, but according to my informants, Assagaf's cousin never succeeded in winning a local parliamentary seat. In these two examples, like many Hadrami men engaged in the politics, those Hadrami women who participate in politics have their own considerations in making choices that serve their own interest best.

5.3 Politics and Alliances

After the 1999 – 2002 communal conflicts, the general preconception about the population of Ambon is that they are segregated into two different religious communities of Christians and Muslims. In some respects this is the case, for example in terms of residential patterns. However, the picture seems to be more complicated when taking into consideration another aspect, namely ethnic group membership as it is played out in people's daily lives. Categorization takes place on the basis of several levels of 'local' and 'non-local' groups, or 'indigenous' versus 'non-indigenous' ethnic groups.

[56] Interview with Dila, December 19, 2014.

In terms of local ethnic groups, the inhabitants of Ambon are generally divided into people from Central Maluku and people from Southeast Maluku. People tend to be very loyal to their own group. Although both Central Maluku and Southeast Maluku consist of several islands, Central Maluku is usually associated with the term *Orang* Ambon (People of Ambon) and Southeast Maluku is associated with the term *Orang Tenggara* or *Orang Kei* (People of Southeast Maluku or People of Kei). The exception is people from Geser, which is geographically located in Central Maluku, but its people have had an alliance with people from the Kei group. The alliance of the Geser people with the Kei group is due to a historical alliance in which the ancestors of Geser made a hard *pela* (political alliance) with Kei (Bartels 1977). The alliance has prevented the people of Geser and Kei from turning against each other in a conflict. This *pela* (political alliance) still exists today, and it is considered to be part of customary laws in Maluku and used as a means of resolving conflicts between disputing parties. People from the Lease Islands, such as Haruku and Saparua, usually dominate the Central Maluku group. Local society in Ambon is grouped into those of Geser-Kei origin and those of Haruku and Saparua origin, a division which sometimes trigger clashes between the groups.[57] I witnessed several occasions of riots close to the neighbourhood where I lived in Ambon in 2012. Apart from this local general ethnic grouping, people in Ambon have strong ties with their home-village. Riots between two neighbouring *negeris* (villages) such Mamala-Morela (Leihitu Ambon), Hitu-Wakal (Leihitu Ambon), Luhu-Iha (West Seram), Porto-Haria (Saparua), Pelauw-Ori (Haruku), Mardika-Batumerah (Ambon) occurred often both long before and after the communal conflicts. The factors that trigger such riots sometimes seem to be very trivial, such as a quarrel between two inhabitants from different villages in a feast where both got drunk. Many cases of the clashes between two neighbouring villages resulted in claims and counter-claims about disputed economic resources such as lands, water supply, or plants. In this context, as some scholars have suggested, communal conflicts in Maluku can be a means of the settling of long-term disputes concerning access to economic resources (Von Benda-Beckmann and Von Benda-Beckmann 2007; Adam 2010a).

Outside the local groups are those people from Sulawesi, Java, Sumatra, and other different islands of Indonesia. Although the 1999 – 2002 communal

[57] According to data from Lembaga Antar Iman Maluku (LAIM, Maluku inter-faith institute), there were about 112 small incidents between 2010-2012 in Maluku. These incidents were not only clashes between communities of different religions, but also clashes between ethnic groups as well as clashes between neighbouring villages (https://lembagaantarimanmaluku.wordpress.com). Another report from the Habibie Center similarly suggest that conflicts due to contest on identity and resource in Ambon were predominant from 2002-2012 (Ansori et.al 2014).

conflicts was framed into religious terms in an early phase, they are also entangled with campaigns of people who want to dispel all non-indigenous groups from Ambon (Gos 2000; Bertrand 2002; Van Klinken 2007; Schulze 2017). Some Ambonese consider Hadramis, although born in Ambon, as non-indigenous and thus classify them under the non-local ethnic groups. In practice, this complex constellation of multi-level and multi-dimensional classification patterns plays out differently in different circumstances. In order to be successful, politicians seeking support therefore have to be very adroit in tapping into the various sources on which loyalty claims can be based.

To conclude, in Ambon's recent political history, particularly in the wake of 1999 – 2002 conflicts, the tense relationship between Muslims and Christians and their competition over political dominance continues to be a very important issue in Ambon. At the same time, however, the discussion in this chapter demonstrates that religion is only one of the significant markers that affects the political preferences of the Hadramis. There is no unified body of politics among Hadramis. Besides a shared ethnic background, another marker that shapes their political activities and loyalties is kinship ties. Although kinship ties and religion play a significant role in the political choices and activities of Hadramis, the significance of shared religion and ethnicity should not be overestimated. As demonstrated in my discussion of five case studies, the diversity of the Hadramis' political activities and loyalties should also be put in a context that is shaped by a wide range of individual interests.

6. Every Day Life Practices: Language, Food, and Dress

This section describes several cultural lived practices of the Hadramis in relation to a broader Ambonese society. This discussion is aimed at understanding the ways in which they differentiate among themselves (Sada and non-Sada), and between the Hadramis as a group and other groups in the local society. I will do so by focusing on the performance of a specific distinct cultural Hadrami identity through language, food habits and sartorial practices.

Today, Hadramis seem to be integrated into the local culture of Ambonese society. Their everyday practices to some extent obscure the distinction between them and other Muslim communities and also between them and non-Muslim communities in Ambon. For example, they do not speak Arabic. All of them use the Ambonese-Malay language in their daily social interaction. Several factors may account for the fact that they do not speak Arabic, such as being in a minority position, absence of residential separation from other communities, and intermarriage practices. Another example is food. The regular staple food in Ambonese society is seafish and *sago,* the extracted

starch from palm tree. Although *sago* has mostly been replaced by rice nowadays, it continues to serve as an alternative staple food today. As seafish is part of the daily diet of Ambonese people, they do not eat sweet water fish. Some informants who occasionally visit Java, for instance, expressed their admiration for my natal island but at the same time complained about the food. As one person confided: "It was nice to be there, but I suffered a lot because I could not find seafish". Interestingly, I found two general Ambonese food products that my informants claimed to be Arab food. These are *asida,* a cake made of flour mixed with palm sugar, coconut milk, and butter, and *nasi kebuli*, curry rice mixed with beef. When I went to Christian areas, I saw people selling *asida* in their stalls in the market. *Asida,* then*,* can be found everywhere, and is even popular among members of the Christian community. During my short fieldwork in Hadramaut in February 2015, on one occasion my informants and I went to an al-Hamid family in Wadi Bin Ali. The host served us food and drinks, and one of the desserts offered to us was *asida*, locally called *asid* (see figure 3.7). The *nasi kebuli* is usually served on special occasions, such as weddings or circumcision feasts. It is popular among the more general Muslim community, not exclusively among the Hadramis. I have attended several weddings, both in Hadrami and non-Hadrami families, and each time, *nasi kebuli,* together with other Ambonese food, was served.

Figure 3.7: Hadrami food served to my Indonesian informants and me
during our visit to a local family in Hadramaut in 2015 (photographed by the author)

Marianne Hulsbosch (2014) argues that the bodily care and practices of Ambonese people in the colonial era not only reflected corporeal demands but also located them into a group of people in society in terms of class, gender, religion, politics, economy, others. In particular, sartorial practices were important as a social identity marker for the Ambonese population. Today, I observed, it is more difficult to clearly identify members of different groups by the way they dress. The Hadramis in Ambon wear various styles of clothing, as do many other Ambonese. Also more generally, ascribing the Hadramis particular practices does not do justice to them, for they are heterogeneous in their public performances. Understanding embodied culture of the Hadramis should therefore be approached as a multiple meaning making process in the construction of personal and social identity.

Particularly concerning the dresscode of men, it is not always easy to differentiate between different groups of people in Ambon, except for religious occasions such as in prayers. Hadrami men wear the same kind of attire when performing their prayers as other Muslim men; they wear long trousers or a traditional lower garment called *sarung* (a large fabric wrapped around the waist), which may or may not be combined with a headdress. This *sarung* is also used in other countries, mainly in South East Asia, some of the Indian sub-continent, and in Yemen. People in Hadramaut even use the same word *sarung*. The practice of wearing this sort of attire results from regional trade relations in former times, although the occasions for which men put on a *sarung* vary between different regions.

During my short fieldtrip to Hadramaut, I noted that many Yemeni men wear the *sarung* for their daily activities, not necessarily to perform prayers. In other regions of Indonesia, for example in Java, the *sarung* is worn more often by people in villages, and by people in traditional boarding schools. Although by and large I noticed no difference between Sada, non-Sada and other Muslim men in Ambon, on specific occasions such as religious feasts, Sada men wear a white turban and a white long robe. If the use of *sarung* is shared by both Sada and non-Sada and other Ambonese Muslim men in Ambon and even by people of various countries especially Yemen and Indonesia, the white turban and *thobe* (a loose ankle-length attire with long sleeves) are exclusively worn by Sada men. One of my informants, Muhammad Rifki al-Hamid (see pages 72-73) wears the *thobe*. He told me the following about the meaning of the garment to him:

> Honestly, when I arrived in Hadramaut for first time (2008) I still wore trousers and a shirt. Then I learned there how to wear a *thobe*. When I went back to Indonesia, I started to wear this long robe. Actually I got a position as a civil servant in the ministry of religious affairs after my return from Hadramaut but I decided to decline it because I was asked by the officials to wear trousers and a shirt. With this kind of attire, I will

> always be reminded to behave carefully and to be a model of a good Muslim. When I completed my studies in Hadramaut, I received this white turban from my teacher. It is kind of *ijaza* (certificate, Istiqomah) and thus I should maintain it in any situation. I will never sell out my faith for worldly affairs. I am comfortable with dressing this way and I should not be afraid of losing a job because we can still make a living with any kind of halal (permissible, Istiqomah) job.[58]

For Muhammad Rifki al-Hamid wearing the white turban and *thobe* is thus related to the religious education he received in Hadramaut. From the quotation it also transpires that besides being a bodily technique that stimulates pious behavior, wearing this kind of attire also signifies to the outside world his status as a man of religious learning and prophetic descent.

In addition to specific dress habits of Sada, to a certain extent, religious distinction can also be recognized in the dress code of Muslim men with a (neo) Salafi identity. Neo-Salafi men usually wear trousers or a *sarung* above their ankles (*lihya*). According to what some informants told me, the neo-Salafi movement has been growing since the 1999 – 2002 communal conflicts. Research seems to confirm this (see chapter 5 section 3.3.1). My informant Hasan al-Kathiri, for example, acknowledged that he has become a neo-Salafi as a result of his interaction with some other neo-Salafis. I could tell that he was influenced by a neo-Salafi ideology from a neo-Salafi mosque in front of his shop in the market, where he regularly performed his prayers during the work by the way he wore trousers above his ankles. Also, when he was not busy helping his customers, I noticed that he liked to watch a neo-Salafi TV channel from Java in his shop.

The sartorial practices of a more traditionalist informant and that of a neo-Salafi informant described above illustrate how various identifications intersect in how Hadramis in Ambon dress. Moreover, the examples illustrate how they engage with other local actors in religious contestations in which the body becomes the symbol of a struggle of various ideologies and a vehicle for public statements. As the clothed body becomes an arena of struggle for 'social identity' including religious identity, its public statement visualizes a multiple social identity (gender, religion, class, etc), the meanings of which are open to contestation.

This comes even more clearly to the fore in the variety of dresscodes of my female informants. Some Hadrami women wear what is locally identified as 'Islamic dress' while others do not. Those who wear Islamic dress differ in their styles. Some wear stylish headscarves while others don plain, darker coloured veils. Those who do not wear Islamic dress otherwise do not differ much from those wearing stylish Islamic dress. The only difference is that they

[58] Interview with Muhammad Rifki al-Hamid, September 30, 2014.

do not cover their head. The rest of their bodies are covered in the same way as those of the women wearing stylish Islamic dress. At first glance, I found it difficult to differentiate beween Hadramis or other Muslims and other non-Muslims. How dress codes may be played out in practice can best be illustrated by providing some examples.

Case 1: Dress and Religious Ideology

My informant Lubna Mauladawilah (see page 77) is a religious preacher from a Sada family. The first time I met her was in her shop on February 11, 2013 when her husband introduced me to her. Afterwards, I attended her study group several times. On these occasions she always wore a loose robe and colorful headscarf. In May 2015, I met her at a ritual meeting of the Sada group Rabita al-'Alawiyya, and she wore a complete black *niqab* with a face veil. Mauladawilah is not the first person who wears a *niqab* in Ambon. Other women from the community of a neo-Salafi group of Java have used *niqab* since they settled in a particular own quarter in Ambon during and after the 1999-2002 conflicts. During my stay in Ambon, I encountered some of them in public places with or without the company of a *mahram* or male custodian. Occasionally I met them while using the public transport. Since Lubna Mauladawilah has a traditionalist religious background, her wearing the *niqab* illustrates that this garment is no longer a distinctive marker for a particular religious ideology, namely neo-Salafism. Similar examples can be seen among other informants, such as Gaia (see page 83).

Gaia is a widow from a non-Sada family. She and her daughter's family live in her small house, which is located in a densely populated neighbourhood near the harbor. In her daily activities, Gaia dresses in a long loose dress and a loosely wrapped headscarf. After having seen Gaia at several meetings, I found out that she is affiliated with a neo-Salafi school of thought. She told me that her husband was a member of an Islamic fighter group and had gone missing during the conflicts. Contrary to her mother, Gaia's daughter did not cover her head, and on some occasions I saw her wearing a short shirt or short trousers when going out. Although Gaia is a neo-Salafi oriented believer, she does not cover her face, nor does she force her daughter to dress like her. This plurality of sartorial practices in one family is common and shows how different religious styles can live side by side in one family.

Case 2: Dress and Occupation

My informant Faiza (see page 53) is a government official from a Sada family. I met her several times wearing her outdoor clothes. She was well and elegantly dressed up when I looked her up once in her work office. In her daily activities outside the office, she dressed more simple but still she followed the latest

fashion. When I complimented her once for her looks, she remarked, "Look, honestly, I am 47 years old".[59] Her position in the government is one among other reasons why she pays so much attention to her appearance. Her clothes express not merely her religious identity but also other dimensions of her social identity, such as belonging to a certain professional group. Faiza is not the only person who spends her money for decorating her body with luxurious clothes. Other informants, such as Niswa, also spend much money and time for her body.

Case 3: Dress and Religious Consumerism

Niswa (45 years old) is of non-Sada origin and works as a lecturer at a private college. Whenever I met her, she always wore her stylish headscarf combined with a long blouse and a long skirt or trousers. She told me that every time she went to Java for her job, she spent time shopping for clothes. She said, "Here, clothes are very expensive and also out of date…now I can buy what I like but once I am married I won't have time".[60] Niswa's case show how Hadramis do not just orient themselves on the local Ambonese society, but also on wider cultural contexts in which global consumerism is part of the daily life of religious community. Yet, dress is more than a sign of conspicuous consumption, it can also be a symbol of resistance, as the case of my informant Rafa (see page 76) below illustrates.

Case 4: Dress and Feminism

My informant Rafa is a journalist of mixed origin whom I met in some occasions during my fieldwork. Her father is of Sada origin, and her mother is a woman of local Ambonese Christian origin who has converted to Islam. I was introduced to Rafa at a seminar at the State Islamic Institute (IAIN) in 2012 by a colleague who knew about my research. If my colleague had not added the information about Rafa's background, I would never have guessed she belonged to a Sada family. Rafa looked 'local', having no physical Arab appearance. Moreover, she was completely dressed in black; wearing a short black shirt, black trousers that were full of holes, casual black shoes, and she had even painted her lips black. On the basis of her appearance I concluded that Rafa was a woman who liked to present herself as rather androgynous if not, masculine. I was quite surprised then, when I visited her in her home, and noticed that she was wearing a more feminine type of dress. When I commented on the different style of clothing, Rafa explained that she does not resist a 'feminine dress' as such, but that the way she dresses in public is a

[59] Interview with Faiza, October 17, 2014.
[60] Interview with Niswa, December 15, 2014.

symbol of her resistance against a patriarchal society, which is characterized by conceiving of masculinity and femininity in opposite terms, and in male domination over women.

The cases above demonstrate that through particular dress habits as well as through body modifications and deportment, people are engaged in complex processes of expressing and constructing individual and social group identifications. Sartorial practices thus provide "a window to look at into a culture -- a window allows a viewer to look in, but also to look out" (Hulsbosch 2014, 6). In this regard, while reflecting both personal and various social dimensions of identity, 'reading' the corporeal performances of Hadramis of Ambon is no easy matter as the meanings behind them are fluid and complex.

7. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have sketched a general picture of the socio-economic, political and cultural practices of Hadramis in Ambon in the present-day era. The Hadramis are a patrilineal descent-based community, claiming a shared origin from Hadramaut. However, as I have demonstrated in this chapter, they are far from a homogenous group. Rather, they are divided into different families/clans as well as into a broad category of Sada and non-Sada. All these heterogeneous classification and status claims show the persistence of some traditional Hadrami social stratification patterns. The distinction between Sada and non-Sada categories remains dominant as a marker of social status or as 'symbolic capital' rather than a social class.

What transpires from the case studies presented in the different sections of this chapter is that the distinction between Sada and non-Sada does not fully prescribe the way the Hadramis act in the public sphere. Their status as Hadramis is, in fact, interlocked in wider social fields in the local structure of Ambon. In this context, the Hadramis of Ambon have proved their adaptability to changing socio-cultural, economic, and political contexts.

The Hadramis' engagement in various professional occupations and political affiliations shows that they are an integral part of the local socio-political structure and participate in seeking, exercising and maintaining power obtained through various economic and political resources, in ways that best serves their personal purposes. The relation between Sada and non-Sada groups should be viewed not only within the wider spectrum of the dynamic power relationship between the two groups both in the diaspora and the homeland, but also on a micro scale of intra- and inter-personal relationships among themselves (see marriage patterns in chapter 4 section 3.1).

Female members of diasporic Hadrami communties are often neglected in research projects on Hadramis. The section on women's economic activities in

this chapter indicates that today, Hadrami women in Ambon have contributed considerably to the dynamics of the Hadrami community in particular and a broader social community in general. Hadrami women are not merely objects for the maintenance of a distinct Hadrami identity situated in a private sphere, but they are active and creative actors playing mediating roles between public and private spheres by engaging in various social fields and at the same time keeping their domestic responsibility.

Therefore, I would argue that Hadrami descendants in Ambon today can best be conceived of as what Appadurai (1997, 90) calls a 'soft culture' community, which allows a relative flexibility of social meanings, values, and organizations. Its 'soft culture' nature enables such a community to engage in various social webs of relationships that may accommodate different customs, values, or norms, without any fear of losing its distinct ethno-religious identity (Feldman 2015, 182). In the next chapters, I will zoom in on the ways in which this distinct ethno-religious identity is maintained and contested.

Chapter 4: Kinship, Marriage, and Gender

1. Introduction

The chapter discusses the relationship between kinship, identity construction, and gender relations in the Hadrami community in Ambon. It focuses on the ways Hadramis engage in situated practices of kinship relations and how these kinship practices affect gender relations, social reproduction and identity construction. It examines how descent or genealogical reckoning is an embodied practice of social reproduction and identity making on the basis of gender difference. In this chapter, I employ kinship theories as a framework to understand the relationship between kinship, identity making, and gender relations. The first part of the chapter sketches the specific kinship system that in principle governs the ways the Hadrami community of Ambon conceives of family relations. It covers fundamental elements that constitute a kinship system in the community, and relationship between patrilineal descent, kin terms, genealogy and naming system. The second part deals with the ways in which this kinship system informs marriage practices. It will address marriage patterns of the Sada and non-Sada, the conception on *kafa'a* regulations, and its impact on gender relations.

2. A Kinship System among the Hadrami Community of Ambon

Kinship is generally defined as a web of social relationships between categories of persons on the basis of descent and marriage that form consanguine and affine relations (Stone 1997, 5). This general definition was predominantly central in early anthropological studies on kinship (Goody 1973; Peletz 1995; Holy 1996; Carsten 2004; Strathern 2005; Sahlins 2011). The specific approach of kinship in this definition has been criticized as being ethnocentric, since it conceptualizes of kinship in terms of genealogical grids or biological ties (blood ties) which may be dominant in western societies but less primarily so in many other societies. One of the leading critics in this matter was Schneider (1984), who defines social bonds (kinship) as a performatively constituted field of social relations which do not necessarily entail genealogical (biological) connections. In other words, Schneider is concerned more with forms of doing than with forms of being, in aspects of nurture rather than of nature. Since Schneider's critique, more and more scholars have approached kinship as a cultural construct by emphasizing the interrelationship between nature and nurture aspects, between the biological and the social, and between real and fictive kinship.

Today, the study of kinship has lost its centrality in contemporary anthropological research, along with the development of medical technology on social reproduction, LGBTQ+ communities, and the decline in western marriage institutions (Read 2007, 329). Also, the focus of kinship studies has shifted from 'kinship' as a terminological system and as a symbolic system in its own right towards kinship in the sense of social relations among variably situated actors engaged in the practice of social reproduction (Peletz 1995, 366; Read 2007, 329). Likewise, current kinship studies focus less on terminologies as such but on linking conceptions of kinship with other aspects such as economy, power, religion, gender, and others (Godelier 2011, 19). This is how I approach kinship in this chapter.

Scholars in Hadrami studies seem to agree that Hadrami migrants actively maintain a distinct diasporic cultural identity. Syed Farid Alatas clearly gives reference to the importance of kinship as he states:

> The Hadhrami migrants in diaspora had for centuries married into East African, South Indian and Malay-Indonesian communities without losing the sense of Hadhrami identity, because such identity was neither national nor ethnic, but was based on kinship. The locus of Hadhrami identity was not so much language but nasab (lineage), which formed the basis of a uniquely Hadhrami type of *asabiyya* (Alatas 1997, 29).

This statement points to two themes: kinship and group formation. Although intermarriage is a salient factor of kinship relations and functioned as cementing ties between the Hadramis, hosting societies and other Hadrami diaspora, the Hadrami identity according to Alatas was primarily formed on the basis of genealogical connections (blood ties). His argument reminds us about early anthropological debates on fundamental assumptions of kinship, whether descent or alliance is a primordial axis constituting kinship, and whether biological or social ties are elements of forming kinship (Godelier 2011). Alatas himself does not refer to kinship debates. The reason I quote him here is that I take his argument as a starting point for my discussion of the kinship system that is the basic point of reference for present-day Hadramis' kinship system. I will address what constitutes fundamental aspects of the kinship system among the Hadramis, how kinship is related to (group) identity making, and how the kinship system is maintained over generations.

By analyzing conceptions of kinship among today's Hadrami descendants of Ambon, rather than merely assuming real genealogical connections, I follow scholars who define kinship as "a cultural construct expressed through a kinship terminology constituted as an interconnected system of symbols, with persons defined as kin to one another realized in many different modalities" (Read 2007, 331). This definition is in line with the actual flexible kinship practices of Hadramis in which descent is one among several other important

categories in forming webs of social relations. Following Keesing (1975, 17) and Stone (1997, 11) who contend that descent serves as a means of constructing discrete, stable groups which persist over time, I argue that genealogical reckoning is a symbolic cultural construct that the Hadramis use in order to form group identities. How a specific cultural kinship construct based on genealogical ties continues to inform kinship practices among today's Hadramis in Ambon will be delineated in the following sections.

2.1 Patrilineal Descent and Kin Terms

The Hadramis in Ambon generally adopt a patrilineal descent system, tracing lineage from Hadramaut in southern Arabian peninsula through shared male ancestors. This means that the community continues the Arab system from the country of origin. This agnatic system is used by local Ambonese as well, who differ in this respect from most ethnic groups in Indonesian society who tend to adopt a bilateral descent system. Although the Hadrami community inherited an agnatic descent system from Hadramaut, its members do not use an Arab kin pattern, which is classified under the Sudanese system in a full sense.[61] Rather, the community combines Arab kin terms from Hadramaut and local terms in their daily activities (see a list of the kin terms in the table below).

Table 4.1: A List of Kin Terms

Kin Terms	Arabic	Ambonese
Father's father	*Jid, Habib*	*Tetek*
Father's mother	*Jidda, Hababa*	*Nenek*
Mother's father	*Jid, Habib*	*Tetek*
Mother's mother	*Jidda, Hababa*	*Nenek*
Father	*Abi, Aba*	*Papa*
Mother	*Umi*	*Mama*
Father's brother	*Ami*	*Om, Paman*
Father's sister	*Amati*	*Bibi, Tante*
Mother's brother	*Khal*	*Om, Paman*
Mother's sister	*Khalati*	*Bibi, Tante*
Mother's sibling's children	*Ibn Khal*	*Sepupu, Adik, Kakak*
Father's sibling's children	*Ibn Ami*	*Sepupu, Adik, Kakak*

[61] The Sudanese system is one of the six major patterns of kinship system classified by L.H Morgan (1871), and it is based on a descriptive model. The descriptive model is a system in which it gives a separate definition (term) for almost each one of Ego's kin, based on their distance from Ego, their relation, and their gender. Ego's Father is differentiated from Ego's Father's brother and from Ego's mother's brother. Likewise, Ego's mother is distinguished from Ego's sister and Ego's mother's sister. The Arab society is under a category of this pattern.

The list above reveals that there are mixed terms of address, which combine Arabic, localized Dutch,[62] and local words. In daily practice, I noted that the Arab descendants rarely use *jid* and *jidda*. They rather use other Arabic terms such as *habib* and *hababa,* which literally mean 'beloved'. The terms of address for maternal grandparents depend on their lineage. If the patrilineal descent of maternal grandparents is from Hadramaut, they may be addressed and referred to with the same terms *habib* and *hababa.* Alternatively, they may be addressed or referred to with the Ambonese terms *tetek* and *nenek*. The terms *habib* and *hababa* are used to address (great) great grandparents as well. In practice, the terms *habib* and *hababa* are commonly used terms for elder people. In addition, there are different terms to address ego's mother's siblings and ego's father's siblings in Arabic. Paternal uncles and aunts are called *ami* and *amati*, while maternal uncles and aunts are called *khal* and *khalati.* I noted that in daily communication some Hadramis use the terms *khal* and *khalati*, but they do not use *amati*. This *amati* is replaced by Ambonese terms *bibi*, *tante*, and even *ibu*, which literally means 'mother' but which is also used as a term of respect for older women. Likewise, the terms *ami* and *khal* are only used by some descendants, and they may be replaced by the local terms *om* or *paman*. Many Hadramis also replace *abi* and *umi* with *papa* and *mama,* while many others prefer *abi-umi* terms, and some of them combine *abi* or *aba* with *mama*. Furthermore, I did not come across the use of Arabic terms for paternal and maternal cousins, although the Arabic terms *ibn ami* and *ibn khal* are used to address paternal cousin and maternal cousin consecutively. In other words, all cousins, whether paternal or maternal, parallel or cross, bear the same term 'cousin' in local terms.

Thus, in their daily encounters today's Hadramis in Ambon use mixed kin terms rather than fully applying Arabic ones. In fact, they borrow from different languages, blending local (or localized) and Hadramaut traditions. Holton (2013) argues on local language extinction in eastern Indonesia that kinship terminology is the first semantic domain to erode under conditions of language shifts due to intermarriage. As a consequence of intermarriage, some original lexical terms may be retained but the kinship terms tend to shift semantically. In the case of the Hadrami community of Ambon, both lexical and semantic aspects of Arabic kin terms have shifted: some terms have been changed, others have not. Also, some terms have been retained but have acquired a different meaning. In this context, language borrowing reflected in the use of kinship terms bears witness of the historical developments of the Hadrami community and its relations with the local population through intermarriage (see further in the section of marriage patterns).

[62] By localized Dutch, I mean Dutch words (terms of address) that have been adopted or borrowed by local Ambonese and other Indonesians as an influence of colonialism.

As illustrated above, there is both continuity and change in the use of patrilineal ancestors' kin terms. As Bloch (1971) and Evans-Pritchard (1964) argue, the categories of kin terms or modes of address may constitute social relations, including rights and obligations within the categories of persons related to birth and marriage, but they give no adequate explanation for the ways that boundaries between groups inside and outside the Hadramis are drawn. The use of some Arabic kin terms to address categories of people that one is related to through birth or marriage shows that the Hadrami community is only partly influenced by its agnatic descent system inherited from Hadramaut. In the following section, I will delineate how a patrilineal descent system is applied in the naming system as a boundary marker of a group (social identity) formation, and thus both expresses and affects social relations, including gender relations.

2.2 Patrilineal Descent and Naming System

The underlying focus in this section is on delineating naming practices among the Hadrami community in relation to a patrilineal descent system. Names and naming practices have been discussed in many anthropological works from functionalism to structuralism approaches (see Vom Bruck and Bodernhorn 2006). In the context of my own ethnographic study, I will consider personal names among Hadramis not only as either codes (signifiers) or as speech acts, but as an entanglement of both. In other words, names are not merely a code (signifier) rendering information about individuals in their collective property or social matrix (classificatory labels), but they are also a way of constituting social relations that may have implications for defining or crossing boundaries (Vom Bruck and Bodernhorn 2006, 25-26).

Today's naming practices among Hadramis in Ambon are very much influenced by the community's drawing on a patrilineal descent system inherited from Hadramaut. The continued influence of Hadrami naming traditions does not mean that the community lacks creativity and innovation in their naming practice as will be explained further in detail below.

The pattern of personal naming in general has two components: given names and surnames. The first component, given names, usually consists of one word such as Alwiyya or Alwi. One of the striking features in the first component is that most of the common names for both male and female names are typically adopted from Hadramaut.[63] The second feature is that many of

[63] The most common female names are Amina, Khadija, Fatima, Fatma, Alwiyah, Syechah, Feryal, Maryam, Rugaya, Aisya, Kalsum, Raguan, Gamar, Tsurayya, Shifa, Muzna, Masni, Madina, Salma, Hamidah, Balqis, Farida, Lun, and Nur. The most common male names are Abdullah, Muhammad, Ahmad, Ali, Hasan, Husain, Alwi,

the given names are repetitive of names from older generations. When, for example, I asked a forty-two-year-old Sada descendant, Aliya how she named her children, she explained:

> We name our children by following the names of our forefathers because otherwise we lose them… the names of my four children follow those of my great grandfather, my father's brother, my grandfather, and my grandmother respectively. My own name also resembles my grandfather's sister's name.[64]

This informant's statement reflects that this kind of repetitive practice is a way to easily remember their older family members and to keep the tradition alive.

On one occasion, I was invited by a young Hadrami family of Sada origin to come to a name-giving ritual for their first new-born baby. The young couple told me that they were very glad with their new-born baby for they had waited two years to get pregnant. In this ceremony, the couple showed their baby to their guests, a mixed group of relatives, neighbors and friends, and shared with them the baby's name and their expectations and reasons of giving a particular name for the baby. In the name-giving ceremony, the parents requested prayers from the guests and asked blessings from older members of the family for the new-born baby. The ritual included body movements and chants of religious texts like those recited in *maulid* celebrations.

In this context, two kinds of collective memory are involved. Keeping a tradition alive through a repetitive act of naming involves what is called 'episodic memory'. The name-giving ceremony itself involves 'procedural memory or implicit memory', which includes ceremonial behaviors as described by Paul Connerton (1984) in *How societies remember*.[65] This practice of repeating names in Hadrami families, whether formally celebrated in a ritual or not, is aimed at easily recalling ancestors' names and the persons attached to the names in people's memory. This naming practice in oral tradition is very important being able to preserve the lineage easily and prevent losing a genealogical record, especially when a written tradition in a society is not yet developed.

Abdurrahman, Muhsin, Abu Bakar, Awadh, Salim, Sahil, Hasyim, Hamid, Saggaf, Tahir, Abdul Qadir, Idrus, Umar, Agil, Muhdar, Syech, Muthahar, Saleh, Hamzah, and Raqwan.

[64] Interview with Aliya, December 5, 2014.

[65] David Manier and William Hirst identify three categories of collective memories, namely episodic memory, semantic memory, and procedural memory. Episodic memory is memory about events in the particular personal past of members of a mnemonic community such as a group of friends or families; semantic memory is memory about all general facts that people learn, and is divided into lived memory and distant memory; procedural memory is memory about events stored through commemorative ceremonies (Manier and Hirst 2008, 61).

The given names of Hadramis intersect with other social categories, such as religion. This religious dimension relates to much more than categorizing a person in terms of his religious affiliation; it delivers messages about who an individual is and it informs the named individual who they are expected to be (Arnold 1988, 53). In this context, names convey messages on the conception of self (identity) in several ways; by locating an individual into a social matrix, and also by interpreting the lexical meanings of the names hoped for qualities of an individual (Arnold 1988, 53). Similarly, in the Hadrami Sada context, a name such as Shaikh bears three different connotations that touch upon both literal and contextual meanings of the name. Engseng Ho (2002) analyzes how the name 'Shaikh' in the biographical Sada text is used to connote three aspects. First, as a person who lived until an advanced age; second, as a leader of esoteric Sufis of his age; third, as a teacher of students in exoteric science. The first is more in a literal sense, and the latter two are more contextual in regard to the positions of the person who bears an honorific name (Ho 2002, 222).

In the context of my informants too, some Islamic names may have a psychological effect on a person because when giving a name, parents hope that their children will have good manners and behavior in their life in accordance with the literal meanings of the words or the heroic activities associated with the names in Islamic history, such as Amina, Khadija, Aisha, Fatima, Abdullah, Muhammad, Umar, Abu Bakar, Ali, Hasan, Husain, or other heroic names in a more contemporary era (Eickelman 1989). A Sada descendant, Shauqi (45 years old), husband of my informant Aliya, for instance, explained why the name of his last child differs from the rest: "My first child's name is like my grandfather, the second is like my father's younger brother, the third is like my father, the fourth is like my mother. The last is a bit different. He is called Sayyid Shamil Bashaib, the name of today's *mujahidin*".[66] He continued by saying that he and his wife hope their last son will be a real *mujahid* (Islamic fighter). In this sense, a name is not just a matter of word choice. Arabic names are supposed to be Islamic and therefore appropriate, and they are expected to invoke blessings. Moreover, a name may points to a role model, an ideal figure, whose manners, attitude and aptitude are projected on a person's child's future, thus illustrating Levy-Bruhl's argument that names are more than a simply code; they are potentially powerful things in themselves (Vom Bruck and Bodernhorn 2006, 10).

As the Hadramis are not the only Muslim groups in Ambon, to some extent they share given names with other Muslim communities. However, I noticed that other Muslim communities of Ambon generally tend to use popular Islamic names referring to well-known role models in Islamic

[66] Interview with Shauqi, December 5, 2014

historiography, such as Ali, Muhammad, Hasan, Husain, Amina, Fatima, Khadija, or Kalsum, rather than other particular names such as Muhdar, Alwi, Saggaf, Shaikh, Alwiyya, Shaikha, Rugaya, which are mainly used by the Hadramis.

Although most of the given names reflect continuation of the Hadramaut tradition, many of today's young families combine several names in choosing first names for their children, while still keeping the most common Hadrami given names. Many informants had given their children more than three names, which were derived from several traditions (western, local, Arab), thus illustrating that naming is a creative action that may serve different purposes (Vom Bruck and Bodernhorn 2006, 10). In this creative action, Hadramis may share some names with other groups in Ambonese society and convey personal and collective desires or orientations that transcend classificatory labels, such as religion, nationality, ethnicity, and others.

The second component of the Hadrami naming system is surnames. As the Hadrami community adopts a patrilineal descent system, both male and female members are born into the group of male lineage, and both men and women inherit in a patriline through their fathers. This means that both sons and daughters bear the names of their father's lineage, but only sons can transmit it to their offspring. Although the status of daughters is fully related to their fathers' lineage, their status may change to their husband's family when they marry. This means that a change in daughter's status after her marriage may lead to change in her family name, by adopting her husband's family name.[67] The same holds true for women who come from outside the Hadrami community; they will bear their Hadrami husband's patrilines as a result of their marriage into the Hadrami community. An individual member of the Hadrami community bears their surname deriving from one of the forty apical ancestors which are largely described as clans (see chapter 3 section 3.2.2). In this context, Hadrami surnames reflect what anthropologists such as Mauss, Levi-Bruhl, and Levi-Strauss called the coded language of naming patterns (see Vom Bruck and Bodernhorn 2006, 8-9), by classifying bearers of the names into a social matrix of ethnic membership as Hadramis or Arabs in local usage.

The Hadrami community is not only heterogeneous in terms of clan membership but also in terms of (claimed) Sada and non-Sada status groups (see chapter 3 section 3.2.1). There hardly exists a distinction between Sada and non-Sada in terms of naming practices except for the specific Sada's construction of clan classification and the use of honorific titles. Arabic/Islamic first names like Hasan for a man or Rugaya for a woman are shared by all Hadramis, regardless their Sada or non-Sada background.

[67] This is a matter of choice, however: officially women keep their maiden surname.

I would never have been able to differentiate and get a full overview of the forty Arab family names in Ambon without the help of my Sada informant Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar (see chapter 2 page 43). Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar shared a list of the family names (surnames) in Ambon and divided them into two larger groups. This classification based on the Sada and non-Sada distinction is constructed by members of the Sada group who established the Rabitha al-'Alawiyya, which serves as a lineage purification institution within the Sada community in order to protect the prophetic lineage and preclude abuse of it. Through this institution, the genealogical records of the Prophet's family are circulated around Indonesia (see section 4.2.3).

Table 4.2: Address Terms

GENDER	SADA	NON-SADA
MALE	Sayyid[68] Abdullah al-Hamid	Hasan al-Kathiri
FEMALE	Sharifa[69] Rugaya al-Hamid	Lun al-Kathiri

The honorific titles mentioned in table 4.2 are mainly used in daily conversation, rather than in official/formal names. When I asked Sasa (31 years old), who is from a Sada family of the al-Aydrus clan about her personal name, she mentioned the title *sharifa*, but she said, "that depends on the parents … even without putting the titles in the written document, the titles are still inherently attached to ourselves".[70] Her statement illustrates that naming as a speech act is an effective way to communicate a social attribute to an audience. Similar to Sasa, many of my Sada informants mentioned their names with the honorific titles or referred to other Sada members by using the mode of reverence address.

This style of in-group identification with honorific Sada titles is both informative and assertive, and moreover symbolic, in the sense that self-naming not only contains messages of status differences among the Arab members, but also constitutes how social relations are enacted by expressing symbolic acts of reverence to the members of the Sada. For instance, kissing the hands of a member of the Sada group in a gathering or meeting is a way of performing hierarchical differences between the Sada and non-Sada.

This kind of symbolic reverence acts can be translated differently into various customs. Liana (37 years old), a woman of Javanese origin whose sister married into a Sada Hadrami family, told me that in the presence of a *sharifa* or a *habib* one has to pay respect to them by not sitting in the same chair they used, not standing next to them, and several other rules of etiquette. I saw

[68] Two equivalent titles to sayyid are *habib* and *sharif,* although the latter is not commonly used.
[69] Another title equivalent to *sharifa* is *sayyida* but it is uncommon.
[70] Interview with Sasa, December 8, 2014.

these rules of respect being applied when I did fieldwork in Tarim in Hadramaut. In everyday life in Ambon, however, I did not observe any special treatment of the Sada in general, except when a person had some additional qualities, such as possessing extraordinary much religious knowledge.

The privilege of honorific titles the Sada group enjoys, and the accompanying symbolic practices of reverence to descendants of the Prophet Muhammad have been subject of a long debate among Muslim communities in general and in the Hadrami community in the diaspora in particular. Such contestations have been described by Michael Gilsenan, for example, in the disapproval of non-Sada reformist Muslims of the custom of greeting Sada by kissing their hand as a sign of respect. Gilsenan described situations where hand-kissing could not be avoided without creating an open conflict, as sort of "a show, but a show with diametrically opposed meanings for the actors" (Gilsenan 1982, 11). After one such incident, for example, a non-Sada informant would confide to Gilsenan that they were only going through the motions and that before long, the Sada would lose their privileged position. Although being contested, the practices still persist among certain groups of Muslims, especially among traditionalist Muslims of prophetic descent.

Rather than through greeting etiquette, in my daily encounters with community members and locals, I learned to recognize who belonged to a particular Sada group thanks to the use of the honorific titles used also by non-Sada Hadramis and members of other local groups to address members of Sada families. In popular local usage, *habib* is abbreviated into *bib* and *sayyid* into *ye*, and *sharifa* into *ipah* or *ipeh.* For many local people, the abbreviation of the titles are more recognizable than the full address terms.

To summarize this subsection, it can be concluded that the naming practices within the Hadrami community are both open and closed in character. On the one hand, given names seem to be of an open nature in terms of semantics, as they render multiple meanings depending on givers' choices, tastes, and expectations. In this regard, the given names seem to be subjective and personal. On the other hand, surnames are part of a closed code, pointing to a particular dimension of social origin or to a social attribute. In this respect, to some extent naming practices within the Hadrami community signify a social order within the Hadrami community.[71] Hadrami patrilineage is reflected in the use of family names and full of symbolic meaning, serving as boundary markers between in- and out groups within the Hadrami community

[71] The order, however, is not itself unique. Within a larger social order of the Ambonese society, the Hadrami community shares a kinship system based on patrilineage reflected in the use of family names. From my fieldwork and previous stays, I learned that every local resident in Ambon bears a family name which points to their origin or geographical location. In this context, we may differentiate between various local and non-local family names.

itself and between in- and out- groups distinguishing the Hadrami community from other communities.

In variation to scholars who point out that 'the power of names lies not in their linguistic meaning, but in the names themselves' (see Vom Bruck and Bodernhorn 2006, 6), in the following section I will argue that in particular, the power of names among Hadramis lies in an enactment of gendered social relations embedded in a system of kinship ties and marriage relations. I will discuss how power-laden names are constructed within the Hadrami community.

2.3 Patrilineal Descent and Genealogy

Descent systems can function to form stable groups in a society (Stone 1997, 59). By adopting a patrilineal descent mode, the Hadrami community has a means of establishing descent groups, which in turn become fundamental to the social organization of the community (Stone 1997, 61). Having adopted a patrilineal descent mode, Hadrami membership is passed on through male members only. It is thus sons who transmit their lineage to their offspring, while daughters' offspring belong to their husband's groups. In order to maintain survival of the groups, sons and daughters in Hadrami families thus have different responsibilities and opportunities. As transmitters of the lineage, sons have more freedom of marriage partners than daughters.

Between the two groups of Sada and non-Sada, there are forty Hadrami clans that can be distinguished (see chapter 3 section 2.2). As I mentioned before, although both Sada and non-Sada groups adopt patrilineal descent reckoning, only the Sada have a systematized genealogical record, which will be discussed in the following section.

2.3.1 A Systematized Genealogy of the Sada

Systematization of prophetic genealogy of Hadrami origin began in the seventeenth century (Ho 2006, 117). This prophetic genealogy appeared in two different canonical texts: 'Abd al-Qadir al-'Aydarus's *The Traveling Light Unveiled* and Muhammad al-Shilli's *the Irrigating Fount: Biographical Virtues of the 'Alawi Sayyids.* In *The Traveling Light,* genealogy is embedded in a plural world of places, dates and persons imbued with mystical, esoteric ways. *The Irrigating Fount,* on the other hand, contains exoteric knowledge in the field of law and a guide of moral action. As law, genealogy draws a boundary between the in and out-group, determining whom a member can or cannot marry, and defining rights and obligations between members, such as inheritance and social security (Ho 2006, 152).

In the nineteenth century, a Sada scholar of Tarimi descent called 'Abd ar-Rahman al-Mashur wrote genealogies of the Sada Hadrami in his book *as-*

Shams az-Zahira (Ho 2006, 177-178). Al-Mashur's book has become one of the main references for Rabita al-'Alawiyya organization in Indonesia.[72] The Rabita al-'Alawiyya was established in Jakarta in 1928 with the aim of maintaining and improving the dignity of Islamic community, more especially the Sada ('Alawi) groups, through social and religious activities in order to cultivate moral values, build an Islamic brotherhood, and maintain national unity. The Rabita al-'Alawiya is involved in providing scholarships to children of Sada families from an elementary school to a higher education level, and it is also active in health care.[73]

The systematic genealogical 'purification' as members of the Rabita organization in Indonesia call it, is managed under a special department called al-Maktab ad-Daimi. Al-Maktab ad-Daimi was established in Jakarta in 1942, and aims at maintaining the history and the lineage of Sada families.[74] This particular department is the only institution that has registered its members in Indonesia and has issued a member list. When a member of the Sada is registered in the organization, he is granted a member book, which looks like a passport with a signature and a stamp from the organization (see figure 4.1). Only men can be registered and receive a genealogy book. The al-Maktab ad-Daimi is an extension of the role of the *munsib*, the headman of the clan, who is responsible for the preservation of the genealogical record of his own clan members. The result of the genealogy record by the *munsib* is different from the record issued by the al-Maktab (see figure 4.1 and 4.2). Figure 4.1 reflects a modern printed format resulting in a passport-like pocket book, while figure 4.2 shows a one-page, handwritten genealogical account that as used by *munsib*s in former times to write down the genealogy of their clan members.

[72] Interviews with two members of the central Rabita al-'Alawiyya in Jakarta, May 14, 2015.
[73] See http://www.rabithah-alawiyah.org/id/?page_id=2. (accessed November 24, 2017).
[74] See http://www.rabithah-alawiyah.org/id/?page_id=2. (accessed November 24, 2017).



Figure 4.1: Genealogy Book of a Sada Descendant
(photographed by the author)[75]

Figure 4.2: Genealogy of a Sada Descendant (photographed by the author)[76]

[75] I photographed a passport-like genealogy book of a deceased Sada man (d. 2010) with the permission from his wife, Muawana (55 year-old Sada descendant), in her house in Jakarta on January 11, 2015. Muawana herself did not have her official genealogy book from the Rabita, and I was lucky to be allowed to see her husband's genealogy and to take pictures of it.

[76] This genealogical record belongs to Abdullah Assagaf, the grandfather of one of my informants. It is written in *Jawi* (Arabic script and Malay language) and consists of only one page. The genealogical record contains three main parts: introduction, lineage, and closing. The first part, which is the first two lines on the top of the page, includes the

The Maluku branch of the Rabita was established in 2008. The first head of the Rabita in Maluku was Muhdar Assagaf (2008-2010). The organization is currently headed by my informant Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar after the previous leader Muhdar Assagaf moved to Jakarta in 2010.[77] The role of the branch of the Rabita itself is to collect and register its members and their genealogies. It does not issue a member book to the members. Before the branch of Rabita in Maluku was established, a similar association with a different name that my informants could not recall had been established in the 1990s before the communal conflicts. The former secretary of the association, Feryal Bin Syech Abubakar (50 years old), who is also a cousin of my informant Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar, told me that the association ceased to be in operation when the communal conflicts erupted. She also explained that the legal documents of the association's establishment had been kept in the Mayor office, which was burnt during the conflicts.[78] Therefore, the association could not be revived after the conflicts as the legal documents on the association's establishment had gotten lost.

Prophetic genealogy is considered sacred by Sada members, and this sacredness apparently spills over to the material genealogical documents. Due to its sacredness, these genealogical records may not be shown to non-members. For example, although my Sada informants claimed that they have registered their genealogies at the branch of the Rabita, only one informant was willing to show her husband's record book, appearing in figure 4.1 above. Most of the members of the Sada group in Ambon, including my informant Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar, current head of the Rabita refused to show their genealogies to me. They claimed that there was a potential abuse of the Sada genealogies by people who hoped to benefit for their own interests from the genealogical information. To explain how this might work they offered an example of such abuse. According to my informant Bin Syech Abubakar, a religious preacher who lived in Jakarta who was a popular figure on the TV screen, falsely used a particular Sada family name and an honorific title. Other informants also told me that this preacher originally came from a local Ambonese family and used the Sada name to boost his popularity as a spiritual

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name of the bearer of the genealogical record, then followed by a *basmala* verse, the first verse of every chapter in the Qur'an. The second part is the chain of lineage from the bearer, Abdullah Assagaf, up to the Prophet. The last part contains the name of the person who wrote the genealogical record. Contrary to his grandfather, my informant himself did not keep his own genealogical record, but he claimed that his own lineage was stored in the Rabita al-Alawiyya. When I asked him about his own lineage, he could only remember his lineage until four generations up (until his great grandfather).

[77] Interview with Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar, September 9, 2014.

[78] Interview with Feryal Bin Syech Abubakar, September 10, 2014.

guide among Muslims of middle-upper class in Jakarta. The Rabita in Ambon gave him a warning by sending an official letter requesting him to withdraw his honorific title and family name. Unfortunately, I could not meet the preacher myself to ask how he came to the name and how he felt about the Rabita's warning.

The case of the preacher and the Sada's reluctance of sharing their genealogical records show how names are not only signifiers of a person's identity but also provide symbolic capital which becomes a potential object of manipulation and restrictions. The passport-like book is thus used as a preemptive device to avoid abuse in the form of an 'illegitimate claim' of a person who presents himself as a member of a certain Sada family. The modern genealogical book authorized by the Sada organization serves as an identity card that may function as a license to guarantee and provide security for group members. Likewise, this modern genealogical record has created a boundary between in- and out-groups materialized in a piece of textual words. Texts like these can define who we are and who we are not as well as who belongs to us and who does not. Benedict Anderson (1991) argues that thanks to printing technology modernity has permitted the circulation of texts to a far greater extent than before, thus creating what he called nations as 'imagined communities'. In line with this, through the circulation of genealogy texts the Sada community has created an imagined transnational community. This imagined community is in fact gendered, in the sense that Sada male members enjoy more freedom of mixing (marrying) with other communities than female members (see section 4.3).

The genealogical records indicate that most Sada in Ambon descend from Husain, one of the two sons of Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet Muhammad, and her husband Ali. One of the most important symbolic figures for the Hadrami Sada is Ahmad, the ninth-generation descendant of the Prophet who was the first to migrate to Hadramaut, together with his son, Ubaidillah. Based on data from the Rabita of Maluku, the Sada descendants in Ambon and Maluku in general descend from fifty-five Hadrami migrants as can be seen in table 4.3.

Table 4.3: The Sada Migrants

No	Clan	Number	Place of Death
1.	Al-Hamid	17 people	Tual, Geser, Sorong, Hila, Pasuruan, Jeddah, Namlea, Tehoru, Hadramaut
2.	Al-Saqqaf	9 people	Namlea, Bacan, Banda, Hila, Gorom, Tehoru
3.	Bin Shaikh Abu Bakr	5 people	Ambon, Ternate, Bacan
4.	Al-'Aydrus	4 people	Waisala, Tehoru, Hadramaut
5.	Al-Attas	3 people	Jakarta, Banda
6.	Al-Habshi	3 people	Ambon, Tehoru, Ternate
7.	Al-Mahdali	2 people	Kwamar, Geser
8.	Bin Tahir	2 people	Geser, Iha Luhu
9.	Bin Smith	2 people	Ambon
10.	Bin Aqil	1 person	Ambon
11.	Abu Futaim	1 person	Ambon
12.	Bafaqih	1 person	Gorontalo
13.	Jamal al-Lail	1 person	Ambon
14.	Al-Zawawi	1 person	Tual
15.	Al-Shatri	1 person	Aru
16.	Bin Yahya	1 person	Madiun
17.	Al-Muhdar	1 person	Tual

The table above shows places where deceased Hadrami migrants of Sada origin are buried across the Maluku Islands. The fact that the present-day generation of the Sada group in Ambon descend from these male migrants points to the high mobility of the Hadrami migrants. Migrants of the Sada group tended to come to a place in Maluku for a short or longer period before moving to other places outside Maluku, such as Jakarta, Pasuruan, Gorontalo, Madiun. A few of them returned to Hadramaut as indicated in the place where they died shown in table 4.3. The high mobility of these Hadramis is related to these migrants' economic activities as well as to (polygamous) intermarriage between members of the Sada group, and between them and other local groups (see further kinship charts of marriage). Deriving from fifty-five male migrants, the members of the Sada group of Maluku today reach thousands of both male and female members according to my informant Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar's calculation. Sada men may go from one place to another and enjoy the flexibility to blend with other groups without any fear to lose their identity. Women are far more limited in their choice of a marriage partner, who should come from their own group. In this context, mixing and moving is the privilege of Sada men.

2.3.2 Patrilineal or Double Descent: Affinity as A Value

Matrilineal Genealogy of the Sada Group of Ambon



R.M : Raden Mas (Javanese title for Prince)
R.A : Raden Ayu (Javanese title for Princess)

The adoption of a patrilineal kinship system does not mean that the Sada ignore their matrilineal relations, especially when they are related to prominent members of society. The chart above shows kinship relations the Sada and a royal family from the Sultanate Yogyakarta in Java. My informant Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar, current head of the Rabita in Ambon, told me a story of the relationship between Prince Diponegoro and the Sada in Ambon. The relationship probably began during the Java War (1825-1830) led by Prince Diponegoro against the Dutch rule in Java. The defeat of Diponegoro in the war resulted in the Dutch sending four of his eighteen children into exile to Ambon. The names of these four sons are Abdul Majid, Adipati Anom, Hasan and Abdul Aziz. The first Sada marrying a daughter of one of the sons of Prince Diponegoro is from an al-Mashur family. Sayyid Abdullah bin Alwi al-Mashur married Raden Ayu Aminah, daughter of Prince Abdul Aziz. Sayyid Abdullah al-Mashur is said to have returned to Hadramaut and never to have come back to Ambon. Al-Mashur's daughter was married with Sayyid Abu Bakar bin Husain al-Saqqaf. Although the al-Mashur family can no longer be found in Ambon, the

al-Mashur family has an affine relation with an al-Saqqaf family through the marriage of the al-Mashur's daughter.

My informant Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar is related to Prince Diponegoro as well. Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar's father's father's mother's mother called Shaikha is the great granddaughter of Prince Diponegoro. Shaikha is a daughter of Prince Ahmad, one of the grandsons of Prince Diponegoro. Shaikha was married to a Sada man of the al-Hamid family. Through Shaikha, Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar claimed to have his relation to the Prince since Shaikhah's daughter was married with a Bin Shaikh Abu Bakr family from which my informant descended.

Not only were the families of al-Saqqaf, al-Hamid and Bin Shaikh Abu Bakr related to the Prince, the al-'Aydrus family also claimed to be related to the Prince since Sayyid Ali bin Alwi al-'Aydrus married Siti Khadija, one of Shaikha' sisters. In this context, since members of the Sada group are regarded as one family of the Prophet, every member can claim to be related to the Sultanate in Yogyakarta. The Sada who have genealogical connections with the royal sultanate of Yogyakarta, especially the Prince Diponegoro are buried in a special cemetery (see figure 4.3).

Figure 4.3: Public Cemetery of Prince Diponegoro's descendants
(photographed by the author)

The authorization of being legitimate offspring of the royal family in the Sultanate of Yogyakarta has been given by an official document issued by the authority in the Sultanate. This document is kept by the Rabita of Ambon, where, thanks to my informant Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar, I was allowed to have a look at it. Although keeping a genealogical record of one's maternal side is an ambiguous practice considering the dominance of patrilineal genealogy, owning this official written document on genealogy is very valuable since it renders validity and authenticity of additional or alternative descent claims to powerful families high up in the Indonesian hierarchy. The document is therefore a form of cultural capital that allows one to strike alliances and maintain valuable relations with local nobility.

Another materialization of maintaining this symbolic relationship to the Sultanate of Yogyakarta is the special graveyard called Makam Anak Cucu Diponegoro, or graveyard of Prince Diponegoro's descendants, which is reserved exclusively for those who are related to Prince Diponegoro in Ambon. Although descendants of the Prince in Ambon are not only related to the Sada but also have other local origins, the graveyard seems to be mostly filled with the descendants of the Prince from the Sada group. The restoration of the graveyard started in 2012, and during my last visit in 2015 it was not yet finished. According to my informant Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar, the graveyard has been renovated with donations from people related to the Prince, especially from members of the Sada group. A large sum of money to renovate the graveyard has recently been received from Said Assagaf (Governor of Maluku from 2013-2018). The money was said to come from Said Assagaf's private assets.

The practice of keeping a genealogical record of one's maternal side reflects an ambiguous practice of the Sada's adoption of patrilineal descent system. By recognizing both matrilineal and patrilineal descent instead of a unilineal kinship system, the Sada, in fact, practice what Godelier (2011, 90) calls 'double' or 'dual descent' for particular purposes. Double descent is applied by the Sada by affiliating its members with a group of patrilineal kinsmen for some purposes and with a group of matrilineal kinsmen for other purposes. In this case, the recognition of matrilineal ties is determined by the status of the matrilineal kinsmen within society. Nobility is a main characteristic of status. Affinity is considered of a great value only if it can enhance the social status. The purpose of this alliance seems to be used for pursuing certain interests as can be illustrated by what my informant Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar told me about his great-great grandfather: "Prof dr. Habib Ali Heyder al-Hamid died in 1918 in Ambon. He married a grand-daughter of Prince Diponegoro, Raden Ayu Kalsum. He studied in a Dutch school and he did

not have to pay fee in the school. He could enter the school easily because he used the title of Prince".[79]

The way my informant presents his forefather as belonging to a modern educated elite not only positions his own family within a larger society but also places the Sada to which he belonged in a wider context. It is likely that during the colonial era, it was very difficult to find such a modern scholar as only those who came from noble families attended Dutch schools. My informant may have been unaware that his statement can spark a critical remark on the manipulation of the title by his forefather who used the title 'Prince' just because his wife was a granddaughter of Prince Diponegoro.

From this anecdote, we may deduce how Dutch colonials applied social stratification policies not only based on ethnicity and religion but that they also classified members of the local population based on descent status (see chapter 2 section 2.3). In this sense, the purpose of marrying local nobility seems to be practical but also highly political, especially when it was shaped by discriminative state policies concerning access to public facilities such as education. Marrying local nobility is not easy for people who do not have certain assets such as high social status. Sada migrants with their cultural capital through their claims as descendants of the Prophet could enter the elite in their new homeland in a relatively smooth way.

What this section demonstrates is that even if an explicit kinship system based on patrinileal descent exists, in practice kinship reckoning is not a matter of simply following rules, but of active appropriation of these rules to apply them in a fashion that best serves one's purposes. For the descendants of Hadrami migrants to Indonesia, in this case to Ambon, close observance of patrilineal descent rules is a strategy to maintain a distinct identity as Arabs, and in the case of Sada as descendants of Prophet Muhammad. At the same time, adapting to the new circumstances by marrying into local nobility and hence integrating matrilineal descent into kinship reckoning may increase one's opportunities in the new land significantly. As we will discuss in the next section, men and women are positioned differently in the safeguarding of patrilineal descent whilst simultaneously integrating into the local social hierarchy through matrilineal descent.

3. Patrilineal Descent, Marriage, and Gender

This section describes the impact on gender relations of how a patrilineal descent system and Islamic *kafa'a* regulations, that is, regulations about the compatibility of marriage partners on the basis of social hierarchy status (see

[79] Interview with Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar, April 30, 2015.

further section 3.2-3.5), play a role in the forging of marriage relations among today's Hadramis in Ambon.

3.1 Marriage Patterns: Endogamy vs Exogamy, and Polygamy vs Monogamy

Marriage in Muslim societies in general is regarded a religious duty, and central to the development and stability of the basic societal unit (Abudabbeh 2005, 427-428). As Hadramis belong to the *umma,* the wider Muslim community, commonality in religion still forms the basis for their marriage relations. Apart from religion, similarity based on ancestry plays a significant role in marriage relations. Marriage practices of both Sada and non-Sada follow more or less similar patterns as will be shown in some kinship charts of some families below.

Table 4.4: A List of Arab Clans in Ambon[80]

NO	SADA	ABREVIA-TION	NO	NON-SADA	ABREVI-ATION
1.	al-Saqqaf	Sq	1.	al-Kathiri	Ktr
2.	al-Hamid	Hmd	2.	al-Tamimy	Tmm
3.	Bin Shaikh Abu Bakr	BSA	3.	al-Amudi	Amd
4.	al-'Aydrus	Ay	4.	Basalamah	Bsm
5.	Jamal al-Lail	JL	5.	Bamahri	Bmr
6.	Abu Futaim	AF	6.	Basharahel	Bsh
7.	al-Muhdar	Md	7.	Bamatraf	Bmt
8.	Barakwan	Brw	8.	Bahajay	Bhj
9.	Bin Smith	BS	9.	Mardas	Mds
10.	al-Attas	Ats	10.	Shaban	Sbn
11.	Balfaqih	Bfq	11.	Bin Sheban	BSb
12.	al-Habshi	Hbs	12.	Bahwereis	Bwr
13.	Bin Yahya	BY	13.	Bahasoan	Bhs
14.	Bin Tahir	BT	14.	Bakhmid	Bmd
15.	al-Shatri	Ast	15.	Najar	Njr
16.	Bin Agil	BA	16.	Bahalwan	Bhlw
17.	al-Haddad	Hdd	17.	Hamdun	Hdn
18.	al-Zawawi	Zww	18.	Ba'adillah	Bdl
			19.	al-Zagladi	Azg
			20.	Bin Talib	BTb
			21.	al-Asiri	Asr
			22.	Bamakhmid	Bmm

[80] The distinction between Sada and non-Sada was made by Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar a Sada informant. I made a list of abbreviation of clans for the convenience of the kinship chart that will be drawn further.

Case 1: Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar (BSA)



Hdr : Hadramaut
: Ego
: Female (died)
: Male (died)
= : Marriage Relation

Being fourth in a row of eight children, in 1975 my informant Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar (BSA), current head of the Rabita al-'Alawiyya in Maluku, was born to a father of a Sada family from the Bin Shaikh Abu Bakr clan, and to a mother from a Sada family from the al-Hamid clan. In patrilineal terms, he is the fourth-generation descendant of the migrant from the Bin Syech Abubakar clan. In my conversations with Bin Syech Abubakar, he emphasized the importance of both his maternal and paternal lineage since both his parents are descendants of the Sada.

The chart of Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar's kinship relations above illustrate that marriages patterns of the first and later generations of Hadrami Sada show different patterns. The first migrants married local women of either Ambonese or Chinese origin, while later migrants married daughters of the previous migrants of both Sada and non-Sada origin. For example, Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar's father's father's father (paternal great-grandfather) was a Sada migrant who married a daughter of another Sada migrant whose wife was from a local clan, while his maternal great-grandfather was also a Sada migrant who married a daughter of a Sada migrant whose wife was of Chinese origin from Ternate.

Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar's father's father's uncle was also married to a daughter of non-Sada Hadrami migrant from Ba'adillah clan, and Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar's mother's father's sister was married to a son of Hadrami migrant from al-Hamid clan, who took another wife a daughter of non-Sada

Hadrami migrant from Bashagub (Bsg) clan.[81] The Bashagub clan can no longer be found in Ambon. In the next generations until the generation of my informant ('Ego'), migrants no longer appear in the chart. The descendants of earlier migrants tend to marry each other, and it is not uncommon to find cross cousin marriages. For example, Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar's father married his mother's brother's daughter. Bin Syech Abubakar himself is married to a daughter of a Sada family from the al-Haddad clan of Java, and they have four children. The chart reveals both monogamous and polygamous marriages. For example, Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar's mother's father's sister was a wife in a polygamous marriage, and his maternal great-grandfather (his mother's father's father) had two wives. This polygamous marriage was common among past generations, but it is rarely found among present generations.

If we look broader at Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar's relatives in vertical and horizontal lines, as can be seen in the chart below, we find both more cross and parallel cousin marriages, marriages between uncles and nieces, and polygamous marriages. Bin Syech Abubakar's cousin, Feryal Bin Syech Abubakar (F), is married to a man from a Sada family that belongs to the al-Saqqaf clan. Feryal Bin Syech Abubakar's husband's father's father's father was married to three women from the al-Atamimy, Najar, and Olong clans respectively. The al-Tamimy and Najar are Arab clans of non-Sada origin, while Olong is a local Ambonese clan. In the example of an exogamous and polygamous marriage of Feryal Bin Syech Abubakar's husband's paternal great-grandparent, the Sada families are related to both non-Sada Hadrami families and local Ambonese families. One of Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar's uncles is married to his niece and Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar's maternal second cousins married each other.

My informant Muhammad Rifki al-Hamid (MRA), a member of the Sada group who went to study in Hadramaut, is the son of Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar's paternal uncle's daughter (see chapter 3 pages 72-73). As we can see, the pattern of marriage within the Bin Syech Abubakar clan in Ambon is mixed, combining monogamous and polygamous, and endogamous and exogamous marriages. Members of the Sada group tend to be endogamous and

[81] One of the well-known Sada Hadramis from Bin Shaikh Abu Bakr clan from Maluku is Des Alwi Abubakar or popularly called Des Alwi (1927-2010). Born in Banda Naira to father of Bin Shaikh Abu Bakr family and to a wealthy non-Sada Hadrami of Ba'adillah family, Des Alwi was not only historian interested in the history of Maluku (see Alwi 2005), but also Indonesian diplomat. He was the adopted son of the first Vice President of Indonesia, Muhammad Hatta, and another nationalist leader Sutan Syahrir who both of them were exiled in Banda by the Dutch colonial regime (see Alwi and Harvey 2007). My informant Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar mentioned Des Alwi when he told me his paternal and maternal relations with the historian.

monogamous in the generations following Hadrami first migrants. Although male members of the Sada group are allowed to marry out on the basis of *kafa'a* regulations, they tend to marry inside the group.



: Ego
: Female (died)
: Male (died)
= : Marriage Relation
: the same person

Another example of the kinship chart can be drawn from Alif below.

Case 2: Alif from Bin Smith Clan



: Ego
: Female (died)
: Male (died)
= : Marriage Relation

The fifty-seven-year-old Sada Alif (see chapter 3 page 68) is a patrilineal descendant of a Sada family from the Bin Smith (BS) clan. His mother is also a patrilineal descendant of a Sada family from the Assagaf clan in Namlea (N). In this chart, two Chinese clans are related to Alif, namely Kiat and Niou, both from his paternal and maternal grandmothers. Although my informant Alif was not absolutely sure whether his paternal and maternal grandmothers were Muslim converts or not, he believes that both were Muslim.[82] Alif himself is married to a daughter of a Sada family from the al-Saqqaf clan from Namlea, Buru island. Alif is also related to other Sada families from the al-Saqqaf clan from Namlea and the Alatas clan from Johor Malaysia through the marriage between Alif's wife's uncle of the al-Saqqaf clan and my informant Rugaya Alatas (R), a female religious preacher among the Sada in Ambon (see page 95 and further chapter 5 section 4.2). Another kinship tie between Alif's father lineage is with another Sada clan, al-Saqqaf, from Banda from which the Governor (G) of 2013-2018 Maluku Said Assagaf (see chapter 3 section 5.2.3) descends.

Like the previous example, the chart indicates a tendency of exogamous marriages in the first diasporic generation of Sada Hadramis and of endogamous marriages in later generations. Because of the pattern of exogamous marriages, the Sada families built kinship ties to various groups, mixing with different origins, both local, and non-local, as well as crossing geographical territories within regional and transregional borders.

The pattern of exogamy and endogamy that cross-cut different generations is not the monopoly of the Sada group, but it also occurs among the non-Sada. An example can be drawn from the family chart of Hasan al-Kathiri below.

Case 3: Hasan al-Kathiri

My informant Hasan al-Kathiri was born in 1946 (see chapter 3 page 54). He is the eldest son of a non-Sada family from the Bin Misfir clan, or the al-Kathiri clan.[83] Both paternally and maternally Hasan al-Kathiri belongs to the third generation of non-Sada Hadrami migrants. Al-Kathiri's paternal grandfather was married to a local woman from Fak-Fak (Papua), while his maternal grandfather was married with a local woman from Maluku. Al-Kathiri's father had a polygamous marriage. One of his wives was from Hadramaut and the

[82] Unlike Chinese citizens in other regions, Ambonese Chinese settlers during the VOC were Muslim. Chinese descendants in Ambon in this case can be distinguished between those who migrated during the VOC times and later generations in terms of religion (Leirissa 2000, 628).

[83] According to some of my informants, there are many clans lumped together into al-kathiri clan, including Bin Misfir.

other one from Maluku. Al-Kathiri told me that his father was born in Fak-Fak Papua. When he was a teenager, his grandfather sent him to Hadramaut. After several years, al-Kathiri's father decided to return to Maluku, leaving his wife and two children in Hadramaut. In Maluku, he married again with a daughter from a non-Sada family from Basalamah clan in Saparua (see chart below).



Hdr : Hadramaut
: Ego
: Female (died)
: Male (died)
= : Marriage Relation

In the chart above, we can see both exogamous and endogamous marriages in Hasan al-Kathiri's family. Exogamy occurs in the first generation, while endogamy in the next generation. The al-Kathiri clan has built kinship ties with both local and non-Sada Hadrami clans. Hasan al-Kathiri himself is married to a woman of the Kathiri clan from Tual in Southeast Maluku. According to Hasan al-Kathiri, his marriage was arranged by his parents. His present wife is his father's close friend's daughter. In his case and his parent's generation, endogamy was the norm. Al-Kathiri explained to me that he realizes that he can no longer force his children to obey this custom. Although he considers endogamy not a religious obligation, he does hold the view that endogamy has its own merits. Among his six children, two of them are married with non-Sada Arab families.

From the kinship charts of both Sada and non-Sada Hadrami informants, we can conclude that there seems hardly any difference of marriage patterns between the two groups. Both groups conducted exogamous marriages in the first generation, and shifted to endogamous marriages in the next generations. They also practice both monogamous and polygamous marriages. These marriage patterns should be understood within a historical context of Hadrami

male migration and Hadrami patrilineal descent system. Historically, only men came from Hadramaut and spread around the Malay Archipelago in the nineteenth until the first quarter of the twentieth centuries (Freitag 2003; Freitag & Clarence-Smith 1997; Mobini-Kesheh 1999; Abushouk and Ibrahim 2009; Jacobsen 2009). The migrants did not bring wives and thus had no choice except marrying local women. Their exogamous marriages were accepted because their mixing with an out-group did not have an effect on their children's lineage. A shifting trend to endogamous marriages, in fact, indicates demographic changes with the availability of female offspring in the diaspora and the need to keep them and their children in the same group (rank).

These patterns, especially endogamy and exogamy, are mainly constructed and justified through Islamic rulings on *kafa'a,* which plays a role in various marriage patterns by the Hadramis in building kinship relations. In this context, in relation with the patrilineal system and various patterns of marriage above, *kafa'a* can function as a marriage strategy that represents an important aspect of the process of the group's symbolic capital, not through manifesting the actors' adherence to the proclaimed ideal, but because each marriage becomes a symbolic expression of the recognition of agnatic relationships (Holy 1983, 93). The recognition of agnatic relationships is very powerful exactly because such relationships are imbued with religious meanings and carry social hierarchy expressed through asymmetrical marriages.[84]

3.2 Hadramis' Views on *Kafa'a*

The term *kafa'a* comes from the Arabic *kufu'* which means suitable, equal, or compatible. In dominant Islamic legal thought, which is said to be patriarchally and patrilineally biased (Mir-Hosseini 2013), one of the main principles of *kafa'a* is that men should be of equal or higher rank than their wives, never of a lower rank. Factors to determine whether a marriage between a man and a woman is considered to be *kufu'* or compatible vary among Muslim jurists and are interpreted within a various range of criteria such as descent, religion, wealth, physical appearance, health, profession, liberty, piety, and social status

[84] A marriage is asymmetrical if one group is considered 'a wife taker' but not 'a wife giver' as it can take a wife from the other group but according to the formal marriage system never gives a wife to the other group. As 'wife takers' the group is superior to 'wife givers'. This kind of marriage relation is called hypergamy. Although marriage relation is asymmetrical, the people themselves can view the marriage relation as symmetrical. This term is developed by Claudie Lévi-Strauss in his *Elementary Structures of Kinship* (1949).

(Ziadeh 1957, 509).[85] F.J. Ziadeh (1957, 515) further argues that the doctrine of *kafa'a* in Islamic law is the basis of social stratification in Muslim society and regulates gender relations. The legal effect of the *kafa'a* rules is that a male guardian can dissolve the marriage of his female custodian to a man not equal in social standing if he does not consent to the marriage (Ziadeh 1957, 510).

Sada and non-Sada today tend to have different views on *kafa'a* in marriage. Sada members commonly agree that the two important constituents of *kafa'a* are religion and lineage. These two aspects are equally important. According to members of the Sada, it is a matter of whether a person is equal in terms of descent, or more concretely whether a person belongs to the Prophet's lineage or not. They argue that the prophetic lineage is the highest descent rank, and that those who are not members of the Sada are of lower rank, irrespective of whether they are from Arab or local origins. In this context, as a member of the Islamic society in general, it is not only the shared religion that matters most, similar descent plays an equally important role in the selection of spouses.

Through adopting an agnatic system, Sada men are allowed to marry women of any different social group because their offspring will inherit the father's lineage and belong to his group. Meanwhile, Sada women are only allowed to marry men of their own group. *Kafa'a* in this case is applied both to endogamous and exogamous marriages but there are gender differences. While men can practice both endogamy and exogamy, women are only allowed to practice endogamy. Although exogamy is allowed for men, endogamy is highly recommended. In this context, the Sada group is a wife taker, but not a wife giver. In other words, they will keep their own women for their own group rather than giving to other (lower) groups. This means that the superiority of the Sada lies in its position as a wife taker.

For the non-Sada group, on the other hand, the *kafa'a* principle is applied predominantly on the basis of religious similarity. Only in very few cases some members prefer *kafa'a* based on lineage as well. This does not mean that descent is not important at all for non-Sada descendants. Due to a shifting understanding of descent, descent is no longer determined on the basis of common ancestry as invoked by the Sada group, but rather on a broader category. For instance, many of my non-Sada informants often said about a person that he or she was from a 'good lineage'. What they meant by a 'good lineage' is not necessarily about a concept of descent by birth in a particular ethnic membership. Besides referring to religious affiliation, the criteria of

[85] According to Ziadeh, the history of *kafa'a* as a religious regulation was a reflection of Hanafi law that dealt much with practical matters and complex society during the Abbasid period, and had nothing to do with the earliest Maliki law, but later on was adopted by other schools of thought (Ziadeh 1957, 503-517)

'good' here overlap with other factors, such as social status, occupation, wealth, and also one's family (absent) record in crime. Non-Sada descendants mostly share this descent conception with the majority of the Muslim population in Ambon in their preference and practice of marriage.

It should be noted, however, that the *kafa'a* principle is, in fact, not exclusively practiced by Sada members. Non-Sada members of the first and second-generation married those of the same rank of lineage as illustrated by my informant Hasan al-Kathiri below:

> My parents and grandparents did not marry Indonesians but Arabs. I will give you an example: if I have a daughter, she is not allowed to marry a man of non-Kathiri descent such as from the Basalamah clan, like Ustad Hadi (my informant Hadi Basalamah, Istiqomah). Our elder people forbade us to do so. Another example, Munif Bahasoan, a popular singer in the past, had a relationship with a woman of the Bin Talib. His girlfriend's father did not agree with his daughter's relationship with the Bahasoan clan. The woman of the Bin Talib clan then failed to get married with the Bahasoan. Another example is Lutfi Mashabi (another singer in the past) who wanted to marry a woman of the Bin Eli clan but did not manage either…a family of the Bin Eli was still very strict then. One day I met my friend of the Bin Eli. We talked about our families. One of my daughters got married with the Bin Jabir. He (Bin Eli) exclaimed, "This would not never have happened in the past".[86]

In his statement above, Hasan al-Kathiri explains that different ranks among clans of the non-Sada group were behind prohibitions of intermarriage between different clans within the non-Sada group. Hasan al-Kathiri also classified some clans, such as the Bin Talib and the Bin Eli as branches of the Kathiri clan to which he himself belonged, and considered them to have a higher rank than other clans. In the last sentence, he referred to his friend, stating that the marriage of his daughter would be invalid according to his group's norm. His view resembles closely that forwarded by another non-Sada:

> In my generation, we (our clans, Istiqomah) married each other because we lived in the same neighbourhood. Now we are scattered. I still think that it (in-marriage, Istiqomah) is good. It is true that we still have a view that our clan is higher than local clans. However, I cannot force my daughters to do what we want. One of my daughters got married with an Arab descendant. Although we introduced her to him, we did not force her. We only said that it was good for her and she understood. The other daughter is married with a local man. Now the important thing for us is that they share the same religion.[87]

[86] Interview with Hasan al-Kathiri, January 11, 2015
[87] Interview with Anisa, January 17, 2015.

These two quotations above of non-Sada informants reflect how a process of creating a hierarchy between members of the non-Sada group implies a power relationship in which the dominant clan constructs distinctiveness of its group members. Claims of descent status are thus not only the monopoly of the Sada group, but occur in the non-Sada group as well. Both my informants' statements also reflect a shift between past and present generations regarding social ranking among the non-Sada clans. Subsequent generations construct different understandings on the conception of descent, which lead to different marriage practices.

Based on the examples from both groups above, it can be concluded that genealogy or lineage is still an important issue in today's Hadrami community, in which regulations of *kafa'a* play a role in justifying kinship ties and marriage relations. However, a distinction should be made between Sada and non-Sada groups concerning their emphasizing the religious underpinning of genealogy. According to Engseng Ho (2002), the maintenance of genealogy for the Sada is not only about preserving their prophetic mission and religious authority, but also about a symbolic exchange of asymmetrical marriage relations between Hadramis and local societies (Ho 2002, 227). Ho's argument is, to some extent, still relevant in today's practices of naming and genealogy. For example, my Sada informant Rugaya Alatas told me the following:

> It is not my business if *sharifa* (women of Sada Families, Istiqomah) married non-Sada men. It is up to them. But they should not forget what God stipulates. That should not be violated. The Prophet says: from Jabir said that the Prophet said: indeed God has created descendants of every prophet in their genealogy and God has created my descendants from the genealogy of Ali bin Abi Thalib.[88]

The Hadith, that is, the account of a saying by the Prophet Muhammad about prophetic genealogy cited by the informant above is commonly used to anticipate criticism by other parties on the ambiguity inherent to the patrilineal kinship system within the Sada group. Likewise, Asma, a 82 year-old Sada descendant, emphasized the importance of Sada groups privileges as follows:

> Our *silsila* (lineage, Istiqomah) is really maintained by God because this is *haqq* (truth, Istiqomah). Thus, we should have an effort to preserve our identity. The Prophet says: I leave two things for you namely God's book (the Qur'an, Istiqomah) as a connecting means stretched from the sky to the earth, and my descendants. Indeed, both will never be cut until the Haudh lake comes (Hadith by Tirmidzi, Ahmad, Ibn Abi Syaibah, Abi Ya'la, etc, Istiqomah).[89]

[88] Interview with Rugaya Alatas, March 7, 2015
[89] Interview with Asma, November 6, 2014.

Based on the statements of the two Sada above, rather than moving from one narrative to another, as Ho describes, in today's context the religious narrative validates the other narrative. In other words, a universalizing narrative of a religious mission is used by the Sada group to justify the obligation to preserve the prophetic lineage through asymmetrical marriage relations. Yet, I would contend that the narrative of asymmetrical marriage is not only about alliance and reciprocal exchange in Marcel Mauss' conception, as Ho argues (Ho 2002, 225). Rather, it is also a narrative about a taboo that constructs religious prohibitions on marriage in terms of gender difference (see the section of *kafa'a* and religious taboo).

On the other hand, genealogy for the non-Sada is shaped primarily by religious conviction, especially on the principle of equality. My informant Umar Attamimy stated:

> Well, don't we read in the Qur'an that we are all the same except our behaviours that will be judged by God…look again to the verse of 13 in sura 49, "O people, we created you from the same male and female, and rendered you different people and tribes, that you may recognize each other. The best among you in the sight of God is the most righteous"…see what the verse says? [90]

The religious discourse on equality that my non-Sada informant refers to above is not novel, but, in fact, rooted in a debate about *kafa'a* between Sada and non-Sada in the diaspora in the early twentieth century (Mobini-Kesheh 1997, 241). The Irshadi organization, which was dominated by non-Sada, tried to challenge the privilege of the Sada by citing the religious principle of *musawa,* the equality of all Muslims. Both groups used religious texts to justify their opinions and invited an Egyptian reformist scholar, Rashid Rida, to release a *fatwa*, religious legal opinion on the matter (Mobini-Kesheh 1997, 241). In this context, the difference between Sada and non-Sada on the concept of *kafa'a* to some extent overlaps with different religious ideologies that predominate in each group: traditionalist Shafi'i among the Sada and reformist Islam among the non-Sada (see chapter 5 section 5.2 and 5.3), each having different implications on marriage and gender relations.

Although not all Hadramis of Ambon are directly engaged in religious discourses, their practices of kinship relations enacted through marriage are partly shaped by Islamic doctrines that are open to multiple interpretations. The relatively loose concept of *kafa'a* in Islamic legal thought, which gives a broad range of criteria not necessarily based on lineage, offers many choices and flexibility for the believers, particularly to members of the non-Sada group, to adjust to pragmatic needs in changing circumstances. This also implies that shared religious affiliation is the most basic criterion that overrules other

[90] Interview with Umar Attamimy, October 8, 2014.

aspects of equality in marriage. This has allowed the less wealthy non-Sada to adapt with a new situation and integrate into a broader society of Muslims on Ambon.

As descent is a very important aspect of marriage relations among the Sada, the members of this group have attempted to prevent their family members from violating the *kafa'a* principle. This means that the regulations affect female members more than male members since whomever a man marries does not affect their offspring's lineage, while women marrying-out would cut their children's off from their prophetic lineage, which is considered sacred. In the following, section, I will discuss how the *kafa'a* regulations are related to taboo concerning women's behaviour, particularly among the Sada group.

3.3 *Kafa'a* and Religious Taboo

The previous section described how religious beliefs concerning *kafa'a* regulations plays a role in the construction of marriage within the Hadrami descendants of both Sada and non-Sada. However, the application of the *kafa'a* principle by Sada has most strongly affected gender inequality. I argue that their conception on the strict application of *kafa'a* in marriage lies in the concept of taboo. In this regard, I apply Margaret Mead's discussion of taboo, which she defined as "any prohibitions which carry no penalties beyond the anxiety and embarrassment arising from a breach of strongly entrenched custom" (Steiner and Bohannan 1967, 143). This definition corresponds with the beliefs and practices of Sada families who consider the transgression of the *kafa'a* regulations in marriage in terms of women marrying out as a forbidden act or taboo. This taboo derives from specific beliefs within the group which are justified by religious decrees although not carrying any institutionalized religious penalities. Rather, the penalties concern social sanctions from family members or the group, such as exclusion, isolation, losing a share of family wealth, and others. Breaking the rules is also accompanied by fear of God's punishment of transgressors and their family members who have permitted them to transgress. In this context, the taboo is related to several aspects, such as religious beliefs, the honor code, and social sanctions.

Like many other cultural taboos (Holden 2001; Tetlock 2003), commitments of Sada members to the *kafa'a* principle are considered absolute and inviolable, and in effect sacred. This sacredness is due to the fact that the members believe in the sacredness of the prophetic lineage, the maintenance of which is regarded obligatory since commanded by God and his Prophet. In this line, my informant Rugaya Alatas, for example, shared her view:

> How could I explain to you about this (*kafa'a*, Istiqomah). The Qur'an in sura al-An'am verse 87 talks about prophetic descendants as being an

> exceptionally high quality of human beings, and the Prophet also said 'We, the Prophet family, are not comparable to anybody'.[91]

Not only is this religious text often cited, but several other texts are also interpreted by the Sada as supporting the maintenance of prophetic genealogy by domesticating women in their marriages. Breaking the *kafa'a* principle is thus deemed a sinful act, and such a transgression is believed to receive God's punishment in the hereafter. One Sada descendant Fatma (44 years old), for instance, told me, "I heard that the Prophet would not greet us in the hereafter if we break the law…yes, I would fear this if I were to do such a thing".[92] Her statement indicates that she is not familiar with specific religious texts in which this claim is stated, but rather accepts information from other members whose religious knowledge she considers authoritative. In fact, many other informants similarly do not actively engage in religious discourse but rather base their views on other people's opinions. Another example is my Sada informant Sasa (see chapter 3 page 115), who noted: "I am not sure, I heard from a *sayyid* that if a *sharifa* marries a non-*sayyid* she is committing adultery…but I am not sure, I can ask him directly to explain to you".[93]

The statement above reflects an extreme view on the sinfulness of a union between a Sada woman and a non-Sada man; in Islamic legal thought, adultery is considered to be one of the biggest sins and may result in capital punishment, such as lapidation (Coulson 1994; Bin Mohd Noor 2010; Bello 2011). This taboo is thus related to what Mary Douglas's *Purity and Danger* calls sexual dangers interpreted as "symbols of the relation between parts of society, as mirroring designs of hierarchy or symmetry which apply in the larger system" (Douglas 1966, 3). In a similar vein, Holden (2001, 6) argues that one major function of taboo is "social control, to maintain the status quo and validate the authority of ruling classes". As a mechanism of social control, *kafa'a* among Sada Hadramis operates to protect the hierarchy of in-and out-groups, and it works through a belief on the danger of the sexual union between women from the in-group and men from out-groups.

Another concept related to the taboo on transgression of the *kafa'a* principle is linked to the conception of purification of the prophetic genealogy. Holy (1983, 93) argued that "whenever differences in status or power between groups in the Middle East are perceived or acknowledged to exist, they are legitimized by invoking the antiquity of the descent line of the more powerful group of the purity of its agnatic descent". The idea of the purity of agnatic descent by imposing marriage restrictions on women can be related to Mary Douglas' concept of pollution and taboo. Douglas (1966, 123-4) distinguished

[91] Interview with Rugaya Alatas, March 7, 2015.
[92] Interview with Fatma, September 28, 2014.
[93] Interview with Sasa, December 8, 2014.

four kinds: "danger pressing on external boundaries; danger from transgressing the internal lines of the system; danger in the margins of the lines; and danger from internal contradiction" .

Women's transgression of *kafa'a* regulations can thus be seen as polluting sacred blood by contaminating it with that of those having unsacred lineage. Hence, marriage with non-Sada is seen as a 'danger'. Moreover, imposing marriage restrictions on women is a way to create a distinction similar to what Bourdieu (1977, 57) argues about the case of patrilateral cousin marriage in that "it is likely to be the tactic of groups characterized by a strong desire to assert their distinction by stricter observance of the tradition or by putting oneself in line with the rule".

In addition to religious connotations, the taboo among the Sada also carries dimensions of a cultural code related to honor and shame. This cultural code will be discussed in the following section.

3.4 *Kafa'a*, Honor and Shame

Every society has rules of conduct, which are sanctioned by rewarding those who conform to them and punishing those who disobey. Honor and shame are social evaluations that at the same time become part of social sanctions (Peristiany 1966). For the Sada, honor and shame are two opposite poles and are related to 'victory' and 'loss' in the context of fulfillment of the ideal marriage for its female members on the basis of the *kafa'a* principle.

In her ethnographic study of the Egyptian Awlad 'Ali Bedouins, Lila Abu-Lughod argues that patterns of emotional expression in situations of loss should be understood in terms of a set of culturally specific ideals, which in her case study are those entailed by the honor code, the moral code fundamental to social life in Mediterranean societies on which the social order and hierarchy in Bedouin society hinge (Abu-Lughod 1985, 246). She further argues that these emotional sentiments of loss are expressed through two different forms or discourses: and ordinary discourse and a poetic one, which are contradictory in their expressive characteristics, but linked to each other in everyday life. These two sentiments cover expressions of vulnerability (non-defensive) and invulnerability (defensive), in which the former is represented in ordinary discourse in the public domain and the latter is reflected in the poetic form in the intimate private domain (Abu-Lughod 1985, 221-2). In a somewhat similar fashion, among the Sada group of Ambon, the honor code is reflected in emotional sentiments on the families' loss of their daughters through two different discourses: a public and a private discourse. Unlike the Awlad 'Ali, who use poems as a medium of invulnerability sentiments, Sada Hadramis express their sentiments of vulnerability and invulnerability through the same ordinary discourse. The difference here lies more in the fact

that the discourse on vulnerability is articulated in a more private domain and is only visible to members of a family, while the discourse on invulnerability is more public, and therefore also visible to non-members of a family. A few examples will illustrate this.

In September 25, 2014, I went to see Zainab, a widow from a Sada family. She was 58 years old at the time. She lived in Batumerah Dalam, the most crowded area of the Muslim neighbourhood in the town. I could not immediately find her house so I asked what turned out to be her neighbors if they knew where Zainab lived. Apparently, most of her neighbors were not familiar with her full name, but rather addressed her or referred to her as *umi*, which literally means mother. Zainab had actually been reluctant to talk about her family matters when I had first asked her to be one of my informants. As was the case with many other informants who often cancelled appointments at a late notice, it was also difficult to set a fixed schedule to interview her. It was late afternoon when I visited her. Her house was quite small, and the living room was simultaneously used as a small shop, for which Zainab had installed a glass showcase. The showcase was stuffed with a wide variety of things, among which frankincense, a clay frankincense bowl, charcoal, and perfume. When Zainab asked me to come inside, a neighbor came to buy a frankincense bowl and charcoal. When I asked her what the customer would use these items for, she explained that it was for a *tahlilan,* a kind of a religious ritual.[94] The frankincense in the showcase reminded me of the popularity of frankincense as a valuable commodity in the ancient times. The Arabian Peninsula, especially Hadramaut, was one of the few fertile places in the world to cultivate frankincense which was used for religious ceremonies in some religions before the advent of Islam (Morley 1949; Groom 1981; Roberts 1998).

Both Zainab and her husband are from Namlea, Buru Island. Until his death in 2005, Zainab's husband worked as a civil servant in the department of training and education. Zainab is the oldest of ten siblings. Both her parents are from Sada families of the al-Hamid clan. Zainab herself has five children, all of whom daughters. When asked about her children and their marriage, her facial expression changed. She frowned and kept silent for a while as if I had posed her an impertinent or painful question. Then she replied that three of her daughters were married. When I asked next with whom they got married, Zainab looked even more upset. I could see tears in her eyes betraying her sadness, although she would not express it in front of me, a stranger. Just when I wondered if maybe I should not have asked this question if it so obviously

[94] *Tahlilan* is a form of *tahlil* ritual. Tahlil, from Arabic, literally means a form of *dhikr* by uttering *la ilaha illa-llah* or there is no deity but God. In Indonesia the *tahlil* ritual is common among traditionalist Muslims.

bothered her, one of Zainab's daughters suddenly entered the living room. She interrupted my conversation with her mother by saying: "my lineage is broken because I am married with non-us". Apparently, she had overheard my conversation with her mother. This might be due to the size of the house which was not spacious so that people could hear what other people talked about in another room. Of the three married daughters, two were married to non-Sada men without the presence or endorsement of their male guardian. In other words, while a male guardian from the family is supposed to marry off daughters, in the case of the marriages of the two daughters of Zainab's, the male guardian was replaced by a guardian judge.

The changing expression on Zainab's face, then, related to feelings of shame. She felt that her family's honor had been polluted by their two daughters' spouses. Her daughters married inappropriate men, rather than Sada men from their highly valued own descent group. The shame that such marriages brings should remain untold and silenced as soon as it is mentioned, not only to their family members and group, but also to strangers like me.

I was surprised about Zainab's daughter interruption, which showed that she was aware of the consequence that marrying a non-Sada man would lead to her exclusion of the group of the Sada and moreover to her exclusion from her family. However, here she was visiting her mother, despite the fact that Zainab had made it clear that she was against her daughter's marriage, commenting: "What can I do, it has happened and I cannot stop it. Their father has died. Maybe if he were still alive, I am sure that they (Zainab's daughters, Istiqomah) would never be able to enter this house".[95]

Here we can see that Zainab faces a dilemma in dealing with her two contradictory roles as a mother and as a member of the Sada. When her husband died she lost the strong support from the highest authority in her family and unfortunately she does not have a son who could help her to prevent her daughters from breaching the family code of honor. Zainab's daughter confided to me that although her mother had been upset about her choice of partner, her feelings as a mother had called her to forgive her daughters their violations, especially when her grandchildren were born. Zainab's daughter said, "It took a while for my mother to allow me to visit her and I have been able to come to her house especially after I gave birth".

A few months later, on January 24, 2015, Zainab's same daughter Zidna (34 years old) agreed to tell more about the story of her bitter relationship with her parents after choosing a local man as her husband:

> When I had a boyfriend who is of local origin, the man I married later, I did not tell to my parents. I hid that for some time. But our love was so strong, and we decided to plan our marriage. Then, I tried to tell my

[95] Interview with Zainab, September 25, 2014.

> parents. At that time my father was still alive. The first response I got was that my father was furious and asked me to choose between the family or my boyfriend. At that time, I was very confused who to choose, my family or my boyfriend. Of course, I had heard similar stories like mine, but I had not thought that my father's reaction would be like that. After a few days, I decided to leave the house and I went to live with a relative… My parents did not come to my wedding ceremony, none of my father's and my mother's family were present… That was sad, but that was the consequence... Now I am happy because my mother accepts me and allows me to visit her with my kids.[96]

A similar example comes from another Sada family in Amantelu Batumerah Atas, this time from an al-Aydrus family. When I came to visit this family in December 3, 2014, I met Fira, who was then 64 years old. Fira is a widow of a Sada descendant who died in 1994 at the age of 70. Fira's husband worked as a civil servant in the department of land tenure in Ambon. Fira herself is not of Sada descent but from Pakistani origin. She has three daughters and six sons. None of her daughters are married to Sada men. She told me:

> My husband and I had emphasized this thing (*kafa'a*, Istiqomah) to our children from the very beginning. When my husband was alive, he really got upset with my daughters' choices. But I told my husband "How can we solve this thing, they are our own children. How long will you remain upset? They will be still our own children forever. Will we follow our parents or our children? If we follow our children whatever their behaviour - either good or bad - they will always serve us, and they know whether we are happy or sad." They could have done worse things such as elopement or marrying non-Muslims.[97]

From Fira's narration, it transpires that a nuclear family is one of the main sources for social security for parents. Parents will ask support and care from their own children rather than from other relatives. Children are expected to live longer than them so that they can rely on their children's support when getting old and weak. The fact that Fira did not live in her husband's family home or neighbourhood is another reason why she eventually accepted her children's marriage transgression. Most family members of Fira's husband live on the island of Sawai, Seram Utara. When I visited Fira's husband's family there two years before I met Fira in December 2014, the family was quite poor and even Fira's husband's nephews were provided for by Fira's daughter in Ambon. This means that Fira and her husband are relatively better off than her husband's siblings. In this case, social pressure from Fira's husband family is less significant due to their weak economic position.

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[96] Interview with Zidna, January 24, 2015
[97] Interview with Fira, May 3, 2015.

This example demonstrates that economic power relations are interconnected with the ways people are able to deal with external pressure such as that coming from husband's family members. Fira's role in mediating the tension between her husband and their daughters is significant. Her mediation might not have succeeded had she been a descendant of the Sada herself. As a non-Sada descendant, she was not raised in a strict family with a strong *kafa'a* tradition and like many other non-Sada members she may be of the view that an appropriate marriage is not necessarily based on shared descent. Apart from that, Fira's role as a mediator, as I observed, also lies in her personality: she is a patient, soft, and calm woman. For her what counts most is that an appropriate marriage should be always under one's parents' consent and that one should follow the proper procedure rather than opt for elopement. Religious identity is thus what matters most for her if other requirements cannot be fulfilled.

Alvina from the al-Hamid Sada clan was 38 years old when I met her, wife of a man from the Jamal al-Lail clan, and mother of four little children. Alvina told me the story of her negotiations over a marriage partner with her father:

> Why are we not allowed to marry out? My father said "For ahl al-bayt of the Prophet it is forbidden to marry out...". He continued, "Please arrange a marriage to your daughters so that they will not lose their way. If you have sons you should not give them away to ordinary women so that our daughters, as *sharifa (*female Sada descendant, Istiqomah), can get married to your sons". Then he said again…"if you marry out, please get out from the house now, and do not use *sharifa* as a title because you just make us ashamed".[98]

Here we can see why it is that although Sada men can marry out, they are highly recommended to marry in. If Sada men marry out, for Sada women it will be more difficult to find appropriate husbands from the same lineage or from the Sada group in general. In some cases, Sada women remained single for their entire life because they did not find appropriate husbands and they were afraid of breaking the norm. Many of them also believed that such a transgression may lead to God's sanctions in the hereafter or that their marriage would not end happily.

The statement above also emphasizes the significance of an arranged marriage as a mechanism to maintain the unity and superiority of the group and protect it against extinction. Arranged marriages within one's own family or clan was very common among the Sada group among the first and second Hadrami generation, especially between immediate cousins, second cousins or even between uncle and niece. In the present context, arranged marriages are rare, and many young Hadramis select their partners themselves. As there are

[98] Interview with Alvina on December 9, 2014.

now more choices open to the young Sada generation of both men and women to select a spouse, the chances to marry out are greater in the present context.

In the three examples above, following the *kafa'a* regulations in marriage is what Abu-Lughod calls part of the 'honor code', that is, a moral code that entails a set of culturally specific ideals (Abu-Lughod 1985). The honor code carries cultural meanings about honor and pride which are symbolized in marriage ideals. Breaking the *kafa'a* regulations brings shame to the family. In the three cases above, the family members express their vulnerable sentiments as non-defensive responses, such as sadness, shame, and pain, due to the loss of their female members, who decided to marry men of a lower rank. On the other hand, their vulnerable sentiments as non-defensive responses in the private sphere of the house are in contrast with their invulnerable sentiments in public domains expressed in more aggressive manners such as anger and resentment, which also reveal rejection of transgressive daughters as part of family members followed by all kinds of sanctions.[99]

In his study among the Bedouin society in Egypt Abou A. M. Zeid argues that honor and shame among the Bedouin is to a great extent about aspects of bonds and values of kinship (1966, 245-260). Zeid argues that in tribal societies, the higher the status of the kin-group in the community, the more rigorous and binding their obligations and responsibilities (1966, 245-260). In the case of the Sada families in Ambon, the value of honor is partly shaped by women's behaviour, especially in their choice of marriage. In other words, belonging to a Sada group is a form of symbolic capital which brings pride and prestige for both men and women of this group, but maintaining the value of honor is imposed on women by restricting their choice of marriage partners. Failing to comply with the binding duties of marriage rules brings shame on family members and the immediate kinsmen beyond the nuclear family.

In the context of the Sada community, the concept of honor is not merely about sexual misconduct or criminal involvement, but it encompasses certain values of commitment to *kafa'a* as a firm, sacred tradition that male and female family members should obey. In contra-distinction to honor, shame is related to the women's misconduct in terms of breaking the *kafa'a* norm.

Transgression of the *kafa'a* principle is regarded as a shameful act that can diminish the status of the family, which is experienced as an insult to all Sada members of the family involved. I discovered that most of Sada felt ashamed when telling about members who had married non-Sada partners, and more often than not they were reluctant to talk about this transgression. In this sense, breaking the *kafa'a* principle means a decline of the honor of the family. Although men's exogamy does not affect the honor of the Sada family, their exogamous marriage choices should still meet some criteria that are

[99] Also see the next subsection on social sanctions.

related to descent as well. For example, Nadia, thirty-seven-year-old Sada descendant stated: "Well, men can marry out, of course, but my forefathers did not marry ordinary women (locals from a lower descent, Istiqomah). My (great) grandmothers came from a higher rank".[100] Her statement reflects that the Sada have a subtle range of honor evaluations to judge the appropriateness and compatibility of marriage partners. These criteria work out differently for women and men.

3.5 *Kafa'a* and Group's Sanctions

One important dimension of the taboo on Sada women marrying out is social punishment. The violation of the taboo has led to various kinds of punishments of the transgressors by their family members, such as isolation, inheritance cuts, marriage annulments, and other measures. Such social punishments might function as creating a social order as what Douglas argues in her analysis of taboo:

> Ideas about separating, purifying, demarcating and punishing transgressions have as their main function to impose system on an inherently untidy experience. It is only by exaggerating the difference between within and without, about and below, male and female, with and against, that a semblance of order is created (Douglas 1966, 4).

Douglas' argument about gender relations and the concept of taboo can be understood in a context of a strong patriarchal cultural order. As in many other patriarchal communities, an important feature of Arab communities is the style of communication, which is hierarchal, creating vertical as opposed to horizontal communication between those in authority and those subservient to that authority. In this context, men are holders of the authority in the family (Peristiany 1966). In Sada families, this can partly be recognized, especially in relation to daughters deviating from the marriage norm. Male family members, such as grandfathers, fathers, sons, and uncles have the authority to decide whether marriage candidates for their daughters, sisters, and aunts are appropriate or not. Since men's choice of spouses does not have any impact on the breaking of *kafa'a*, they function as guardians of their female family members in a broad sense and are expected to see to it that their female family members will obey the rules.

Although the Sada also have a patrilineal kinship system, it is not only men of the paternal side hold the authority but men of the maternal side as well if both father and mother are from the same Sada group. If only the father is of Sada descent, the control over the family is in the hands of men on the paternal side. Although men are higher in the family hierarchy than women,

[100] Interview with Nadia, February 27, 2015.

this does not mean that female family members do not hold authority at all. Especially those who are regarded as senior members such as mothers, paternal grandmothers and aunts enjoy authority. In this context, hierarchy in Sada families is not exclusively based on gender, but gender intersects with age differences.

The first stage of social punishment to women's transgressions of the *kafa'a* principle is that their marriages are not endorsed. Rejection of a woman's marriage choice can become visible when during a wedding ceremony the male guardians of the women and other members are absent. According to the national marriage act on Islamic marriages in Indonesia, women should be married off by their guardians or by religious officials (Cammack, Young, and Heaton 1996). The guardians of the women are those male members in the family with whom marriage is prohibited. When fathers are no longer alive, another male member in the family such as a brother, paternal uncle or grandfather acts as the guardian for daughters. In the case of absence of any family guardians, women are allowed to be married off by religious officials. As I observed, in most cases of Sada women marrying non-Sada men, the bride's family guardians did not attend the marriage ceremony. Since a father in the Sada family is a figure of much authority, the rest of the family members, including his wife and other children, should obey him. If a female member in the family breaks the *kafa'a* norm, often her family members are not allowed to attend her wedding ceremony or to visit her anymore. The woman, in turn, is prohibited from visiting her natal family. If both parents are of Sada descent, the treatment of the female members can be even more severe because both her paternal and maternal relatives may exclude her.

It is not only the bride that is punished, but the social punishment also psychologically and socially affect her family through social rumors which may create fear and worries. Rumors about transgressors tend to spread quickly. Such stories are imbued by religious condemnation, and many Sada descendants thus believe in the rumors and the religious sanctions. Fear for the consequences of breaching *kafa'a* regulations thus keeps the religiously inspired taboo alive among members. Many of the Sada women I spoke to, for example, expressed their fear for this punishment, and believed that fulfilling *kafa'a* marriages would lead to a happy marriage both in this world and in the hereafter as it is in accordance with God and his Prophet's injunction. Some people's fear is aggravated by collective stories about women who ended up unhappy in their marriage, suggesting that the main cause of an unhappy marriage was the violation of the taboo. Another factor contributing to the conception of unhappy 'mixed' marriages is the high value attached to parents' consent in marriage choices. The central problem thus lies in the fact that most Sada parents do not agree with their daughters' out-marriages. Because of

parents' disagreement, members of the Sada believe that children would never be happy in their marriage if their parents do not give their consent. Shaikha (35 years old) expressed her view as follows:

> It has been a few years since I have seen my family. I miss them a lot, but my parents and brother do not want to talk to me. My sister is the only one whom I can still contact and who is kind to me… I have two kids now. I don't know…but, I am happy with my husband, he is a loving person, I still hope my parents will accept him even he is not from us (Sada, Istiqomah)…Well, I know the reason though.[101]

Shaikha is not the only person who emphasizes the importance of parental social support and blessings and who hopes that her family will eventually endorse her choice. That the consent of parents is considered crucial for the future happiness of the marriage, is because it is imbued with religious meaning. Some informants, for example, stated: "God's consent is in the hand of parents' consent". The belief of Sada members in the sacred nature of parental consent finds its 'proof' in failed marriages of family members, or relatives or friends whose parents withheld their consent. Husna (50 years old), a Sada from the al-Shatri family explained to me:

> Look what happened with such…and such…they did not want to obey our elderly people. I just got married a few years ago. I don't have children myself but my husband does have children from his previous marriage. Don't you notice my age, I was already old when I got married (around 50 years old, Istiqomah). This is because I wanted to respect my parents' wishes.[102]

The informant above is not the only one who married at a relatively old age. Other cases are even more extreme: some women of the Sada group chose to remain single for their entire life, rather than marrying a man of lower rank. The phenomenon reflects the view that non-Sada men marrying into into Sada families will contaminate the Sada family's blood, resulting in breaking the prophetic lineage. In other words, it reflects the view that the purity of the blood, in terms of prophetic descent can only be preserved through restricting the conduct of female members. One of the informants even expressed his joyful feeling when telling about his sister's divorce:

> All of my sisters got married with men from Sada families except one. First, she married a non-Sada man. At that time, they lived in Seram. All of my family members strongly disagreed with her choice and we told her that we were not responsible for her fate. Almost seven years we did not

[101] Interview with Shaikha, April 18, 2015.
[102] Interview with Husna, April 20, 2015.

> want to talk with her until two years ago when she got divorced. Now she is married again with our cousin.[103]

The statement 'we were not responsible for her fate' illustrates how strong this Sada family believes that a *kafa'a* transgressor will face punishment in the Hereafter. This is an example of an extreme case, in which the family attempted to annul the marriage of their female member. Although according to the Sada divorce is disproved of by God, it is considered to be an act of salvation for the female member who has transgressed the *kafa'a* norm and will prevent a more severe punishment in the Hereafter.

In another case, the marriage of parents ended in a divorce because they responded differently to their daughter's choice to marry a non-Sada. The mother, Inaya (55 years old) stated: "I only have one daughter. I wished she could marry an appropriate man, but she did not. But she is still my daughter, although her father does not acknowledge her anymore… hmmm, he divorced me because he thought I supported my daughter's decision".[104] Inaya's narration reflects her feeling of hopelessness in negotiating her identities as a member of a larger group, the Sada, and as a mother to her daughter. The fact that she decided to side with her daughter rather than with her husband shows that her relations through descent (blood ties) are more significant than those through her marriage. For her ex-husband, to the contrary, keeping the Sada lineage pure was more important than his marriage and fatherhood.

The case of Inaya's husband and the other examples show that the idea that the fulfillment of the *kafa'a* regulations are directly connected to rewards or punishment in the Hereafter's in the view of the majority of the Sada. When discussing kinship, such views are expressed frequently in sayings like: "The Prophet will not give any *shafa'a* (forgiveness)" or "we have our own law" or "This is our destiny as descendants of the Prophet".

In addition to social exclusion, a woman who breaks the *kafa'a* norm will be punished by not receiving any financial aid or property from her parents. In some cases she will not even inherit from her parents when they die. The family punishment to transgressors is strongly kept under the control of male members, such as a father, uncles, or brothers, and the rest of the family will obey them. In many cases, when male members in the family die, particularly if

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[103] Interview with Salim, October 28, 2014.

[104] Inaya is from the al-Saqqaf clan and her former husband is from the al-Hamid clan, and both are Sada descendants. Their only daughter married into a local family, who is related to a rich man according to their neighbors. Inaya and her daughter's family live in the same house in Batumerah Atas. Inaya is my former landlord in Ambon. I rented a room in her house for a few months in 2011 before I was engaged in the research of Arab community. In fact, the first time I learned about her daughter's out-marriage was from another informant, who is from a non-Sada family and related to Inaya through her marriage with Inaya's brother. The interview with Inaya took place on November 3, 2014.

the father of the transgressing woman dies, the family punishment to the transgressors is loosened.

Preservation of the tradition of *kafa'a* marriages is not only the responsibility of the Sada members but also members of the non-Sada group who are incorporated into the structure of a Sada family. From what I observed, many non-Sada women who are married with Sada men became incorporated into the structure and culture of their husband's families. These women carried the same responsibility as their Sada husbands in keeping the *kafa'a* as a customary law. In some cases, these wives were even more strict in relation to their daughters than their husbands. My informant Fathur (see chapter 3 page 72), for example, told me about the relationship between his sister and his mother and the rest of the family:

> My father is a *sayyid*, and he passed away a few years ago. My mother is of local origin from Ternate and a second wife because my father's first wife could not have children… I am married with a Buginese, but I am a man you know… my younger sister is married with a man of local origin. When she got married, my mother did not come to her wedding, … me neither, well until now my mother has not talked to her ... she was in fact firmer than my deceased father.[105]

This statement shows how non-Sada women tend to internalize particular values, doctrines, and practices which are, to some extent, new for them. The obedience of wives to their husband by accepting his values and practices and then transmitting them to the following generation demonstrates how strong patriarchy is in the Sada families. Fathur's statement also reflects the isolation of violators of *kafa'a* can be a disciplinary measure that may warn the other family members not to make the same mistake. Unfortunately, it is only women who are thus restricted. Female family members learn from an early age that they will face the same severe treatment if they breach the *kafa'a* norm as female family members who refused to abide the rules.

Not all Sada women uncritically adopt the view on the sacredness of *kafa'a* regulations. My informant Rafa (see page 104) expressed her view on the *kafa'a* principle as follows:

> Actually I am fed up with and disgusted with this kind of view since I have not found any strong religious ground (text, Istiqomah), which instructs the endogamy marriage and the superiority of one ethnic category to another. Although I am not a religious scholar, I like to read books. I have searched to find information about this matter in some sources including in the Qur'anic verses. I would rather not ever get married than being forced to marry a *sayyid* man… The Qur'an does not recognize superiority of one tribe over another. I know that this superior feeling is strongly

[105] Interview with Fathur, November 5, 2014.

> emphasized in the Sada community. And I am very much against this view. Men and women have an equal position. Women are not men's servants. The view on endogamy marriage is due to a patriarchal system that constructs this reality in order to maintain a primordial sense… Sometimes I also do not understand why my family especially from my father's lineage disagrees with me, because my mother is also an Ambonese, originally from Seram.[106]

Rafa's statement reflects a feminist's point of view that is very rare among female Sada members in Ambon. Rafa's self-proclaimed lack of religious knowledge does not prevent her from critical reflection on the religious ground of the *kafa'a* tradition. This highlights that religious authority within the Sada group is being challenged and contested through the same normative lens that is referred to in order to provide it with a legitimate foundation. Rafa's mixed background of both Arab and local origin, and the social networks that she has built through her career as a journalist may account for the way she openly shared her disagreement with the *kafa'a* tradition. Although she is not associated with any Islamic organization, her line of thought is very much inspired by a reformist idea on an egalitarian Islam. Her disapproval of *kafa'a* practices within her paternal family is based on what she disapproves of as harsh treatment by her father's family towards transgressors:

> My father has nine siblings, four sisters and five brothers… only one of his sisters is married to a Sada. The rest of his sisters are married with locals (from Kei, Ternate, and Buru, Istiqomah). All of his sisters' marriages with locals were rejected by the family… finally they could accept one of them from Buru because my aunt is married with a rich man.[107]

Rafa's statement reveals that in practice breaching the family honor code by transgressing the *kafa'a* norm is not always met with the same response, but can vary depending on other elements at play. If the non-Sada husband of a Sada wife is in possession of significant economic capital this may attenuate the shame brought to the family, as Rafa's anecdote illustrates.

The lack of religious authority of female clan members of the Sada makes it very difficult for those who challenge the *kafa'a* tradition and demand equal rights to be heard. Religious texts thus have become an important tool to justify the *kafa'a* tradition, since knowledge of the religious texts is mainly the monopoly of men. Among the few female members who are considered to have religious knowledge, most support the tradition of *kafa'a*. By extension, disagreement with the *kafa'a* norm is rare compared to a dominant voice that accepts the *kafa'a* rules. Those who criticize the *kafa'a* tradition, such as Rafa,

[106] Interview with Rafa, September 13, 2014.
[107] Interview with Rafa, September 13, 2014.

have few female supporters, and are accused of denying their own identity, their roots, and their forefathers' practices.

While the majority of female Sada clan members accept the dominant view on the *kafa'a* norm, this does not prevent some of them from breaking it. I found instances of violation in almost every Sada family (out of the twenty Sada clans). In other words, many Sada women did not get married in compliance with the *kafa'a* norm. I also discovered that the main reason for Sada women's out-marriage was not so much that these women were critical about the tradition, but, rather that there was only a limited number of Sada men to choose from. As one female Sada put it, "Look, this is because many Sada men have the freedom to marry outside. As a result, many *sharifa* (female Sada descendants, Istiqomah) cannot get a suitable husband anymore". Her statement is confirmed by many other informants who explained to me that they were not against the *kafa'a* tradition as such. Rather, they point to the shortage of the Sada men and state that they did not want to remain single for their entire life.

The relative importance of the *kafa'a* norm to them comes to the fore in the fact that despite the fact that they underscore its value, they still prefer monogamous marriages with non-Sada men over entering into a polygamous marriage with a Sada man. They are even fully aware of certain consequences they face by breaching the *kafa'a* regulations. Altogether, it was only a small number of Sada women who voiced outright criticism about the *kafa'a.* Moreover, these women would only do so in a private conversation, and were reluctant to pronounce their views in public. This demonstrates that the taboo about breaking *kafa'a* rules is still strong.

That in practice breaching the *kafa'a* norm does occur is not only due to the shortage of Sada men, but also to the relatively greater freedom of present-day Sada women in the public sphere. In Ambon, the present young female generation of Sada membes have more freedom of movement than women of older generations enjoyed at their age. Referring to her parents and her own children, my informant Rugaya Alatas, for example, told me the following:

> In former times, we (daughters) stayed at home with our parents, and our marriages were arranged… now we could not force our daughters anymore. We don't expect anything from our daughters, they are allowed to pursue a high education and a career, but they should not forget to choose right persons (the Sada, Istiqomah) for their husbands. That is what our great hope.[108]

Alatas's statement reflects a shift in women's freedom to select spouses between past and present generations. In former times, arranged marriages were common practice. The statement of Alatas also implies that in her view

[108] Interview with Rugaya Alatas, March 7, 2015.

women's greater freedom in the public sphere today may make them vulnerable to selecting inappropriate husbands and engaging in unacceptable relationships. However, other people pointed out that women's greater freedom in the public space, especially in terms of education and employment, also creates more opportunities for women to meet 'appropriate' spouses. Many informants told me that they met their husbands in their schools, workplaces, and other social institutions. They even met their husbands through social media. In this context, modern communication tools such as online media have contributed significantly to shaping the ways the Sada maintain their kinship relations. In this line, Martin Slama (2014, 74) asserts that online forums enable female Sada members to considerably enlarge their choices in preferential marriage spouses in resonance with parents' wishes.

Although Sada families provide their daughters with more freedom and rights in terms of education and employment, socialization and internalization of the *kafa'a* norm continues in order to prevent female members from transgressing the traditional marriage regulations. Thus, the *kafa'a* principle continues to play a considerable role in shaping the way people perceive themselves as a member of the Sada group. This socialization process is undertaken at two levels: that of the family and that of the Sada group. On the family level, parents hold authority and children must obey them. With the use of an authoritarian style, children are raised with the expectation that they will perpetuate the customs and traditions of the family. Parents teach their children about their sacred lineage and their marriage options, about which clans should be avoided and why they should be avoided. Children thus learn from their parents who they are and to which clan they belong.

On a group level, the process is regulated through group forums such as regular religious forums or social gathering forums that meet weekly, monthly, or annually. The group forums are usually led by several Sada organizations, such as the Rabita branch of Ambon, Melati al-Khairat, and ar-Rahmah. While religious forums tend to be open to non-members, the inter-family gathering forums are exclusive to members. The topics of religious forums are usually general while those of the inter-family gathering forums are more specific, focusing on *kafa'a* and other dimensions of Sada customs.

Through these group forums, social rumors on family affairs are spread and in this way the forums serve the function of social sanctioning. My informant Inaya (see page 149), for instance, told me that she does not visit such forum meetings anymore. She explained that she was ashamed because her only daughter got married to a non-Sada and she could not face other Sada members' gossip and criticism. Similarly, my informant Fathur told me, "I don't like this gossiping… the Arabs like to *fudul* (gossiping, Istiqomah)."[109] His

[109] Interview with Fathur, November 5, 2014.

statement about gossiping was, in fact, related to his mother's pain about how she is treated by other Arab people, who accuse her of having failed as a mother to prevent her daughter from marrying a non-Sada man. According to Fathur, such gossiping usually takes place during meetings of the *pengajian* or religious forum, and during an *arisan,* a meeting of money saving circles.[110] The group level of socialization and the cultivation of values is thus used as a means to warn female members of the consequences of transgressing the group's cultural code by breaching the *kafa'a* norm, and at the same time it is used as a mechanism for social sanctions by spreading rumors and gossip which may damage a person's honor in the eyes of other people.

4. Conclusion

This chapter has examined how the Hadrami descendants of Ambon construct and maintain their group identities as heterogeneous Hadrami Arabs through a patrilineal kinship system in the present-day context. I have approached the kinship system first of all as a symbolic cultural construct that marks boundaries and regulates social relations, including gender relations, among the Hadrami community members and between the Hadrami community and other communities. This genealogical reckoning is a means of constructing discrete and stable group identities or diversely imagined Hadrami identities that may persist over time.

I have also discussed how the *kafa'a* principle works on the ground. The research findings reveal that the patrilineal kinship system is enacted through an application of asymmetrical marriage tradition justified by *kafa'a* doctrines. Marriage patterns between Sada and non-Sada groups are relatively similar as they both practice exogamous and endogamous marriages based on gender difference. However, there is a shift of understanding on the conception of *kafa'a* among the non-Sada. This reflects the continuity of a dispute about *kafa'a* between Sada and non-Sada groups in the beginning of the twentieth century in Indonesia and in other parts of the diaspora (see Slama 2014). In this context, religious ideologies, to some extent, play a role in different understandings of both groups on *kafa'a* and thus result in differences in how gender relations are organized.

The chapter has focused in particular on the agency of Hadrami women. Approaching women as actors rather than passive carriers and transmitters of tradition, the case studies discussed demonstrate that Hadrami women may

[110] *Arisan* is a form of social gathering in which a certain amount money of the members or participants of the forum is collected as a way of saving, and each member gets her/his money back in a rotating way. During the period of arisan, the amount money paid by every member is equal to the amount she/he receives.

use their agency both to maintain and to cross Hadrami identity boundaries. It has also become clear that the burden of the consequences that come with the transgression of the *kafa'a* tradition lies much more on Sada women than on men, who have more freedom of choice concerning marriage partners.

On the basis of the aforementioned findings, this chapter argues that the descendants of Hadrami migrants of Ambon actively claim their ethnic identity as Hadrami Arabs not only through socially constructed similarity but also through claims of difference with some reference to common descent and certain 'cultural stuff' or cultural traditions (see conception of ethnicity by Eriksen (1992) and Jenkins (1995). In this context, the descendants of the Hadrami migrants today similarly claim to be descendants of Arab ethnic groups and at the same times distinguish between different, unequal Hadrami clans. This active claim of a Hadrami Arab ethnic identification is socially reproduced through boundary making practices that interlock with other cultural (Hadrami) elements, such as kinship and marriage, traditional social hierarchy, particular Islamic teachings, and gender. This Hadrami Arab ethnic identification, however, allows some other cultural practices from local Ambonese culture concerning language, food, dress, etc. (see chapter 3) to be part of the reproduction of the descendants' identities as Hadrami Arabs. The Hadramis in the diaspora, and in Ambon in particular, may share more cultural features with local Ambonese Muslims than the Hadramis in Hadramaut, while claiming the same identity with those in the homeland. By extension, identification with a social category, as here ethnic identity, does not coincide with the cultural content of the same identities.

The following chapter will demonstrate how identification with another social category, that is religion, not only informs everyday life of the Hadramis but also affects the reproduction of the dynamics of Hadrami identities.

Chapter 5: Religious Developments within the Hadrami Community of Ambon

1. Introduction

This chapter discusses religious developments within the Hadrami community in Ambon. The focus is on continuity and change concerning religious beliefs and practices. The chapter is divided into three sections. Before zooming in on the Hadrami community in Ambon, I will first provide a general picture of religious configurations within the Hadrami community in Indonesia in order to grasp the impact of locality (context) on religious understandings and the activities and membership of religious organizations from one place or region to another in the diaspora. Next, I examine the historical and present religious constellation within the Hadrami community in Ambon in order to understand the dynamics between Sada and non-Sada groups in terms of ideological differences and struggle over religious authority. In the last section I sketch the Hadramis' engagement in Islamic activities in Ambon. I will shed light on their contribution to local Islamic developments and reflect on the role of religion as an important dimension of social integration within the Hadrami community itself and in other Muslim communities in Ambon in general.

2. Traditional Religious Authority and Its Contestation

In Hadramaut, religious authority was traditionally closely related to the specific social stratification that was discussed in previous chapters. Divided into three or four strata, Hadrami society positioned the Prophet's descendants, Sada, at the top of the hierarchy, thereby granting them a special societal role in religious authority (Bujra 1971). In terms of beliefs and practices, Hadramis followed the Shafi'i school of law and combined it with Sufi teachings. By extension, they not only respected religious scholars, but also practiced saint veneration and paid *ziyara*'s or visits to saint shrines.

In Indonesia, this traditional religious authority in the Hadrami community began to be contested as a result of the propagation of Islamic reformism from the Middle East. This reformism came in tandem with Hadrami *nahda* (awakening, resurgence, renaissance) in Indonesia in the early twentieth century. This *nahda* was embodied in three distinct forms, namely voluntary associations, modern-type schools, and publications (Mobini-Kesheh 1999, 34 & 52; Ulrike Freitag 2003, 227).

The earliest modern-style organization initiated by Hadramis in Indonesia was Jam'iyya Khair (Mobini-Kesheh 1999, 36). Founded in Batavia (now Jakarta) in 1901, Jam'iyya Khair was officially registered in 1905. In its

early establishment, Jam'iyya Khair's membership included both Sada and non-Sada elite. As a modern-style organization, the Jam'iyya Khair operated in resonance with western conventions and was concerned with modern education as an essential way for Hadramis to realize progress without abandoning their Arab-Islamic identity. Therefore, their curriculum consisted of western sciences and languages as well as traditional religious subjects (Slama 2011, 333).

To develop its educational programmes, in 1911 the Jam'iyya Khair invited a Sudanese reformist minded-scholar, Ahmad Surkati.[111] Although Hadramis had access to Islamic reformist ideas from the late nineteenth century onwards through the circulation of the reformist journals *al-'Urwa al-Wusta* and *al-Manar*, the reformist movement only gained momentum upon the arrival of a group of reform-minded teachers to Indonesia from Middle East, among whom Surkati (Mobini-Kesheh 1999, 54).

Surkati's influence on the organization and his reformist-minded thinking on egalitarianism soon became a source of tension among its members. In 1914 this led to the resignation of Surkati and many Hadrami members from non-Sada families. The tension was related to implications of Surkati's view on egalitarian Islam when he issued a *fatwa* allowing a marriage between a daughter of Sada origin with a Chinese man in Java. By extension the *fatwa* approved of marriage between Sada women and men of non-Sada origin, which, as was discussed in chapter four, in the view of Sada was forbidden since not in line with the *kafa'a* principle according to which Sada women should not 'marry down'.

After resigning from the Jam'iyya Khair, around 1913/4 Surkati established his own organization: al-Jam'iyya al-Islah wa al-Irshad al-'Arabiyya (Arab Association for Reform and Guidance) or later popularly abbreviated to al-Irshad (Mobini-Kesheh 1999, 56). The main objectives of the establishment of al-Irshad resonated the voice of Islamic reformism of Egyptian scholars like al-Afghani, Abduh, and Ridha, who were concerned with what they perceived of as the decay of Islamic society and the superiority of Western (European) people in science and technology. The scholars argued that the plight of Muslim society around the world was a result of Muslims' failure to correctly interpret and implement the Islamic teachings. To solve this problem, these intellectuals aimed to purify the faith from foreign elements, such as

[111] Born on the Arqu Island in 1875/6, Surkati came from an educated family; both his father and grandfather were graduates from Egypt. Surkati obtained his earliest education from his father and was able to memorize the Qur'an at a young age. He received his basic Islamic education in Sudan. When he went on *hajj* to Mecca he remained in the Hijaz for fifteen years to learn Islamic subjects. With his Islamic knowledge, he was awarded a distinguished teaching post and scholar in Mecca. He was also exposed to the modernist movement in Egypt (Mobini-Kesheh 1999, 54).

superstitions and innovations, by returning to the two basic sources of Islam: the Qur'an and the Sunna, that is, the tradition of the Prophet Muhammad as documented in the Hadith, the stories about the deeds and sayings of the Prophet. Apart from this purification, they considered it necessary that Muslims study modern sciences in order to achieve strength and welfare. The al-Irshad, following these reformist ideas by encouraging the Hadramis to embrace progress, develop themselves and purify religious practices from any foreign elements (see Rippin 2012, 235-262). Al-Irshad soon gained support and followers, mostly among the Arabs from non-Sada background established branches of the al-Irshad around the archipelago and the homeland (Mobini-Kesheh 1999; Freitag 2003).

The Jam'iyya Khair and al-Irshad were the two first modern-style Hadrami associations in the Indonesian diaspora that engaged in voluntary Islamic activism. This activism focused on education, publications and social activities as part of reform programmes, which addressed Hadramis both in the diaspora (Indonesia) and in the homeland (Mobini-Kesheh 1999; Freitag 2003). The Jam'iyya Khair and al-Irshad differed in the sense that the former tried to maintain the traditional social hierarchy and continued to respect symbolic reverent acts to the Sada such as kissing Sada's hands, giving them their proper seating during the gathering, and maintaining *kafa'a* marriage (Mobini-Kesheh 1999, 52-53). Al-Irshad rejected such preferential etiquette. In this way, Islamic reformism paved a way for Hadramis in the diaspora to deconstruct and reconstruct their traditional Hadrami social hierarchy.

To understand how the introduction of Islamic reformism in the Hadrami community in the early twentieth century enhanced religious divides to the point of polarization in the community in Indonesia, three interlinked contexts must be taken into account. The first concerns the larger context of global trends in intellectualism that occurred at the time in many centres of Islamic learning, a trend that cannot be separated from the expansion of European powers to many parts of the Muslim world. As argued by Ulrike Freitag (2003), intellectual trends in the Middle East and elsewhere contributed to intellectual developments among Muslims around the world and shaped early nationalism and modernist reform in South East Asia. Muslims were exposed to new interpretations of Islam, namely revivalist teachings of a both moderate and conservative nature aiming to 'purify' Islam.

This exposure took shape through increased Muslims' mobility to other Islamic centres as a result of modern means of transportation. One example was through the experiences of South East Asian Muslims during the *hajj*, the pilgrimage to Mecca. In Mecca, the pilgrims were exposed to Ottoman pan-Islamism and learned about the Sudanese Mahdi, the Indian Mutiny, and the expansion of European powers in the Muslim world. The Hadramis in the Malay diaspora were also integrated into Malay-Muslim developments, at the

same time as European interference with the internal economic and political structures of Malay regions, both by the British on the Malay Peninsula and the Dutch in Indonesia, was increasing. Due to their international networking and high mobility as merchants, scholars or statesmen, the Hadramis were furthermore among the important players who were exposed to global intellectual trends. This exposure to global developments enticed Hadramis in the diaspora to initiate reform programmes with the aim to modernize administrative forms, education, infrastructure, and political structures both in the homeland and diaspora (Freitag 2003, 226-227).

The second context that helped to shape the new ideas and desires of Indonesian Hadramis concerns the socio-political situation during the last phase of colonialism. In the early twentieth century, Indonesian movements arose that opposed colonialism and created awareness among inhabitants in the Indonesian Archipelago about sharing one national identity. Around this period, the political movements Budi Utomo[112] and Sarekat Islam (SI) were founded in 1908 and 1911/1912 respectively (Noer 1973; Ricklefs 2008; Vickers 2012; Kahin and Anderson 2018). These two organizations were soon followed by the reformist Muhammadiyah organization in 1912 and the traditionalist organization Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) in 1926 as representatives of the two biggest national Muslim organizations in Indonesia (see Peacock 1978; Bush 2009). Within this context, both Jam'iyya Khair and al-Irshad represented the earliest main religious organizations in Indonesia with an ethnic character (Mobini-Kesheh 1999, 38-41).

The third context that must be taken into account to understand religious and organizational developments among the Hadramis in Indonesia was related to internal developments in the Hadrami community, especially the dynamics of the relations between Sada and non-Sada (Mobini-Kesheh 1999, 52-53). The traditional social stratification, based on heredity which positioned the Sada group at top of the hierarchy, was challenged in the diaspora by a newly emergent elite originating from groups of non-Sada lower strata, who had economically succeeded in collecting considerable wealth in the diaspora. Some of the non-Sada even rose to become part of the political elite in the Dutch colonial administration. In some respects, this gave them authority over the Sada group (Mobini-Kesheh 1999, 27-28). In this context, the changing power relationship between Sada and non-Sada in the diaspora resulted in the breakdown of the traditional Hadrami social hierarchy,

[112] Budi Utomo (literally 'prime philosophy') was established on May 20, 1908, and is considered the first native political society in the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) as a result of the Dutch Ethical Policy, which emphasized the significance of improving the welfare of the people especially in education and culture.

increasing the appeal of Islamic reformism that offered an egalitarian Islam to those who contested the superiority of Sada.

With the rise of the first era of Indonesia's independence (Sukarno regime, 1945-1967), both Jam'iyya Khair and al-Irshad maintained their character as traditionalist and reformist organizations respectively. While neither organization was exclusively Hadrami, leading positions had until then always been held by Hadramis, but now both organizations opened up such positions to Muslims of any origin as a way of a greater integration to Indonesian society. Traditionalist Sada remained dominant in the Jam'iyya Khair, however, while reformist non-Sada members continued to dominate the al-Irshad. In this regard, one can conclude that the early religious polarization within the Hadrami community was more influenced by different interests in reforming the traditional Hadrami social stratification than by different interests in reforming Islamic educational institutions. At the same time, however, it must be noted that some Hadramis were not only active in one of these two Hadrami dominated organizations, but were also engaged in religious organizations with a broader national scope, such as NU and Muhammadiyah.

Religious transformations within the Hadrami community acccelerated in the course of the New Order Era (1968-1998). During the New Order era, the state restricted and controlled Islamic activism in public arenas. This does not mean that there was no Islamic activism on the ground at all. The dynamics of Islamic activism during the New Order regime became more variegated with an influence of global Islamic movements, particularly Wahhabism and Shi'ism. Saudi versions of Salafi Islam (Wahhabism, neo-Salafism) started to exert its globalized influence in tandem with the oil boom of Saudi kingdom in the 1970s. At the same time, as an effect of the Iranian revolution in 1979, across the globe Twelver version of Shi'a Islam spread. Both ideologies gained significant followers among Indonesian Muslims from the 1970s onwards. The Saudi version of Salafi Islam attracted many Hadramis, especially from non-Sada background, who, together with other Muslims of non-Hadrami origin, formed some Islamic organizations. Wahhabism also influenced the existing reformist Hadrami organization al-Irshad, resulting in an internal friction between members with a reformist-modernist orientation and those with a more conservative (fundamentalist) orientation (Rijal 2017). At the same time, a significant number of Hadramis, especially those of Sada origin, converted to Twelver Shi'a and formed organizations, which have become effective only after 1998. This conversion will be explained further in section 3.3.2. Although Saudi Wahhabism and Iranian Shi'ism have become widely spread among the Indonesian Muslims since the second half of the Suharto regime, their overt activism in the public domain only became more prominent after the fall of the New Order regime in 1998.

The collapse of the New Order regime in 1998 has had an impact on religious changes and constellations in Indonesia in several ways. The first change concerned the political structure, which from then on allowed public participation in politics (democratization), resulting in the emergence of many Islamic-based parties. The second change is the visibility of Islamic revivalism, including Wahhabism and Shi'ism, in the public sphere. Diversity of Islamic activism, movements and publications has flourished in resonance with their different ideologies. The diversity of Islamic activism is not only a result of global flows of ideas injected from Middle Eastern countries, but also of those from western countries, namely ideas on secularism, pluralism and liberalism leading to transforming activism among Muslim intellectuals and activists as well. In this way, liberalism and fundamentalism (Islamism) have added more flavors to Indonesian Islam (Kersten 2016). Despite the diversity of Islamic movements and organizations, Indonesia is still home to two mainstream Islam orientations; the more traditionalist and the more modernist one, which have persisted among the majority of Indonesian Muslims (Van Bruinessen 2013). Having been part of the larger community of Indonesian Muslims since their arrival, this is also the case among Hadramis.

Along with the above mentioned transformations, the collapse of the Suharto regime has also influenced diasporic movements of the Indonesian Hadramis. After unification of the two Yemeni states in 1990 and the breakdown of the New Order regime in Indonesia in 1998, the Hadrami community in Indonesia has been reconnected with their forefathers' homeland, thanks to the development of new technologies in transportation and telecommunication, facilitating the contemporary Hadrami mobility back and forth between Indonesia and Hadramaut (Knysh 2001; Ho 2006; Alatas 2016b). In both the homeland and diaspora this renewed connection has contributed to the revitalization of traditionalist Islam and the Sufi order Tariqa 'Alawiyya,[113] as well as to the revitalization of particular traditional gender roles (see further chapter 6 section 3).

Looking at this broader picture, I would next like to sketch the religious developments within the smaller scope of the Hadrami community of Ambon as there has hardly been any scholarly attention to developments concerning this issue in Ambon so far. The following section will discuss the contestation of religious authority within the Hadrami community in Ambon in past and present contexts in order to understand the community's beliefs and practices

[113] A Sufi path which is ascribed to 'Alawi, a term denoting descendants of the Prophet from the Hadramaut. The institution of the Tariqa 'Alawiyya was developed by Muhammad b. Ali or called the First Jurist (*al-Faqih al-Muqaddam*, d.1255) who is the eighth-generation descendant of the first Prophet's offspring migrating to the Hadramaut valley, Ahmad b.'Isa al-Muhajir (Ho 2006, 37-41; Alatas 2011, 47).

as well as to see whether the Sada and non-Sada distinction is related to ideological differences and power struggle over religious authority.

3. Religious Authority and Contestations within the Hadrami Community in Ambon

3.1 Traditional Islam Versus Islamic Reformism

Traditionalist notions characterize most adequately the oldest ways Islam was practiced in the Hadrami community of Ambon. The term tradition in the concept traditionalism here relates to the importance of three interrelated concepts: Sunna, Hadith, and *adat* (Van Bruinessen 1999, 163-189). Traditionalist Muslims are viewed by reformists as those whose religious practice is pervaded with local practices of non-Islamic origin (*adat*) or even in contradiction with the Shari'a or without precedence in Islamic doctrine (*bid'a*), such as *tahlil* (repetition of the name of God), *ziyarah kubur* (visiting the graves of ancestors and teachers), reciting certain prayer formula *(ratib*), reciting *shalawat* (invocations of divine blessing on behalf of the Prophet and his family, beliefs in miracles of saints and intercession). In addition, traditionalist Muslims are also considered to adhere to one of the orthodox *madhabs* or schools of law and practise *taqlid*, i.e. follow the rulings of the founding father and other major scholars of this school as they are found in standard *fiqh* works.

Many Hadrami descendants in Ambon practise traditionalist Islam and observe Islamic traditions from Hadramaut by following the Shafi'i school of thought and Sufi teachings. Like other traditionalist Muslims, traditionalist Hadramis in Ambon conduct certain religious rituals collectively. Among the rituals are reciting certain prayers or formula (such as *tahlil, ratib)*, visiting graveyards (*ziyarah kubur*), and commemorating deceased persons (*haul*). Traditionalists also celebrate annual festivities, such as *'ashura* (mourning day to commemorate Husain's martyrdom in Karbala Iraq) and *maulid al-nabi* (the Prophet's birthday). In chanting specific texts, such as *shalawat,* invocations of divine blessing on behalf of the Prophet and his family, traditionalists use a traditional musical instrument; the tambourine. Sometimes, they also burn incense during the rituals.

The organization of these rituals is usually the responsibility of the group's leaders. For instance, Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar, head of the branch of Rabita al-'Alawiyya of Ambon (see chapter 4 section 2.3) and Rugaya Alatas, head of the orphanage foundation of Melati al-Khairat (see further on chapter

5 section 4.2)[114], regularly arrange religious rituals for their members. During my fieldwork, I was able to participate in "Majelis al-Husaini", a weekly religious gathering to recite texts of *maulid al-Habshi* or *simt al-durar* [115] conducted by the Rabita several times. My informant Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar told me that this Majelis al-Husaini meeting was launched in the month of Ramadan in 2007, one year before the legal establishment of the branch of Rabita al-'Alawiyya in Maluku. The Majelis al-Husaini was initiated by nine people consisting of eight Sada and one non-Arab. Its name was given by a religious preacher of Sada origin from Jakarta.[116]

The Majelis al-Husaini ritual is usually held after the *isha* or evening prayer on Thursday night, and takes about two hours. This ritual is to chant religious texts called *simt al-durar*. When I attended the ritual for the first time on March 28, 2015, it started at 9 p.m. As it was held in the orphanage foundation, Melati al-Khairat, all of the orphans staying in the Melati al-Khairat participated in the ritual. Apart from the orphans and the leader of the Rabita, I saw two other attendants; Kamil, a manager of the Melati al-Khairat, and Hasanusi, an *imam* of the grand-mosque, al-Fatah, and another person. Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar, Kamil, and Hasanusi wore neat (religious) attires combining headdress (white and black colors), white, long sleeve upper shirts and long trousers. I sat on the rug in the female line, together with female orphans. The chanting began with reciting *al-fatiha*, an opening chapter of the Qur'an, and chants dedicated to the Prophet, his family the *ahl al-bayt*, the Prophet's descendants, the author of *simt al-durar* texts, and some saints and religious *imams*. Each participant recited one line of the text, starting with Hasanusi, followed by my informant Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar, Kamil, and the others. In the middle of the recital indicated by the text '*mahal al-qiyam'*, the participants stood up and some male orphans played the *rebana,* a traditional kind of tambourine, while the rest were reciting. While we were reciting the *simt al-durar* accompanied by the *rebana*, one of the participants sprinkled perfume on the hand palms of each participant. After standing for ten minutes, we sat on the rug again and continued reciting. The ritual was then closed by reciting the *al-fatiha* (the first chapter in the Qur'an) again.

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[114] Melati al-Khairat is one of the *dar al-aytam*, orphanage foundations, in Ambon. It is probably the first led by a woman from Sada background.

[115] *Simt al-durar* literally means string of pearls. It is a text containing poetry and compliments on the Prophet's life or well-known as a *maulid* text. The text is taken from the book entitled *Simt al-Durar fi Akhbar Maulid Khair al-Bashr min Akhlaq wa Aushafi wa Siyar*. This text is well-known as an al-Habshi *maulid* as it refers to its author, Ali bin Muhammad al-Habshi (1839-1913), a religious scholar from Tarim, Hadramaut (Al-Habsyi 1992).

[116] Interview with Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar, October 4, 2014.

On many occasions the Rabita and the Melati al-Khairat conduct these kind of religious rituals together as the heads of the Rabita and Melati al-Khairat are related each other, both being from Sada families. In this regard, a substantial number of the traditionalist adherents have a Sada background. This does not mean that traditionalist Islam has no followers at all among Hadramis of non-Sada origin and other Muslim backgrounds. Yet, Hadramis of non-Sada background are more active in activities related to reformist Islam.

Traditionalist Islam among the Hadramis in Ambon was challenged by Salafism in its reformist-modernist sense since early twentieth century. Salafism itself comes from the Arabic term *salaf* that refers to the first three generations of scholars after the Prophet Muhammad. Salafism, thus, advocates a return to the traditions of the *salaf*, which are based on the Qur'an and Hadith. Centered around the concept of returning to the path of the first three generations after the Prophet, the Salafi doctrine rejects *bid'a,* religious innovation, and *taqlid*, adherence to certain schools of thought. It also advocates the application of Shari'a (Islamic law). Scholars classify Salafism into two categories: classical Salafism, which is characterized by reformist-modernist notions, and neo-Salafism, which is strongly influenced by Wahhabism or the Saudi version of Salafism.

Scholars use the term 'classical Salafism' as a school of thought that rose in the second half of the nineteenth century as a response toward western (European) hegemony in search for the roots of modernity within Muslim civilization. Muslim thinkers such as Muhammad Abduh, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, and Rashid Rida proclaimed this school of thought. However, some contemporary Salafis reject the aim to reconcile what they conceive of as specifically Islamic social norms with modernity. Their objective is to follow literal interpretations of the holy texts. They are sometimes also called a form of reconstituted Wahhabism, due to the determination of its proponents to more systematically introduce the thoughts formulated by the three main classical references among Wahhabis, namely Ahmad ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328)[117], Muhammad ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (1291-1350) and Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792). Followers also often refer to the *fatwas* issued by contemporary Wahhabi authorities, such as 'Abd al-'Aziz 'Abd Allah ibn Baz (d. 1999) and Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani (d. 1999). This movement has anti-West sentiments, which inspired the birth of twentieth century Islamist movement, such as Ikhwan al-Muslimin and Jama'at al-Islami (Hasan 2001, 25).

Similar to other diaspora Hadrami communities such as in Java, the wave of Islamic reformism from the Middle East that influenced the Hadrami community in Ambon inspired some of its elite members to found modern

[117] All historical dates mentioned in this study are Common Era.

Islamic schools. The Hadramis' early involvement in modern Islamic education, however, still needs further investigation. As there has been no historical research on Hadramis' early role in Islamic education in Ambon, I must rely on my informants' stories.

Many present-day Hadrami descendants, both Sada and non-Sada, claim that their forefathers have contributed to Islamic education in Ambon. Informants who have been involved in Islamic education contended that the earliest modern Hadrami-initiated an Islamic school was established around the 1920s. In the first half of the twentieth century, there were about three Hadrami-initiated Islamic schools, namely Raudat al-Adab, Ma'ahid al-Huda, and Mahasin al-Akhlaq.[118] These three schools were said to have introduced Islamic curricula combining general and Islamic sciences, and to have provided equal opportunities to boys and girls. All three schools, which appear to have been reformist-modernist in character, lasted only shortly. The last school, Mahasin al-Akhlaq continued its educational activities until just before Indonesian independence (1945). My informant Hadi Basalamah (see chapter 3 page 82) told me that after the independence some graduates of these three schools continued their commitment to provide Islamic education by forming a

[118] Raudat al-Adab was established by Shaikh Bakhmid. The school used Arabic and Malay as languages of instruction, and most of the subject matters were Islamic subjects, such as *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence), *tauhid* (theology), *tafsir* (Qur'anic exegesis), and *akhlaq (akhlak* in Malay) (Islamic ethics). Students of the school were obliged to wear Islamic dress, *pantalon* for males, and *kerudung* (a loosely draped scarf to cover half of the women's hairs) for females. Ma'ahid al-Huda was founded by two brothers of Bahwereis family, Said and Muhammad. Like the Raudat al-Adab, the Ma'ahid al-Huda used Arabic and Malay as languages of instruction. Apart from Islamic subjects, extra topics such as scouting were taught. The school succeeded in training Muslims, not necessarily from Hadrami origin, as religious preachers in Ambon. This is a list of the local clerics (e.g Abdurrahaman Assagaf, Ahmad Alhamid, Awad Bamahri, Abu Bakar Bin Yahya, Hasan Bin Galib, Ari Lestaluhu, Abdulkadir Abduljabbar, Abdul Gani Tangke, Ahmad Bantan, Ali Fauzi, Muhammad Ambon, and Ismail Tanke).
Mahasin al-Akhlaq was established by Abdurrazak Alamudi. After finishing his study in al-Azhar University around the 1930s, Abdurrazak returned to Ambon and initiated the school. The board of the school management consisted of those who graduated from the two previous schools, the Raudat al-Adab and the Ma'ahid al-Huda, such as Husain Bin Shaikh Abubakar, Ahmad Hatala, Abdulkadir Liem, Abdulkadir Drahman, Muhammad Hatala, and Abdurrazzaq Alamudi's brother, Husain Alamudi. Graduating from an Islamic university abroad, Abdurrazaq was said to be a respected scholar, who brought with him modern ideas of Islam in the school. He was said to combine European outfits, such as coat and tie, and Egyptian headdress. On Fridays, he dressed like a religious scholar from al-Azhar University. The students of this school were obliged to wear a *kopiah*, black headdress for men, and *kerudung* for women. As the two previous schools, Arabic and Malay were languages of the school's instruction. Extra musical lessons using traditional music instruments such as *seruling* (wooden flute), *tambur* (small drum), *genderang* (large drum) were also taught. The students usually showed their public music performance on the streets of Ambon town. Interview with Hadi Basalamah, December 14, 2014.

modern-style foundation called al-Hilal.[119] Hadi Basalamah is current head of the al-Hilal.

According to Ch.F. van Fraasen, from the nineteenth century until the first half of the twentieth century, there was no such formal Islamic school established in Ambon (Central Maluku), but a few Muslims such as from Kailolo, Tehoru in Seram were reported to go to study in Mecca and al-Azhar university of Egypt. Besides, in the 1920s, a Muslim from Malay region of Johor came to Tulehu Ambon to teach the tenets of mystical Islam (*tasawwuf)* to his students. Although there was no such formal Islamic school, every Muslim village (*negeri*) had a religious teacher who would teach children how to recite the Qur'an, although not all of them had command of the Arabic language (Van Fraassen 1972b, 323-328). Albeit ever so shortly, al-Hilal was mentioned briefly in Fraasen's report (Van Fraassen 1972b, 323-328), so that there is some textual evidence to confirm the claim of my Hadrami informants. It is likely that the foundation of al-Hilal played a role in unifying the Hadrami community in Ambon regardless of differences in religious understandings. It thus functioned as an umbrella organization of the Hadrami community, as will be discussed in the following subsection.

3.2 Al-Hilal as a Unified Organization of the Hadrami Community

Al-Hilal appears to be the oldest Hadrami-initiated modern-style Islamic foundation in Ambon. Although some modern-Islamic schools may have existed earlier, the al-Hilal is the first Hadrami foundation that began to exert its educational influence on the Hadrami community around Maluku Islands or what Martin Slama (2011) characterized as "the institutionalization of the diaspora in formal organization".

The al-Hilal was established on May 2, 1946 and given the name 'Islamic Unity of al-Hilal' by wealthy Arab merchants in Ambon. Born in a revolutionary era, initially engaged it two main activities were sports and informal religious education. Its main target was the young Muslim generation. My informant Hadi Basalamah explained to me that the al-Hilal initially functioned as a platform to guide Muslim youth to good conduct. This grew out of a concern about religiously forbidden practices, such as drinking alcohol, that were prevalent among the youths after World War Two. The founders' concern about young Muslims' morality thus urged them to establish the al-Hilal forum. Another reason of its establishment was related to fear concerning Christian missionary work.

[119] Interview with Hadi Basalamah, December 14, 2014.

Figure 5.1: Headquarter of the al-Hilal in Ambon
(photographed by the author)

On December 23, 1952, the al-Hilal began to offer its first formal Islamic education. Around this time, it established two elementary schools as an Islamic education channel for young Muslim generation in Ambon. Since then, the al-Hilal has opened many schools around the Maluku province and reached its heyday during the third leadership. The 2014 profile of the al-Hilal indicates that the central foundation of al-Hilal has been mostly led by Hadramis of non-Sada origin, that is: Ali Bahasoan (1946-1950), Sayyid Abubakar bin Yahya (1950-1954), A.Z. Basalamah (1954-1992), Ahmad Badarudin (1992-1997), M. Ekan Alatas (1997-1999), and Hadi Basalamah (1999-present).

My informant Hadi Basalamah told me that Abdullah Basalamah was a leading Hadrami figure who made the foundation successful and led its management for almost four decades (1954-1992).[120] Hadi Basalamah depicted the second leader of the al-Hilal Abdullah Basalamah as a modern educated person who graduated from a Dutch school and had broad networks. During Abdullah Basalamah's leadership, the al-Hilal received much support not only from its members but also from the local elite and government. His educational and social background helped Abdullah Basalamah to develop the foundation and expand its schools outside Ambon. Before the communal conflicts between 1999 and 2002, the al-Hilal had many branches and established around 200 schools spread both in southern and northern parts of

[120] Ch.F.van Fraassen in his report on Ambon also reports briefly on the al-Hilal in the 1970s, which ran a *madrasa* (elementary Islamic school) that offered Islamic knowledge. This school was both for female and male students. The school was called the beginner's religious education (PGAP) or equivalent to junior high school and advanced religious education (PGAA) equivalent to senior high school (Van Fraassen 1972b, 323-328).

the Maluku Islands. After the conflicts, the al-Hilal no longer managed the schools in the northern part of Maluku Islands. During the second leadership, the al-Hilal hired professional teachers and staff of Christian affiliation. In this sense, the al-Hilal resembles the al-Khairat foundation in Palu, central Sulawesi, which is considered to be the biggest Hadrami-initiated Islamic organization in Eastern Indonesia (Slama 2011, 334).[121]

Through the establishment of the al-Hilal, Islamic modernism (reformism) was founded in Ambon by Hadramis of mainly non-Sada origin who gained economic and political power during the colonial era, similar to developments in Java (see Mobini-Kesheh 1999). These changing economic and political positions in the diaspora would become the main tool of reforming traditional Hadrami social stratification from an Islamic perspective, and this thus changed the power relationship between Sada and non-Sada Hadramis in the diaspora, especially in Ambon. Three periods of Arab captainship in Ambon, for instance, were in the hands of non-Sada, two of whom set up the al-Hilal.[122] Similarly, according to my informant Hasan al-Kathiri (see chapter 4 pages 131-132) many rich Hadrami merchants in Ambon of non-Sada background donated their land as *waqf*[123]to build schools, mosques, and other assets for the al-Hilal.[124] Most of the al-Hilal's buildings (such as schools, offices, and mosques) have been designed using local architecture. An exception is An-Nur mosque (see figure 5.2). Looking at the architecture of this mosque, which is rather different from that of local mosques in Ambon, we can see that its design is partly influenced by mosque architecture in the Middle East, especially Yemen. In line with the argument by Bruneau (2010, 39), this construction illustrates how Yemeni architecture is used to reproduce cultural memory in order to re-root the diasporic community in the host society.

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[121] Although the al-Khairat has branches in most of the eastern regions of Indonesia, including Maluku, it has less influence on the southern part of Maluku.

[122] Arab captainship is a position appointed by the Dutch colonials to Arab leaders in order to manage affairs of Arab community. This position was regulated within the Dutch policies on the principle of social segregation, by classifying people into three different social groupings: the Europeans, Foreign Oriental, and natives (see chapter 2). The Arab community in Ambon during the colonial period was led by three non-Sada Hadramis, namely Shaikh Hadi b. Salim Basalamah, Shaikh Muhammad b. Muhammad al-Zagladi, Shaikh Awadh Bahasoan respectively (Bahadullah 2010, 190).

[123] *Waqf* is an Islamic endowment, usually by donating properties (buildings, lands) to Muslims for a charitable or religious purpose without any intention to reclaim the assets.

[124] The al-Hilal was initially funded by donations from rich merchants, such as Abdul Qadir Najjar, Ahmad Bamahri, and Abdullah Hamdun. Besides, some pioneers (e.g Zain Basalamah) initiated an Islamic trade company aiming at supporting the al-Hilal, although the company lasted shortly. Interview with Hasan al-Kathiri, January 11, 2015.

Figure 5.2: An-Nur Mosque in Ambon (photographed by the author)

Although the al-Hilal is a reformist-modernist foundation, the ways in which Islamic reformism was propagated differed from the al-Irshad in Java. The foundation's Islamic missionary activities avoided controversy by not challenging certain traditionalist practices, such as *maulid* celebrations, kissing the hands of the Sada, and *kafa'a* marriage. This strategy of tolerating certain practices was adopted to keep the Hadrami community from different ideological background united and to integrate the Hadrami groups into broader Muslim communities in Ambon. This is as the Hadramis considered themselves as belonging to the same *umma*, Islamic community as other Ambonese Muslims, sharing with them the minority position in relation to the Christian majority. It is in this context, that al-Hilal's opening up membership to Muslims of any origin and ideological background must be understood, although it must be added that most key leading figures in the central board of management continue to be those non-Sada Hadramis.[125]

[125] The 2014 profile of the al-Hilal states that the central foundation of al-Hilal has been mostly led by Hadramis of non-Sada origin, as follows: Ali Bahasoan (1946-1950), Sayyid Abubakar bin Yahya (1950-1954), A.Z. Basalamah (1954-1992), Ahmad Badarudin (1992-1997), M. Ekan Alatas (1997-1999), and Hadi Basalamah (1999-now). When I visited two other branches of the al-Hilal outside Ambon, namely in Namlea town, capital of northern Buru Island, on April 2015, and Tual, capital of Kei Islands, their leaders told me that the management of the al-Hilal distinguishes for its management between the foundation and the schools. The foundation is superintended by those with a kin connection, while the schools are handled more by professionals who may come from any origin. In Namlea, for instance, the foundation is led by a Hadrami of Sada origin from al-Hamid clan, while in Tual it is led by a non-Hadrami.

Today, the al-Hilal continues to focus on Islamic education and Islamic programmes.[126] It still has several branches and manages about 174 schools around the South Maluku Islands (see figure 5.3). However, the role of the al-Hilal in providing basic Islamic education for the Muslim communities in Ambon and the Hadrami community in particular, as well as in integrating the Arab members is decreasing. This is due to several factors.

Figure 5.3: An al-Hilal school in Namlea, Buru (photographed by the author)

One of the main reasons is the impact of the communal conflicts between Muslim and Christian communities in 1999-2002. The conflicts marked the loss of the al-Hilal's control over many schools as well as the end of hiring Christian teachers and staff. Having to run and develop the foundation after the conflicts, my informant Hadi Basalamah, the current general chief of the al-Hilal, perceived himself to be in a difficult situation. During the conflicts, many of al-Hilal's assets, such as the office, school, vehicle, and mosque were attacked and burned down several times. After the conflicts, many schools have been taken over by the local government. Furthermore, the communal conflicts have opened up opportunities for other Islamic ideologies to exert their influence on the community and for new religious elites to emerge. These

[126] In terms of education, the al-Hilal has provided basic and secondary schools by establishing modern Islamic schools, integrating Islamic and general sciences. Around 2010, the al-Hilal established a university, which, however, lasted only shortly (a few years) due to a dispute between internal members of the al-Hilal management board. In terms of social aspects, the foundation has set up various programmes, such as supporting poor people and providing scholarship for poor students. In terms of religious aspects, the foundation has also set up some programmes, such as initiating public preaching and sermons. Profile of 2014 al-Hilal, and Interview with Umar Attamimy, September 29, 2014.

new ideologies, which include neo-Salafism, Shi'ism, and neo-traditionalism, have contested older conceptions of Islam and have challenged the existence of the al-Hilal as the only legitimate Hadrami organization.

At the same time, the al-Hilal has lost its influence on education. Based on what I have been told during interviews, most of the older Hadrami generations in Ambon went to the al-Hilal schools, while it is apparent that today's Hadrami children are sent to some other schools than those run by the al-Hilal. Indeed, the end of the 1999-2002 conflicts marked a significant increase of Islamic schools initiated by Muslims of non-Hadrami origin. From what I observed, these newly established schools, such as al-Fatah, al-Manshurah, as-Salam, Hidayatulah, Ishaka, and others, succeeded in attracting a significant number of Ambonese Muslim students. Unlike the al-Hilal's headquarter and schools, most of other new Islamic schools are located in Muslim areas. Being traumatized by the communal conflicts, many Muslims send their children to the schools located in the Muslim neighbourhood.

In addition to the communal conflicts and the rise of newly emergent religious groups, the al-Hilal has recently faced internal frictions among its leaders as a result of the disagreement over the management of the foundation.[127] The dispute between the leaders over the al-Hilal's management culminated in their taking different political stances during the local governor's election of the 2013 (see chapter 3 pages 92-93).

Despite its reformist-modernist character, the al-Hilal is the only Islamic foundation that has functioned as an umbrella organization for the Hadrami community as a whole. Although the al-Hilal can be compared to the al-Irshad in Java in terms of its reformist-modernist character, the al-Hilal is not so much concerned with modernist publications. I could not find any publication issued by the foundation. I assume that this may be due to the fact that the al-Hilal was established in the second half of the 1940s or much later than the al-Irshad, in which an awareness of national identity was much less disputed.

3.3 New Developments in Post-Communal Conflict Ambon

Today, Islamic affiliations among Ambonese Muslims are very diverse. Traditionalist and reformist-modernist notions of Islam have come to be contested by other Islamic views, especially after the recent communal conflicts between Muslims and Christians in 1999-2002.

At the basis of the conflicts lies the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism and communal violence around Indonesia, including Ambon, during the period of transition from authoritarianism to democracy after the fall of the New Order regime in May 1998. The fall of the Suharto regime provided

[127] Interview with Hasan al-Kathiri, January 11, 2015; interview with Hadi Basalamah, October 15, 2014; interview with Umar Attamimy, September 29, 2014.

opportunities to different people and groups to get access to the state: for local communities this opened up chances to reshape local socio-political and economic configurations; businessmen, politicians, and military officers manipulated these conflicts for their own goals, and radicalists/Islamists jumped to the opportunity to challenge the state's ideology (Van Klinken 2001; Bertrand 2002[2004]; Sidel 2006[2008]; Schulze 2017). In this context, religion as a cultural marker for Ambonese identities became further politicized, building on a long-term politization during the colonial era, which had continued during the post-colonial period (Adam 2010b, 28), while still playing a role in the present-day.

Bringing new ideologies into the community, the communal conflicts between Muslims and Christians in Ambon have left their marks, especially in terms of the religious views, practices and affiliations among Ambonese Muslims in general and the Hadrami community in particular. In the post-conflict situation, contestation over religious authority is more pronounced, contributing to the breakdown of the community building of Hadramis, which was previously more or less held together under the umbrella organization of al-Hilal. By extension, the role of the al-Hilal for the Hadrami community in Ambon as a whole is now considerably less influential than before, and the position of Hadramis and their authority has been challenged by Muslims of various branches of Islam. This is due in particular to the emergence of religious elites affiliated with neo-Salafism, Shi'ism and neo-traditionalism. The Hadrami community is thus divided into several religious groups. To some extent, the Sada and non-Sada distinction plays a role in people's ideological preferences; the trend among non-Sada Hadramis is to be more attracted to either modernist or fundamentalist puritan ideologies, while Sada Hadramis tend to be more attracted to traditionalist Sunnism and Shi'ism.

3.3.1 Neo-Salafism

As has been described in the previous section, Salafism was spread in the late nineteenth century and beginning of twentieth century. It also influenced Hadramis in the diaspora (Indonesia), thus contesting traditional religious authority within the Hadrami community.

The expansion of neo-Salafism and Wahhabism in Indonesia started in the mid-1980s when Salafi adherents became more assertive, demonstrating their affiliations in the public sphere, amongst others, through their choice of clothes. This can be noted, for example, in the appearance of men wearing long flowing robes (*jalabiyya*), turbans (*imama*), trousers to right above their ankles (*isbal*) and long beards (*lihya*), and women wearing a form of enveloping black veil (*niqab*) in public places (Hasan 2001, 23). Although the neo-Salafi communities display their distinctive identity, overall they have

adopted a stance of apolitical quietism (Hasan 2001, 23; Roy 1996, 25). Their main concern is the question of safeguarding *tauhid,* that is, the oneness of God, and a number of other issues which concentrate on the call for a return to strict religious practices and an emphasis on individual moral integrity. Sartorial pracices such as wearing the *jalabiyya, imama, lihya, isbal and niqab,* have become the main topics in their day-to-day discussions and have acquired significant symbolic power. A commitment to wear the *jalabiyya* by men and the *niqab* by women, for instance, is considered much more important than participating in political activities. Adherents generally have the view that the Muslim society must first be Islamized through a gradual evolutionary process that includes education (*tarbiya*) and purification (*tasfiya*) before the comprehensive implementation of Shari'a can be realized. To reach this goal, adherents of Salafi movements have been committed to *da'wa* or proselytization activities by participating in the establishment of *halqa* (literally circle) and *daura* (literally turns). A *halqa* is a forum for the study of Islamic sciences in which a teacher gives lessons on the basis of certain books while his participants sit around him to hear and scrutinize his lessons. A *daura* is a type of workshop that is held for a period of time ranging from days or weeks or months, during which participants gather and stay in one place and follow a specific programme (Hasan 2001, 24).

Contemporary Salafism can be classified into three categories: the largest group are the purists (quietists), who are followers of political abstinence; the second largest group are the activists, who are engaged in politics; the smallest group are jihadists, who are willing to exert violence in order to fight for what they consider the just cause. Salafis are divided into those who reject strict adherence (*taqlid*) to the four Sunni schools of law, and others who remain faithful to these (Hasan 2001, 23; Roy 1996, 25).

In the context of Ambon, there is not such a thing as a local Hadrami-initiated neo-Salafi organization. The neo-Salafism that was intensively spread after the communal conflicts was propagated by neo-Salafi followers from Java. Two national neo-Salafi organizations that attracted Hadrami followers in Ambon are the paramilitary MMI (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, the Indonesian Holy Warrior Assembly), and the Laskar Jihad (the Warriors of the Holy Struggle). The MMI was launched in Yogyakarta in August in 2000 after it held its first national congress of *mujahidin*, Islamic fighters (Hasan 2005, 8).[128]

[128] The purpose of the establishment of the MMI was to enforce Shari'a as a necessary means to curb problems and disasters in Indonesia. As the organization is based on Islam as an ideology, other ideologies in contradiction with Islam are rejected. The organization also bases its main doctrine on *jihad* in order to uphold the dignity of Islam. The MMI, as argued by Noorhaidi Hasan (2005, 8), is a continuation of the older underground movement called Negara Islam Indonesia (NII), which was established on

Many leading figures from different Islamic organizations and political parties were recruited. These leading figures included a non-Sada Hadrami preacher, Abu Bakar Ba'ashir, founder of the *pesantren* or boarding school Ngruki of Solo, who was jailed after he was suspected to be involved in the Bali bombing attack in October 2002 (Sholeh 2008, 94). The MMI gained momentum in the communal conflicts in Maluku and thus called its members for *jihad* (war) to Maluku (Hasan 2005, 9). The branch of the MMI was established in Ambon in 2001 during the communal conflicts. The MMI members in Ambon were, according to Sholeh (2008, 95), to some extent members of another fundamentalist organization based in Java called Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII, Indonesian Council for Islamic Propagation), an organization established by Masyumi leaders in 1967. During the conflicts, MMI members were said to have been responsible for igniting violence and provoking the Muslims on Ambon to perform *jihad* after the peace agreement between Muslims and Christians in 2002. Members of the MMI were then jailed for attacking some government forces (Sholeh 2008, 95).

My informant Gaia (see chapter 3 page 105) confirmed the involvement of her husband as a member of the MMI. She told me that many former members of the MMI have been jailed. She further claimed that her husband went missing during the conflicts. He is believed to have been kidnapped and murdered by the army forces. After the conflicts, the activities of the MMI have been focused on proselytizing religious doctrines to counter Christian missionary activities as part of their new *jihad* strategy.

Similar to the MMI with its *jihad* ideology, the Laskar Jihad was present in Ambon during the communal conflicts in response to the government's inability to settle the conflicts and protect Ambon's Muslims from Christian attacks (Schulze 2002, 58). Being a paramilitary group identifying themselves as Salafis, the Laskar Jihad was launched in Yogyakarta in January 2000, and was initiated by Ja'far Umar Talib (b. 1961), a non-Sada Hadrami origin from East Java (Hasan 2005, 5). During the conflicts, the Laskar Jihad was said to be the largest and best organized group sending voluntary *jihad* fighters to Maluku (Hasan 2005, 5). Allegedly it had links with international *jihadi* groups, such as the Taliban and Abu Sayyaf (Schulze 2002, 69). The Laskar Jihad was later banned by the government, and it dissolved itself following the peace agreement between Muslims and Christians, Malino II treaty, in 2002, although FKAWJ (Forum Komunikasi AhlusSunnah Wal Jamaah, Forum for Followers of the Sunna and the Community of the Prophet) as its umbrella organization continues to exist (Gos 2000, 9).

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the same date with the launching of the MMI, and the fact that many former members of the NII were active in the process of the establishment of the MMI.

During the conflicts members of the Laskar Jihad present in Ambon originated mainly from outside Ambon, such as Java and Sulawesi. Its ex-members continue to live in Ambon, having transformed to quietist Salafism after the conflicts. These ex-members who decided to stay in Ambon have formed an Islamic Arabian residential quarter in Batumerah Atas. They brought their family members and turned the former Christian neighbourhood into an Arabian-like hamlet with its own mosque and home-shops with merchandise like perfume, herbal medicine, Islamic clothes, traditional Islamic medications and so on. The female adult members wear a *niqab* and the men wear *lihya* and keep beards. Mapping this quarter for my research, I counted about 50 households, in which the adult men mainly worked as small entrepreneurs (e.g shop owners) and the women as housewives. The ex-members of the Laskar Jihad have established a foundation called al-Manshurah in their living quarter, which runs a primary Islamic school that has its own curriculum and school uniform, including a face cover for female students. As the school does not follow the state school curriculum, it relies on private donations and school fees. This school has recently gained a significant number of Muslim students from middle class families, especially in the Muslim area of Batumerah Atas. For example, some of my university colleagues with a Salafi-oriented ideology, among whom both modernist oriented and neo-Salafis, in the IAIN have sent their children to study at the school. Although the Laskar Jihad was initiated by the Javanese Hadrami preacher, many Laskar Jihad followers in Ambon are new migrants of non-Hadrami origin, who have taken a dominant role in proselytizing neo-Salafi teachings.

3.3.2 Shi'ism

The history of Shi'ite Islam in Indonesia is far from clear. Yet, Shi'ite Islam, especially specific elements such as rituals devoted to the Prophet and his descendants, *ahl al-bayt*, festivals, and philosophical Sufism, are said to have been historically present in the archipelago for a long time – perhaps from the beginning of Islamization. They have even been practiced by Sunni Muslims, especially among those from a traditionalist background (Marcinkowski 2008, 50; Zulkifli 2013, 3; Formichi 2014a). The contemporary presence of Shi'ism in Indonesia, which denotes to adherence to Shi'ite jurisprudence, is, however, a recent phenomenon (Marcinkowski 2008; Formichi and Feener 2015). Shi'ism in this context is still small compared to Sunnism, which is the major denomination among Indonesian Muslims. As Indonesia has adopted a form of 'delimited pluralism', in which only specific set of religions are officially recognized, there is no available Indonesian census that provides information on different Islamic denominations (Formichi 2014, 103). The National Statistic Bureau (BPS) recorded in 2010 that 87.2 % of the total Indonesian

population consists of Indonesian Muslims, that is about 225 million people. In this official figure, Sunni and Shi'ite adherents are lumped together as having the same religious affiliation. Thus, the number of Shi'ite followers in Indonesia cannot be presicely estimated (Marcinkowski 2008, 50; Zulkifli 2013, 15). Non-official reports, however, have tried to give some estimates. According to 2005 online *Asia Times*, the number of the Shi'ite followers in Southeast Asia was estimated to be around 3 to 4 million, and it is around 1 to 3 million in Indonesia based on 2005 US state department on its annual report of International Religious Freedom (Marcinkowski 2008, 50). Some Shi'ite themselves also attempted to provide an estimation of the Shi'ites, ranging from 20,000 to 2,5 million adherents (Zulkifli 2013, 15).

The majority of contemporary Shi'ite followers in Indonesia adopts the Ithna 'Ashariyya, the Twelver Shi'a, the main branch of Shi'ite Islam (Marcinkowski 2008; Zulkifli 2013; Formichi and Feener 2015). The early propagation of Twelver Shi'ism in what is now Indonesia is said to date back to the nineteenth century, a period of intensive contacts between Hadramaut and the Malay-Indonesian world (Zulkifli 2013, 16). Hadramis, especially those of Sada background, were among the earliest Shi'iite followers who played a major role in the propagation of Shi'ism in Indonesia (Zulkifli 2013, 15-27). The earliest prominent Shi'ite figures of Sada origin were Muhammad bin Ahmad al-Muhdar (1861-1926), Ali bin Shahab (1865-1944), Aqil bin Zainal Abidin al-Jufri (1870-1952). These figures were all dedicated to Islamic education and involved in branches of the Jam'iyya Khair, the first Hadrami-initiated Islamic school in Indonesia. They also built Islamic networks with other Shi'ite Hadrami scholars, such as Abu Bakr bin Shahab (1846-1922), Muhammad bin Aqil bin Yahya (1862-1931). Although these Shi'ite figures dedicated their lives to Islamic education, their Shi'ism proselitization was limited to their own family members and close relatives. Journalists and writers such as Muhammad Dhiya Shahab (d.1986) and Muhammad Ali Shahab (d.2001) are, for instance, sons of aforementioned Ali bin Shahab who followed their father's path in Islamic learning and Shi'ite orientation. In this regard, kinship played a main role in diasporization of Shi'ism in the early period, especially among Sada Hadramis (Zulkifli 2013, 15-27).

The current revival of Twelver Shi'ism, however, must be understood in relation to the Iranian Revolution in 1979 (Marcinkowski 2008; Zulkifli 2013; Formichi 2014; Formichi and Feener 2015). The success of the Iranian Revolution impressed the whole world. In Indonesia, it functioned as a milestone that marked a transformation in Shi'ism propagation. In the 1980s and 1990s, a significant number of young Sunni Muslims began to convert to Twelver Shi'ism. Before the revolution, Shi'ism conversion and its propagation were limited to a few people, especially those from Sada families, as has been mentioned earlier. After the revolution, Shi'ite converts came not only from

Hadrami Sada but also from Muslims of non-Hadrami backgrounds, especially among members of several university campuses (Zulkifli 2013, 15-48). The conversion of Muslims of non-Hadrami backgrounds was related to the success of the Iranian revolution led by a charismatic figure, Ayatolllah Khomeini, and their interest about the ideology underpinned the success of the revolution. As for converts of Sada origin, apart from the leading figure in the revolution who is of Sada background himself and thus familiar with a similar kind of genealogical reckoning that characterizes Shi'a leadership, another reason for Sada conversion to Shi'ism is the lack of '*ulama* from Hadramaut who could act as a religious model for young Sada in Indonesia (Rijal 2017, 9).

Besides resulting in a remarkable number of converts, another impact of the Iranian revolution was the intensification of relations between Indonesia and Iran. For example, exchange visits were organized of Iranian Shi'ite scholars to Indonesia while Indonesians were sent to study in Iran, especially to the Islamic learning centre in Qum (Zulkifli 2013, 27-34). In this context, the role of Hadramis of Sada background in building networks between Indonesia and Iran in terms of Islamic education has been very important. Sada Hadramis pioneered in sending students to Qum, who after their return to Indonesia became Shi'ite preachers and leaders across the country. Husain al-Habshi (1921-1994), founder of YAPI (Yayasan Pesantren Islam, Foundation of Islamic Pesantren) in Bangil East Java, for example, was one among several eminent Shi'ite leaders in Indonesia who had a special recommendation to send students to Qum. Besides, he played a major role in the early propagation of Twelver Shi'ism in eastern Indonesian regions, namely Maluku (Zulkifli 2013, 56).

Shi'ite proliferation occurred primarily during the 1980s and 1990s. Yet, during the New Order regime (1966-1998) Shi'ite activists were forced to go underground and practice *taqiyya* (concealment) due to the state's suppression of Islamic activism (Marcinkowski 2008, 51). Shi'ism and other minority groups gained momentum after the fall of the regime, paving the way for overt Islamic activism in the public sphere. The growth of Shi'ite activism can be discerned among a middle upper class of society and through the establishment of Shi'ite affiliated institutions, such as publishing companies, social foundations, Islamic schools, and also higher education around Indonesia (Assegaf 201 5, 251-252).

Shi'ite followers in Indonesia can be categorized into two groups (Zulkifli 2013, 49-52; Assegaf 2015, 250-68). The first consists mainly of intellectuals with educational background in various fields of non-religious sciences on mainly secular university campuses. Although they can be engaged in Islamic education and *da'wa*, they are not religious teachers by formal profession. The second group consists of *ustadh,* religious teachers, who have an education in

traditional Islamic learning in Islamic schools and/or pesantrens, and dedicate themselves professionally to fields of *da'wa* and Islamic education.

For a while, the two Shi'ite groups tried to unite themselves as part of the Indonesian Shi'ite followers, especially before the fall of the New Order era, establishing an organization called MAHDI (Majlis Ahlulbait di Indonesia, Indonesian Ahl al-Bayt Council) in the early 1990s. It was represented by all Shi'ite prominent leaders in Indonesia of both groups, with a chairmain from a Sada family; Ahmad Baraqbah. The MAHDI lasted only shortly as it failed to unite the members, a failure which is said to be related to the fact that the MAHDI gained no legal recognition from the government. Moreover, the different socio-political backgrounds of those representing the campus circle and the *ustadh* group proved to be too difficult to make close cooperation possible. (Assegaf 2015 in Formichi and Feener 2015, 257-258).

The internal friction within the Shi'ite community became more visible after May 1998, when those representing moderate and conservative affiliations established their own associations (Zulkifli 2013; Formichi 2014; Assegaf 2015). The campus circle established the IJABI (Ikatan Jama'ah Ahlul Bait Indonesia, the all-Indonesia Assembly of Ahl al-Bayt Associations) which was launched in 1 July 2000, and is said to have 145 branch offices around Indonesia. Considered the first national Shi'ite organization recognized by the State, under the leadership of Jalaluddin Rahkmat the IJABI tried to accommodate all Shi'ite members in Indonesia, but soon failed as those of the *ustadh* circle disagreed with the IJABI's leadership and the application of Twelver Shi'ism and its basic tenets (Assegaf 2015, 258-260). For instance, the campus circle is accused of partially implementing the teaching of the Ja'fari school of law as it is oriented towards a more inclusive Islamic teaching in a pluralistic setting. Another instance is that through the IJABI, the campus circle does not have to follow the concept of *wilayat al-faqih* (guardianship of Islamic jurist) in order to be an independent, democratic social organization, in which its leadership is determined through a congress. Before the establishment of ABI (Ikatan Ahlulbait Indonesia, Indonesian Association of Ahl al-Bayt) on June 15, 2011, those of the *ustadh* circle were affiliated to several Shi'ite organizations and foundations whose scope is limited to local areas (districts/provinces).[129] The ABI was established as an umbrella to unify

[129] The Shi'ite organizations and foundations established by the Ustadh circle are FAJAR (Forum Ahlubait Jawa Timur, Forum of East Java Ahl al-Bayt Congregations), KIBLAT (Komunitas Ahlul Bait Jawa Barat, West Java Ahl al-Bayt Community), Madinatul Ilmi in Depok, al-Hujjah Foundation in Jember, Al-Hadi foundation, al-Wahdah Foundation in Solo, ath-Thohir Foundation in Surabaya, al-Kautsar Foundation in Malang (East Java), al-Jawad Foundation in Bandung, Ahlul Bayt Youth Association (Ikatan Pemuda Ahlul Bait Indonesia or IPABI) in Bogor, al-Mujtaba Foundation in Purwakarta (West Java), and Amirul Mukminin Foundation in Pontianak (West Kalimantan).

all members of Shi'ite followers from the *ustadh* circle in Indonesia who were not in favor of the IJABI. The ABI is characterized by its strict application of the Ja'fari school of thought and its orientation towards legitimation from Iran (Formichi 2014, 114). In this regard, Hadramis from Sada origin, and also those of Qum graduates have a dominant role in the organization of ABI.

a. Early Shi'ite Conversion in Ambon

We have no sources for the emergence of Shi'ism in the nineteenth century Maluku and therefore do not know if it existed at the time. However, according to Dieter Bartels (1994), it is not unlikely that Shi'ite elements may have influenced the region during the early Islamization process. Bartels points to some traditions such as *gabus* (art performance) in East Seram, and Islamic rituals in Central Maluku (especially two villages Rohomoni and Kaibobo, Haruku Island), which may have been influenced by Shi'ite elements.

The propagation of contemporary Shi'ism in Maluku, especially Ambon, is part of the larger trend of formation of the Indonesian Twelver Shi'ism. The position of Twelver Shi'ism is small compared to Shafi'ite Sunnism, which is the major denomination among Ambonese Muslims although there is no official estimated number. In line with what Formichi (2015) suggested, my fieldwork observations confirm that the Shi'ite ideology among Shi'ite Hadrami followers in Ambon is apolitical or non-revolutionary in character, in the sense that their activities are concerned primarily with Islamic education and religious activities.

Added to this, the conversion of Sunni Muslims Ambon to Twelver Shi'ism is related to a significant contribution of the aforementioned Indonesian Shi'ite figure from Sada background, Husain al-Habshi (1921-1994), founder of the YAPI in Bangil East Java. Husain's al-Habshi's contribution to Shi'ite propagation in Maluku occurred in the late 1980s (Zulkifli 2013, 56). According to my informant Umar Attamimy, a non-Sada Hadrami (see chapter 2 pages 43-44), Husain al-Habshi came to Maluku in the late 1980s as a religious missionary. Umar Attamimy met al-Habshi for the first time on a boat on their way to Ambon around 1987/88. In Ambon Husain al-Habshi was introduced to Umar Attamimy's brother, Muhammad Attamimy, who soon became al-Habshi's student and advocate of his teachings. Husain al-Habshi, together with these two Attamimy brothers (Umar and Muhammad) and other Ambonese of local origin, pioneered in the establishment of an Islamic boarding school, *madrasa* in Arabic or *pesantren* in Indonesian, in Hila village as a branch of the YAPI school in Bangil, called Nurul Tsaqalain[130], in 1988/89

[130] Nurul Tsaqalain or (Arabic: *Nur al-Thaqalayn,* literally means light of two weighty things) is originally a name of exegesis book written by a Shi'ite scholar, Abdul Ali bin Jumah al-Arusi Huwaizi, in the twelfth century. The book contains an exegesis of a

(see figure 5.4). The initial name of the *pesantren* was Dar al-Arqam but it was changed for its present name Nurul Tsaqalain.[131]

Figure 5.4: Nurul Tsaqalain *Pesantren*, Hila Ambon
(photographed by the author)

The Attamimy brothers and local members who pioneered in the establishment of the *pesantren* were most probably early Shi'ite converts. Jamaludin Bugis, leader of the present *pesantren*, confirmed that local members, including his own parents-in-law, were Shi'ite converts. When I met sixty-eight-year-old Amar (non-Sada), a cousin of the two Attamimy brothers from Fak-Fak Papua in his shop, he told me that he did not want to talk with Muhammad Attamimy anymore as he believed that Attamimy had become a Shi'ite convert, which he deduced from the fact that Attamimy studied in the YAPI school, Bangil East Java.[132] Yet, when I interviewed Umar Attamimy, he rejected the suggestion that he and his brother identified as Shi'ites. He indicated that he prefers being called a Muslim who takes a middle position (between Shi'a and Sunni).[133]

The establishment of the Nurul Tsaqalain in Ambon marked an early Twelver Shi'ism presence in Ambon on an educational level. However, the

popular, disputed Hadith text, or well-known Hadith al-Thaqalayn. This Hadith al-Thaqalayn contains an information on two sources as guidance after the Prophet died. These two sources are the Qur'an and the *ahl al-bayt*, which becomes a reference for Shi'ites to the claim of the Prophet's descendants in leadership succession after the death of the Prophet.

[131] Interview with Umar Attamimy, September 29, 2014.

[132] Amar himself is a neo-Salafi advocate. Interview with Amar, November 13, 2014.

[133] Interview with Umar Attamimy, September 29, 2014.

existence of the *pesantren* seems to have influenced Ambonese Muslims of local orgin more than those with a Hadrami background. When I visited the school, most of the students were non-Hadrami. This is perhaps due to the location of the school which is far from the part of town where the majority of Hadramis live. Another reason may be the lack of the Shi'ite figures and teachers of Hadrami background in the management of the school.

This is much related to the dispute over the management of the *pesantren* between the Attamimy brothers and local villagers after the outbreak of the communal conflicts in Ambon. The dispute was taken to court, and the founders of the village, notably those who had given a land endowment (*waqf*) to the *pesantren,* have won the case and have taken over its management. The conflicts changed both the management and the curriculum of the *pesantren*. My informant Umar Attamimy told me that the *pesantren* was initially managed under his foundation called Jembatan Jasa, which was established around 1978, but then it was taken over by the local founders in Hila village.[134]

The take-over of the *pesantren*'s management after the conflicts has resulted in the change of school curriculum from exclusively Islamic subject matters into a combined curriculum of state and Islamic subjects. According to my informant Jamaludin Bugis, in the early years of the school, that is, before the conflicts, many teachers with a Hadrami Sada background were imported from the YAPI in East Java to work in the school, and the school curriculum was initially restricted to the kind of Islamic subjects adopted that were taught at the YAPI school. Bugis pointed out that today the teachers of the *pesantren* are locals and the school only teaches the Shi'ite subject matters in the afternoon, teaching state subject matters in the morning. In Bugis's view, this school restructurization was necessary in order to be adaptive to the needs of the students and also to gain a more financial support from some instititutions and the state. The combination of the state and religious curricula has attracted more students, thus facilitating the spreading Shi'ite teachings among students and the people, especially those who live in the vicinity of the school.[135]

b. The Contribution of Sada to the Propagation of Shi'ism

The establishment of the Nurul Tsaqalain school in 1988/89 was one of the earliest markers of the presence and institutionalization of Shi'ite converts in Ambon. Apart from this institutionalized platform, before the 1999-2002 conflicts the conversion from Sunni to Shi'ite within the Hadrami community, especially those of Sada origin, in Ambon also occurred on an individual and family level. Hanna from a Sada family of al-Saqqaf clan (64 years old) told me

[134] Interview with Umar Attamimy, September 29, 2014.
[135] Interview with Jamaludin Bugis, March 12, 2015.

that she became a Shi'ite follower in 1995. She decided to convert to Shi'ism as she learned Shi'ite teachings from her elder brother who lives in Jakarta and who had converted to Shi'ism earlier. Through her discussions with her brother she learned how the Prophet's family was betrayed, killed and hunted. Hanna told me that this bitter story about her ancestor, the Prophet's son-in law, Ali b. Abu Talib, had touched her heart and convinced her to convert to Shi'ism.[136]

Two years prior to Hanna's conversion, her nephew, Hasyim (45 years old), also from a Sada family had converted to Shi'ism. Hasyim became interested in Shi'ism when his uncle asked him to join a religious learning forum in Jakarta in 1993. Hasyim claimed that his conversion was a true conversion from his heart and not the result of merely following other people's opinion.[137] Two years later, Hasyim's cousin, Jailani (36 years old), converted to Shi'ite as well,[138] and in 2006 Jailani's eldest brother, Sahid, followed suit.[139].

As these examples ilustrate, conversion to Shi'ism already occured before the 1999-2002 conflicts. However, the conflicts became an important moment of conversion of greater numbers of Sunni Muslims of Ambon, especially among those of Hadrami Sada origin. Besides the impact of the conflicts themselves, what was also important in this respect was that they occured in the same period of transition in Indonesia from the New Order regime to the reform era, which allowed open Islamic activism in the public sphere. After the conflicts, Muslims in Ambon therefore came into contact with Wahhabism, Shi'ism, and other branches of Islamic thought. The regime change allowed the establishment of Shi'ite institutions, be they local initiates or branches of national organizations. Some Shi'ite converts no longer denied their Shi'ite identity when I asked them, and claimed that they do not hide it, although others might still do so.

The leader of the ABI branch in Ambon, my Sada informant Abdurrahman Assagaf (see chapter 2 pages 46-47) claimed that he was much inspired by the Shi'ite teachings of his uncle, Ali Assagaf (d.2010), who was among the first Shi'ite converts in Ambon. According to Abdurrahman Assagaf his uncle had become a Shi'ite convert together with his relative of an al-Hamid family when they went to Java (Jakarta) in the beginning of the 1990s. Unlike his relative who decided to stay in Jakarta permanently, Abdurrahman Assagaf's uncle came back to Ambon to preach Shi'ism to his family members and relatives. Abdurrahman Assagaf's uncle first kept his Shi'ite identity secret, but after the communal conflicts he presented himself as Shi'ite in public. Abdurrahman

[136] Interview with Hanna, April 5, 2015.
[137] Interview with Hasyim, April 9, 2015.
[138] Interview with Jailani, April 9, 2015.
[139] Interview with Sahid, March 25, 2015

claimed that most of his family members have converted to Shi'ism. Before his own conversion, he was motivated to search for true Islam and he found it in Shi'ite teachings such as in prayer, fasting, and other forms of worship, especially after his intensive discussion with his uncle, Ali Assagaf, who had converted to Shi'ite earlier.[140]

Another Shi'ite I met who had converted after the conflicts is Farhat (35 years old) who is from a Sada family. Farhat was exposed to Shi'ism through his uncle in-law (a husband of his father's elder's sister), who lives in Jakarta. His uncle-in-law has memorized the entire Qur'an. He studied in an al-Khairat school in Ternate and later at another school in Jakarta. His uncle has a *majelis ta'lim*, a religious forum, and is involved in a Shi'ite foundation called Fatimah Az-Zahra. Farhat himself became interested in learning more about religious matters after the conflicts, especially after the booming of religious thought and ideas such as Wahhabism, Salafism and the Sunni-Shi'a controversy in Ambon. He shared his confusion about these different views with his uncle in Jakarta whom Farhat considered somebody with the adequate religious knowledge to help him. The explanation that his uncle gave him made sense to him, especially when his uncle based his justifications on the Qur'an rather than on the Hadith which for him is deemed to be corrupted by some earlier Muslims.[141] The uncle in-law whom Farhat consulted is in fact a younger brother of Husain al-Habshi, founder of a Shi'ite organization, IMI (Ikhwanul Muslimin Indonesia, Indonesian Muslim Brotherhood).[142] Husain al-Habshi, who is a well-known blind *habib* (religious scholar/preacher of Sada origin) is also a cousin of my informant Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar, head of the branch of the Rabita of Maluku. Bin Syech Abubakar told me that his cousin, Husain al-Habshi was prisoned for his involvement of bombing Borobudur temple in Central Java.[143] He further claimed that his cousin, Husain al-Habshi, and Ali Assagaf, Abdurrahman Assagaf's uncle, were part of the same religious learning forum (Shi'ite forum), and went to a religious forum of Husain al-Habshi the founder of the YAPI. According to Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar his cousin, Husain al-Habshi head of the IMI, sometimes comes to Ambon to visit his relatives and is then invited to deliver sermon, such as in *'ashura f*estivity, held by the orphanage foundation Melati al-Khairat.

As the examples above show, mobility, particularly within Indonesia is part of the life-style of many Hadramis. Even before the 1999-2002 conflicts,

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140 Interview with Abdurrahman Assagaf, March 25, 2015.
141 Interview with Farhat, March 26, 2015.
142 The Ikhwanul Muslimin Indonesia (IMI) that was established in around 2001 should not be confused with Ikhwanul Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood), an Islamist movement in Egypt founded by Hasan al-Banna in 1928 which inspired some Muslim groups in Indonesia to establish a political party, PKS, in 1999 (see Ufen 2009).
143 Interview with Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar, October 4, 2014.

some Hadrami members moved in and out of Ambon and other places. Most of my informants told me that they have family members and relatives scattered around Maluku and beyond. There are various reasons for such mobility: a job, marriage, education, etc (see chapter 3 on family distribution in Ambon). From what I have observed, most of the earliest Shi'ite converts among the Hadrami community in Ambon are those whose mobility between Ambon and Java is high. This allowed them to come into contact with Shi'ite ideas and teachings when they went to Java for temporary or longer visits or to live there permanently. Those who converted to Shi'ism, then, have actively proselytized Shi'ism among their own family members and relatives in Ambon. In this regard, propagation of Shi'ism in Indonesia and of Ambon in particular can be attributed to the mobility of the Hadrami community, especially from Sada families, in the diaspora.

The aforementioned examples also indicate that kinship ties have played a major role in Shi'ite conversion in Ambon, especially among those Hadramis of Sada background. Nonetheless, some Shi'ite converts have non-Hadrami backgrounds. Their conversion is often the result of their colleagual connections, especially with Shi'ite Hadramis. I noticed that Shi'ite followers of non-Hadrami origin work in the same workplace as their colleagues who had converted to Shi'ism earlier. Their day to day encounters with Shi'ite colleagues in the workplace and also their shared interest in Islamic teachings led those of non-Hadrami backgrounds to convert to Shi'ism or to become sympathizers of Shi'ism.

A case in point is the non-Hadrami Rifai (38 years old), who works in a pearl handicract business. Rifai converted to Shi'ism in 2011. He told me that he was engaged in discussions about Shi'ism with his Shi'ite colleague. Rifai had read about a story of the murder of the Prophet's grandson, Husain. After discussing this with his colleague, Rifai found that teachings from the Sunni version of the story that he had previously learned were less convincing. He then became interested in becoming a Shi'ite follower.[144] On the basis of the conversion stories they told me, Rifai and other Shi'ite converts in Ambon share similarities with other Shi'ite converts in Indonesia. They all forward reasons for their conversion related to what they perceived as correct and reasonable Islamic teachings in four doctrinal concepts: justice in leadership, position of reason, *ijtihad* or independent endevour to formulate Islamic law, and *marja' al-taqlid* or religious authority to be followed (Zulkifli 2013, 47-8).

Today, Shi'ite followers in Ambon can basically be categorized into two groups. The first group consists of people active in academia. Unlike the situation in Java, where Shi'ism has attracted people working in secular campuses, in Ambon it is predominantly people with a higher education in

[144] Interview with Rifai, May 02, 2015.

Islamic studies or IAIN who are attracted to Shi'ism. The people who become sympathizers or converts to Shi'ism are predominantly those working as lecturers. These people are also called *ustadh* by students or local people as they specialize in an Islamic field. This campus circle was set up by my informant Umar Attamimy's brother, Muhammad Attamimy, who led the IAIN around 2006-2008. The propagation of Shi'ism among members of the campus circle was most intensive during Attamimy's leadership. Afterwards, discussions within the campus circle have been limited to Attamimy's close relatives and his loyal colleagues who have a more traditionalist background. Religious discussions or gatherings are usually held in the leader's house. During my 2014-2015 fieldwork, Muhammad Attamimy was rarely in Ambon as he was in charge of leading the *waqf* department in the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Jakarta.

When I attended a religious gathering in Attamimy's house in January 28, 2015, I only met his close colleague of non-Hadrami origin Saif, and Attamimy's wife and nephew. Saif (50 years old) told me that religious gatherings in Attamimy's house are attended by a few people. Saif himself stated that he is member of a branch of the NU, the largest national Islamic organization with traditionalist background, but he also stated that he is open to any kind of Islamic thoughts including Shi'ism. Saif also told me that his daughter studied at the YAPI in Bangil and then continued her studies to Qum in 2012-2014. During Attamimi's leadership in the IAIN, he created the 'Iranian Corner' as a reading room (a small library on Iranian culture, including Shi'ism) on the campus. When I visited this Iranian Corner at the IAIN campus during my fieldwork in 2015, students there seemed to lack interest in using this Iranian corner room as there was hardly any visitor in the room.

The second group of Shi'ites consist of people from outside academia. In the beginning this group consisted mainly of individuals from Sada Hadrami families. Later some non-Hadrami converts joined the group, especially when regular Islamic rituals were initiated. After the establishment of the ABI of Indonesia in 2010/11, the branch of ABI in Ambon was founded in 2013 by this group. My informant Abdurrahman Assagaf is the chairman of the ABI branch of Maluku. He told me that the ABI in Maluku has become an umbrella organization for the Shi'ite community in Ambon and Maluku in general. Its legal establishment serves as a means of obtaining social recognition and acceptance. According to my Sada informant Husna, a local Shi'ite foundation called al-'Adl was established by Faisal, a Shi'ite convert of Javanese origin who used to work at the IAIN campus. This so-called al-'Adl foundation received books donated by a Shi'ite foundation called al-Huda foundation in Jakarta. Unfortunately, the donated books were not well managed. Since the founder of this al-'Adl foundation moved to West Java, the foundation no longer exists. Yet, the founder's younger brother has joined a branch of ABI organization in

Ambon.[145] Apart from that, the current leader of the Nurul Tsaqalain school, Jamaludin Bugis, is also part of the ABI structure, where he occupies the position of secretary of the ABI of Maluku. The ABI in Ambon organizes a weekly Islamic learning forum and some annual festivities, such as *'ashura.* For instance, every Tuesday evening the group organizes a religious meeting where Qur'anic exegesis is provided in the house of one of the members after the sunset (*maghrib)* prayer (see figure 5.5). The sessions are attended by eight to twelve people. Due to the lack of local religious Shi'ite preachers (scholars), the group usually receives help from central ABI organization in Jakarta by conducting this kind of interactive distant-learning. When the participants are ready to listen to the preaching, the preacher from Jakarta is called in via cellphone. The preacher then teaches the participants in accordance to a specific theme/topic he has announced in advance. The cellphone is put on loudspeaker, which is then amplified, so that the preacher's voice can be heard by all the participants who listen to his lesson. The participants can also ask him questions. Teachers are not always the same and regularly rotate. In the distant learning session that I attended, the teacher was a Sada from an al-Hamid family, who is a relative of my informants Husna and her cousins.

Figure 5.5: Distant Shi'ite teaching on Qur'anic exegesis held in a Shi'ite follower's house in Batumerah (photographed by the author)

The two groups of Shi'ites in Ambon have different characteristics. The second group consisting of non-academics focuses on the strict application of Ja'fari

[145] Interview with Hasyim, May 3, 2015.

school of thought. The Campus group on the other hand claims to take a moderate position by accomodating both Sunni and Shi'ite teachings. Their downplaying their affiliation to Shi'ism may well be related to the minority position of the Shi'ite community in Indonesia in general and Ambon in particular. In general, the term Shi'ism carries negative connotations in Indonesia for its direct reference to Iran's official religious thought (Assegaf 2015).

The diversity of the Shi'ite community in Ambon, however, has not resulted in the strong polarization of organizational affiliations that one might see elsewhere. In Java, the difference between the two Shi'ite types is shown through their different affiliations to the two Shi'ite organizations: IJABI and ABI. In Ambon, the outside academia group sticks structurally to the ABI organization, while the campus group keeps its connection to the *ustadh* circle without formally declaring its membership to the ABI organization.

3.3.3 Neo-Traditionalism

The position of traditionalist groups within the Hadrami community in Ambon today is revitalized through a renewed connection between Hadramaut and Indonesia. Unlike traditionalist Hadramis in Java who were reconnected to Hadramaut in the mid 1990s (Knysh 2001; Alatas 2014), Ambonese Hadramis have been in contact again with their forefathers' homeland only since the last ten years, mainly following the 1999-2002 communal conflicts. This renewed connection has paved the way for interested Hadramis to search for religious knowledge in Hadramaut. Some of my informants have graduated from traditional Islamic schools in Hadramaut, and upon their return to Ambon they have committed themselves to Islamic preaching, *da'wa*, by transmitting religious knowledge and traditions from Hadramaut to other Muslims in Ambon.

An example is my informant Muhammad Rifki al-Hamid (see chapter 3 pages 72-73), a young Sada preacher who established the Ar-Rahmah foundation, which is concerned with *da'wa* based on traditionalist notions of Islam in Hadramaut. Established in 2012, the Ar-Rahmah was officially launched on February 14, 2013. Unfortunately, I was not able to participate in its launching. Drawing inspiration from his teacher Habib Umar in Dar al-Mustafa in Hadramaut, Muhammad Rifki al-Hamid established the foundation in order to spread the main teachings of his teacher. The influence of Dar al-Mustafa's Islamic education in Hadramaut on Muhammad Rifki al-Hamid's religious life and missionary work is enormous.[146] Under his leadership the ar-

[146] Al-Hamid's journey to Islamic education to the Hadramaut, and how traditionalism combined with Tariqa 'Alawiyya is revitalized through the kind of connections that al-

Rahmah foundation set up a religious forum, *majelis*, which delivers informal teachings, following the Islamic teachings in Hadramaut. Apart from informal religious teachings, the ar-Rahmah has planned to establish a religious school, which is more or less governed by the same rules and teachings as in many traditional Islamic schools in Hadramaut, especially the Dar al-Mustafa. This means that the school curriculum will only consist of religious subjects. The ar-Rahmah also offers religious travel tours. It offers not only include pilgrimage tours to Mecca for the mandatory *hajj* or the voluntary *umra,* but also to shrines in Hadramaut (see further chapter 6 pages 228-229).

Apart from his activities as a preacher, together with his wife Rifki al-Hamid set up a regular Islamic study circle that focuses on learning basic Hadith texts and Shafi'i Islamic jurisprudence. During my fieldwork, I attended both meetings organized by him and those of his wife. The aim of the study circles is to train male and female Ambonese Muslims of all generations to cultivate religious values (see figure 5.6).

Figure 5.6: A Hadith teaching in an-Nur mosque (on the left) and a religious ritual reciting *burda*, poems to the Prophet, in the ar-Rahmah building (on the right), (photographed by the author)

The activities of Muhammad Rifki al-Hamid and his wife demonstrate that religious scholarship in Hadramaut is a salient source not only for obtaining religious authority among the Hadramis from traditionalist backgrounds, but also of maintaining religious authority among the broader Muslim communities in general. This religious knowledge, borrowing the words of Piere Bourdieu, comprises 'a field of cultural reproduction within which those

Hamid has with Hadramaut will be described further in chapter 6 on the section of religious revitalization.

who monopolise the specific cultural capital devise strategies of safeguarding and perpetuating their command' (Bourdieu cited in Ephrat and Hatina 2013, 11).

The main reason for the spread of neo-traditionalism in Ambon is to protect the identity of the Sada group from other ideological influences. Within the context of the expansion of Wahhabism, neo-Salafism and Shi'ism in Indonesia since the 1980s onwards, the Sunni community of Sada background has tried to reformulate the definition of the community of 'Alawi (Sada) as a community imbued with a Sunni ideology. In one of my interviews with the founder of Ar-Rahmah, for instance, he showed me a video containing a lecture in Arabic by Habib Alkaff from Solo, Central Java. The lecture discussed the Tariqa 'Alawiyya (a Sufi path which is ascribed to 'Alawi, descendants of the Prophet from Hadramaut) and its meaning. The founder of Ar-Rahmah used the video to underscore his view that the status of 'Alawi can be maintained only through following the old *tariqa,* a religious way practiced by his ancestors who adopted the Shafi'i school of thought, loving the Prophet and his descendants, and performing religious rituals, such as the *maulid* (celebration of the Prophet's birthday), as well as the practice of *kafa'a* marriage. On the basis of the same video he claimed that members of the Sada or 'Alawi (the Prophet's descendants) can no longer categorized as part of the 'Alawi if they follow other ways (schools of thought), such as Salafism or Shi'ism. The Ar-Rahmah founder thus claimed that many Sada people have actually left the 'Alawi tradition by becoming followers of Wahhabism or Shi'ism.[147] What the statement of my informant hints at, is that the revitalization of traditionalist Islam is a means to protext an orthodoxy of the Sada's identity from other Islamic 'threats' such as Salafism, Wahhabism, and Shi'ism, as well as being a means of maintaining religious authority of the Sada group within the Hadrami community in particular and the Muslim society in general. Al-Hamid's statement also shows that the reformulation of such a distinct cultural identity, and that of Sada identity in particular, does not merely depend on claims of descent in terms of ethnicity, but also other cultural content such as a religious ideology as a way of boundary maintenance.

3.4 Religious Groups and Overlapping Religious Practices

As came to the fore in the previous section, in comparison to the past the Hadrami community in Ambon today has become more heterogeneous in terms of their Islamic views and practices. The Hadramis can be divided into several Islamic groups, each of which, to some extent, has different Islamic beliefs and practices, ranging from Sunnism to Shi'ism, traditionalism to

[147] Interview with Muhammad Rifki al-Hamid, January 3, 2015.

reformism, and they can be anything between moderate and conservative. However, and within the Indonesian context this may well be specific to Ambon, as I will argue, these groups do not operate completely separately. Some activities are attended by members of different religious affiliations. Below, I take two examples of how different religious groups may practice similar rituals, which seem to contradict to their doctrinal teachings.

3.4.1 *Maulid* Celebration

A *maulid* is celebration of the birthdays of exemplary role models or religious figures in Islamic community, such as saints or the Prophet. Among popular *maulid* celebrations in Indonesia is *maulid al-nabi* or the commemoration of the Prophet Muhammad's birthday held on the twelfth of the month Rabi' al-Awwal or the third month of the Islamic calendar. The celebration may comprise different activities, such as participating in colourful processions; reciting Qur'anic passages as well as stories from the Prophet's biography and poems extolling his virtues; giving alms to the poor; attending Sufi *dhikr* ceremonies; eating festive meals, organizing fairs, singing, and dancing (Schusman 1998, 1; Kaptein 1993). Muslims around the world, including Indonesia, organize *maulid* festivities with their own specificities (Sila 2015, 91- 106).

In Ambon, *maulid* celebrations are predominantly popular among traditionalist Sunni and among Shi'ite followers. Traditionalists and Shi'ite celebrate the *maulid* in order to remember the role of the Prophet as the messenger of Islam but also to take him as a role model for being a good Muslim. For those with Sada background, performing the *maulid* is a way of tracing their origin, and of reminding them to follow the path of their exemplary ancestor. *Maulid* celebrations are not accepted by Salafis. However, they are not totally condemned by some local Salafis in Ambon. This is especially true among those with reformist-modernist inclinations. Reformist-modernist Salafis celebrate the *maulid*, albeit with a different emphasis than traditionalists and Shi'ites.

My informant Hadi Basalamah argued that the *maulid* celebration is allowed as long as it is not understood as a religious teaching, but rather as a local tradition. He further emphasized the social function of the celebration as a way of binding social ties among Islamic members. Another non-Sada informant, sixty-eight-year-old Yayah, told me that she has personal reasons for liking to attend the *maulid* festivities. She reasoned that the *maulid* celebration is a means of freeing herself from the daily routines as a household wife and to engage more in socializing outside the house, such as to meet up

with friends and have chit-chats.[148] It is important to note that Yayah's husband is a neo-Salafi follower who has a stricter view on the *maulid* celebration, which he regards as religious innovation, *bid'a*. He does not participate in *maulid* celebrations. Other informants, Said Muzakkir Assagaf (43 years old Sada) and Fahri al-Kathiri (43 years old non-Sada), leaders of the PKS party in Ambon (see chapter 3 page 86), similarly told me when I interviewed them in their office in the People's Representative Council in Karangpanjang of Ambon that Ambonese Muslims are generally traditionalists, even many of those who are affiliated to reformist-modernist organizations or even to such an Islamist-inspired party as PKS.[149]

My observations during religious practices in Ambon reconfirm the suggestion that Muslims who hold reformist-modernist notions in Ambon in general are more tolerant vis-a-vis local practices. Figure 5.7 shows a *maulid* celebration held on the campus of the State Institute of Islamic Studies of Ambon, IAIN, which was attended by both traditionalist and modernist staff. In this regard, my informants Basalamah and Yayah are not alone; other Muslims of non-Hadrami origin with reformist-modernist notions have similar views. The reformist-modernist Salafis' participation in celebrating the *maulid* are in line with dominant Islamic practices among Ambonese Muslims, who have a long tradition of engaging with a form of cultural Islam or Islam *adat* (customary Islam), that is adaptive to local culture or mixed with existing local tradition (Cooley 1962; Bartels 1977; Bräuchler 2010).

Figure 5.7: *Maulid* celebration at the IAIN campus (photographed by the author)

[148] Interview with Yayah, November 27, 2014.
[149] Interview with Said Muzakkir Assagaf and Fahri al-Kathiri, November 6, 2014.

3.4.2 *'Ashura* Celebration

Another example of how in Ambon Muslims from various denominations come together to celebrate is *'ashura,* the commemoration day of the murder in Karbala of Husain, one of the two sons of the Prophet's daughter Fatimah and her husband on tenth day of the Muslim month of Muharram. Although *'ashura* is a well-known holy day for the Shi'ite community, not only members of the Shi'ite community observe the celebration, but some traditionalist Muslims do as well. In this case, Hadramis of traditionalist background in Ambon usually organize an*'ashura* celebration in the office of the Rabita and Melati al-Khairat. For these traditionalists, especially for those with Sada origin, celebrating *'ashura* is not only commemorating the death of Husain, but also expressing one's gratitude to God for saving His messengers who preceded the Prophet Muhammad. Unlike Shi'ite followers do for *'ashura*, the traditionalist attendees of this celebration do not wear black clothes. In contrast, the Shi'ite followers celebrate *'ashura* in order to express their grievance over the unjust treatment and murder of Husain by the Sunni ruler regime at the time. Their grievance is symbolized by wearing black clothes and by weeping as they pray for Husain and others who in their view died as martyrs. In this regard, it is not the celebration of *'ashura* itself that marks an ideological boundary among Muslims in Ambon, but rather the way the celebration is performed, related to different socio-religious collective memories of the formative years of Islam.

That the boundaries between Muslims of different affiliations blur or at least prove to be porous also came to the fore in the diversity of opinions I observed among traditionalist Hadramis with a Sada background about Shi'ism. For instance, I noted a contrast between founders of the Melati al-Khairat and ar-Rahmah. The founder of the Melati al-Khairat organizes a celebration of *'ashura* each year and is very keen on emphasizing her identity as a member of *ahl al-bayt* (the Prophet's family) rather than criticizing doctrinal difference between Sunnite and Shi'ite. The Melati al-Khairat sometimes invites a Shi'ite preacher to give sermon during the *'ashura* celebration. This preacher is called Husain al-Habshi, head of the IMI, Indonesian Muslim Brotherhood, a Shi'ite affiliated organization (see page 183). The founder of the Melati al-Khairat thus tries to accommodate both Sunni and Shi'ite religious rituals. For instance, I attended a religious gathering for women conducted by the Melati al-Khairat on April 28, 2013. Held in the afternoon (13.30), the religious ritual consisted of reciting prayers called *asma al-husna*[150] and *jaushan kabir*[151]. The former is a popular prayer among Sunni,

[150] *Asma al-husna* literally means 'good names'. It refers to the prayer that contains 99 names attributed to God. The prayer is common among traditionalist Sunni Muslims.

while the latter is popular in Shi'ite religious practices. Although the participants brought small prayer books themselves, the Melati al-Khairat also provided some copies for participants who did not bring or have the prayer books. As I noticed, the prayer book on this *jaushan kabir* prayer is published by Fatimah Azzahra foundation in Jakarta, a publisher which is affiliated with the Shi'ite group, ABI.

On the other hand, the founder of ar-Rahmah also attempts to strengthen traditionalist notions of Islam based on Shafi'i school of thought and Tariqa 'Alawiyya teachings from Hadramaut. In this regard, he forbids any practices related to Shi'ite practices that in his view cannot be incorporated in local religious practices that have been performed on Ambon for generations.

4. Hadramis' Contribution to Islamic Development of Ambon

This section discusses the contribution of Hadramis to Islamic development in Ambon, focusing on their role in Islamic education and Muslim community building. This discussion aims to describe the importance of religious identity as a cultural characteristic in bridging ethnic differences and bringing social integration between the Hadramis and other Muslim communities of Ambon in general.

4.1 Islamic Missionary Activities and Muslim Community Building

Christians and Muslims constitute the two major religious communities in Ambon today. However, much of the history of Islam in Ambon is yet unknown. There is a lack of knowledge concerning details of proselytization, such as: date, actor, denomination, and process. Islam in Ambon can be traced back to the late fifteenth century just before an arrival of the Portuguese (Andaya 1991). It was competing with Christianity in converting many local pagans during the late nineteenth century (Broersma 1936, 31-32; Chauvel 1990). Some historical scholars characterize Ambonese Muslims as syncretic Muslims, combining local customs with Islamic practices (Broersma 1936, 32; Cooley 1962; Bartels 1977). In this regard, the Hadramis, who massively migrated to Maluku in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (William Clarence-Smith 1998; Roy Ellen 1996 & 2003), came to Ambon when Islam had been already proselytized. As I mentioned in an earlier chapter, although their

[151] *Jaushan kabir* literally means 'steel plate' or mail. It is the name of a prayer that contains 1000 names and attributes of God. The prayer is said to have been taught by Gabriel to Muhammad in his battle as a protection from injuries in war. In Shi'a the prayer/supplication is an essential part in Shi'a religious rituals (Kose 2006).

migration was obviously motivated by economic reasons, Islamic missionary work may well have been their concern too.

The motivation to engage in Islamic missionary work was most likely linked to the wish to protect the Hadramis' own religious identity as Muslims. Besides, it was also interwoven with the socio-political context of Ambon town at the time; Christianity was dominant during the colonial era (Knaap 1991; Chauvel 1990). The minority position of the Muslims and the fear for Christian missionaries have been reflected in most of my informants' narratives. My informant Hasan bin Syech Abubakar, for example, told me that one of his great-grandfathers came to Ambon in order to become a religious teacher at a special request of the already settled Hadrami people who were concerned about the lack of Islamic teachers. The need to protect the religious identity of the Hadrami community and the broader Muslim population in general was thus part of the Hadramis' main concerns.

In order to achieve their religious missionary work effectively, the Hadramis have established modern Islamic schools since the first half of the twentieth century. Through the establishment of the al-Hilal schools and other previously initiated Islamic schools, Hadramis have contributed to providing basic Islamic education for young Muslim generations in Ambon. By building Islamic schools, they have also contributed to (re) production of local religious teachers and scholars. According to my informants, in former times most Muslims in Ambon town sent their children to the al-Hilal schools. Many graduates have become leading religious figures in society. My informant Hadi Basalamah, who has occupied a leading position in the al-Hilal, is a graduate of the al-Hilal school himself. He gave me several names of the school's alumni, not all from Hadrami origin, who have become prominent religious clerics and leaders in Ambon.

In other aspects, the Hadramis have contributed to providing an equal access to Islamic literacy for men and women. Gender equality in Islamic education has been embedded in the reformist-modernist foundations' main programmes in the schools. Women as well as men have been given an equal opportunity to get access to Islamic education. As a result of this policy, some women have benefitted by succeeding to obtain important religious roles in society. My informant Rugaya Alatas (see page 162), for instance, is among the first female graduates from the al-Hilal School for Religious teaching (PGA), and since then has become a well-known female religious teacher (preacher) in the Muslim communities of Ambon. Her contribution to Islamic development will be discussed in the next sub-section.

Moreover, the Hadramis have adapted Islamic reformism in a way that ties in with traditional religious practices among Muslims in Ambon. As mentioned in the previous section, unlike al-Irshad in Java, the al-Hilal foundation has accommodated public festivities, such as *maulid* celebrations.

In this sense, certain local practices that are associated with traditionalist Islam are tolerated rather than totally condemned. Also, the competition between Muslims and Christians as socio-political groups should be taken into account in this stance. These two aspects have resulted in emphasizing sharing one faith among fellow Muslims over stressing internal differences. In post-communal conflict Ambon, a narrative about solidarity among Muslims has been voiced by many Muslims, especially among their religious figures including those of Hadrami origin.

In this context, the Hadrami descendants in Ambon have positioned themselves as part of Ambonese community of Muslims in general, bringing new developments to society and at the same time accepting certain local values as a way of social integration among Muslims. By extension, tolerance toward certain local practices is a way for the Hadramis to integrate themselves into a broader Ambonese Muslims.

In addition to the al-Hilal are two other reformist-modernist foundations in Ambon, al-Irshad and al-Khairat. As was mentioned in the first section of this chapter, al-Irshad al-Islamiyya was established in Jakarta in 1914/1915 by the Sudanese scholar Ahmad Surkati, who was first affiliated to the already established Hadrami-based Islamic organization called Jam'iyya Khair in Jakarta (see the aforementioned section 2 here). As the founder of the al-Irshad gained fame, the al-Irshad significantly spread to other regions. However, the al-Irshad was limited to the western part of Indonesia namely Java and Sumatra.

In Maluku, the foundation only established its formal branch in the late 1980s (1987-1989). According to my non-Sada informant Hadi Basalamah, who is current leader of the al-Hilal and at the same time has occupied the top position in the al-Irshad of Maluku province, the al-Irshad in Maluku was mainly established for reasons of survival of the central organization, instead of merely propagating reformist ideas. The New Order Government issued a regulation around the 1980s to reorganize social and mass organizations in Indonesia and required every organization to have many branches around Indonesia which is at least two third of the whole regions/provinces in Indonesia in order to be legally permitted. In other words, the establishment of the al-Irshad branch in Ambon was said to have protected the central organization against being closed by the Government. Similar to its central foundation in Jakarta, the al-Irshad branch in Maluku province and Ambon district was led by Hadramis of non-Sada origin.

Many non-Sada Hadrami descendants have occupied management positions in the al-Irshad of both in provincial and district levels of Maluku. This does not mean that its membership is closed to Muslims of other origins, as Saiful Ali al-Maskati, a fifty-year-old non-Sada Hadrami, (see chapter 3 page 86), the current leader of the al-Irshad in Ambon district, claims. The al-Irshad

in Maluku and Ambon is quite independent from the central organization in terms of both financial and administrative managements. In its early phase of establishment in Ambon, the central organization helped the Maluku al-Irshad branch by donating Islamic books for the schools, but soon afterwards the branch organized its programmes and activities itself without interference of the central organization. Like the al-Hilal, the al-Irshad received *waqf,* religious endowment, from wealthy Hadrami families to erect buildings to run Islamic education and other Islamic activities. One of the Hadrami families who gave the *waqf* to the al-Irshad is from a Ba'adillah family, who was among the wealthy merchants in Maluku during the colonial era.[152]

Like the al-Hilal, one of the main activities of the al-Irshad in Maluku concerns Islamic education, but its scope is far smaller than that of al-Hilal. The al-Irshad of Maluku only manages a few schools from kindergarten up to junior high levels. Although the al-Irshad foundation is involved with Islamic education by establishing Islamic schools, there is separation between the management of the foundation and the schools. When I visited one of the al-Irshad schools, the teachers told me that the al-Irshad foundation did not interfere in the management of the school and that the school curriculum was adopted from that of the State school. The teachers whom I talked to at the school explained that the school had only asked permission from the foundation to use its name in order to get legal permission from the government to run the school. Apart from religious education, the al-Irshad also engages in other religious activities, such as organizing *maulid* celebrations and public preachings. The al-Irshad branch of Maluku is thus more tolerant than the central organization. Unlike its central foundation that has faced an internal split between those with modernist and those with fundamentalist views (Rijal 2017, 15-22), the al-Irshad in Maluku seems to be far from internal friction and very independently manages the local branch of the foundation.

Another foundation that offers Islamic education is al-Khairat. The al-Khairat was established in Palu on June 30, 1930 by Idrus bin Salim al-Jufri, a Hadrami of Sada origin. In the first *muktamar* (congress), the al-Khairat of 1956 had 25 schools. From the second congress until the last congress of 2004, the al-Khairat increased its branches from 150 to 732 and presently manages 1561 schools, 34 boarding schools spread around North Maluku, North and South Sulawesi, Kalimantan, Maluku, and West Papua (Kadir 2008). The al-Khairat in Ambon is a branch of al-Khairat in Palu, Central Sulawesi. The al-Khairat is a modern Islamic foundation concerned mainly with modern Islamic education in line with a moderate Sunni oriented ideology, although it has also

[152] Interview with Iza, October 17, 2014.

contributed to sending local students to Qum of Iran to study Shi'ism (Zulkifli 2013, 27).

The branch of the al-Khairat in Ambon was established in 1986 by several Hadramis of both non-Sada and Sada origin. One of the prominent members contributing to its establishment is a Sada from Ternate, North Maluku. My informant Alwi al-Hadar (69 years old) from a Sada family told me that he established the foundation when he lived in Ambon for twenty years during his career at the ministry of public construction. Afterwards, he moved back to his hometown, Ternate.[153] The management of the foundation and school has been taken over by Ibrahim al-Kathiri (57 years old), a non-Sada Hadrami. Since then, the branch of the al-Khairat in Ambon has adopted a more reformist ideology. This shifting orientation of the foundation is related to religious education background of the leader. After completing his secondary school in the al-Khairat school of Palu, Ibrahim al-Kathiri continued his studies in Medina University, Saudi Arabia.[154] I surmise that Ibrahim al-Kathiri's experience in Medina is related to the way the al-Khairat school in Ambon is organized. From my observation, activities in the boarding school of the al-Khairat in Ambon have emphasized reformist-modernist teachings, unlike those of the school in Palu which are infused with traditionalist ways of teachings.

The different activities between the central al-Khairat and its branch in Ambon illustrate the flexibility of the branches to arrange and manage the schools. My informant Alwi al-Hadar told me that the central foundation of al-Khairat is only responsible for appointing a leader in its region, but each branch has the full right to organize its school and foundation. I surmise that this flexibility individual branches are allowed to organize its school and foundation is part of a strategy to expand its influences and branches around Eastern Indonesia while at the same time allowing each branch to gain financial support from other sources. Besides, as long as the activities and programmes do not contradict the main objectives of the central foundation to undertake Islamic missionary activities, any initiative is allowed. The al-Khairat school in Ambon thus focuses on studying Qur'anic science and its memorization.

Like the al-Hilal, both al-Irshad and al-Khairat in Ambon take a tolerant stance towards certain local traditions. However, of the three, the al-Hilal is a foundation that is the most local in character as it was initiated by local Hadramis, while the al-Irshad and al-Khairat are branches of other Hadrami-Islamic foundations, from national and regional respectively.

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153 Interview with Alwi al-Hadar, October 28, 2014.

154 During my fieldwork I could not meet Ibrahim al-Kathiri as he was always busy, but I could interview one of the teachers in the school. Interview with Nariya, April 3, 2015.

Today, Hadramis from non-reformist-modernist background try to engage in similar kinds of educational organizations. As far as I have observed, the Hadramis who are affiliated with neo-Salafism do not establish a foundation themselves. They rather join newly established local foundations initiated by Muslims of non-Hadrami backgrounds or other national branches. Most Salafi schools that have obtained many students are initiated by Muslims of non-Hadrami origin (mainly Javanese). Due to its minority position, followers of Shi'ism mainly restrict themselves to local informal religious circles, and prefer to send their children to Shi'ite schools outside Ambon (such as Java). As for the traditionalist revivalists (neo-traditionalists), their effort to establish their own school is underway as the establishment of a school needs much support.[155]

4.2 Female Leadership in Religious and Social Empowerment

Aiming at gender equality in education has been voiced since the propagation of Islamic reformism by the Hadramis in Ambon. In principle, men and women have equal access to Islamic literacy. Despite this, religious authority within the Hadrami community is strongly gendered. Most of the prominent religious leaders are men. One of the few exceptions is Rugaya Alatas, who plays an important role in religious and social empowerment.

Rugaya Alatas was born to a religious Sada family with a traditionalist background.[156] She is married to a Sada man from Assagaf of Namlea in Buru. She spent her entire education in the al-Hilal school, from primary until senior high school levels.[157] After finishing her senior high school, she began to offer

[155] My informant Muhammad Rifki al-Hamid, founder of ar-Rahmah, lamented to me that his effort to establish ar-Rahmah school faced barriers from the local community. He told me that a previously donated plot of land in Liang village for an ar-Rahmah school in 2010 has been taken over by the villagers as the villagers wanted to manage the school themselves. The school, or boarding school, which he has intended to build, will focus on religious knowledge, copying the curricula of traditional boarding schools in the Hadramaut. Interview with Muhammad Rifki al-Hamid, April 7, 2015.

[156] Rugaya Alatas told me that her grandfather and uncle were well-known preachers and were considered to be saints. The story that was passed on to her was that the body of her grandfather called Habib Abdullah Alatas, who died in 1956 and was buried in Benhill Tanah Abang Jakarta, did not show any signs of decay when the local government in Jakarta relocated his grave in 1978. Rugaya Alatas's grandfather's tomb is also one of the shrines where Indonesian Muslims go on pilgrimage. Interview with Rugaya Alatas, March 7, 2015.

[157] Rugaya Alatas was among the favorite students for her religious teachers in the school as she expressed with pride to me. Although she could not continue her study to a university, she is a 'learner person' as she likes to study new things herself. She confided to me that she is jealous of women who can continue their studies in higher educational institutions. She explained that her parents had not allowed her to continue her higher education because she was a girl. Yet, her traditional upbringing did not

informal religious lessons and classes to children in the afternoon and in weekends in 1973, while at the same time officially starting to work as a civil servant.

Rugaya Alatas's involvement in religious activities and her commitment to educate the young Muslim generation is proven by her efforts to run an orphanage foundation, or *dar al-aytam* in Arabic, called Melati al-Khairat. The name of Melati itself bears the name of the street where her parents formerly lived.[158] Established in 1999, the Melati al-Khairat was initiated by Rugaya Alatas, together with a wife of the man who at the time was regent of Central Maluku. During the communal conflicts the regent's family fled to Semarang in Central Java, and since then there has been no contact between Rugaya Alatas and the regent's family even after the regent's family came back to lead Central Maluku regency. With the help of her family members Rugaya Alatas has taken up a leading role in managing the Melati al-Khairat.

Rugaya Alatas told me that she was inspired to establish the Melati al-Khairat by some of her relatives in Jakarta, who worked for a charity foundation focusing on Islamic education. Initially, the main purpose of Melati al-Khairat was to help orphans to perform well in school. Yet, during the conflicts many children from poor families did not have access to education. Since then, the foundation has attempted to support children from poor families as well, rather than only those who are good at school. Rugaya Alatas told me:

> During the 1999-2002 conflicts, the condition of the Muslims was bad and there were many orphans left by fathers who had left to fight and were killed. As Yayasan Kesuma initially focused particularly for those orphans with good records in their school, many other orphans could not benefit from the donation. I began to propose an idea for local donators to fund these orphans. There were about 250 children who benefitted from donations during the conflicts. Afterwards, the Melati al-Khairat has regularly given donation to orphans with or without good grades at school. What we achieve now is from Allah.

Rugaya Alatas' statement reflects her social commitment to support needy children by developing the foundation. Through kinship ties and social networks of the founder, she has managed to engage people to help the Melati al-Khairat grow. The Melati al-Khairat operates the foundation using donations

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prevent her from learning something (knowledge) outside formal educational institutions. Interview with Rugaya Alatas, March 7, 2015.

[158] Rugaya Alatas, together with her parents, formerly lived in street Melati, one block street near Anthony Rhebok street where the headquarter of the al-Hilal is located. After the conflicts, she has moved to Silale, one of the neighbourhoods where many Muslims in the town of Ambon were relocated during the conflicts. Interview with Rugaya Alatas, March 7, 2015.

both from individuals and institutions. One of the main donators for the Melati al-Khairat is Rugaya Alatas' relative Said Assagaf, (see chapter 3 pages 88-97) who has occupied the top position in Maluku government as governor between 2013-2018. Apart from her family connections, Rugaya Alatas's former job as a civil servant has also allowed her to interact with many members of the elite in the government, who in time of need were willing to help the Melati al-Khairat. When I met her in her house in Silale on March 07, 2015, for instance, Rugaya Alatas, told me the following:

> Another story was a wife of former Governor, Latuconsina. She had been diagnosed as having Glukoma (an eye disease) and needed an operation in Singapore. She came to me and requested prayers from the Melati al-Khairat. Then she went to Singapore for Medical Check Up. Surprisingly, her medical check-up results said that she did not have to undergo any eye operation. When she came back to Jakarta, she called me inviting me to come to Jakarta with another fellow to have an ESQ (Emotional Spiritual Quotient) training for free.

The Melati al-Khairat undertook efforts to develop its infrastructure and management after the communal conflicts. Around 2006 the management board was restructured. As a result of the conflicts the office, formerly in a Christian neighbourhood in Street Melati, was relocated to a Muslim area in Galunggung Batumerah Atas (see figure 6.8). In the new building, half of the orphans can be accommodated while the other half lives with their relatives. The orphans who live in the Melati al-Khairat building can do so until they are able to live on their own. The Melati al-Khairat provides the means for the basic needs of these orphans and their formal education. The Melati al-Khairat allows the orphans to choose whatever school or a university they want to enter. In addition to supporting their formal education, the Melati al-Khairat also gives the orphans additional Islamic teachings as a way to educate them with religious values.

During my fieldwork in 2015, the Melati al-Khairat accommodated fifty male and female children from several islands around Maluku between the age of eight and early twenties. Rugaya Alatas proudly claims that the foundation has brought forth many achievers; talented people who have gained great achievements in their education and career. She mentioned, for instance, a colleague of mine in the IAIN, who is among the successful orphans in the Melati al-Khairat. In this regard, the Melati al-Khairat has contributed significantly to the local Islamic community in educating and empowering young Muslims in Ambon.

Figure 5.8: Melati al-Khairat Building in Galunggung Batumerah Atas
(photographed by the author)

Figure 5.9: Religious preaching of Rugaya Alatas in the Melati al-Khairat, Galunggung
(photographed by the author)

Apart from empowering society through providing basic education to the needy, the Melati al-Khairat also conducts regular religious activities, mainly teachings and gatherings. The religious teachings and gatherings address women of any age. During my fieldwork, I participated in Rugaya Alatas's religious meetings several times. Most of them take place in the Melati al-Khairat building. Rugaya Alatas told me that she was disappointed by the fact that many Muslim women in Ambon lack what she considers 'a good attitude'. Her religious calling is to teach them and educate some women to continue her work, but only few women are interested in doing this work. Thus, Rugaya Alatas's role in the social empowerment of local Muslim citizens is not only concerns her commitment to support needy children, but also her efforts to empower Ambonese Muslim women and protect their identities as both women and Muslims against what she designates as 'corrupt behaviour' (see figure 5.9).

5. Conclusion

In this chapter I have presented how religious authority within the Hadrami community has developed. It was originally embedded in the traditional social stratification system that characterized social relationships in Hadramaut. Contestation of traditional religious authority within the Hadrami community in Ambon began in the early twentieth century, in tandem with Islamic reformism voicing an egalitarian Islam that influenced on a large number of the Hadramis from non-Sada groups in Indonesia. This contestation led to differentiation between Sada and non-Sada in Ambon in terms of different understandings of Islam, on a more private level rather than in an institutional one.

In this respect, the role of the al-Hilal as a unified organization within the Hadrami community was indispensable. The loss of control of the al-Hilal over the community as a whole has become particularly visible after the communal conflicts (1999-2002). The conflicts have significantly changed the religious configuration within Muslim communities in Ambon in general and the Hadrami community in particular, bringing new understandings on Islam that contested earlier traditions. Earlier dominant notions of Islam, consisting of traditionalist and reformist-modernist views and practices, are now challenged by neo-Salafism and Shi'ism, while at the same time traditionalist Islam is revitalized through renewed connections between Hadramaut and Indonesia. A competition over religious authority can be noted through building local, national, and transnational religious networks, searching for religious scholarship, and establishing/engaging in Islamic foundations. The religious differentiation within the Hadrami community, to some extent,

follows an old division between Sada and non-Sada in their ideological preferences.

The Hadramis in Ambon have contributed to developments in local Islamic views and practices in several aspects. First, the character of Islamic reformism appears to be more adaptive to existing traditions than one finds elsewhere in Indonesia. Second, they have played a major role in the (re) production of religious teachers and scholars through providing Islamic education. Third, they have invested in and contributed to promoting gender equality in Islamic education. Fourth, a strong commitment can be noted to community building and social empowerment.

The Hadramis' engagement in Islamic activities in general can be interpreted as a struggle over religious authority and its maintenance, as well as a way of showing their religious commitment and solidarity as part of one Islamic *umma* or Muslim community. The solidarity towards the wider Islamic society was also shown by the Hadramis' siding with the broader community of Muslims in Ambon during the 1999-2002 conflicts. Therefore, religion as part of the Hadramis' multiple identities as both external and internal boundary marker: a boundary that unites the Hadramis and other Muslim groups in Ambon and a larger Muslim context, as well as a boundary that divides the Hadramis into various communities of Islamic understandings and practices.

While this chapter has emphasized how religion plays a significant role in building lateral ties among dispersed Hadramis in the diaspora and between Hadramis and the wider host-society, the following chapter will elucidate how religion is played out as one of the salient intersecting dimensions together with ethnicity, class, gender in the revitalization of the Hadramis' distinct cultural identiy through restoring ties with the homeland.

Chapter 6: Hadramaut as an Imaginary Homeland

1. Introduction

This chapter examines the orientation of the Hadramis in Ambon towards their forefathers' homeland by focusing on their current journeys to Hadramaut. The chapter consists of three parts: the first part deals with the contexts of renewed connections between Hadramaut and Ambon; the second illuminates the impact of the restored links on the Hadramis in Ambon in the revitalization of Hadrami identity; and the concluding section will reflect on the continuity and change in the orientation of Hadramis in the diaspora towards a homeland. This chapter argues that Hadramaut as an imaginary homeland continues to be an authoritative source of identity for many Hadrami descendants while at the same time its position has been contested due to the influence of new religious views and practices.

2. Wider Context of the Renewed Connections between Hadramaut and Ambon

The apex of Arab migration from Hadramaut in South Yemen to the Indian Ocean region during the second half of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth century has left its legacy in the diversity of Muslim society in contemporary Indonesia. Scattered across numerous coastal islands, today's Hadramis in Indonesia are mainly third and fourth generation-descendants of Hadrami migrants (Jacobsen 2009). After having been cut off from their forefathers' homeland for several decades, the Hadrami descendants in Indonesia were able to undertake return journeys to Hadramaut since the 1990s, and many have done so. Their journeys to Hadramaut have largely been motivated by one or several of three interests: to renew family ties, to pursue religious education in religious schools, and to perform pilgrimage (Slama 2005; Ho 2006; Alatas 2016b).

The current back and forth movement of Hadramis between Indonesia and Hadramaut is not a novel phenomenon. Historically, it can be traced back to the period of the massive wave of Hadrami migration towards the end of the nineteenth century until the first half of the twentieth century. During this period of Dutch colonial occupation, Indonesia hosted the greatest numbers of Hadrami migrants, most of whom were mainly engaged in trade. As the Hadrami migrants felt a strong attachment to their homeland, they sought to maintain their ties with Hadramaut by sending remittances to their families. Some wealthy merchants even made regular journeys back and forth between Hadramaut and Indonesia. Their sons born to Indonesian women were also

sent back to Hadramaut in order to get acquainted with and search for religious knowledge in their fathers' homeland.

The Second World War and the subsequent two decades, which were characterized amongst others by the emergence of nation-states, marked the first major phase of disintegration of the networks between Hadramis in Hadramaut and their diaspora in the Indian Ocean region particularly with those in Indonesia (Freitag 2003). During this period, the Hadramis in Indonesia were forced to opt for Indonesia as a result of the state's national integration policy. The second major disruption was during the Cold War, when Indonesia and South Yemen were governed by regimes of different political ideologies divided into Western and Eastern blocks, which in turn exacerbated the contacts between Hadramaut and Hadramis in the diaspora. For state security reasons, they could not easily travel back and forth between Indonesia and Hadramaut (Freitag 2003).

The restoration of the connections between Indonesia and Hadramaut gained momentum around the 1990s when the political regimes in Indonesia and South Yemen changed their policies. On the one hand, the collapse of the socialist regime in South Yemen and the unification of North and South Yemen in 1990 resulted in a relatively free political climate among different Muslim groups in Hadramaut. This enabled them to revitalize their religious ideologies and to express their beliefs in public spaces (Freitag 2003; Slama 2005; Alatas 2016b). Among various religious strands, Salafism and Sufism are the two most important religious currents in South Yemen that have attempted to exert their influence on the diaspora. In Indonesia on the other hand, a shifting policy toward Islamic groups in the late New Order followed by the fall of the regime in 1998 gave freedom to Indonesian Muslims to voice their religiosity in public domains. This is indicated by the flourishing of Islamic organizations and activities undertaken mostly by people belonging to the middle class in urban areas, the increase of local practices such as pilgrimage to shrines in rural areas, and the burgeoning of Islamic publications and the use of mass media for Islamic propagation. These dynamics of political changes in both Hadramaut and Indonesia have shaped the desires and possibilities of Indonesian Muslims, including the Hadrami descendants, to participate in religious journeys such as pilgrimage to Hadramaut (Alatas 2016b).

Specific to the Ambonese context is that ties between the Hadramis in Ambon and their relatives in Hadramaut were renewed after the communal conflicts in Ambon between 1999-2002. The communal conflicts between Muslims and Christians in Ambon displaced a considerable number of people, including Muslims of Hadrami descent, to safer places outside Maluku. During the riots, many Hadramis in Ambon moved to Java for a permanent or temporary period. Java became one of the main destinations for the Hadramis in Ambon to move to as they had relatives there to support them. Their

displacement to Java not only resulted in strengthening kinship ties with relatives in Java but also those with relatives in Hadramaut as the Hadramis in Java had already restored ties with their family members in Hadramaut a decade earlier.

In addition, the connections between the Hadramis in Ambon and Hadramaut after the religious conflicts were restored by Hadramis living in Saudi Arabia. Given their proximity to Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries had become new destinations for Hadramis in search for a better life during the oil boom and the Cold War, when the connection between the Hadramis and their diaspora in the Indian Ocean was disrupted (Freitag 2003). The countries were new routes of migration not only for the Hadramis in Hadramaut but also for those in the diaspora, particularly in Indonesia. Some Hadramis in Ambon who were sent to Hadramaut by their fathers by the end of the 1960s did not stay there for a long period. Rather, they departed to Saudi Arabia. Some of them later returned to Indonesia, while others have settled in Saudi Arabia where they continue to live until today.

Through their relatives in Saudi Arabia and Java, the Hadramis in Ambon began to reconnect with their family members in Hadramaut. At the same time, a new transnational connection was established between a number of Hadramis in Indonesia and Iran. The influence of the 1979 Shi'ite revolution in Iran on the Hadramis in Ambon was also mediated by their relatives in Java after their displacement during the communal conflicts. In fact, the connection between Ambon and Iran has resulted in the multiplication of travel destinations outside Indonesia among Hadramis, mostly in line with the specific Islamic affiliation of travellers.

Regarding the context outlined above, despite the disrupted connection between the Hadramis in Hadramaut and those in the Indonesian diaspora during the Second World War and the Cold War, networks among Hadramis in various localities within Indonesia became established and strengthened. This resulted in what Martin Slama has called a 'diaspora within a country' (2011, 241).

At the same time, the networks among Hadramis have been extended beyond their forefathers' country of origin and their country of residence, thereby forming new transnational links that connect Hadramis in localities of different nation-states. The recently renewed connections between the Hadramis in Ambon and Hadramaut are, indeed, a result of various trans-local networks established among the Hadramis in Ambon and other regions both inside Indonesia, particularly Java, but also outside Indonesia, especially Saudi Arabia. Therefore, 'diaspora' as a concept related to transnationalism does not seem to decrease in significance. In fact, it should be broadened to include various trans-local connections, which may cover localities not necessarily

linked to political boundaries of nation-states (Freitag and Von Oppen 2010, 11-12).

3. The Impact of the Renewed Connections between Hadramaut and Ambon

The participation of the Hadramis from Ambon in return journeys to their ancestors' homeland after the 1999 – 2002 communal conflicts has revitalized their construction of certain elements of Hadrami identity related to three following aspects: ethnicity, religion, and gender.

3.1 Kinship, Social Hierarchy, and Marriage

The renewed links between Hadramaut and Indonesia, and those with Ambon in particular over the last two decades have had an impact on the revitalization of some elements of Hadrami ethnic identity, notably those related to kinship, social hierarchy, and marriage patterns. As I discussed in chapter four, kinship relations constitute one of the most important elements of ethnic identity formation among the Hadrami descendants in Ambon. One of the cultural markers of Hadrami ethnic identity is family names. The Hadramis in Ambon still maintain family names by following their Hadrami agnatic lineage. The oldest families now consist of seventh generation of Hadrami migrants. An even stronger feature of the pattern of keeping genealogical imaginary alive are the systematic genealogical records based on patrilineal kinship system that are kept by some Hadrami families, particularly among the Sada.

Thanks to the active maintenance of family names and genealogical records, the Hadramis in Ambon have not faced many difficulties in rebuilding their ties with the Hadramis in Hadramaut even though their connections had been disrupted several decades before. During my short fieldwork in Hadramaut in February 2015, I observed that genealogy was one of the important subjects of communication both among Sada Hadramis in Hadramaut and those on Ambon. For example, when meeting people in Hadramaut, my informants from Ambon introduced themselves by stating their family origin and even mentioned their family tree up to the Prophet, which means that they cited names of more than thirty generations. This style of communication demonstrates how genealogy does not merely link the Hadramis in Hadramaut and in the diaspora but it also serves as a symbolic marker regulating social relationships between Hadramis in the diaspora and in Hadramaut.

The renewed connections between Hadramis in Hadramaut and in Indonesia particularly those in Ambon have indeed strengthened their kinship ties predicated on traditional Hadrami social stratification. As I stated in

chapter three (section 2.1) the traditional Hadrami social stratification ranks members of the Hadrami society according to several strata: Sada, *mashaikh-qabail, masakin-du'afa* (Bujra 1971). The hierarchy today, however, is only based on two ranks, in which prophetic descendants, Sada are distinguished from non-prophetic descendants, non-Sada. With regard to this social hierarchy, the Sada and non-Sada tend to have different ways to reconstruct their kinship ties with Hadramaut. Members of the non-Sada usually renew ties with their core family members only, while those of the Sada extend their ties with a larger category of descendants of the Prophet. Irrespective of their dissimilar clans, the Sada regard all descendants of the Prophet as one family. Unlike the non-Sada, for the Sada, meeting with core family members seems to be not a priority, and the ones I travelled with did not put much effort in searching for their core family members. In fact, during my fieldtrip to the Hadramaut I noted that some Sada informants were much more concerned with performing religious rituals such as visiting shrines, attending religious festivals, meeting religious leaders, and attending religious schools.

The strengthening of various levels of kinship ties between Hadramaut and Ambon has resulted in the maintenance of the traditional Hadrami social hierarchy through the continued application of asymmetrical marriage based on *kafa'a* doctrines. One of the main channels through which the *kafa'a* norm is reinforced is through socialization by way of religious education. Tarim is one of the religious centers in Hadramaut that many Sada members in the diaspora visit to revitalize their religious identity. Thus, it functions as a model of socio-religious hierarchy and at the same time as the site of cultural reproduction of that hierarchy.

This came to the fore, for instance, in a conversation I had with my thirty-eight-year-old informant Anisa from Tarim, who is a teacher in a religious school. I asked her about *kafa'a*, and whether it was still locally practiced, for instance. She responded that she had hardly heard any member of the local society violating this social norm, and she also contended that it was not merely local custom but also a religious norm justified by Islam. As part of its teaching curriculum the school uses Shafi'ite Islamic jurisprudence books, which Hadramis in Hadramaut and the diaspora refer to as providing religious grounds for the legitimacy of the practice of *kafa'a* based on the compatibility of descent ranks.

The renewed connections between Hadramaut and Indonesia have also revived the old Hadrami marriage patterns of exogamy, endogamy and polygamy on the basis of *kafa'a* rulings and gender difference. As I discussed in chapter four (section 3.1) in former times, many Hadrami migrants came to Indonesia without their wives and then married Indonesian women (Mobini-Kesheh 1999, 22-23). This polygamous intermarriage was a common practice during the early phase of Hadrami migration. It provided a basis for local social

support and for the Hadrami community's expansion outside the homeland, while at the same time it was a means of overcoming a problem of natural shortage partners for women of a particular social origin such as the Sada (Slama 2014, 73).

During my fieldtrip to Hadramaut, I found one case of a polygamous intermarriage between a Sada Hadrami, who is an elder brother of Habib Umar, the founder of the religious boarding school Dar al-Mustafa in Tarim, with an Indonesian woman from Java. The brother of Dar al-Mustafa's founder was a successful construction businessman who frequently travelled between Hadramaut and other countries to expand his economic activities. Saudi Arabia and Indonesia were two countries outside Yemen between which he most frequently moved back and forth. For his third marriage, he married an Indonesian woman, who had no patrilineal affiliation with the Hadramis, and whom he brought to Tarim when their first child was five years old.

In Ambon itself, I came across various examples of Hadramis marrying and/or proposing partners from Hadramaut. Ajib (see chapter 3 page 71), a construction businessman and second generation of a non-Sada migrant in Ambon, told me, for example, that his nephew from Ambon working in Abu Dabi married his cousin in Hadramaut. Another non-Sada informant had proposed his two sons to marry his nieces in Hadramaut, but his sons had declined his father's suggestion. In another part of Indonesia, Jacobsen (2009, 47) similarly observed that one of his informants planned to send his son to Hadramaut in order to search for a suitable wife.

The last examples above illustrate that marriage between Hadramis in Hadramaut and Indonesia is used as an important tool not only to renew ties between the homeland and the diaspora but also to prevent the present-day Hadrami generation in the diaspora from losing their Hadrami identity. As women within the Hadrami community have been crucial subjects of cultural reproduction and social boundary maintenance (Freitag 2003, 41), marrying women from Hadramaut may become a strategy of preserving a sense of Hadraminess, or Arabness, for future offspring in the diaspora.

The differences in views between what Sada and non-Sada consider family in Hadramaut tend to be closely related to contrasting religious views. Also, these differences often result in different kinds of activities undertaken when visiting the country of origin. Every time my non-Sada informant Hasan al-Kathiri (see chapter 4 pages 131-132) visited Hadramaut, for example, he stayed with his step-sister's family members for several weeks or months. This was also the case when his wife and one of his sons accompanied him. While staying with their family, they had the opportunity to visit their relatives and neighbours in the neighbourhood. They also made some tours to visit heritage centers such as a museum and a palace located in historical towns such as Sa'yun and Shibam (see figure 6.1). In contrast, I noted during my stay in

Yemen that Sada who visit Hadramaut stay mainly in lodges or hotels in Tarim or other adjacent towns. The primary purpose of their visit was to make tours to several shrines and religious sites, and to visit religious leaders and attend religious celebrations such as *haul* and *maulid*. They tended to visit their core family members – if they knew where they lived, which was not always the case - only after completing such religious rituals. As most of the shrines were of members of Sada clans, visiting their graves and religious leaders was deemed sufficient to justify their origin linked to Hadrami religious leaders claiming descent from the Prophet.

Figure 6.1: Hasan al-Kathiri (on the left) with his step-sister's son and grandson in Bahere, Say'un, Hadramaut. This picture is part of al-Kathiri's photo collection concerning his visit in 2013

The different activities that non-Sada and Sada engage in reflect their different Islamic affiliations, which roughly divide them into more Salafi and traditionalist Islamic groups. Among the group of Ambonese Hadramis whom I accompanied on their visit to Hadramaut there were no followers of Salafi Islam. When I talked to Salafi Hadramis in Ambon about their return visits to Hadramaut, they told me that they did not go to any shrine as they considered visiting shrines heretic. I noted that the Sada informants whom I accompanied, on the other hand, were very keen on engaging in any religious activity related to requesting blessings from both living and deceased 'imagined' family members. They conceive of such 'family members' as mediators of God.

I also noted that differences in interpretations of Islam come to the fore in the shopping activities of the people I accompanied to Hadramaut. Both Sada and non-Sada were busy collecting what in their eyes were typical Hadrami items as gifts for their relatives or friends in Indonesia. My Sada informants,

for instance, showed me typically Hadrami food, clothes, and accessories such as honey, tribal dresses and other items they took back to Ambon. In addition to typically Hadrami products, I noticed that my Sada informants also bought religious souvenirs such as a headdress with the stamp of the Prophet's hand, religious chanting booklets, and other religion related items which may mark particular signs of their traditionalist affiliation. In contrast, when my non-Sada informant Hasan al-Kathiri showed to me what items he bought from Hadramaut, he produced some Hadrami items, such as a dagger, men's clothes, and honey. He explained that he considered them as mere traditional items that reminded him about the homeland, rather than considering them as something Islamic.

3.2 Religious Revitalization

Religious differentiation among the Hadramis in Indonesia differs slightly from that in Hadramaut. As I discussed in chapter five, after the Islamic reform movement initiated by Jamaludin al-Afghani and his followers Muhammad Abduh and Muhammad Rashid Rida gained its foothold in Egypt in the end of nineteenth century and was spread to other Muslim colonies in the beginning of the twentieth century, traditionalist Sunni Islam based on Shafi'i school of thought brought by the Hadrami migrants to the diaspora began to be contested (Mobini-Kesheh 1999, 52-53). Since then traditionalist and (classical) Salafi Sunni Islam have been in competition with each other among Hadramis in Indonesia and also in Hadramaut until today. While a more rigid Salafi ideology from Saudi Arabia has found support both among Hadramis in Indonesia and those in Hadramaut, Twelver Shi'a Islam has caused religious polarization among the Indonesian Hadramis, but there is no account suggesting the penetration of Twelver Shi'a into Hadramaut.[159] The dominant views on Islam in Hadramaut still concern traditionalist and Salafi Sunnis, in which the latter is categorized into reformist, fundamentalist, and politicist streams (Knysh 2008).

The polarization between Salafi and traditionalist (Sufi) Islam in Hadramaut has been a striking feature after the fall of the socialist government in 1990 (Freitag 2003; Ho 2006; Knysh 2008; Arai 2011; Alatas 2016b). However, traditionalist Islam is more dominantly present than Salafi Islam because the traditionalists have gained a strong support from locals or 'nativists', while Salafism is viewed by many as a foreign ideological import (Knysh 2001). Traditionalists and Salafis can also be distinguished in terms of different institutionalization of both groups. Traditionalists have a long history

[159] This situation may have changed in the last few years when the war in Yemen has been supported by various foreign parties, at least by Saudi Arabia in one hand and Iran on the other hand.

of experience in managing religious institutions. In the late nineteenth century, Hadramaut was one of the religious centres of Shafi'i scholarship and jurisprudence, and of a Sufi order, Tariqa 'Alawiyya, among the Indian Ocean religious scholars. Many religious schools were established throughout Hadramaut especially in towns of Say'un and Tarim. They were closed during the Socialist regime but reopened after the collapse of the regime (Freitag 1999).

During my fieldtrip to Hadramaut I noted that most of the Islamic boarding schools are affiliated with the traditionalists. My informants told me that the Salafis also have religious schools, but their schools are mainly non-boarding schools. A well-known Salafi boarding school is located outside the province of Hadramaut. This school was called Dar al-Hadith, located in Dammaj, the northern governorate of Sa'dah. The Dar al-Hadith has attracted many students from around the world (Bonnefoy 2011). It was closed down during the siege of the Yemeni capital by the Houthi group, a member of Zaydi Shi'ite Islam, in September 2014. A non-Sada informant said that a Salafi school in the North was relocated to Mukalla, the capital of the Hadramaut governorate in the South. He did not know its name, but I surmise he was referring to the Dar al-Hadith. He added that three brothers of non-Hadrami descent, sons of a Butonese trader in Ambon went to North Yemen to study there. The eldest was killed during the clashes between Sunni and Shi'ite militias, but it was not clear whether the deceased student was involved in the fighting against the Shi'ite.

As the Zaydi branch of Shi'ism has dominated North Yemen, the growing Salafi activism after the 1990 Yemeni unification in the region has threatened Zaydism. This has led to several clashes between Zaydi and Salafi followers (Salmoni et al 2010, 3-6). In this regard, although the Salafi movement in Yemen has been rising significantly since the 1980s (Vom Bruck 2005) and even more so in the 1990s (Knysh 2001[2008]), it has not been supported by educational institutions such as religious boarding schools in Hadramaut. This was one of the main reasons why I found no Salafi Hadrami from Ambon who came to Hadramaut to study religion. Instead of going to Hadramaut, some Salafi Hadramis from Ambon departed to universities of other Middle Eastern countries such as Riyadh University in Saudi Arabia and al-Azhar University in Egypt.

In line with the above Islamic configurations both in Hadramaut and in Indonesia and Ambon in particular, one of the main results of the renewed connections between Hadramaut and Indonesia is the revitalization of traditionalist Sunni Islam based on the Shafi'i school of thought and the Sufi order Tariqa 'Alawiyya (Knysh 2001; Alatas 2008 [2011] [2016b]). The revitalization of the Hadrami traditionalist Sunni Islam is marked by the establishment of traditionalist schools and networks around Indonesia, and

the emergence of pilgrimage centers linked to the Tariqa 'Alawiyya in Hadramaut.

3.2.1 Traditionalist Schools in Hadramaut and their Networks in Ambon

Hadramaut has several religious educational institutions linked to traditionalist Islam. One can find such institutions throughout the whole region, with a concentration in the interior. Say'un and Tarim are among the main oldest religious educational centres in the region and have a long history of relations with the Hadrami community in the Indian Ocean littoral (Freitag 1999).

The oldest religious school, *rubat*, was founded in Say'un around 1878/9 by Ali b. Muhammad al-Habshi (1843-1915). Al-Habshi studied in the Hijaz with his father, the Shafi'i mufti of Mecca, as well as with the prominent scholar and teacher of so many Shafi'i *'ulama* of his generation, Ahmad Zayni al-Dahlan. After his return to Say'un, he regularly preached in mosques until he built his own mosque, al-Riyad, in 1878/9. Later, the mosque became the foundation for the school, *rubat.* Less than a decade later, another school was established in Tarim. This Rubat Tarim was initiated by members of a Hadrami reform society based in Singapore and Java. The members of the reform society appointed Abd al-Rahman b. Muhammad al-Mashur, the Mufti of Hadramaut and author of *shams al-zahira*, the famous genealogy of the Hadrami Sada, as the director of the Rubat. One of the graduates from the Rubat Tarim was Sayyid Idrus b. Salim al-Jufri, who travelled to Indonesia and founded a religious school, al-Khairat, in Central Sulawesi, in 1930. Branches of this school have spread mainly to northeastern Indonesia, ranging from North Maluku to West Papua (Slama 2011, 245-248). We can also find its branch in Ambon (see chapter 5 pages 206-207). During the late nineteenth century, some smaller religious schools were also erected in other parts of Hadramaut. Most of them were related to religious scholars of Sada origin (Freitag 1999, 165). During the Socialist era (1967-1990), the religious schools in Hadramaut were closed down, and they were revived again after the collapse of the regime (Arai 2011, 54).

The unification of North Yemen and South Yemen marked the beginning of period in which religious schools would flourish. Apart from the revitalization of existing schools, new religious schools have been founded, especially in Tarim. Today, there are several religious schools in Tarim, such as Rubat Tarim, Dar al-Mustafa, Dar al-Guraba, and Ahqaf Shari'a faculty, each of which has its own religious specificity. Dar al-Mustafa emphasizes its learning curriculum on *da'wa*, while Dar al-Guraba focuses on Qur'anic sciences. While the Rubat Tarim, Dar al-Mustafa and Dar al-Guraba are non-formal education

institutions that use traditional methods of religious learning, the faculty of Shari'a of Ahqaf is the only formal religious education which focuses on Islamic law and is addressed particularly to students of a higher level of education. Although each school operates independently, the schools allow students from other religious institutions to participate in each other's religious courses, rituals, and other activities. Each school is founded by prominent members of Sada families, whose kinship ties play a role in building a cooperation among their religious institutions.

The revived connections between the Hadramis in Hadramaut and their diasporas in the Indian Ocean is reflected in student enrollment in the religious schools of Hadramaut. During my fieldtrip in 2015, I noted that the majority of students in the schools came from Malay speaking countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia. This was followed by students from Africa and Yemen. Furthermore, there appear to be new entries from Western countries. Among these religious educational institutions, the Dar al-Mustafa is the most popular school. Having gone through vast improvements it currently attracts many Indonesian students (Knysh 2001; Ho 2006; Alatas 2016b). One of the alumni of this school is my informant Muhammad Rifki al-Hamid, founder of the ar-Rahmah (see chapter 5 pages 187-188). Al-Hamid was the first initiator among the Hadramis in Ambon who established a link with the school.

The success of the Dar al-Mustafa is due to the many activities of its founder, Habib Umar, and of its alumni, who have built religious networks around Indonesia and other countries (Knysh 2001; Arai 2011; Alatas 2016b). Apart from Muhammad Rifki al-Hamid, two other Hadrami informants from Indonesia now living in Hadramaut told me about their relationship to the Dar al-Mustafa.

The first was Hakim, an Indonesian Sada descendant from al-Khiyyid family in Tegal who was 35 years old when I met him. He came to Hadramaut to study in Rubat Inat in 2006/2007 and also spent time at the Dar al-Mustafa. After finishing his studies five years later he married a Sada woman from Ba Shura family in Pasuruan East Java, and brought his wife to Tarim. Since 2011, Hakim and his wife has lived opposite of the Dar al-Zahra, which is a female religious boarding school and a co-joint school of the Dar al-Mustafa managed by Habib Umar's first wife and their daughters. Apart from assisting the development of the Dar al-Mustafa and its founder, Habib Umar, Hakim has also opened a souvenir and grocery store and he has begun a business as a pilgrimage tour operator. Al-Hamid, his aunt, and I, as well as other pilgrims, were staying in his rented house during our stay in Tarim. Besides running his office, Hakim also acts himself as a tour leader for pilgrims, especially those from Indonesia.

The other informant is Sunan, a Sada Hadrami of the bin Jindan clan from Jakarta. At the time of my fieldtrip to Yemen, Sunan was 28 years old. His

father had died when he was five years old. Habib Umar, the founder of Dar al-Mustafa, adopted him and his brother in 2005. Sunan and his brother lived in Habib Umar's house from 2005 to 2012. Sunan then married an Indonesian woman of the Sada al-Atas family in 2013 and brought his wife to Tarim where he rented an apartment nearby the Dar al-Mustafa complex. Apart from assisting the Dar al-Mustafa, Sunan also has opened a restaurant in the Dar al-Mustafa school and he runs a food catering enterprise. During my stay in Tarim, Sunan was the one who cooked for the Indonesian pilgrims who were staying in Hakim's house.

Both Hakim and Sunan told me that the Dar al-Mustafa was a product of Habib Umar's first trip to Indonesia in 1993. His visit to his relatives and other religious institutions such as the Rabita al-'Alawiyya was the initial step of establishing a religious school in Tarim. The Rabita al-'Alawiyya (see chapter 4 pages 117-121) functioned as co-founder. Its main task was to send around thirty to forty Indonesian students to Tarim. Thirty Indonesian students who were recruited in 1994 became the first generation of the school. They completed their studies in four years. I was told that the first generation of the Dar al-Mustafa was students of various backgrounds, although many of them originated from Sada families.

Since 1994, Indonesia has sent students to the Dar al-Mustafa every year, and it has become the biggest student-sending country. Hakim told me that the number of Indonesian graduates from the school reached 3.000 in 2015. As the graduates founded several *majelis ta'lim,* non-formal religious study circles or forums after their return, approximately 3.000 alumni have established religious forums/centers all over Indonesia. The graduates have thus acted as religious preachers and promoters in the development of Hadrami traditionalist Islam in Indonesia.

My informant Muhammad Rifki al-Hamid is an example of being both an object and subject of diaspora of Hadrami traditionalist Islam. Al-Hamid became interested in seeking religious knowledge in the Dar al-Mustafa when he attended some non-formal religious courses during the 1999-2002 conflicts in Ambon and his temporary stay in East Java. His teachers in the courses introduced him to former alumni of the Dar al-Mustafa, who frequently travelled to Hadramaut. Al-Hamid's dream to study in Hadramaut was realized after completing his bachelor in computer science in a college in East Java. He studied in the Dar al-Mustafa from 2008 to 2010 with a scholarship from the Rabita al-'Alawiyya. After his return to Ambon, he established a foundation, called ar-Rahmah, which conducts a regular *majelis ta'lim* (religious teaching forum). In 2014, the ar-Rahmah granted scholarship to five students to study to the Dar al-Mustafa and other traditional schools in Hadramaut. This example illustrates how al-Hamid has transformed from being a passive

receiver toward an active transmitter of traditionalist Islam. This transformation was the result of his mobility and religious networking.

As a centre of the Sada organization in Indonesia since the very beginning of the establishment of the Dar al-Mustafa, the Rabita al-'Alawiyya has been one of the most important supporting institutions that contributes to the revitalization of the Dar al-Mustafa and other traditionalist schools in Hadramaut. With the spread of several religious schools and religious institutions initiated by the Indonesian alumni from the Dar al-Mustafa and other religious schools in Hadramaut, scholarships to study in Hadramaut are not only provided by the Rabita but also by these newly religious foundations and schools such as the ar-Rahmah foundation initiated by my informant Muhammad Rifki al-Hamid.

Many Indonesian students in Hadramaut, however, do not receive a scholarship, but are supported by their own families. This is especially the case for those who are related to Hadrami-initiated traditionalist boarding schools in Indonesia. When I was in Tarim, I met several people from Indonesia who had come to visit their children or relatives, and to make a pilgrimage tour. Most of these people manage traditionalist boarding schools in Indonesia themselves. For example, a Sada descendant from the al-Muhdar family who founded a boarding school in East Java came to Hadramaut together with his wife, his wife's sister and brother's in law. Apart from performing the pilgrimage to Mecca and visiting several pilgrimage sites in Hadramaut, they also came to visit their son and nieces who were at that time studying at the Dar al-Mustafa and Dar al-Zahra. During their pilgrimage tour in Hadramaut, they were staying in the same lodge run by my informant Hakim where I stayed.

Some religious leaders related to these traditionalist schools in Indonesia have invested money to provide their children with an education in Hadramaut with the purpose of preparing them to replace their fathers as religious leaders when they become older. This shows that acquiring religious knowledge in Hadramaut is still an important form of symbolic capital among the Hadrami traditionalist descendants in the diaspora to gain religious authority.

Maintaining contacts between the schools in Hadramaut and graduates and Sada descendants in Indonesia is not only undertaken by sending students to Hadramaut, but also by convening meetings and founding a network association. My informant Muhammad Rifki al-Hamid told me that twice a year, Indonesian graduates of the Dar al-Mustafa organize meetings during the months of Muharram (the first month of the Islamic calendar) and Rajab (the seventh month of the Islamic calendar) for which they invite the founder of the Dar al-Mustafa and his family to Indonesia. Many other former students in Indonesia, particularly in Java, invite the founder of Dar al-Mustafa Habib

Umar to their religious schools during his annual visit. He thus makes a tour to give public sermons and lead prayer meetings, usually attracting around a thousand participants. Another purpose of his yearly visit to Indonesia is to discuss with his former students the development of their religious missionary work in Indonesia. In 2014, the alumni of the Dar al-Mustafa in Indonesia established a network called *majlis muwasala baina al-muslimin wa al-'ulama* (translation: forum of binding Muslim communities and religious scholars/preachers). The association's central office is based in Jakarta, and it has branches around Indonesia. Al-Hamid explained to me that the forum is an open association that includes religious preachers of any descent in its organizational structure. Through the network forum, alumni from around Indonesia are able to support other fellows' religious missionary activities.

I attended the launching of the branch of the forum in Ambon initiated by al-Hamid on November 6, 2014. Al-Hamid often invites Indonesian Sada graduates of the Dar al-Mustafa to deliver public sermons in Ambon (see figure 6.2). On some occasions, he invited his teachers from Hadramaut who visited Indonesia to come to Ambon as well. After completing his study in the Dar al-Mustafa in 2010, al-Hamid has endeavored to increase his public exposure with his preaching activities. During the period of my fieldwork, al-Hamid advertised several religious events and feasts by installing big posters and pamphlets with large images of himself and other preachers, mainly Indonesian graduates of the Dar al-Mustafa as well as his religious teachers from the Dar al-Mustafa.

Figure 6.2: Poster inviting Indonesian alumni from Dar al-Mustafa school to a public sermon (photographed by the author)

Thanks to its massive networking activities in the diaspora, particularly in Indonesia, Dar al-Mustafa has been able to grow significantly. My informant Hakim (see pages 213-214) told me that in its early days, the school did not have a boarding house but used a local mosque to teach the first pupils from Indonesia. The construction of the Dar al-Mustafa building was carried out around between 1999 and 2000 with the help of two Indonesian architects from Sada families. Hakim pointed out me that the Dar al-Mustafa and its neighbourhood is a religious endowment from a successful businessman of Sada origin in Abu Dabi. The building of the Dar al-Mustafa is the only religious school in Hadramaut built of modern brick instead of mud. Some modern facilities such as ACs, electricity, computers, and internet have gradually been installed in order to develop the institute. The teaching staffs of the school, including the founder, have been trained to use modern communication technology. During my fieldtrip in Hadramaut, I met a Sada man (about 30 years old) from Jakarta who specialized on TV broadcasting. He had come to the Dar al-Mustafa to train some of its staff members to use camera recording to make videos. The use of such modern amenities for supporting the religious missionary activities of the Dar al-Mustafa reflects how the revival of traditionalist Islam in Hadramaut in the twenty first century has been reshaped by its entanglement with a more modern world in the diaspora, which results in reforming a homeland as occurred in the early twentieth century (Freitag 2003).

The branches of the Dar al-Mustafa presently include the Dar al-Safa in Sana'a, Rubat Inat in Inat, Rubat in As-Sihr, Rubat in Mukalla, and Dar al-Idrus in Tarim. Another goal for further development of the Dar al-Mustafa is the broadening of the school's branches and targeting new categories of students by establishing new branches and offering short religious courses, *daura*. The Dar al-Mustafa has recently started to attract female students, for example by establishing Dar al-Zahra as a co-joint school of the Dar al-Mustafa. Consisting of a seven years programme, the religious education at the Dar al-Zahra consists of three levels: beginner, intermediate, and advanced.

I had the opportunity to interview the vice principal of the Dar al-Zahra, Muniba who was 40 years old when I met her.[160] She told me that the school

[160] Muniba was born in East Africa to parents of African Yemeni origin, who moved from East Africa to Canada in 1990. Her father was an accountant and her mother is a housewife. Muniba is a graduate from a university in Toronto Canada, majoring in mathematics, and then took an Arabic course in al-Azhar University of Egypt. Afterwards, she went back to Canada to teach in an Islamic school. When teaching in that school, Muniba felt that something was lacking. It was the spirituality that she finally found in the Dar al-Zahra in Tarim. Her hunger for spirituality led her to quit her job as a teacher in that Islamic school in Canada. In the Dar al-Zahra Muniba has spent

began in 2004 – 2005 and that twenty out of the thirty first generation of students were from Indonesia. These girls were accommodated in the house of Habib Umar's first wife. As more and more students enrolled, after few years a boarding school was opened to accommodate the students. According to Muniba, the school had 350 students in 2015, 100 of whom came from Indonesia, followed by students from Malaysia, Thailand, Africa, Yemen, and Western countries (e.g America, Scotland, Britain, and France).[161]

When I visited the Dar al-Zahra, I met many Indonesian female students. Salima (17 years old at that time), a student from a Sada family of al-Muhdar in East Java helped me to make a list of the students studying at Dar al-Zahra at the time. Approximately twenty five of the hundred Indonesian students turned out to be from Sada families from all over Indonesia, especially from Java.

As of 2010, the Dar al-Mustafa has introduced more restrictive entrance requirements for new students, who must now master Arabic and have memorized at least half of the Qur'an before enrollment. The different branches that were established in order to accommodate the influx of students from abroad have less strict requirements than those of its main school. Also, a one-month religious course during the month of Sha'ban is offered every year, providing a preliminary religious training for those interested in the Dar al-Mustafa's method of learning but who do not yet have any adequate knowledge of Islam, such as new converts.

The growing expansion of the Dar al-Mustafa has had a significant impact on its surrounding neighbourhood. Many shops have opened in order to respond to the needs of both the students of the Dar al-Mustafa and short-term visitors such as pilgrims. Newly constructed houses have also emerged in response to an increasing demand and interest of religious seekers and pilgrims from overseas who come to visit the Dar al-Mustafa for a short period of time.

Also, the Dar al-Mustafa boarding school has resulted in the development of a new neighbourhood surrounding the school called *bi'a mustafiya* (translation: 'chosen environment'). Walking through the neighbourhood, I noted that it was in fact a multicultural area with settlers mainly from outside Tarim and outside Yemen, many among whom Indonesians. At the time of my visit, there were about thirty Indonesian families of both Hadrami and non-Hadrami descent who rented houses and flats nearby the Dar al-Mustafa

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most of the time on teaching, preaching, and doing social work/charity. This brings her more satisfaction in life. Muniba has been at the Dar al-Zahra 9 years (since 2006) when I met her. The first time she came to the Dar al-Zahra was when she participated in a religious course, *daura*, as the third batch for forty days and then she extended her stay for a year until I met her in February 2015. Interview with Muniba, February 16, 2015.

[161] Interview with Muniba, February 16, 2015.

compound. They were mainly alumni of the Dar al-Mustafa and other educational institutions in Hadramaut who had brought back their wives and children to settle nearby the school. They returned to Tarim in order to deepen their religious knowledge as well as for *khidma* (assistance) to the founder of the Dar al-Mustafa and his religious missionary project. Both Hakim, who rented a room to me and other pilgrims, and Sunan, who cooked during our stay in Tarim belong to this group of alumni.

The Indonesian alumni of the Dar al-Mustafa who have settled in the Dar al-Mustafa complex play a major role in the expansion of the religious missionary work of the school. The *khidma* or assistance in religious missionary activities includes participation in educational programmes and organizing pilgrimage activities. In terms of education, the alumni have been involved in recruiting new students from Indonesia and helping them to adjust to a new environment. When pilgrims from Indonesia visit, they serve as tour leaders. Some of them also run their own business such as shops selling miscellaneous goods including souvenirs, or they may rent out rooms for guests or pilgrims from abroad.

The alumni's assistance to the Dar al-Mustafa is not limited to religious missionary activities as such. Some of them assist in internal affairs of the Dar al-Mustafa. I met some people who managed the logistics in the house of Habib Umar's family and his boarding school. Those who are not married stay with the family as household assistants. While living with the family of the founder, they follow some religious courses held by the Dar al-Mustafa and/or Dar al-Zahra in accordance with their working schedule. These students who stay with the family of the founder are recruited on the basis of their lineage. More precisely, the founder has prioritized to recruit orphans with Sada backgrounds.

The popularity of the Dar al-Mustafa and its religious teachings is mediated by the use of social media, particularly the internet. Many users of social media use images of the founder of the Dar al-Mustafa and other prominent Hadrami scholars of Sada origin in their profile pictures, and they also set up online religious forums and websites linked to the school. Many of the users of these forums are graduates of the Dar al-Mustafa, who regularly update news about the school and Habib Umar's religious missionary work.

Habib Umar is a very famous and respected mobile preacher, who has visited many regions and countries including Western countries. Thanks to modern communication technology, his trips around the world can be easily watched on Youtube where they are uploaded by his followers. Anthropologist Alexander Knysh (2001, 407) reports that when he spent some time in Tarim, Habib Umar was constantly on the move, having an agenda of preaching in several areas in Yemen. This was the case during my visit as well. During my fieldtrip in Yemen, Habib Umar had a very busy schedule, moving from one

place to another, including Abu Dabi where he regularly visits a hospital for a medical check-up. Unfortunately, I could not manage to arrange a personal interview with him. Besides his busy travelling programme, other obstacles were the strict regulations of gender segregation, which did not allow me as a woman to interview a male religious preacher. Fortunately, I did visit his house to meet his first wife and daughter, who are responsible for managing the Dar al-Zahra school.

The use of social media in promoting the Dar al-Mustafa and its teachings has facilitated extending religious networks from offline to online contacts. Having majored in computer science before starting his religious studies in Tarim, my informant Muhammad Rifki al-Hamid is an example of a modern religious leader who uses social media to support the religious missionary work of the Dar al-Mustafa. He regularly shares his religious activities, including his several visits to Hadramaut, on his Whatsapp group and Facebook. Like al-Hamid, many alumni of the religious schools in Hadramaut have expanded their roles from offline 'faith entrepreneurs' (Reetz 2013, 10), who open a 'religious shop' in the religious market, into online faith entrepreneurs, who open virtual religious shops, thereby creating virtual religious travels for both old and new followers. Although virtual mobility can be an alternative form of travelling for the Hadramis in the diaspora in order to increase their religious knowledge and revive their religious identity, physical mobility, which is always emphasized by the Hadrami Sada, is still a stronger form of cultural capital. The reason for this is that it signifies direct access to what is considered as the truth and blessing from owners or guardians of religious knowledge.

What characterizes the religious education of the Dar al-Mustafa is a focus on cultivating values and morality rather than Islamic scholarship. As Knysh (2001, 409) argues, training students in developing moral and spiritual self-discipline is based on Shafi'i and Sufi practices. The school's educational philosophy focuses on preparing students to become future religious preachers who will propagate Islamic values to ordinary people in a simple manner, instead of training students to become religious scholars such as jurists or judges.

Furthermore, as there are many religious schools in Hadramaut, specialization in a specific educational curriculum is not only a way to distinguish one school from other religious schools, but is also a strategy to meet people's diverse demands and interests and thus survive in a highly competing religious market.

For the purpose of this thesis, what is most significant in the activities of the Dar al-Mustafa is its strong ties with Hadrami descendants in Indonesia. The institution owes its success to a significant degree to the interest of students, particularly students from Sada backgrounds, who are interested in

pursuing their studies in Hadramaut. For Hadrami families in Indonesia and Ambon, in turn, staying at the Dar al-Mustafa is not only a means of religious self-development, but it also provides them with highly valued symbolic capital in their countries of residence and allows them to expand their social capital by building on the networks that connects Dar al-Mustafa alumni. Having attended the Dar al-Mustafa is thus a way of expressing distinction, that is, distinction from fellow Indonesian Muslims who have no roots on the Arab Peninsula, and distinction also between Sada families and non-Sada families. The strength of a focus on spiritual growth and avoiding scholarly debates on the interpretation of Islamic texts, allows Dar al-Mustafa networks to include a heterogeneity of traditionalist views, thus enhancing rather than hampering the opportunities of alumni to expand their networks both in Indonesia and elsewhere.

3.2.2 Local Pilgrimage and Religious Tour Industries

a. Pilgrimage to Shrines

The revival of traditionalist Sunni Islam that has resulted from the renewed connections between Indonesia and Hadramaut since the mid-1990s also comes to the fore in the emergence of pilgrimage activities. Knysh (2008, 518) points out that the position of a traditional, shrine-centered Islam in Hadramaut has proved to be particularly robust. This shrine-culture is centered on saint veneration and graves-based rituals. As most of the religious shrines and sites in Hadramaut are related to the ancestors of the Sada, performing pilgrimage to Hadramaut has been mainly of a great interest for Indonesian Hadramis of Sada descent. However, Indonesian pilgrims who visit Hadramaut are not necessarily all of Hadrami descent.

The main activities of the Indonesian pilgrims I accompanied to Hadramaut consisted of visiting religious shrines such as tombs, mosques, and houses. These visits to shrines and sites mainly followed the trajectories of the most important symbolic figures in the formation of the Sada community and the development of the Tariqa ‘Alawiyya. The formation of the Sada community in Hadramaut started with the migration of the first descendant of the Prophet, Ahmad b. Isa, from Iraq in the tenth century (Ho 2006, 206). His settlement in Hadramaut is marked as a corner stone of the construction of the Sada community in Hadramaut. As Ahmad’s descendants have spread beyond his original area inside Hadramaut, the graves of his offspring form new centers of pilgrimage for their progeny outside Hadramaut. These shrines are mainly located in the interior such as Tarim, Gurfah, Huraidah, Inat, Hautah, Sa’yun, and other adjacent regions, such as Wadi Du’an. Some diasporic places could, however, also be found on the coast such as Mukalla and As-Shir.

Tarim has become one of the main pilgrimage centres for traditionalist Hadramis in the diaspora (Ho 2006). Thousands of religious leaders are buried there, some of whom have founded mosques such as the Ba'Alawi mosque, the al-Aydrus mosque, the al-Saqqaf mosque, the al-Muhdar mosque, and the al-Haddad mosque. The names of the mosques are ascribed to the clan names of their founders. Each has its own mystical stories related to their founder. One of these mosques, the al-Muhdar mosque, has the highest minaret of all mosques and has become an icon of the town of Tarim. Of Tarim's three public cemeteries, Zanbal, where members of Sada are buried, is the cemetery most pilgrims whom I accompanied on the journey from Ambon to Hadramaut intended to perform prayers (see figure 6.3). Bujra (1971, 17) noted in 1971 that the main class distinction within the Hadrami society was reflected in the separation of graveyards, and this separation exists until the present-day. To distinguish Zanbal from the other two cemeteries--Furat and Akdar-- is that it has several whitewashed domes, which symbolize its grandeur and the high social and religious status of the founder who lies buried there.

Figure 6.3: Indonesian male and female pilgrims listening a story from the tour guides and leaders about a saint in Zanbal cemetery, Tarim, Hadramaut. While listening to the story, some of them were taking pictures
(photographed by the author)

When visiting Zanbal, together with other pilgrims, I was provided with a map for directions (see figure 6.3 above). As most of the Indonesian pilgrims were not familiar with the cemetery, they depended on their group tour leaders to direct them where to begin and end their visit. Yet, the pilgrims stopped only at several tombs to conduct prayers. One of the most striking features I observed in the Zanbal graveyard complex was the blackening of the white

gravestones in the tombs where the pilgrims performed their prayers. This was the result of ritual touching and kissing by the pilgrims. They touch or kiss the tombs either before, after, or during the prayers. The black stains on white gravestones were therefore fair signs of where the most significant spiritual leaders within the Tariqa 'Alawiyya's chain lie buried. We found the tombs my companions wanted to visit, thanks to a manual for visiting the Zanbal which was first written by Ahmad al-Junaid (d. 1858) and then published in an abridged version by Abd al-Rahman al-Mashur (d. 1904), the first director of the Rubat Tarim.

The al-Junaid's manual *Salve for the Sickly* consists not only information on what to recite and to whom the recital prayers should be addressed, but it also gives the sequence in which graves should be visited. The chronological order of pilgrims' movement from one station to another is not based on who was first buried there. Rather, the sequence is symbolically linked to the foundation of the Tariqa, which was established by Muhammad b. Ali, al-Faqih al-Muqaddam (the first Jurist), in the thirteenth century (Ho 2006, 221). In this regard, the al-Junaid's manual has played a key role in constructing the ritual process of contemporary pilgrimage into a symbolic order of the Sufi order, which has left its traces in the forms of tombs of important leaders of the order.

Shrines in Hadramaut are mainly, although not exclusively, related to members of prophetic lineage. The devotion to the Prophet and his descendants is a key aspect emphasized within the shrine-culture embedded in Sufi traditions particularly the Tariqa 'Alawiyya. Knysh (2001, 407) argues that this devotion to the Prophet and his descendants is one of the greatest values Habib Umar and his followers appropriated in order to justify their religious status in general and their Sufi-based educational philosophy in particular. I also heard this value emphasis from the tour leaders many times when visiting the shrines. For example, the tour leaders often said that devotion for those buried in the shrines was a means of gaining access of God's knowledge for ordinary people. It would elevate their religious status in the eye of God because access to religious knowledge is an exclusive right of the descendants of the Prophet. I heard this explanation also when visiting the tombs of the two saints Shaikh Abd al-Rahman Ba Jalhabban and Shaikh Abdullah b. Ahmad Basaudan. The tour leaders told us that these saints were not of Sada origin, but that due to their closeness and devotion to descendants of the Prophet, they had become saintly religious scholars, whose tombs are among the major shrines that people visit in Hadramaut. Shaikh Abdullah b. Ahmad Basaudan is said to be co-author of a religious litany, Hadrah Basaudan, which is ritually recited by traditionalist Hadramis both in Hadramaut and in the diaspora every Tuesday afternoon in order to protect people from bad

luck. Indeed, I observed the prayer being said by traditionalist Sada people in Ambon.

Sainthood in Hadramaut seems to be predominantly a male affair. However, there was one female saint whose shrine was included in the pilgrimage tours. This female saint was called Shaikha Sultana. She is said to have lived in the period of Abd al-Rahman al-Saqqaf (d.1416), one of the saints buried in the Zanbal cemetery. According to our tour leader, Hakim, Sultana remained single and devoted her entire life to performing worship. In this sense, this female saint resembles the famous historical Islamic female saint Rabi'a al-Adawiya (717-801), who is also said to have remained single in her entire life (Ahmed 1992; Smith 2010).

Besides the tombs of saints, the tomb of the Prophet Hud located in north eastern part of the region is among the most popular pilgrimage destinations in Hadramaut. In the present-day, local people visit the tomb during the Islamic month of Sha'ban, especially on the fifteenth day (Al-Shabban 1998). However, pilgrims or visitors from abroad or other places outside Hadramaut are welcome to visit the tomb at any time.

A popular story about the tomb of Prophet Hud is about the river nearby the tomb complex. It is said to never fall dry because it is blessed. Unfortunately, during my visit because of long drought it had dried up, nonetheless. One of the pilgrims in the group I accompanied told me that there is a sad story related to this river; one of the sons of Habib Umar, the founder of the Dar al-Mustafa, was swept away by the current when he was swimming in the river. The yearly ritual at the tomb of the Prophet Hud has thus gained additional significance to the founder of the Dar al-Mustafa as a commemoration of his son. After the boy had died, Habib Umar built a boarding house within the tomb complex, which can accommodate his students during the yearly ritual of prophet Hud.

Pilgrims are also directed to visit a tomb of the Prophet (*nabi*) Haudan, a prophet who is less popular as he is not mentioned in the Islamic scripture. The tomb of the Prophet Haudan is located near the complex of the grave of the saint Shaikh Ba Saudan.

Through the pilgrimage tours, shrines and objects-related to shrines undergo a process of sacralization. The most common practice during such pilgrimage rituals is drinking water. Religious shrines and sites such as graveyards and mosques provide water for the visitors to drink from and to use for their ablutions before prayers. Echoing the highly valued Zamzam water from Mecca, this water is considered to contain special powers to heal people. Indeed, the pilgrims with whom I travelled regard the water in these places as a conduit of blessing and having the power to cure illnesses. Besides drinking the water at the site, they also took some bottles back home. I noted that when visiting religious leaders and attending religious rituals, the pilgrims

similarly brought water bottles with them and asked the leaders to say a prayer to bless the water (see figure 6.4).

Figure 6.4: A tour leader pouring water that has been blessed by a religious preacher in water bottles that pilgrims brought with them (photographed by the author)

All objects related to the shrines are considered to possess similar special qualities. Sand from the complex of Shaikh Abu Bakar b. Salim, for example, is also used as a medicine. When visiting Shaikh Abu Bakar b. Salim grave in 'Inat, I saw pilgrims taking some sand from the graveyard complex and putting it in plastic bottles (see figure 6.5). The pilgrims brought the sand back to home to Indonesia to keep some for themselves and also to give some of it away as a gift. Some people specifically ask their relatives or friends who visit Hadramaut to bring them sand from saint shrines there. The popularity of the sand as medicine is related to a story about saints such as the one the tour leaders told us when we visited a specific shrine:

> A student once came to ask his teacher for an *ijaza*, a religious certificate that proves that someone had completed his religious studies and is allowed to teach the texts he had learned from his teacher. The Shaikh told his student that two thirds of his religious knowledge certificates would not be given to anybody other than his own descendants, but that one third could be obtained by others through his graveyard.

So the sand is considered as a proof of connection to the saint. The sand in the graveyard of the saint is said to bring about miracles for every pilgrim, particularly those of non-prophetic lineage. In this case, sacredness of this sand lies in a popular invented story, which is orally passed on and written down by the saint's followers in a form of hagiography. Not all pilgrims may know such stories, but it is common wisdom that sand from a saint's graveyard

has healing power. For Hadrami living in the diaspora taking home sand carries an extra layer of significance by connecting them to the country of origin.

Figure 6.5: Indonesian pilgrims collecting sand at the shrine of Shaikh b. Abu Bakr in Hadramaut (photographed by the author)

Another example of the sacralization of objects pertains to the personal belongings of the saints. Some descendants of saints have kept some belongings of their holy ancestor. When visiting the *munsib* (leader of a clan) of al-Habshi clan in Gurfah after visiting the graveyard of a saint of al-Habshi clan called 'Aydrus b. Umar al-Habshi, we were welcomed into his living room and shown some remains of his grandfather's belongings. The remains consisted of an *imama* (headgear), a *janbiyya* (traditional dagger), and some other dress accessories. Every pilgrim was allowed to touch them before passing them onto others. This ritual of touching the saints' belongings is performed in order to receive blessings from the saint. A similar rite was performed when we visited the house of Shaikh Abu Bakar b. Salim, where we were shown Shaikh's private bedroom. In the bedroom a recently painted piece of the Shaikh's wooden bed was on display. Pilgrims were allowed to get into the bed in order to experience how it was used by the saint. Moreover, actually lying in the bed where the saint slept himself gives the pilgrims a strong sense of his presence. This house was taken care of a descendant of the saint, who functioned also as *munsib* or clan leader.

This phenomenon of cherishing and displaying personal belongings of saints is not unique. There are pilgrimage sites, both Islamic and otherwise where similar practices can be noted (Turner 1969; Turner and Turner 1978; Cohen 1993; Reader and Walter 1993; Coleman and Elsner 1995). The practice

of keeping the saints' belongings in Hadramaut is not merely to connect the living to the past. The belongings of the dead are valuable treasures that provide symbolic capital to the descendants of the saint. The material authenticity that is claimed through ownership of such belongings also relates to claims of legitimate continuity of the leadership for present-day and future descendants of the saints. Particularly for Indonesian Hadrami of Sada descent, seeing and touching the belongings has a special ring to it: again, it connects them to their cultural background and reminds them of their Sada origin. In this way, their religious identity and ethnic identity mutually constitute each other.

b. Religious Tour Industries

The availability of air travel and new communication systems has led to a burgeoning pilgrimage tour industry over the last two decades to cater Indonesian Muslims of Hadrami descent trips to their forefathers' homeland (see figure 6.6). Evidently, given the relative proximity of Mecca to Hadramaut, many Indonesian Hadramis who travel to Hadramaut combine it with performing the pilgrimage to Mecca. They either make the *umra* or voluntary pilgrimage, or they plan their visit to Hadramaut in the season of the *hajj*, the compulsory pilgrimage to Mecca that every Muslim who is capable should perform once in a lifetime.

Figure 6.6: Malika's journey back from Yemen to Indonesia with Yemeni Airlines (photographed by the author)

Although their motivations to visit Hadramaut may differ, Indonesian Hadramis with different religious affiliations benefit equally from the *hajj-umra* tour industries. Salafi Hadramis use the opportunity to perform pilgrimage to Mecca to also visit their close family members in Hadramaut, while traditionalists use the opportunity to perform pilgrimage to Mecca in order to also visit religious shrines in Hadramaut. Both traditionalists and Salafis may buy package tours to Mecca and Hadramaut, or they travel individually. When they travel in a group, they depart with pilgrims of any descent. It is mostly pilgrims who visit Hadramaut for the first time who make use of travel agencies. Those who travel individually are usually people who are already familiar with Hadramaut so that they can arrange their itinerary by themselves or by the help of their relatives in Indonesia, Saudi Arabia or Yemen.

The emergence of Hadramaut as a pilgrimage destination has led to the rise of entrepreneurial religious actors. The commercialization of shrines and sites in Hadramaut involves several actors such as travel agents, tour guides, and religious leaders. The functions of these actors overlap to some extent. The role of the alumni of religious educational organizations, some, but not all of whom from Sada origin, in promoting Hadramaut as a religious site is remarkable. The alumni have used both their kinship ties and religious networks to promote travelling to Hadramaut.

Figure 6.7: Poster of the ar-Rahmah's tour agency that promotes pilgrimage tours to Hadramaut (photographed by the author)

My informant Muhammad Rifki al-Hamid, for instance, started his pilgrimage tour business in 2013 through his ar-Rahmah foundation (see figure 6.7). He offers three kinds of pilgrimage tour packages: *hajj-umra* pilgrimage, *hajj-umra* and Hadramaut pilgrimage, and Hadramaut pilgrimage. He mainly sells the first and the second package, as most of his customers are not interested in only visiting Hadramaut. Malika (see chapter introduction, page 1) and myself, were in fact, al-Hamid's first customers who took the last tour package that only included Hadramaut. Because of the civil war in Yemen that was quickly getting worse during our stay, it turned out that for the time being, we were also his last customers for a package tour that included Hadramaut.

It must be noted that unlike many other cultural heritage tours elsewhere in the world, such as the Orkney Homecoming described by Basu (2004), North American Jewish missions to Poland (Kugelmass 1992) or African-American pilgrimage tourism in Ghana (Schramm 2004), there are no package tours to Hadramaut that are exclusively designed for Hadrami descendants. Pilgrimage tours to Hadramaut are open to all Muslims of any descent. Indeed, the pilgrims and religious seekers in Hadramaut from Indonesia are not exclusively linked to Hadrami descent.

My informant Muhammad Rifki al-Hamid, however, operates his business in close cooperation with a Sada-owned tour agency based in Jakarta and Indonesian Hadrami Sada people based in Hadramaut. He does not only provide his customers with religious tour packages, but also acts as a religious tour guide for them, and he regularly travels back and forth between Hadramaut and Ambon. His main task is arranging a tour from Indonesia to Mecca and to Hadramaut. Once his pilgrim customers arrive in Hadramaut, the Indonesian alumni based in Hadramaut take part in the tours as tour guides, interpreters, and also as logistic managers of the tour, arranging accommodation, food, and transportation. They are also in charge of the contacts with local actors such as religious leaders and gatekeepers of the shrines in Hadramaut. Together with his co-organizers of the tour packages, al-Hamid can adjust the tours in terms of budget, taste, and demands of Indonesian pilgrims. In this respect, similar to the religious authorities and pilgrimage tour operators described by Ian Reader (2014) they use their agency as 'entrepreneurial religious leaders' to contribute to the creating of sacred spaces commensurate with visions and expectations of the pilgrims (Reader 2014, 119).

The traditionalist Hadrami pilgrims from Indonesia to Hadramaut rely on tour packages they buy from travel agencies in Indonesia. The activities for pilgrims are not confined to visiting religious shrines and sites, but there are also town tours that consist also of visiting religious leaders, public markets, and other non-religious places. The tour agents offer the pilgrims the

opportunity to attend religious feasts such as *haul, maulid*, or other religious rituals, depending on the season of the pilgrim's visit. In my case, as I chose a two weeks-tour package tour our group was given several excursions such as visiting religious celebrations, religious leaders, clan leaders, and religious schools such as the Rubat Tarim, the Dar al-Mustafa, the Rubat Say'un, and the Rubat Hautah. The main purpose of visiting these religious leaders is similar to that of visiting the shrines, which is asking for blessing, healing, and other requests related to issues in daily life such as success in one's career, family, marriage, children, and others.

The commercialization of pilgrimage tours in Hadramaut has resulted in local and transnational economic, social, and cultural changes. Pilgrims are recommended to offer money to gatekeepers of the tombs and to the religious leaders they visit. Some of the shrines have become begging sites for local children and incidental beggars, most of whom poor local women. Hotels and shops are built to cater pilgrims' needs and seemingly ordinary Hadramaut commodities are sold to the pilgrims as souvenirs alongside newly invented ones. The meals served to pilgrims in the hotels or the apartments are not purely local food, but they are adjusted to the pilgrims' taste and/or cuisine. In many shops, the Indonesian currency, the rupiah, is accepted if pilgrims prefer that over paying in the Yemeni Reals. Also, local shopkeepers and religious leaders may intersperse Indonesian (Malay) words in their social interaction with pilgrims from Indonesia and other Malay people.

Reader argues that pilgrimage patterns tend to be refashioned in accordance with wishes of the pilgrims (Reader 2014, 139). Similarly, Bruner points out that not only should travelers respect the tradition of the local population, in turn local people are forced to adjust to social, cultural, political and economic resources of the travelers as well (Bruner 1991, 239). In Hadramaut this has led to modification of some religious and cultural practices and values. One that particularly struck me was the negotiation over taking pictures of people. Indonesian pilgrims like to take pictures of themselves and other people present at any event they visit to document their trip, while most of the local people in Hadramaut are against being photographed. Their reluctance is related to the belief in the evil eye; it is believed to cause 'eye illness', which is meant here jealousy. For example, I could not easily take a picture of inhabitants of Hadramaut during my visit. Interestingly, however, the religious leaders we visited did not mind when we asked to have our picture taken with them.

Changes in local cultural beliefs and practices due to the increased influx of visitors from Indonesia also have an impact on views and practices concerning gender relations. Male religious leaders in Hadramaut are more flexible about the presence of female pilgrims than female religious leaders with regard to male pilgrims. The male leaders are not against being visited by

female pilgrims and both male and female pilgrims can be hosted in the same living room. Although in general male religious leaders do not shake hands with female pilgrims, an exception is made during ritual performances. At request they may put their hands on heads of the female pilgrims during the prayer. Male leaders also allow the female pilgrims to stand at his side to be photographed together. In contrast, female religious leaders, who are mainly the wives of the religious leaders, only receive female visitors. In contrast to male leaders they refuse to be photographed with their visitors.

Tour leaders play a significant role in bridging the demands of the pilgrims and the religious leaders they visit. What struck me was that not only the pilgrims themselves wanted to document every step in their pilgrimage tour, but that such documentation was also in the interest of the tour leaders. The tour leader of the group of pilgrims I accompanied, my informant Muhammad Rifki al-Hamid, for instance, never forgot to take photographs himself, which he used for promoting his tour business once he was back to Indonesia.

The pilgrims' interest in visiting saints' shrines also affects local cultural practices. When visiting one of the shrines, my informant Hakim explained that only few of the local people who live in the surroundings of the shrine came to visit the tomb. Hakim added that the bond between Indonesians and the saints in Hadramaut was stronger than those of the local Hadramis, who were mainly from non-prophetic lineage and whom he labelled as Salafis. His statement hints at two developments. The first is related to the polarization between Sufi and Salafi practices in Hadramaut, which occurs mostly along the lines of the traditional Hadrami social stratification in terms of Sada and non-Sada descent.

The second trend deals with the efforts of repositioning religious identity among traditionalist Hadramis and their reconnection with those in the diaspora. As Indonesia has one of the biggest concentrations of traditionalist Muslims and of Hadramis, the renewed connections between Hadramaut and Indonesia are a means for Sada Hadramis in both locations to protect themselves against the danger of losing both religious and non-religious positions in Hadramaut and diaspora. In other words, the attempts to revive religious traditions based on Shafi'i and Sufi practices can be viewed as motivated by more than religious reasons only. They are projects of the Sada members to regain their status in Hadramaut, which was undermined during the socialist regime, as well as in the Indonesian diaspora (Knysh 2001; Alatas 2016b).

Taking up pilgrimage projects by traditionalist Hadramis after the collapse of socialist regime has been in line with global economic transformations in the tourism industry. Recreation and tourism have become the largest and fastest-growing economy sector in the world and rank fourth

after fuels, chemicals and automotive products (Post and Van Tongeren 2014, 11). Pilgrimage is a very promising field in the global booming tourism industry, which has led to a blurring dichotomy between pilgrimage and tourism in terms of a religious and secular nature of travels (Badone and Roseman 2004; Post and Van Tongeren 2014; Reader 2014). This also questions a purely religious motive behind the pilgrimage projects of the Sada Hadramis and raises the point about additional commercial interests. The revived pilgrimage activities in Hadramaut are not merely the result of the dissemination of traditionalist Islam, but also of modern modification and commodification of traditionalist Islam, which in turn contributes to creation of what Ian Reader (2014) calls a 'consumerist culture' among the Hadramis both in Hadramaut and diaspora.

3.3 Gender Identity Construct

Over the last two decades, the renewed connections between Hadramaut and Indonesia have led to the transformation of the mobility of Hadrami women. Although there is no source that gives the exact number of women travelling to Hadramaut, many female Hadramis have recently participated in journeys to their ancestors' homeland. Unlike the situation in former times, present-day Hadrami women in Indonesia have equal opportunities to visit Hadramaut as men. As I mentioned in earlier chapters, in former times, especially during the massive waves of Hadrami emigration to the Indian Ocean, Hadrami mobility was an exclusively male affair (Freitag 2003). The Hadrami migrants and their male descendants in Indonesia made return trips to Hadramaut without female members (Mobini-Kesheh 1999). The Hadrami women were left at home and thus did not experience to live in their (fore) fathers' homeland (Mobini-Kesheh 1999).

The inclusion of women in today's Hadrami mobility has a considerable impact on how the reconstruction of Hadrami identity is gendered. Hadrami women in the diaspora are active players in the reshaping of Hadrami identity. This reshaping comes to the fore in reconfigurations of Hadrami gender roles, in patterns of gender segregation, and in the performance of religious piety as manifested in bodily comportment and veiling. However, the reconstruction of Hadrami gender identity that results from new patterns of women's mobility is multi-vocal and directly related to the different objectives that women may have to travel to Hadramaut. In the following, I will reflect on the impact of divergent travel motivations such as seeing relatives, visiting saint shrines or attending religious courses on Hadrami gender identity as coming to the fore in patterns of gender segregation and veiling in public places (see figure 6.8 below).

Figure 6.8: Indonesian Female pilgrims of Hadrami and non-Hadrami background pose with the author (the second from the right) on the roof of a graveyard complex of saint Habib Ahmad al-Muhdar in Quwereh Wadi Du'an Hadramaut

One of the most striking features of gender relations that is associated with countries in the Middle East is a patriarchal value system which comes to the fore, amongst others, in a strongly gendered division of space (Marin 2012, 355-357). Men are conceived of as the heads of the households who work outside the home, and women are primarily seen as housewives who stay at home. In terms of spatial arrangements, this ideal has often been interpreted by locating men primarily in the public sphere and women predominantly in the domestic sphere. Feminist scholars have pointed out, however, that not all women-only space is necessarily private. Judged by other criteria than gender only, such spaces can be equally public as men only spaces (see Buitelaar 1998; Van Geel 2018). It is therefore more correct to state that the patriarchal value system prevalent in the Middle East is characterized by regulating social relationships between men and women by sex-segregation. Female veiling, an ideal of women's seclusion in the domestic sphere and women-only places in the semi-public sphere, as well as strict regulations of sexual relations are the main features through which sex-segregation is regulated.

Although women's movements are subject to strict social regulations, they are not completely invisible in public places. The extent of women's visibility in public spaces and differentiated practices of veiling is closely associated with class, status, and age. The covering of the whole female body in public places to protect her 'private parts' (*aura*) against men's gaze, is related to preventing *fitna* (disorder) that may result from illicit sexual relations if the natural sexual drive of people is not restrained. Avoiding social disorder by veiling is justified with reference to religious doctrines which relate veiling to

religious piety and modesty. Lower class families cannot always afford to respect the regulations of sex-segregation. Therefore, women's seclusion and veiling are related to status. Among families in the higher classes, the visibility of women in public places is considered a transgression of social norms, which implies a loss of family honor, particularly for its male members.

Women in Hadramaut are restricted in their movements to a considerable extent. Ideally, they are only allowed to go out in public places in the company of a *mahram* or male guardian such as husbands or male relatives. In addition, women may go out in the company of their female fellows for visiting specific women's shops or for performing rituals at religious shrines. In general then, gender relations in Hadramaut should be understood in terms of gender segregation so that unrelated men and women are prevented from mingling each other, thus allowing the creation of separate male and female public spaces. In practice, the rules of sex-segregation are not always met. Some women may have professions outside the home, such as teachers and shopkeepers, for instance, and one can also see female beggars or shepherds in the streets. What nearly all women abide, however, are local veiling practices; Hadrami girls reaching puberty should cover their body and face with black clothes with exception of their eyes, while married women should cover their face including their eyes.

Indonesian women who visit Hadramaut to see their relatives or to visit saint shrines usually abide Hadrami cultural values for the duration of their visit, but discontinue to do so in a strict sense once they are back in their daily routines at home in Indonesia. From the conversations I had with women, I learned that this should not be interpreted as the outright rejection of the practices of sex-segregation and veiling in the Hadramaut, although some women stated that they found it difficult for themselves and that they were happy that they lived in Ambon rather than in the homeland of their ancestors. Whilst in Hadramaut, however, many felt more comfortable respecting the rules of seclusion and veiling and would feel awkward transgressing local cultural norms. Also, they realized that the restrictions they faced during their stay in Hadramaut were of a temporary nature and would be lifted again upon return home. In their daily lives in Indonesia, however, they are accustomed to another 'gender order' (Robinson 2009, 10-32) that is not organized around gender segregation and the accompanying dressing codes and sanctions for gender mingling. In their daily life worlds, they therefore find it much more difficult or inconvenient to live by the rules of sex-segregation as practiced in Hadramaut.

One of the women with whom I discussed the issue of sex-segregation was Asri, a sixty-five-year-old non-Sada. Asri travelled to Hadramaut with her husband in 2013. She spent about a month with her husband's family in Bahere, Say'un. For the duration of her stay, she left the house only

sporadically and hardly interacted with the men in the family. She told me that she was happy that she lived in Ambon because covering her entire body as she had done in Hadramaut had made her perspire a lot, particularly as the weather had been extremely hot. The restricted freedom of movement of women and the use of a face veil and the anonymity of being covered in black cloth had added to her discomfort.

Fifty-year-old Malika (see chapter 1 pages 1-2), whom I accompanied during the visit to Hadramaut, felt slightly different. Malika is from a Sada family. She is married to a Sada man and the mother of five children. Malika told me that she would never be able to live in Hadramaut because she thought that many women in the Hadramaut are household wives who spend most of the time at home whereas she has a career and works outside home. Neither would she be able to wear a face veil in public places. In her daily life, when going out in public she dresses up in a fashionable Islamic dress, combining religious modesty and the latest fashion trends. She also told me how she had struggled to pursue her education until she managed to obtain her university degree. Wishing her children to have a better future, she, together with her husband, were saving money for the future education of her children. She criticized the life of women in Hadramaut, for whom a good education was much more difficult to get and whose career perspectives were slim in comparison to those of women in Indonesia. In addition to her profession as a civil servant, Malika is engaged in various religious activities as a religious teacher. However, she does not view women's visibility in public places as violating Islamic piety. With her educational and professional background, she could never apply the segregation rule in her hometown. As a civil servant she has to interact with both men and women, and she is accustomed to traveling outside home without the company of her husband or male relatives.

The pattern seems somewhat different among women who travel to Hadramaut to study religion. These religious seekers spent more time in Hadramaut and have the opportunity to learn local traditions and adapt to the societal norms in Hadramaut. Despite their prolonged stay, however, they have only limited access to the lives of the local population. As part of obligatory religious educational trainings, students in religious schools spent most of their time in the compound of their boarding school. The students of the Dar al-Zahra school who I followed a few days, spend their days studying and performing religious rituals from three o 'clock in the morning until ten o 'clock in the evening. They are not allowed to leave the compound except for visiting shrines and religious leaders, or for attending religious feasts. They are obliged to cover their whole body including their face when they go outside. They are also prohibited to interact with men other than their male relatives.

The religious schools in Hadramaut have contributed to the assertion and the implementation of Hadrami gender values by the religious students after

they return to Indonesia. The students learn Hadrami customs and practices from a religious point of view, which then motivates them to adopt some Hadrami customs in their home-places. When asked, some female Indonesian students in the Dar al-Zahra whom I talked to stated that covering the entire body from head to toe was an obligatory teaching of Islam, and they also said that they would wear the *niqab* (face cover) once they returned to Indonesia. For example, my informant Lubna Mauladawilah, wife of the founder of the ar-Rahmah stated, "Many say that covering our face is an Arab tradition, but it is in fact Islamic. According to the Shafi'i school of thought, the face is *aura* (private part of body that may attract sexual impulses)". She added that she preferred working in the privacy of her home in order to avoid mixing with men. Mauladawilah's receptivity for Hadrami customs thus overlaps with her receptivity for religious teachings.

To some extent, different views on face veiling are therefore related to different expectations embedded in particular objectives for travelling to Hadramaut. For instance, Elma a 38 years old woman of Sada descent from East Java who is married with a Sada man from Ambon distinguished visitors such as pilgrims from religious students by saying that many of her relatives and friends in Java wore black robes and face covers after they completed *ta'lim* (religious study) from the Dar al-Zahra. She further explained that she did not wear a face cover because she did not take the *ta'lim*.

People who travel to Hadramaut for family visits or to perform pilgrimage are not expected to make considerable changes in their dress codes because they are not driven by any particular religious missionary activity. In contrast, religious students travelling to Hadramaut expect or are expected to become future religious teachers who pass on the religious lessons they have learned to others in their home environment. As a consequence, religious students are expected to be rigorously modest in their attitudes and appearance and to act as role models for devout Muslim women. Respecting strictly the dress codes and other rules of sex-segregation is considered a sign of the religious discipline they have developed (Mahmood 2005).

The use of face veils among women who studied in Hadramaut after their return home also depends on the socio-political situation of their home-places. Before she left Ambon to study at the Dar al-Zahra in 2014, Lubna Mauladawilah confided to me that she was quite doubtful whether she would be able to cover her face once she would be back in Ambon, where, since the practice is often associated with Muslim terrorist groups. She feared that covering would actually hinder her religious missionary activities she planned to undertake upon her return to Ambon. She mentioned her mother as an example: "My mother wears a face veil, but that is different, because she lives in Java. I wish I could do that here. Let's see, I don't know". She reasoned that it

was due to the situation in Ambon compared to Java, in which the freedom to wear a face veil in Java was a much easier option.

Likewise, my informant Elma told me that she would rather stay at home than covering her face when going out as she was not prepared to be mistaken for belonging to militant groups such as the Laskar Jihad (see chapter 5 pages 173-175). The situation in the post-religious conflict area, where relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in general and between diverse Muslim groups in particular can be tense, has caused Mauladawilah and Elma to fear to be associated with Muslims who in the local general imagery are viewed as 'foreigners' (non-indigenous Ambonese) and terrorists, and who are hated for having played a major role in the escalation of the 1999-2002 conflicts.

On Java the situation is different; Muslims there constitute the majority of the population and the atmosphere there has been relatively open to diverse articulations of Islam after the reform era (Robinson 2009). In this regard, public representations of religious terrorism and militancy after the so-called global 'War on Terror' and the 1999 – 2002 communal conflicts in Ambon play a part in shaping different women's subject-positions and embodied practices of piety like veiling.

As I explained earlier in this chapter, it is mostly students of Sada descent who come to Hadramaut to study in a religious school. The practice of face veiling among the female religious seekers after their return home therefore also has connotations of distinction; it functions as a symbolic marker of status differences between learned and lay people. When I met Mauladawilah in Ambon after she had returned from her studies in Hadramaut in March 2015, she was totally covered with black robes and tried to be invisible to men's gazes. Before her departure to Tarim to study, she had told me that she felt uncomfortable in front of the alumni from Hadramaut because she was the only wife of a graduate student from Hadramaut who did not cover her face. As the wife of a religious preacher trained in one of the schools in Hadramaut and particularly after she herself had also studied there, she had more reasons to cover her face and thus distinguish herself from others of her social rank in order to be accepted within the circle of the religious elite. In this regard, the religious pedagogy in Hadramaut is not only a means of generating a capacity for the enactment of gender identity linking piety with body performance (Mahmood 2005), but it also contributes to acquiring cultural capital that may produce social inequality. Thus, articulated in what Bourdieu (1977) called 'bodily hexis' the practice of a face veil creates a boundary between the religious elite and non-religious elite.

As most of the religious seekers among the Indonesian female Hadramis are of Sada origin, women who are deeply conscious of their social distinctiveness, their mobility to travel to Hadramaut is not merely motivated by a search for religious knowledge but also by a wish to find a religious basis

for reconstructing their own class identities, thereby maintaining gender inequality in terms of marriage. Compared to the men within the Sada group who are freer to choose any suitable partner from any descent, Sada women are subject to strict regulations in terms of marriage partnership. As the core issue of Sada identity and the survival of Sada community is in the hands of women by controlling their behaviors and prevent their mingling with non-Sada men (Ho 2006, 181-184), seeking religious knowledge in Hadramaut provides them a religious basis for the maintenance of their ascribed social status based on descent. Sada Hadramis find religious legitimacy for the *kafa'a* principles that safeguards their superior social status in Shafi'ite jurisprudence taught in the schools in Hadramaut. Pursuing religious knowledge in Hadramaut becomes a way for female Sada Hadramis to reassert their imagined hierarchical identity in terms of marriage and gender inequality.

Adopting the practice of strict covering by some Indonesian traditionalist Hadramis as a result of their religious studies in Hadramaut, has also created a new boundary between them and other Indonesian traditionalist Muslims. Indonesian traditionalist Muslims have been identified with their ability to adjust to local traditions by recontextualizing regulations in religious scriptures on dressing and veiling. Indonesian Muslims with a traditionalist point of view see the practice of veiling as part of a contested religious discourse, and they emphasize that the practice should be put into socio-cultural contexts. As a consequence, they do not consider veiling an obligatory teaching of Islam. In contrast, non-traditionalist Muslims such as neo-Salafis and Islamists use their textual interpretation of Islam and the tradition of early Islam to justify the practice of veiling (Robinson 2009). Therefore, the transformation of Indonesian traditionalist Hadramis that I have described above into strict veiling blurs the distinction between them and Islamist and neo-Salafi groups in Indonesia in terms of religious performance and symbols.

The transformation mentioned above seems to refer to an ongoing discourse of the relationship between being Arab and being Muslim. As one of the authoritative religious centres for Indonesian traditionalist Hadramis, Hadramaut has become a model for the implementation of Islamic values and for the reconstruction of an imagined Islamic identity. This is particularly the case since it is located in Arabian Peninsula, where Islam originates. Many of my informants from traditionalist backgrounds, for example, argued that Islam and Arabness are two inseparable entities, and any kind of effort to separate Islam from its origin is a mistake. This is basically an argument shared with neo-Salafis and Islamists, who view any practice including gender segregation and veiling in the Arab countries as intrinsically Islamic, practices that should therefore be applied in other countries as well.

To sum up, the restored connections between Hadramaut and Indonesia and Ambon in particular have a specific effect on the construction of gender

identity. This gender identity construction in terms of religious piety reflects how the body has become a contested site in the production of a pious self among Hadrami women in the diaspora, as well as having become the subject of multiple (re) constructions, which create symbolic and non-symbolic performativity. Hadrami women's articulations of their gender identity are thus shaped not only by religion, class, education, occupation, and family upbringing, but also by their diasporic return journeys to the homeland. Religious education is a key to a major transformation for the Indonesian traditionalist Hadrami women in enacting their gender identity.

4. Return Visits to Hadramaut as Homecoming

The renewed connections between diaspora Hadramis in Ambon and Hadramis in Yemen over the last one-decade show that Hadramaut continues to be of big significance for many Hadrami descendants. Their back and forth movement is undoubtedly related to Hadramaut being their ancestral homeland where they have kinship ties. As Hadrami descendants in Ambon have a desire of return to Hadramaut and stay in contact with Hadramis in Indonesia and in other diasporic communities, questions remain on the symbolic meanings of this diasporic return and whether Sada and non-Sada Hadrami attach similar or different meanings to these returns. To analyze the Hadramis' journeys to their ancestral homeland, and in particular to understand how class distinctions play a role in their symbolic return practices and the meanings they attach to them, in what follows I will use Paul Basu's conceptualization of what he calles three 'root-metaphors' of roots-tourism: homecoming, quest, and pilgrimage (Basu 2004, 153-179)

The first root-metaphor of roots-tourism is the notion of 'homecoming'. The notion of homecoming in diasporic communities reflects the diversity of perspectives on 'home' which captures the physical, social and cognitive experience of returning to a distant place where one knows oneself best and where one's self-identity is best grounded (Basu 1995, 150-189). A 'thick' notion of homecoming is exemplified by the Jewish diaspora, which carries all the connotations of forced exile, oppression and genocide. The Scottish diaspora that Basu (1995) studied share some similarities with the Jewish diaspora in attaching symbolic meanings to a distant homeland: the 'desire of the dislocate self to relocate itself in time and place; a sense of 'metaphysical loss of home'; feelings of 'dislocation or alienation in physical, social, and psychological home-place'; and conceptions of the distant 'homeland as both imaginary and material lands'.

In the case of Hadrami diaspora, Ho (2006, 227-229) has pointed out that many *muwallads,* Hadrami descendants who were sent back to Hadramaut

from the diaspora in the 1990s experienced displacement instead of homecoming. In my study, I will show that there is a variety of experiences among the Hadramis from Ambon who made return journeys to Hadramaut, in which the notion of homecoming is still valid for some of them, especially for those who regard Hadramaut as an authoritative source of value and identity.

For traditionalist Hadramis, especially those from Sada families, going to Hadramaut is, to some extent, a kind of coming home. This homecoming is combined with their search for spirituality and blessing. This homecoming is enacted through their strong connection and devotion to their spiritual leaders. In this regard, their lived experiences in Hadramaut are restricted to the ideal place of the religious compound next to their spiritual leaders' houses or religious institutions, instead of having actual lived experiences with Hadrami culture. Hadrami descendants who feel 'this homecoming' are those who come to seek religious knowledge in Hadramaut. As I have argued above, pursuing religious education is one of the main purposes for traditionalist Hadramis to come to Hadramaut, especially those of Sada origin. I would argue, however, that seeking religious knowledge is more than acquiring knowledge in a formal sense for them; it is also a 'quest' of the indeterminate, the second root-metaphor that Basu (2004, 162) distinguishes. This indeterminacy is characterized by Basu as mysterious and incommunicable, and related to individual hunger for a deeper, more unified, coherent and enduring sense of self (Basu 2004, 162-164). This notion of quest can be recognized in the story of my informant Lubna Mauladawilah, who told me:

> I really wanted to come to Hadramaut. I really want to be close to pious people because they are close to God and the Prophet. I am very grateful now that I am here. People here devote their life to God and the Prophet. By being close to the pious people here, I hope I can feel the presence of the Prophet in their existence, and I have been longing to be able to meet him too. Staying here (the boarding school, Istiqomah) makes me feel in peace because I spend my entire time only performing worship. People here just think about the hereafter, and they do not have time for the world.

Rather than homecoming, Mauladawilah here expresses a wish for spiritual development. Hagiographical stories of saints often emphasize miracles of pious people in experiencing the presence of the Prophet and they mention that dreaming the presence of the Prophet is the only true dream. This 'true dreaming' is accordingly thought to guarantee a reward from heaven for the dreamer. In this sense, for my informant, a pious milieu may satisfy her hunger for the kind of prophetic figure that is embodied in pious saints.

Although the Hadrami migration to Indonesia was voluntary, unlike Jewish, Armenian, and Scottish diasporas, this does not mean that the connotation of 'nostalgia' in the notion of homecoming is absent for diasporic

Hadramis. Those who undertake short journeys to their forefathers' homeland often experience this as a 'homecoming' in the sense of what Basu characterizes as 'an existential journey to the source of the self' (Basu 2004, 161).

The feeling of homecoming, however, is not shared by all Hadrami descendants who come to Hadramaut for a short period of time, such as performing pilgrimage. Earlier in this chapter I have demonstrated how diasporic return visits of the Sada are also motivated to perform pilgrimage to shrines. Half of the Sada travelers to Hadramaut are pilgrims, whose main intentions are to conduct religious rituals near their ancestors' graves in order to ask blessings (*baraka*) from the saints. My informant Malika underlined the significance to her of her journey by saying: "It is not cheap to come here and I can spend my money for something else, but coming here is different because I want my life to be blessed". Her statement implies the belief in the effectiveness of religious consumption in the sense that she hopes that the financial cost of the journey will have a religious impact on her life. Malika further shared with me that she felt strange in Hadramaut in regard to many aspects of her everyday life. She felt grateful that she was born and raised up in Ambon where she enjoyed the freedom to achieve a high educational level, to have a career and to combine her career with her responsibilities as a wife and mother.

In a similar vein but for different reasons, some other Hadrami descendants, especially from non-Sada background told me that they would not want to live in Hadramaut in the long run; they did not feel familiar enough with the place. Haris, a thirty-year-old non-Sada man of the al-Khatiri family said that his father had arranged his trip to Hadramaut since his father wanted him to learn Arabic with his step-cousin in Bahere for one year. But after three months, Haris left Hadramaut and went back to Ambon. "How could I live there, I did not like the food, I felt very isolated and I could not do anything... everyday I felt just like being homeless, I missed my family in Indonesia", he explained.[162] Haris' statement reflects a feeling of displacement rather than a homecoming in the way he experienced the actual Hadrami life and culture in Hadramaut. The statement also shows that although Hadramaut is claimed to be part of the multiple roots or identities of the Hadramis, some Hadramis in Ambon do not feel at home or attached to the place. In this respect, the imaginary homeland can be disappointing when the actual encounter involves too much unfamiliarity, resonating the argument by Jan William Duyvendak that familiarity in the sense of, 'knowing the place or inhabiting it', is an important factor in one's feelings of attachment or being at home in a place (Duyvendak 2011, 38).

[162] Interview with Haris, March 27, 2015.

As I argued earlier in this chapter, for most non-Sada, visiting Hadramaut is motivated by the desire to visit their immediate family members with whom contact had been lost for several years or even generations. Their return visits reflect the limited scope of their maintaining links with Hadramaut. Their goal is to renew the contacts with core family members of their forefathers in a particular place within Hadramaut. In contrast, for Sada, return journeys are not motivated exclusively to visiting their core family members. Rather, they also aim at seeking religious knowledge and performing pilgrimage. Unlike the non-Sada, the Sada have succeeded in extending their sense of belonging to a larger imagined community, members of prophetic lineage, regardless of their different clans. This is reflected in the practice of pilgrimage to religious saints of any Sada origin instead of visiting graves of their own clans. Hadramaut for the Sada is therefore more than a place of origin where some of their relatives live. It is also a spiritual, sacred place which symbolizes their lineage and their legacy of sharing in Islamic sacredness through their descent of the Prophet Muhammad.

Generally speaking then, the distinction between the meaning of journeys to Hadramaut for traditionalist Hadramis and non-traditionalist (reformist and neo-reformist) ones lies in their conceptions of the sacredness of Hadramaut. Traditionalists regard Hadramaut as a sacred place and a source of self-renewal where they seek blessings, authenticity, tranquility, and spirituality. This view is mostly voiced by Sada descendants. From my interviews with informants belonging to this category it can be concluded that to them, Hadramaut is a place of thousands of saints who are their ancestors, who taught truth and who inherited religious knowledge from their first ancestor, the Prophet Muhammad, and who spread Islamic messages to the world. Visiting Hadramaut to them brings blessings, but vice versa, to be able to visit Hadramaut is regarded as being blessed, since not many people have an opportunity to go for this distant trip.

On the other hand, Hadramaut is regarded by other Hadramis as part of their multiple roots but without sacredness. This view is shared by many Hadrami descendants from non-Sada families. Within this category, the main reason to come to Hadramaut is to renew ties with immediate family members. Visiting shrines and religious scholars seems to be even out of the question for those who hold a Salafi ideology that bans the practice of pilgrimage to shrines and condemn it as a *bid'a*, religious innovation. In this regard, the practice and meanings of visits of different categories of Muslims from Ambon to Hadramaut largely overlap with their different Islamic orientations.

Apart from their original intentions to visit Hadramaut, hardly any Hadrami descendant who actually visits the region has only one objective. In fact, many descendants have multiple purposes of their journeys to Hadramaut. The pilgrims who visit religious shrines also try to obtain religious

knowledge from religious scholars or from their relatives who are supposed to be more learned because they study at religious schools in Hadramaut. For the religious seekers, performing a pilgrimage to shrines is part of their religious rituals as well. Since most pilgrims and religious seekers are of Sada origin, the journeys of the Sada descendants to Hadramaut are not only a sign of homecoming, but also at the same time a 'quest', seeking authenticity, religious knowledge, and 'pilgrimage'. Moreover, visiting Hadramaut for Hadrami descendants is also meant for relaxation or a break from their daily routines at home. My informant Malika said that she had longed to visit the land of her ancestors for a few years but she had had a difficult time trying to realize her plan, as she was always very busy with her work, family, and other activities in several organizations. Her trip to Hadramaut is also motivated by the wish to have a short break from her daily life. Furthermore, economic motives are interlocked with other motivations for a return journey as well. In some cases, both informants of Sada and non-Sada have benefitted from the opportunity to renew their connections with Hadramaut for commercial activities such as organizing pilgrimage tours and trades.

From several examples of return-journeys of the Hadramis mentioned in this section we can say that simultaneous connections with a country of destination and a country of origin and multiple belongings are possible. However, variations can be observed between those who exhibit 'transnational ways of being' but not necessarily 'transnational ways of belonging', or the other way around, those who exhibit 'transnational ways of belonging' but not necessarily 'transnational ways of being'. Or, again, those who actually combine transnational ways of being and belonging.[163] As already mentioned in the examples I presented, some Hadramis went to Hadramaut as a quest in search for their roots, whereas other made their journeys at the request of their parents. In other words, some went for their own will, while others went because their parents forced to do so. In this light, Hadramis' transnational ways of being are not necessarily a reflection of their attachment to the country of origin of their forefathers and thus they do not necessarily have a sense of transnational belonging. On the other hand, many Hadramis in Ambon who never travel to Hadramaut and who are not in touch with people in Yemen maintain contacts with Hadramis elsewhere in the diaspora and preserve the *kafa'a* marriage tradition as they consider it their forefathers' tradition. In this sense, their 'transnational ways of belonging' overlap with 'transnational ways of being' in relation to other people of Hadramaut origin but not to Hadramaut itself.

[163] See Levitt and Glick-Schiller's conception on simultaneity (Levitt and Glick-Schiller 2004; Glick-Schiller 2005).

5. Hadramaut as a Contested Imaginary Homeland

As was described in the previous section, Hadramaut is still a place to which many diasporic Hadramis make return journeys. Irrespective of their different opinions about Hadramaut with regard to its sacredness, many Hadrami descendants in Ambon share the view of Hadramaut as a point of reference to construct their diasporic identity. They continue to share a collective memory of sharing a common origin, heritage and religious tradition. The attribution to Hadramaut as a shared place of origin comes to the fore in the specific meaning for Hadramis of the term *'jama'a',* an Arabic word meaning a congregation, group or community. Hadrami descendants use the term exclusively to denote the community of those of Arab or specifically Hadrami origin. The visible identification of being a *jama'a* is the continued use and protection of Hadrami clan names, which lead to their perception of being a member of an imagined group or community. As Anderson (1991) argues, being an imagined group does not require members to have a face-to-face interaction. Moreover, sharing a common origin in a far away land in southern Arabia that can still be visited, Hadrami descendants in the Malay diaspora believe that their ties with Hadramaut as their ancestors' homeland are not just imagined, but rooted in a specific geographical terrain (Tilley 1994, 33). Hadrami descendants who have visited this homeland come back with narratives, objects and comportment picked up in Hadramaut, thus feeding the desire of others to follow suit and reconfirm their own ties with the idealized country of origin.

Also, despite their identification as part of the *jama'a*, most Hadrami descendants in Ambon are aware of their status as *muwallads* (descendants) which refers to Hadramis born in *mahjar,* diaspora. As *muwallads* they do not only identify with people in Hadramaut but being of Hadrami descent also connects them to other Hadramis in several localities in addition to those in the country of origin. Furthermore, as I have demonstrated in several chapters of this dissertation, they also identify with fellow Muslims in Indonesia in general, and against the background of the 1999-2002 communal conflicts even more closely with fellow Muslims in Ambon. In this respect, the Hadrami diaspora confirm the argument that Rima Berns-McGown makes about diaspora being no more than a space of imagination and a space of two vectors of connections; connections between the mythic or real homeland and the host-land, and connections to the wider (mainstream) society in the host-society (Berns-McGown 2007-2008, 8).

It should be pointed out, however, that the significance of Hadramaut as a locus of transnational sense of belonging is not the same for all Hadrami descendants. As I have described in chapter five, since the 1990s, especially

after the 1999-2002 conflicts, some Hadrami descendants, most of whom from Sada families, have converted to Twelver Shi'a. Their conversion from traditionalist Sunni to Twelver Shi'a has transformed their view on Hadramaut as their primary imaginary homeland. As Hadramaut and other southern parts of Yemen have been dominated by religious centers following the Shafi'i school of thought and other new reformist Sunni groups, Shi'ite followers have no interest in visiting Hadramaut for religious education. Rather, they are oriented towards other sacred places where they can make similar claims of being of prophetic descent. For Shi'ite Hadramis, Karbala in Iran, has become an important point of orientation since Husain, one of the grand-sons of the Prophet is buried there. Husain has become a symbol of the Shi'ite struggle and ideology of *ahl al-bayt*, the Prophet's family and therefore Karbala, where he was killed and buried, is of great significance to Shi'ite Muslims. By extension, as home of Sunni Muslims, Hadramaut is no longer their ideal place to return as. My informant Abdurahman Assagaf, the leader of the ABI branch, the Shi'ite association in Maluku, conducted a pilgrimage tour to Iran in March 2015. He went in a group of twenty Shi'ite followers from all over Indonesia. He spent a month in Iran and visited several shrines, mosques, and religious scholars. Telling me about his trip to Iran, he said that he longed to visit Iran again in the future. Other followers who have not visited Iran even told me that they have dreamed to live in Iran as they imagined that there they might practice their belief publicly. They wanted to feel the atmosphere of an ideal Shi'ite community, which they imagined to be characterized by peace, spirituality and truth. In this sense, for Shi'ite Hadrami, Iran plays a similar role as an imaginary homeland as Hadramaut for Sunni Hadrami, albeit more one-sidedly as a spiritual point of orientation. For the majority of Hadrami descendants, however, in addition to Ambon in particular and Indonesia or the Malay region in general, Hadramaut remains the primary imaginary homeland in their translocal sense of belonging.

6. Conclusion

This chapter discussed the diasporic return journeys of some Hadrami descendants in Ambon to Hadramaut. I have described how the renewed connections between Indonesia and Hadramaut since the mid-1990s have encouraged both male and female Hadramis in Ambon to visit their ancestor's homeland. Such visits to Hadramaut take several forms: family visits, taking courses at religious institutions, and performing pilgrimage. To some extent, the various purposes that different people may have for visiting the country of origin run along the lines of their ideological orientations, such as being traditionalist or Salafi, and their status as Sada or non-Sada.

The chapter also demonstrates that the social-political instability of Hadramaut and the country of Yemen in general since 2011 has not seriously hampered Hadramis to make diasporic journeys back to Hadramaut. According to some informants with whom I have stayed in contact with after my fieldwork, return journeys of Hadramis in Ambon to Hadramaut seem to continue. For instance, those who want to visit Hadramaut they should travel via Cairo (Egypt) to Say'un in Hadramaut instead of going via Sana'a Capital of Yemen. Thus, as one of the authoritative religious centres, Hadramaut continues to be of big significance for the identity formation among the traditionalist Hadramis in Indonesia and Ambon in particular. Yet, its position has been (re) shaped by the dynamics of social, cultural, economic and political changes on various levels (global, national, local) that have contributed to shifting power relationships between different categories of Hadramis and between Hadramis and other categories of Ambonese and Indonesian citizens. The renewed connections between Hadramaut and Indonesia have thus played a salient role in the revitalization of some Hadrami identity elements, which intersects in the construction of ethnicity, class, religion, and gender identifications. These diasporic return journeys have had a transformative impact on the revitalization of traditionalist Islam, on the maintenance of the Hadrami ethnic identity, and on the construction of gender identities.

Political changes that have made it possible for diasporic Hadramis to visit the country of their ancestors has opened up new travel opportunities. I have demonstrated in this chapter how the motivations people mention for wanting to visit Hadramaut resonate with the themes of 'homecoming' and 'quest' in Basu's 'roots paradigm'. As an imaginary homeland, Hadramaut thus plays a different role for various Hadrami descendants of Ambon. New transnational connections linking Hadramis in the diaspora to other communities, such as Shi'ite Muslims who identify with Iran, inform people's stories of their attachment to Hadramaut. In this regard, the divergent narratives about roots and routes among the Hadrami descendants in Indonesia and those in Ambon in particular, have been influenced by their varying religious affiliations and understandings. Therefore, diasporic identity of the Hadrami descendants in Ambon should not be understood as a given, but as historically dynamic relationship with the homeland, which allows both continuity and change, particularly in terms of religious and cultural dimensions (Vertovec 2001). Attachment to the homeland does not inform the diasporic identity of Hadrami descendants in Ambon in a homogenous way, but it is part of a multi-layered identity, which is discursively constructed, negotiated, modified, and contested, and simultaneously interlocked in various social fields, such as ethnicity, religion, class, gender, education, economic occupation, and others.

Chapter 7: Conclusions

1. Problem Analysis, Objectives, and Research Questions

This dissertation is the result of an ethnographic study of the Hadrami Arabs of Ambon in the present-day era. The aim of the research was to understand the interplay between ethnicity and religion on the construction of diasporic identity and on the social integration of the descendants of Hadrami Arab migrants in Ambon by way of a contextualized analysis of how they articulate their identity through everyday life practices. The overarching research question addressed in this dissertation is how ethnicity and religion intersect in individual and collective constructions of identity of present-day Ambonese Hadramis and how this intersection relates to their positions in Ambonese socio-economic, political and religious power constellations. I have formulated answers to this question in the various chapters that make up this thesis by addressing the following subquestions: How do Hadrami Arabs actively claim and maintain their ethnic identity in everyday practices? How do they present their multiple senses of belonging in individual and collective self-narratives and what (wishes for) concrete relations with the country of origin do they have? What kind of religious discourses and practices do they engage in and how do these discourses and practices relate to their various claims of belonging to certain groups? What kind of local religious, social, economic and political networks do they participate in and how do these networks extend over various ethnic and religious communities in and outside Ambon?

This is the first comprehensive study on the lives and identifications of Hadrami descendants in Ambon. For historical information about the ways they adapted to local society, I therefore had to rely on literature about diasporic Hadrami communities in the wider Malay Archipelago. Much of the existing historical literature on Hadramis suggests that because Hadrami migrants and their descendants maintained a distinct cultural ethnic identity, they never fully assimilated into the host societies. The literature also indicates, however, that their religious identification helped the Hadramis to integrate in their host-societies in certain respects, if in those societies there were communities with the same religious affiliation. The existing literature also points out that the Hadramis have played a significant role in social, political, economic, and religious social domains in the local societies where they settled, not in the least by drawing on their transnational connections with diasporic Hadramis elsewhere in the world, and with Hadramis in the country of origin (Freitag and Clarence-Smith 1997; Mobini-Kesheh 1999; Boxberger 2002; De Jong and Kaptein 2002; Freitag 2003; Manger 2010; Mandal 2018).

The existing body of anthropological literature on Hadrami diaspora similarly suggests that Hadramis in the diaspora play an important role in local religious spheres, while ethnicity features as a salient marker in the maintenance of a distinct cultural identity in the private domain (Clegg 2005; Fachrudin 2005; Shahab 2005; Ho 2006; Hafizhah 2007 Jacobsen 2009; Siregar 2009; Tridewiyanti 2009; Slama 2011[2014]; Sila 2012[2015]; Alatas 2008[2011][2014][2016a][2016b][2016c]). This distinct cultural identity, however, is not homogenous. An important internal axis of differentiation among the Hadramis, for instance, is the distinction between those claiming descent from the Prophet Muhammad, the Sada, and those who cannot make such claims, the non-Sada. The reproduction of a social hierarchy based on this distinction has been maintained through an asymmetrical marriage system justified by *kafa'a* rulings. The findings of recent studies also suggest that religion plays a major role in the renewed connections between the homeland Hadramaut and the diaspora (Knysh 2001; Slama 2005; Ho 2006; Jacobsen 2009; Alatas 2008[2016b]).

Based on the main findings of the previous studies mentioned above, in this study I take diaspora not only as a category of practice, but also a category of analysis to examine the Hadramis' identifications. While ethnicity, religion, class, and gender are mentioned by most scholars as contributing to the reproduction of diasporic Hadrami identity, in most studies these dimensions of identity are predominantly approached as separate social categories. For this study, I have rather used diaspora as an analytical lens in combination with the intersectionality perspective in order to understand how multiple intersecting social categories such as ethnicity, religion, class, and gender mutually shape each other in constructing a diasporic Hadrami identity and the positions that individual Hadramis occupy in a particular context.

2. The Main findings

2.1 Claims and Maintenance of an Ethnic Identity

In the historical overview presented in chapter 2, it came to the fore that Dutch colonial rule contributed significantly to shaping the construction of a distinct cultural identity of the Hadrami migrants and their descendants in Indonesia. During the colonial era, Dutch colonials positioned the Hadramis as a group of second-class citizens that was lower in position than the Europeans but higher than the indigenous population. In the Dutch East Indies Arabs were subjected to residential segregation and travel restrictions. In Maluku, residential segregation was applied only in the southeastern parts of Maluku, namely Banda and Dobo.

These colonial policies influenced the ways the Hadramis and their descendants interacted with other communities in the diaspora, as well as the ways they perceived and identified themselves as part of a specific ethnic group. In fact, considering oneself superior to local ethnic groups because of one's ethnic identification as Arabs or Arab *muwallads* (descendants) still characterizes the views of many Hadrami descendants today, as I demonstrated in chapter 3-6. Although the colonial policies contributed to a heigthened sense of Arabness, this sense of Arabness came in different modalities. In chapter 2, I described that the Hadrami migrants came from various different clans and brought with them their traditional social stratification, distinguishing different strata of Arabs based on descent: the Sada were the highest in terms of social status, and they were followed by the *mashaikh-qabail* and the *masakin*. As I have argued in chapter 3-6, despite the fact that the differentiation into clans of different social status still exists, the most important distinction that counts today among Hadrami descendants is between the two general categories of Sada and non-Sada. More particularly, I have demonstrated that contrary to the situation in the past, the Sada and non-Sada distinction today is based more on status differences rather than on class differences. Life in the Ambonese diaspora has enabled shifts in the power relationship between Sada and non-Sada, resulting in a partial breakdown of the traditional social stratification.

The dynamics of power relationships between Sada and non-Sada groups in the diaspora is related first and foremost to economic developments. Many Hadramis of non-Sada origin have engaged in successful economic enterprises in the diaspora. This economic success enhanced their socio-political, and religious positions, which, in turn led to the breakdown of traditional social stratification in the diaspora. I have described, for instance, how in Ambon, non-Sada people, such as the families az-Zagladi, Bahasoan, Basalamah, Ba'adillah, and others, were quite successful in their trading activities in Ambon, thus gaining much economic capital and allowing some entrepreneurs to obtain high political positions as Arab leaders or 'kapiteins' appointed by the Dutch colonial authorities.

Chapter 2 also addressed the specific genderedness of how the Hadrami identity in general and the Sada non-Sada distinction has been maintained. Since it was Hadrami men who migrated to Indonesia and Ambon in particular, they began to build Hadrami communities by marrying local women. I have demonstrated how this specific intersection of ethnicity, religion, class, and gender in the diasporic identity construction of the Hadramis can still be recognized in today's context and how this marriage pattern affects contemporary male and female Hadramis in Ambon differently.

The descendants of Hadrami Arab migrants in Ambon today are all born in Indonesia and have Indonesian citizenship. The Indonesian political system

does not recognize Indonesian citizenship in combination with a foreign ethnic label, such as being Hadrami or Yemeni or Arab. Rather, the official census categorizes the Indonesian population in terms of regional residencies and religious affiliations. In everyday life classifications on the ground, however, ethnic categorization does take place, although more often than not, in public discourse in Ambon the more specific categories of Hadrami or Yemeni are subsumed under the broader label of Arabness. In chapter 3, I have demonstrated in this respect that the descendants of Hadrami Arab migrants in Ambon today commonly self-identify and are identified by others as Arab *muwallads* or descendants, with reference to Hadramaut as the place of their forefathers' origin. In chapter 4, I have described how this Arab ethnic identification has been constructed through specific cultural traditions concerning marriage patterns and kinship reckoning. In this light, Hadrami Arab ethnic identity in Ambon largely pertains to socially constructed claims to similarity and difference that is in line with the conception of ethnicity as theorized by Eriksen (1992) and Jenkins (1995), who understand ethnicity as the product of social processes, specifically creating social boundaries rather than a cultural given, made and remade rather than taken for granted, chosen depending on circumstances rather than ascribed through birth. Both authors also argue that ethnic belonging is best conceived as an ongoing process of ethnic identification, which my analysis of the multiple identifications of the Hadramis of Ambon seems to confirm.

The analysis of marriage patterns and kinship reckoning among the Hadramis in chapter 4 highlights how cultural domains of power operate Hadramis in social relations. These cultural domains of power are directly related to conceptions about what establishes the ideal marriage in terms of providing a basis to create a stable group. These ideas stem from a traditional Hadrami kinship system and marriage traditions, as well as from certain religious understandings. Patrilineal descent reckoning combined with an asymmetrical marriage based on *kafa'a* doctrines according to which women may marry 'up' but never 'down', whereas for men marrying down is much less problematic as it does not affect patrilineal descent which is applied based on claims of social ranks and gender differences that are imbued with religious justification. A caste-like social hierarchy is thus embedded in marriage relations between Sada and non-Sada Hadramis and between Hadramis in general and the broader local society. I have argued that in this light, marriage is the main factor in defining both internal boundaries within a variety of forms of Hadrami identity, as well as defining external boundaries with a host-society. Chapter 4 brought to the fore specifically how shifting understandings of asymmetrical marriage based on *kafa'a* rulings differ between Sada and non-Sada Hadramis, in the sense that non-Sada descendants tend to be more flexible in the application of *kafa'a* principles than Sada ones. As a result, Sada

women are more affected by upholding the *kafa'a* tradition than non-Sada women. Social sanctions and a taboo on breaking the ideal marriage are stronger in Sada families than in non-Sada families. This patrilineal kinship reckoning combined with a religiously justified asymmetrical marriage (*kafa'a*), thus, has generated gender inequality in marriage, particularly in Sada families.

In principle Hadrami descendants adopt a patrilineal kinship system in order to maintain a particular Hadrami or Arab group identity. I have demonstrated, however, that in practice, they also recognize their maternal relations with local families, and in certain cirmcumstances present themselves as Ambonese of Arab origin. In some cases, they use their maternal relations in order to pursue particular interests. For example, those who have maternal relations with local royal families, cherish such relations and benefit from them for economic gain and in order to enhance their social status. In this regard, my data confirm for the Hadramis that genealogical reckoning is 'a symbolic cultural construct expressed through a kinship terminology constituted as an interconnected system of symbols, with person defined as kin to one another realized in many different modalities' (Read 2007, 331).

Whereas marriage and kinship relations operate very much as a societal arena where the Hadramis have maintained their distinct cultural identity as Arabs, other cultural features, such as dress, dietary, language, art festivals, appear to be very much adapted to local Ambonese culture as I described in chapter 3. The Hadramis also show high adaptability and heterogeneity in their engagement in domains of public life such as in education, the job market, and in politics. A special note must be made on the participation of Hadrami women in the public sphere, a situation which is quite different from that in Hadramaut or other diaspora places. These local differences underscore the main argument that I make in this dissertation that Hadrami identity must be understood as a product of an on-going process of positioning and being positioned and also how in maintaining a particular Hadrami identity, some cultural elements are preserved while other cultural features are abandoned or blend with non-Hadrami cultural practices. In some respects, the Hadramis in Ambon thus share more some cultural features with local Ambonese than with people in Hadramaut, while at the same time they are able to claim their specific Hadrami Arab ethnic identity. My data therefore confirms the suggestion made by Leif Manger (2010) that the cultural content of a category of Hadrami Arab identity (identification) may differ considerably from one diaspora place to another; the reproduction of a particular Hadrami group identity is informed by the reproduction of the multiple identities of individual Hadramis as they are embedded in different local cultural contexts (Manger 2010, 116). As came to the fore in several chapters in this dissertation, how

Hadrami identification intersects with other axes of differentiation in Ambonese society is particularly influenced by the 1999 – 2002 communal conflicts between Christians and Muslims, the effects of which are still tangible in everyday life.

2.2 Multiple Senses of Belonging and Orientation towards a Homeland

The Hadrami migrants in Ambon often express their multiple senses of belongings by making references to both foreign and local ethnic categories in presenting themselves as Ambonese Arabs. On other occasions, they may present themselves by highlighting only one of the two ethnic categories of being Arab or Ambonese. Alternatively, in yet different situations they may present themselves in terms of their religious identification as Muslims, or both in ethnic and religious categories as Ambonese Arab Muslims. Such contextualized general ethnic and/or religious identification is in many ways specified in a variety of social status, gender, and ideological orientations, namely as Sada or non-Sada, men or women, Sunni or Shi'a (traditionalist or Salafi, etc.). Moreover, all these categories that refer to what Steven Vertovec (1997) would call the 'multicultural competence' of Hadramis are sometimes combined together with references to citizenship status as Indonesians. In the various chapters of this thesis, I have demonstrated how this multicultural competence is played out and improvised upon by Hadrami individuals in different contexts and in relation to different webs of social relationships.

These various intersecting categories of ethnicity, religion, class, and gender also have different implications for how Hadrami descendants orient themselves toward Hadramaut as the homeland of their forefathers. The findings of chapter 6 suggest a variegated dynamics of diasporic-return journeys among present day Hadrami descendants. As a site of diasporic return, Hadramaut is internally contested. Some Hadrami descendants have an orientation toward their forefathers' homeland not only as the place of origin but also as the place to turn to for authoritative sources of religious value and spirituality. This can be seen particularly among Hadramis with traditionalist views, who visit Hadramaut to study at Islamic boarding schools and to perform local pilgrimage. In contrast, others only consider Hadramaut to be their place of origin and disregard it as a place of authoritative source of spirituality. Rather, to cultivate religious values and comportment the latter turn to places such as Saudi Arabia or Iran. Global Islamic movements, such as Salafism (and Wahabism) and Shi'ism, contribute to this reorientation.

As I demonstrated in chapter 6, for Hadrami women, who have only recently begun to participate in return-journeys, such trips take on partly different patterns and meanings than for men. The most important factor in the gendered experiences of return journeys is related to the fact that sex-

segregation and the related full body veiling for women in public spaces is much more strictly adhered to in Hadramaut than in Ambon. The practice of strict sex-segregation in Hadramaut both restricts women's movements while there, but by bringing them home to Ambon, local Hadrami dress and veiling practices also provide women with attributes to express their special status as Muslims with a specific affiliation and background.

My descriptive analysis of return journeys demonstrate that for some Hadrami descendants in Ambon, diaspora is not only a space of imagined relations but rather one of very concrete relations between diasporic communities and the homeland. The nature and relevance of these real or imagined relations depend very much on the context in which the Hadramis whom I studied find themselves in and the variety of experiences that they have on the basis of their participation in various contexts. Between the emergence of nation-states and the mid-1990s, the connections between Hadramaut and Indonesia were disrupted and weakened. Generations who were born and lived around this period could only remember and imagine their relations with the homeland, since it was very difficult to visit their forefathers' country of origin due to the specific socio-political circumstances both in Indonesia and Hadramaut.

During the time that their relations with their forefathers' homeland were weakened, they did build networks with other Hadramis in various dispersed places in the diaspora. This can be seen from in-marriages between Hadrami communities living in different parts of Ambon and other places around Indonesia. Through these marriage practices, the Hadramis in Ambon enacted their imagined relations and maintained their specific cultural identity as Hadramis. Since the unification of two Yemeni states and the changing socio-political contexts in both Yemen and Indonesia, more and more people travel to Yemen to build real connections with people in the homeland, and the same holds for Hadramis from Hadramaut who come to Indonesia. However, we should realize that the number of people who are in a position to travel to the homeland remains limited. Also, the renewed contacts between Hadramis in the diaspora and those in Hadramaut have suffered from the recent political unrest and civil wars between the Houthi rebels and the Yemeni government since 2011. Illustrating the strong pull of Hadramaut to present-day diasporic Hadramis, this political unrest has hardly reduced the motivation and efforts of some Hadramis in Indonesia to travel to Yemen, as I experienced when joining a group of Ambonese Hadramis to Hadramaut in 2015, when the tense political situation in Yemen was turning violent.

For some Hadrami descendants from the Indonesian Archipelago, then, diasporic-return journeys are not the kind of 'myth' that Hall (1990) and Gilroy (1997) argue as central features of diasporic dreams of return journeys on the basis of their research among African diasporas living in the West. Although

return to the homeland for diasporic Hadramis is not a myth, neither are return journeys intended to reclaim the land and resettle in the country of origin permanently. In this sense, for the Hadramis in Ambon, diaspora is not a 'social form' in the sense that Vertovec uses the term to designate the condition of, for instance, the Jewish diaspora (Vertovec 1997, 278-279). Rather, living diasporic lives for Ambonese Hadramis and those elsewhere in the Indonesian Archipelago means having the opportunity to build networks with Hadramis elsewhere in the diaspora and in the homeland and thus expand their local networks. This orientation to Hadramis elsewhere, however, should not be interpreted as an indication that building social ties with the host-society is not important for the Hadramis in Ambon.

The multiple cultural and social competence of Ambonese Hadramis touches upon the issue – often a highly politicized one – on whether maintenance of such a distinct cultural identity can co-exist with integration into the host-societies or whether multiple belongings both within and beyond the nation-state are possible. The findings of my study demonstrate that the Hadramis of Ambon are quite successful in maintaining simultaneous connections with Indonesia and Yemen. In this light, variations can be observed between those who display a 'transnational ways of being' but not necessarily 'transnational ways of belonging', or vice versa, those who display 'transnational ways of belonging' but not necessarily 'transnational ways of being'. Or, again, those who actually combine transnational ways of being and belonging (see Levitt and Glick-Schiller 2004).

As I described in chapter 6, although some of my informants have visited Hadramaut, their diasporic return journeys cannot be generalized as having a single meaning. For some, for instance, it concerned a quest in search for their roots, whereas others made their journeys because their parents forced them to do so. In other words, 'their transnational ways of being' are not necessarily a reflection of their own attachment to their forefathers' country of origin; they do not necessarily have a sense of transnational belonging. On the other hand, many Hadramis in Ambon who never travel to their forefathers' origin and who are not in touch with people in Yemen do keep contacts with Hadramis elsewhere in the diaspora and maintain the *kafa'a* marriage tradition because they cherish it as their forefathers' tradition. In this instance their 'transnational ways of belonging' overlap with 'transnational ways of being' in relation to other people with Hadramaut roots but not to Hadramaut itself.

Another dimension of a nuanced understanding of 'diaspora' that the findings of this thesis point to is that in order to grasp the nature and degree of attachment to the country of origin, a distinction must be made between the first generation of migrants and their descendants. The findings of my thesis illustrate that the nature and intensity of attachment to the country of origin depend very much on the place where one was born and raised. Consisting of a

variety of generations, from second to seventh generation, the descendants of Hadrami migrants in Ambon today are all born and raised in Ambon and on other Maluku Islands, or else in other regions in Indonesia. The conception of the country of origin of their migrant fathers for members of the second generation, although they are rare today, is very much informed by romanticized stories directly transmitted to them by the first generation who came directly from Hadramaut. For the third and later generations, however, the cultural memory of migration is much less closely linked to their own lives. Besides factors such as their place of birth and the context in which they grew up, their attachment to the host-societies is also informed by the fact that they have maternal relations with local ethnic groups. For these Hadrami descendants, Ambon represents the country of their mother's origin, their 'motherland' in other words. These maternal relations have played a significant role in building relations with the mainstream population in Indonesia in general and in Ambonese society in particular, thus creating different Hadrami identities. In line with what Carment and Sadjed (2017) argue, then, in this context, diaspora needs to be understood as consisting of 'cultures of cooperation' rather than being viewed of as representing an antagonistic relationship with the host-societies in order to accommodate various customs and norms in both homeland and host-lands.

Also, my findings demonstrate that living diasporic lives in the contemporary world where global communication and travel has become much easier than in the past, often entails balancing triangular relations between the homeland, host-land, and dispersed communities elsewhere in the diaspora in which different individuals play out their various intersecting identities in different contexts and relations (see Berns-McGown 2007-2008).

2.3 Islamic Discourses and Practices

Besides ethnicity, religion is another crucial dimension in the formation of a diasporic identity by the Hadrami descendants in Ambon. Religious heritage is played out both in individual and collective narratives among the present-day Hadramis in their everyday life practices. On an individual level, Hadrami descendants commonly present themselves as Muslims, thereby sharing their religious identity with the Muslim minority communities in Ambon as well as the majority of the Indonesian population and the global *umma*. Yet, they do not constitute a homogeneous group, but are heterogeneous in practice, beliefs, and in building and participating in organizational structures.

Chapter 5 has highlighted how religion is played out in the construction and maintenance of the Hadrami descendants' multiple identities, and how the religious field functions as a socio-cultural space to build social networks among the Hadramis themselves, as well as between the Hadramis and the

broader local society. In chapter 5, I discussed how the religious identity of the Hadramis in the diaspora has been affected by the dynamics of Islamic movements in global, national and local contexts. I have demonstrated how the encounter with the Muslim 'Other' or those with distinct Islamic practices has influenced the ways the Hadrami descendants articulate their religious identity.

Of particular interest in terms of the comparative study of Hadrami communities in the diaspora are the ways in which my findings shed light on how the local context has shaped the ways in which the Hadramis in Ambon articulate their religious identity as being part of a Muslim minority population which has known serious, violent clashes with the dominant Christian majority population of Ambon. The intricate ways in which the Hadramis both distinguish themselves from and identify with other Muslims in Ambon illustrate that in line with what Eickelman and Piscatori (1990, xv) argue, the encounter with the Muslim 'Other' is thus as important for the self-definition as Hadrami Muslims as the confrontation with the non-Muslim Christian 'Other'. As a result, both continuity and change in religious understandings marks the dynamics of and diversity in the Hadramis' Islamic identity.

Two specific developments in Ambon have affected how some Hadrami practices, beliefs and organizations have persisted while others were created, became contested or were transformed. The first one occurred in the late 19th and early 20th century, when modernist Islamic reformism challenged the traditional authority of the Sada group and affected the institutional building of a Hadrami community reflected in the 'Alawi-Irshadi distinction. The main Islamic debates during this period focused on the purification of religious practices, touching directly on the issue of equality between Sada and non-Sada and, by extension, on the issue of traditional Hadrami social hierachy. In the case of Ambon, reformists took a moderate stance and the wave of reformism that swept through the Malay Archipelago as much as through the Middle East did not affect the internal organization of the Hadrami community to the extent of breaking it up.

The second major religious transformation occurred during and after the communal conflicts between Muslims and Christians in Ambon between 1999 and 2002. Adherents of neo-Salafism, Shi'ism and neo-traditionalism have tried to exert their influence on Ambonese Muslims and on the Hadramis in particular. A variety of Islamic discourses to choose between has come to the fore, resulting in further differentiation of views among Hadramis on the correct understanding of performing religious practices and the political and religious legitimacy of the Prophet's successors. During this second religious transformation, new religious elites and new Islamic foundations emerged which contested the old established foundation, al-Hilal. Despite efforts of the newly emerging foundations to undermine the al-Hilal, it still serves as a

symbol of the Hadrami collectivity and continues to function as a platform where Hadrami identities are maintained. At the same time, al-Hilal functions as a socio-religious channel to build relations with non-Hadramis by contributing to local Islamic development in Ambon.

By mapping these developments, chapter 5 sheds light on the complexity of religious articulations among the Hadrami descendants today and how such articulations are shaped by local contexts. In some instances, traditionalists may differ in practice from those with Salafi affiliations, but traditionalists may also share more practices with Salafis than with Shi'ite followers or, the other way around, instances in which traditionalists share certain practices with Shi'ites but not with Salafis. Even among those with the same ideological orientation there are those with more moderate and those with more conservative views, reflecting or expressing internal discord on some issues.

Furthermore, in chapter 5 and 6 it came to the fore how in the face of external challenges, traditionalism has been revitalized through a renewed connection between the homeland and diaspora. Traditionalist beliefs and practices such as pilgrimage to local shrines in Hadramaut have been reinvigorated. Obedience to strict Shafi'ite jurisprudence has been reshaped, and other traditions and teachings from the homeland have been promoted. Also, this revitalization of a traditionalist stance has affected views on how other Islamic variants such as Shi'ism, Salafism, and Wahabbism are to be tolerated. For instance, in spite of sharing similar views on Salafism and Wahabbism, neo-traditionalists are harsher than other traditionalists in condemning Shi'ite beliefs and practices. What should be taken into account, however, is that this revitalization of traditionalism is not simply an issue of transplanting the kind of traditionalism that characterizes dominant views and practices in Hadramaut to the Muslim community of Ambon, but rather one of reshaping them, so that they acquire new meanings and functions in the new context. More precisely, the differences between Hadramaut and Ambon in terms of socio-cultural issues play a major role in how traditional views and practices are revitalized. For instance, whereas ritual practices in Hadramaut oblige gender segregation, in Ambon this gender segregation is modified and applied differently. By extension, although neo-traditionalism can be considered as an avant-garde of orthodox traditional Hadrami religious identity, in their performance of these ritual practices, neo-traditionalists refashion them by adapting them to Ambonese cultural traditions.

Another example of the complexity of religious articulations was provided by my presentation of the views and practices among followers of Salafism. Despite the popular dictum to return to the Qur'an and Hadith as the only authoritative original sources to 'purify' Islam, the ways in which Salafism is articulated are also shaped by the local context. Unlike traditionalist Muslims, Salafis in Ambon emphasize the distinction between religion and culture. For

instance, they reject practices such as *maulid* celebrations. Yet, a difference can be observed between those with modernist and those with fundamentalist orientations. Modernists may tolerate the practice, while Salafis with more fundamentalist inclinations tend to condemn the practice. Modernist Salafis may even participate in *maulid* festivities or organize them themselves, approaching the celebration as a cultural festival rather than a religious tradition. The distinction between modernists and fundamentalists in the case of *maulid* celebrations is related to contestations between old and new Salafi oriented Muslims, in which the former emphasize the importance of social integration and strive to be an integral part of local Muslim communities in Ambon, whereas the latter foreground doctrinal matters on purification and strive to implement rigorous religious tenets freed from any non-religious elements.

Furthermore, the findings of chapter 5 suggest that more non-Sada Hadramis tend to embrace or at least be inspired by Salafism than Sada, while those who convert to Shi' ite orientations are more often Sada Hadramis. Traditionalists are found mostly among Sada rather than non-Sada. However, these patterns of Sada and non-Sada differences in ideological orientations are not carved in stone. I came across several instances in which members of one family, be they either Sada or non-Sada, had different ideological affiliations, yet they saw little objections in living or socializing with each other despite their differences.

My analysis of religious developments among the Hadramis in Ambon thus illustrates that religion, like ethnicity, is not cultural given, but rather a living tradition that evolves in an on-going process of construction and reconstruction, reinventing and reinterpretating stories, symbols and practices. More specifically, my analysis demonstrates that among the Hadramis in Ambon, religion has become an arena for both internal and external boundary making between different Hadrami identities, and between Hadramis and other Muslims. Religion, thus, plays a dual role; by bridging different ethnic and national boundaries it enhances the social integration of Hadramis in Ambonese society, while at the same time it can lead to internal frictions and divisions due to different ideological orientations. In sum, the ways in which Hadramis articulate their religious views, practices and identities can only be understood against the background of local, national and global forces that have co-shaped the ways in which they make sense their lives.

2.4 Networks Extending beyond Ethnic and Religious Communities

While the findings of my research certainly point to dimensions in the lives of contemporary Hadramis in Ambonese society in which claims to ethnic and

religious specificities stand out, I have argued that such specificities intersect with commonalities shared with other citizens of Ambon and, more generally, citizens of Indonesia, so that no clear-cut boundaries can be drawn between specific Hadrami groups or between Hadramis as a group and other categories within the Indonesian or Ambonese society. In chapter 3, I have mapped the engagement of Hadrami descendants in societal domains such as the educational, economic, political and cultural fields. The picture that emerged indicates that their engagement in these various social fields in Ambon does not distinguish the Hadrami descendants from the rest of Ambonese society. In fact, through their engagement in these various public arenas, they have built social networks that extend over different ethno-religious communities within and outside Ambon.

The Hadrami descendants of Ambon engage in different economic activities, ranging from those in the public sector to private ones, participating in and building economic networks crosscutting ethnic, religious, and even national categories. This is not to say that being a Hadrami does not play a role at all; as I have demonstrated in chapter 3, relying on shared kinship ties continues to be an important asset in building economic networks among the Hadramis, especially for those engaged in trade.

In the political arena, some Hadrami descendants are active participants of local and national politics, ranging from operating in Islamic-based parties to being active in secular ones. I have sketched the political activities of Said Assagaf, a figure of the former governor of Maluku province, as an example of a Hadrami descendant who has been engaged in local politics and is affiliated to a non-religious based party, which allowed him to build networks crosscutting specific religious and ethnic groups. There are also many Hadramis who are engaged in Islamic-based parties which cross cut ideological orientations. For instance, the PKS, an Islamic-based party that has a pan-Islamic ideology, and whose platforms are largely shared by Islamist and reformist followers, has gained popularity among Ambonese Hadramis with traditionalist backgrounds. The Hadramis' various engagements in different Islamic-based parties, at times tapping into the sources that Hadrami background provide them with, on other occastions operating outside them, thus contribute to broadening their religio-political networking.

In the religious arena, the Hadramis likewise build networks through engaging in various organizations. Some of them actively engage in various religious organizations on local, national, and transnational levels. On a local level, they engage in organizations/foundations that have a limited scope, targeting only Muslims in Ambon or Maluku, such as al-Hilal, ar-Rahmah, Melati al-Khairat. On a national level, some of them also participate in regional branches of national religious organizations, such as NU, Muhammadiyah, al-Irshad, Rabita al-'Alawiyya, MMI, DDII, ABI, etc. On a transnational level, the

Hadramis build religious ties mostly through platforms that operate on a national level. Although to some extent the Hadramis' engagement in religious organizations is influenced by their particular ideological traditionalist, Salafi or Shi'ite orientation, operating along the lines of such affiliations can be overruled by drawing on individual networks, such as on the basis of professional and humanitarian matters. Therefore, the various political projects that Hadramis engage in can be based on various criteria, depending on which networks are most productive to draw on for a particular goal.

The Hadramis engagement in various religious, economic, social-political activities within local, national, and transnational levels show their multiple senses of belonging that span a myriad of networks that are not necessarily based on kinship ties. This demonstrates my main argument in this thesis that in the Ambonese context, as in many other cases, the active maintenance of diasporic identity is only partially undertaken through making exclusive claims on boundaries between one's 'own' group and the majority of the population in Ambon and Indonesia through one particular exclusive network, be it cultural, social, religion, or political. More importantly, the Hadramis are able to engage in various social webs of relationships that can accommodate different customs or norms, without fearing to lose their distinct cultural identity.

As described in chapter 3-6, Hadrami women participate in all domains of the public sphere in Ambon. Some Hadrami women occupy important positions in high profile institutions or organizations and have managed to build networks that extend over various ethnic and religious communities. This situation is very different compared to that of the position of most women in Hadramaut where active female participation in the public sphere is much more restricted. In this light, the role of female descendants of Hadrami migrants in the making of diasporic identity in particular local contexts should be taken into account. I have demonstrated in this thesis that women are not only passive receivers, but also active participants in strengthening, negotiating, and transforming Hadrami diasporic identities, both on individual and collective levels.

3. Reflections on the Scope of this Study and Suggestions for Future Research

In this study I have adopted an ethnographic approach to document and analyse the practices of different categories of Hadramis and different individual descendants of Hadrami migrants to Ambon in the process of diasporic living and identity construction. I have demonstrated that in different historical and socio-political contexts, the kind of Hadrami actors

who play a role in the foreground of various societal arenas are liable to change. Most notable is the recent entering of the stage of female actors who claim their own positions in the public domain. This demonstrates that in line with the argument of Leif Manger, Hadrami identities should be placed in the context of lived experience, and understood as historical, social, political, and religious phenomena which are played out differently in different social arenas (Manger 2010, 123-124). Besides, I have argued that the diverse and shifting, contextual alliances of Hadrami descendants shows that the dynamics of diasporic identity construction consists of an interplay between multiple interlocking identities such as ethnicity, religion, class/status, gender. Furthermore, the dynamics of diasporic identity formation and its active maintenance among the Hadramis in Ambon reflect an intricate web of power relations that shape both intra-and interpersonal relations among a variety of Hadrami identities, and between Hadramis and other communities in local society and those in the homeland. This intricate web of power relations is simultaneously shaped by the dynamics of local, national, and global contexts.

As in any ethnographic study, decisions had to be made as to what to include and what not. One of the limitations of the scope of my research is that the dimensions of power dynamics I focused on pertain predominantly to social relations on a micro-level and thus my study does not elaborately address how structures at meso and macro levels influence the construction of diasporic identity of Hadrami descendants today. For instance, I have only been able to touch upon the ways in which recent state regulations or policies in Yemen and Indonesia have repercussions on transnational ties between various Hadrami communities in Hadramaut and the diaspora. The renewed connections between Indonesia and Yemen since the mid-1990s, for instance, are influenced by state regulations concerning citizenship and visa. Indonesia does not recognize dual citizenship except for individuals under the age of eighteen according to Indonesian nationality law no.12/2006. In Yemen, dual citizenship is not recognized at all and a naturalization requires ten years of residency according to Yemeni citizenship law no.2, 1975. My case study reveals that due to the renewed connections between Yemen and Indonesia some Hadramis from Hadramaut married Indonesian women of either Hadrami or non-Hadrami origin. Children that were born out of these marriages have been affected by these states' citizenship policies as they should deal with different policies of both states they are connected to. My study, however, does not go in to this issue further than just identifying it.

Also, the focus in this study is on a broad range of Hadrami identities of 'ordinary' people rather than on those in leadership positions. I have therefore not zoomed in on the activities of specific political actors who use their diasporic position for certain political projects, such as strengthening relations between Hadramaut and diaspora, or on certain political actors who challenge

or fight state authorities that they consider illegitimate infidels. While Hadramis tend to live side by side peacefuly with non-Muslim authorities (Singapore case), others played a role in resistance against what they view as infidel authorities. Taking the findings of my study as a stepping stone, for future research it would be interesting to investigate the views of Hadramis in Ambon on Abu Bakar Ba'ashir, a religious preacher of non-Sada Hadrami origin from Java who is convicted for playing a role in spreading religious radicalism in Indonesia and involved in radicalizing perpretators of 2002 Bali bombing and bombings in other areas in post 9/11. It was beyond the scope and might have jeopardized my rapport and position in the field had I paid more than cursory attention to the political views and connections of my informants with religious political movements. It should be mentioned, however, that such connections, or at least similar inclinations exist in Ambon. In fact, much earlier than Abu Bakar Ba'ashir's involvement in the 2002 Bali bombing, there was a case involving an Ambon-born Hadrami Sada preacher, Husain al-Habshi or a well-known blind *habib* (a preacher of Sada origin) and founder of a Shi'ite organization, IMI (Ikhwan al-Muslimin Indonesia (Muslim Brotherhood of Indonesia), who was accused to be the mastermind of bombing Borobudur temple, the main icon of Buddhist temples in Indonesia in central Java in 1985. My study, however, cannot describe much on the role of Husain al-Habshi in his involvement in violence against people with different religious affiliations.

Furthermore, a recent trend that I identified but could not follow up on within the scope of my present research, is the use and impact of social media on Hadrami identity constructions and translocal senses of belonging. For instance, I have demonstrated in this study that Hadrami women in the Ambonese diaspora increasingly play a significant role in many societal arenas in Ambon while at the same time playing a major role in the maintenance of a Hadrami diasporic identity. Many women of younger generations appear to use the social media to find suitable partners based on *kafa'a* principles. Some also use the internet to find religious content that helps them to revitalize their diasporic sense of identity, while others seek out information that helps them challenge what they view as restrictive traditions. Future research might examine how (social) media contribute to shaping the diasporic identity construction among the Hadramis in Ambon and what its implications are on current power relations and social networks.

I hope and trust that I and other researchers who will be inspired to take up the themes identified above in future research will be able to benefit from the findings of the research I have conducted, the ethnographic nature of which has allowed me to map how present-day Hadrami descendants in the hitherto understudied region of Ambon claim and live their multiple belongings 'on the ground'. By taking this approach, this study contributes to

Hadrami studies by pointing out commonalities and specificities in the ways that Ambonese Hadramis in comparison to Hadrami diasporic communities elsewhere in Indonesia and the Malay Archipelago have constructed their diasporic identity and how they have maintained relations with fellow Hadramis and other categories of people in the country of settlement and beyond.

Another implication of this study is that it provides more insights in (post)migration issues within the Global South, which in most migration/diaspora studies have been neglected. In this study, diasporic identifications focus on positioning oneself as Asian (Indonesian)-Arab or Arab-Asian (Indonesian) rather than on identifications of hyphenated western individuals. Focusing on migration and diasporic communities within the Global South contributes to the field of diaspora studies by going beyond the focus in many studies on relations between the West and former colonies. Also, while studies that do focus on South-South migration tend to emphasize the impact of colonialism on migration flows, this study also takes into account the ways in which commercial and religious activities of south-south migrants have shaped the social and cultural formations and relations people find themselves in, thus highlighting the agency of these migrants. Therefore, this study attempts to contribute to migration and diaspora studies by combining insights from the study of (post)colonial migration and diasporic communities by adding a South-South migration perspective.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Abbreviations

ABI	:	Ahlul Bayt Indonesia (Indonesian Association of Ahl al-Bayt)
BPS	:	Badan Pusat Statistik (Central Bureau of Statistic)
DDII	:	Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Missionary Council)
Demokrat	:	Democratic Party
DI/NII	:	Darul Islam/Negara Islam Indonesia (House of Islam/Islamic State of Indonesia
FKAWJ	:	Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jama'ah (Forum for Followers of the Sunna and the Community of the Prophet)
Gerindra	:	Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia (Great Indonesia Movement Party)
Golkar	:	Golongan Karya (Party of the functional Groups)
Hanura	:	Hati Nurani Rakyat (People's Conscience Party)
IAIN	:	Institut Agama Islam Negeri (State Institute of Islamic Studies)
ICMI	:	Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Organization)
IDP	:	Internally Displaced Persons
IJABI	:	Ikatan Jama'ah Ahlul Bayt Indonesia (the all-Indonesia Assembly of Ahl al-Bayt Association)
IM	:	Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood)
IMI	:	Ikhwanul Muslimin Indonesia (Muslim Brotherhood in Indonesia)
KNIL	:	Koninklijke Nederlands-Indische Leger (the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army)
LAIM	:	Lembaga Antar Iman Maluku (Maluku Inter-Faith Institute)
MAHDI	:	Majlis Ahlul Bayt di Indonesia (Indonesian Ahl al-Bayt Council)
Masyumi	:	Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims)
MMI	:	Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Indonesian Council of Fighters)
MUI	:	Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Council of Religious Scholars). Established in 1975 during the New Order as a religious body to issue *fatwas* and to advise the Indonesian Muslim community on particular matters
Nasdem	:	Nasional Demokrat (National Democratic Party)
NU	:	Nahdlatul Ulama (Awakening of Ulama). The biggest traditionalist Muslim organization in Indonesia, established in 1926 aimed at defending Shafi'ite school of thought against reformist organizations
PAI	:	Persatuan Arab Indonesia, the Indonesia Arab Union (PAI

PAN	:	Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party)
PBB	:	Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent Star Party)
PBR	:	Partai Bintang Reformasi (Star Reform Party)
PDK	:	Partai Demokrasi Kebangsaan (Nationality Democratic Party)
PDS	:	Partai Damai Sejahtera (Prosperous Peaceful Party)
PDI	:	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party)
PDI-P	:	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle)
Perti	:	Perhimpunan Tarbiyah Islam (Islamic educators Association)
PGA	:	Pendidikan Guru Agama (School for Religious teaching)
PIM	:	Partai Indonesia Maluku (Indonesian Maluku Party)
PKB	:	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party)
PKI	:	Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party)
PKPB	:	Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa (Nation Functional Care Party)
PKS	:	Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party)
PNBKI	:	Partai Nasional Benteng Kerakyatan Indonesia (Indonesian National Fortress Citizenship Party)
PNI	:	Partai Nasionalis Indonesia (Indonesian National Party)
PNI	:	Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Party)
PNI-Marhaenisme	:	Partai Nasionalis Indonesia-Marhaenisme (Indonesian Nationalist Party-Marhaenism)
PPD	:	Partai Persatuan Daerah (United Region Party)
PPNUI	:	Partai Persatuan Nahdatul Ummah Indonesia (Indonesian United Awakening of Islamic Community Party)
PPP	:	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party)
PSII	:	Partai Serikat Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Union Party)
RMS	:	Republik Maluku Selatan, Republic of South Maluku founded on April 25, 1950
SI	:	Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union)
UI	:	Universitas Indonesia (University of Indonesia)
VOC	:	Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (the Dutch East India Company)
YAPI	:	Yayasan Pesantren Islam (Foundation of Islamic Pesantren)

Appendix 2: Glossary

Select glossary items are Arabic unless those indicated

'adl	:	justice
'Alawi	:	a term to denote descendants of the Prophet Muhammad who settled in the southern part of Yemen, Hadramaut
'amara	:	sub-tribe
asabiyya	:	spirit of kinship; social solidarity with an emphasis on
'ashura		group consciousness, unity and cohesiveness anniversary of the martyrdom of Husain, one of the Prophet Muhammad's grandsons, commemorated on the tenth day of Muharram, the first month of the Muslim calendar
'ulama	:	Muslim religious scholars
adat	:	customary law
ahl al-bayt	:	the people of the house; the Prophet Muhammad's household/family (the Prophet, 'Ali and Fatimah and their sons Hasan and Husain)
akhlaq	:	morality, ethics
akhwal	:	singular form of khal means affine
angkot (Ind.)	:	minibus
arisan (Ind.)	:	a meeting of money saving circles
asabiyya	:	spirit of kinship; social solidary based on
asida	:	cake made of flour mixed with palm sugar, coconut milk, and butter
asma al-husna	:	good names; a supplication/prayer that contains 99 names attributed to God
aura	:	private body parts
baraka	:	divine blessing
batn	:	clan
bid'a	:	religious addition/innovation
burger	:	citizen
burger-kampongs (D.)	:	state-founded villages
da'wa	:	Islamic preaching or missionary activity
dar al-aytam	:	orphanage foundations
daura	:	literally means turn, which is a type of workshop/course held for a period ranging from one week to one month, during which its participants gather and stay in one place and follow all the designed programmes
dhikr	:	remembrance of God
du'afa	:	weak; a group of people from the lowest rank in traditional Hadrami social stratification
dhuriyya	:	descendant

do'a	:	supplication or prayer
fakhd	:	kin
fasila	:	joint family
fatwa	:	religious opinions issued by an authorised Islamic scholar
fiqh	:	Islamic jurisprudence
fitna	:	disorder
fudul	:	gossiping
gandong	:	brothers or sisters
genderang	:	a large musical instrument like drum
habaib	:	plural form of *habib*
habib	:	beloved; a religious preacher or scholar of the Prophet's descent or a popular call for any male descendant of the Prophet
Hadith	:	account of the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad transmitted through a chain of narrators as one of the basic sources of Islamic law
hajj	:	major pilgrimage to Mecca in Islam.
halal	:	permissible
halqa	:	circle; a forum for the study of Islamic sciences, in which a teacher or preacher, gives lessons based on certain books and his participants sit around him to hear and scrutinize his lessons
haul	:	annual commemoration of deceased persons, usually saints or religious scholars
hikayat (Ind.)	:	Malay historical tale or account
ijaza	:	license, the authority granted by a religious scholar to a student to exercise
ijtihad	:	independent interpretation of Islamic doctrine or question based on a sufficient knowledge of the Qur'an and Sunna
imam	:	a leader; a religious leader in Sunni Islam and an honorific title for those the successors of the Prophet Muhammad in Shi'a Islam
imama	:	a turban
isbal	:	trousers right to their ankles
isha	:	Evening
jalabiyya	:	long flowing robes
jama'a	:	congregation, group or community
jaushan kabir	:	steel plate or mail; the name of a prayer that contains 1000 names and attributes of God and an essential part in Shi'ite rituals
jihad	:	war
jol	:	plateu
kafa'a	:	compatibility or equality between partners in marriage
kapitein (D.)	:	captain; a high-ranking government position in the colonial civil administration in Indonesia and other

		Malay regions which was given to different individuals of different ethnic groups (Arabs, Chinese, Indians, others)
khidma	:	assistance
kopiah	:	black headdress for men, and *kerudung* for women in Indonesia
kumail	:	a supplication presented by Ali b. Abu Talib to his follower Kumail b. Ziyad, which is usually recited every Thursday evening
kubur (Ind.)	:	graves
lihya	:	long beards
madhab	:	schools of law
madrasa	:	Islamic school
maghrib	:	dawn/sunset
mahdi	:	the expected final imam as a key concept in Shi'ism
mahram	:	men who are not allowed to be married (male guardians)
majelis ta'lim (Ind.)	:	a place to conduct religious study
marja' al-taqlid	:	literally reference for emulation; in Shi'ism the authoritative source who through his learning and probity is to be followed by the laity in all points of religious practice and law
mardijkers (D.)	:	freed slaves
masakin	:	a plural form of *miskin,* literally means poor people; a group of people from lower class in the traditional Hadrami social stratification
mashaikh	:	a plural form of *shaikh,* a learned Muslim in Islamic studies; a group of people in the second rank in traditional Hadrami social stratification
maulid	:	commemoration of exemplary role models or religious figures in Islamic community, such as saints or the Prophet
mestizo (D.)	:	those mixed of European fathers and Asian or local women
moorsche burgers (D.)	:	Muslim citizens
Muharram	:	the first month of the Islamic calendar
mujahid	:	an Islamic fighter
mujahidin	:	fighters
muktamar (Ind.)	:	congress, conference
munsib	:	a headman of the clan
musawa	:	equality of all Muslims
Muwallad	:	descendant; Hadramis born in the diaspora
nabi	:	a prophet
nahda	:	awakening
nasi kebuli (Ind.)	:	curry rice mixed with beef
negeri (Ind.)	:	village

niqab	:	a form of enveloping black veil
Nisfu Sha'ban	:	the fifteenth day of the month of Sha'ban (the eight month) of the Islamic calendar
nur thaqalayn	:	light of two weighty things; an exegesis of the *thaqalayn* hadith text, which is well-known as the reference of Shi'ism to claim a political religious legitimacy of the successors of the Prophet Muhammad
passen stelsel (D.)	:	pass system; regulation obliging individuals to obtain a travel pass when leaving their place of residence
pela (Ind.)	:	alliance
pela-gandong (Ind.)	:	a concept of inter-village alliance between Muslims and Christians in Maluku based on claiming to putative common descent
pengajian (Ind.)	:	religious preaching or forum
pesantren (Ind.)	:	Islamic boarding school(s)
qabail	:	a plural form of *qabila,* literally means a group of people related blood or marriage, such as clan, kin, or tribe; a group of peole in the second rank in traditional Hadrami social stratification
Qahtan	:	a group of people or tribe originate from the southern region of Arabian Peninsula, especially Yemen, and who is considered as pure Arabs
qabila	:	tribe
Qur'an	:	God's word revealed to the Prophet Muhammad and absolute authority for Islam
Rabi' al-Awwal	:	the third month of the Islamic calendar
Rajab	:	the seventh month of the Islamic calendar
ratib	:	formulae of *dhikr* and prayers formulated by a Sufi teacher
rebana	:	a traditional kind of tambourine
rubat	:	religious school(s)
Sada, *sayyid*	:	the Prophet's offspring through Fatimah and Ali through their sons Hasan and Husain
sago (Ind.)	:	extracted starch from palm tree
Salafism	:	a strict and puritanical Sunni movement seeking to return to the example of the earliest generations of Muslims
sarung (Ind.)	:	a large fabric wrapped around the waist
seruling (Ind.)	:	wooden flute
sha'b	:	people
shafa'a	:	forgiveness
shalawat	:	an Arabic phrase containing the salutation to the Prophet, usually recited during Muslims' daily prayers and when the name of the Prophet is mentioned
Shari'a	:	Islamic law
sharifa	:	an honorific title for women of the Prophet's

		descendants
Shi'ism	:	adherence to Shi'ite Islam
simt al-durar	:	string of pearls; a text containing on poetries and compliments on the Prophet's life or a well-known as a al-Habshi *maulid* text which was composed by Ali b. Muhammad al-Habshi (1839-1913) from Tarim, Hadramaut
Sunna	:	established customs and normative precedents based on the example of the life of the Prophet Muhammad
Sunnism	:	adherence to Sunni Islam; the name comes from the word 'Sunna'
ta'lim	:	and it is the largest Islamic denomination in the world religious study
tahlil/tahlilan (Ind.)	:	a form of *dhikr* by uttering 'la ilaha illa-llah' or there is no deity but God. In Indonesian the *tahlil* ritual is common among traditionalist Muslims
tambur	:	tambourine (small drum)
taqiyya	:	concealment
taqlid	:	following the traditional interpretations of the '*ulama*
tarbiya	:	education
Tariqa 'Alawiyya	:	a Sufi order founded by descendants of the Prophet Muhammad ('Alawi/Sada) who settled in the southern part of Yemen, Hadramaut
tasawwuf	:	mystical Islam
tasfiya	:	purification
tauhid	:	oneness of God
tawassul	:	supplications to God by the uttering of names of persons having a high position at his side
thobe	:	a loose ankle-length attire with long sleeves
traditionalism	:	an Islamic movement which maintains tradition
umma	:	the community of Muslim believers
umra	:	minor pilgrimage to Mecca in Islam
ustadh	:	Muslim religious teacher
vreemde oosterlingen (D.)	:	foreign orientals; legal category for non-indigenous Asians living in the Ducth East Indies
Wahhabism	:	an Islamic reform movement founded by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab in the eighteenth century, aimed at purifying Islamic tenets or to restore pure monotheism, it is often to be associated with Salafism
waqf	:	an Islamic endowment by donating properties (buildings, lands, assets) for a charitable or religious purpose
wijken stelsel (D.)	:	quarter system; regulation obliging ethnic groups to live in specific quarters in a city
wilayat al-faqih	:	literally means guardianship of the jurist. The Shi'ite concept that government belongs by right to those who are learned in Islamic jurisprudence
wulayti	:	Hadramis born in Hadramaut

ziarah kubur (Ind.)	:	visitation to graves
zina	:	adultery
ziyara	:	visit; visitation to graves of saints or prominent religious scholars

Appendix 3: List of Informants

All listed informants are pseudonyms except those who hold leading positions in social, political, and religious organizations

1. Abdurahman Assagaf: 35 year-old Sada from Ambon, head of the ABI of Maluku
2. Ahmad: 59 year-old non-Sada from Ambon
3. Aisha Bin Shaikh Abu Bakr: 39 year-old, Sada Hadrami from Tarim, principal of the Dar al-Zahra of Tarim
4. Ajib: 67 year-old non-Sada from Ambon
5. Alif: 57 year-old Sada from Ambon
6. Aliya: 47 year- old non-Sada from Ambon
7. Alvina: 43 year-old Sada from Ambon
8. Alwi al-Hadar: 69 year-old Sada from Ternate, one of the founders of the al-Khairat of Ambon
9. Amar: 68 year-old non-Sada from Fak-Fak Papua
10. Anisa: 67 year-old non-Sada from Ambon
11. Asma: 80 year-old Sada from Ambon
12. Asri: 65 year-old non-Sada from Ambon
13. Dara: 23 year-old Sada from Ambon
14. Dila: 53 year-old non-Sada from Ambon
15. Elma: 38 year-old Sada from Ambon
16. Fahira: 53 year-old non-Sada from Ambon
17. Fahri al-Kathiri: 43 year-old non-Sada from Ambon, legislative member from the PKS party
18. Faiza: 50 year-old Sada from Ambon
19. Farhat: 35 year-old Sada from Ambon
20. Fariha: 65 year-old non-Sada from Ambon
21. Fathur: 33 year-old Sada from Ambon
22. Fatma: 44 year-old non-Sada from Ambon
23. Feryal Bin Syech Abubakar: 50 year-old Sada from Ambon, former secretary of an association of Sada families
24. Fira: 68 year-old non-Sada from Ambon
25. Gaia: 68 year-old non-Sada from Ambon
26. Hababa Nur: 58 year-old Sada from Tarim, former principal of the Dar al-Zahra in Tarim Hadramaut
27. Hadi Basalamah: 69 year-old non-Sada from Ambon, head of the al-Hilal and of the al-Irshad in Maluku, former lecturer at the IAIN
28. Haikal: 46 year-old Sada from Ambon
29. Hakim: 39 year-old Sada from Ambon
30. Hanna: 64 year-old Sada from Ambon
31. Haris: 30 year-old non-Sada from Ambon
32. Hasan al-Kathiri: 75 year-old non-Sada from Ambon, former secretary of the al-Hilal and owner of Bameru shop in Batumerah market

33. Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar: 43 year-old Sada from Ambon, head of the Rabita al-'Alawiyya in Maluku and owner of Salim shop
34. Hasna: 56 year-old non-Sada from Banda
35. Hasnan: 67 year-old non-Hadrami from Ambon
36. Hasyim: 43 year-old Sada from Ambon
37. Hilya: 30 year-old Sada from Java
38. Hisham: 67 year-old non-Sada from Ambon
39. Husna: 50 year-old Sada from Ambon
40. Inaya: 55 year-old Sada from Ambon
41. Iza: 65 year-old non-Sada from Ambon
42. Jailani: 37 year-old Sada from Ambon
43. Jamaludin Bugis: 45 year-old non-Hadrami from Ambon, head of the Nurul Tsaqalain
44. Jasmin: 48 year-old non-Sada from Ambon
45. Liana: 37 year-old non-Hadrami from East Java
46. Lubna Mauladawilah: 33 year-old Sada, religious preacher and owner of the ar-Rahmah shop
47. Malika: 54 year-old Sada from Ambon
48. Muawana: 55 year-old Sada from Jakarta
49. Muhammad Rifki al-Hamid: 33 year-old Sada from Ambon, religious preacher and head of the ar-Rahmah foundation
50. Muniba: 44 year-old African descent, vice principal of the Dar al-Zahra in Tarim Hadramaut
51. Munir: 50 year-old non-Hadrami from Ambon
52. Nadia: 37 year-old Sada from Ambon
53. Najwa: 22 year-old Sada from East Java
54. Nariya: 35 year-old non-Hadrami from Ambon
55. Nashuha: 33 year-old Sada from East Java
56. Naufal al-Kathiri: 43 year-old non-Sada from Tual, head of the PPP party in Tual-Kei
57. Naura: 38 year-old non-Hadrami from Jakarta
58. Niswa: 45 year-old non-Sada from Ambon
59. Rafa: 33 year-old Sada from Ambon
60. Rahma: 54 year-old Sada from Ambon
61. Rifai: 38 year-old non-Hadrami from Ambon
62. Rina: 70 year-old non-Sada from Ambon
63. Rugaya Alatas: 75 year-old Sada, head of the Melati al-Khairat foundation
64. Sadiq: 23 year-old non-Hadrami from Ambon
65. Safira: 23 year-old Sada from East Java
66. Sahid: 49 year-old Sada from Ambon
67. Said Assagaf: 65 year-old Sada, former Governor of Maluku (2013-2018)
68. Said Muzakir Assagaf: 43 year-old Sada from Ambon, parliament member from the PKS party
69. Said Muzakir Assagaf: 43 year-old Sada, parliament member from the PKS party
70. Saiful Ali al-Maskati: 50 year-old non-Sada, head of the al-Irshad of Ambon town district
71. Saima: 56 year-old non-Sada from Banda

72. Sakina: 72 year-old Sada from Namlea-Buru
73. Sasa: 31 year-old Sada from Ambon
74. Shaikha: 35 year-old Sada from Seram
75. Shauqi: 45 year-old Sada from Seram
76. Sofia: 70 year-old non-Sada from Tual-Kei
77. Sulaiman: 29 year-old Indonesian non-Hadrami from East Java
78. Sunan: 32 year-old Sada from Jakarta
79. Tata: 65 year-old non-Sada from Jakarta
80. Umar Attamimy: 69 year-old non-Sada from Ambon, former director of the al-Hilal and chief of Jembatan Jasa foundation
81. Yayah: 68 year-old non-Sada from Ambon
82. Zainab: 63 year-old Sada from Ambon
83. Zidna: 34 year-old Sada from Ambon

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Appendix 6: A Survey on Political Behaviours

Survey on the parliamentary elections (2004, 2009, 2014) and governor elections in Maluku (2008 and 2013) among forty-six Hadrami descendants in Ambon

Respondents' sheet form:

Name	Family/ Clan	Marriage Status	Education	Job	Address

Interview questions:

1. Did you vote in the 1999 election? If yes, which party did you vote for in 1999? Why did you vote this party and did you have any criteria to vote to such a political party?
2. How about the elections in 2004 and 2009, did you vote? If yes, which party did you vote for, and why did you vote the party and did you have any criteria to vote to such a political party? Did you vote the same party in 3 elections (1999, 2004, 2009)? If yes/no, why?
3. Are you involved in any political party? if yes, what position do you have, since when have you been involved, and why are/have you been involved in this party?
4. In the upcoming election (2014) which party will you vote, and why?
5. Did you vote in the governor election in 2008? If yes, which candidate did you vote for, and why?
6. Which candidates will you vote for in the upcoming election (2013 and why and do you have any criteria for voting for these candidates?

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Figure 7.3: Welcoming a Sada preacher from Jakarta in a meeting of the Rabita al-'Alawiyya in a house of a Sada family in Kebun Cengkeh Ambon (photographed by the author)



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

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

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Appendix 8: Summary of the Dissertation

1. Problem Analysis, Objectives, and Research Questions

This dissertation is the first comprehensive study on the lives and identifications of Hadrami descendants in Ambon. It is the result of an ethnographic study of present-day descendants of the Hadrami Arab migrants in Ambon. It aims at understanding the interplay between ethnicity and religion on the construction of diasporic identity and on the social integration of the descendants of Hadrami Arab migrants in Ambon. The overarching research question addressed in this dissertation is how ethnicity and religion intersect in individual and collective constructions of identity of present-day Ambonese Hadramis and how this intersection relates to their positions in Ambonese socio-economic, political and religious power constellations. To answer this question, the following subquestions were formulated: How do Hadrami Arabs actively claim and maintain their ethnic identity in everyday practices? How do they present their multiple senses of belonging in individual and collective self-narratives and what (wishes for) concrete relations with the country of origin do they have? What kind of religious discourses and practices do they engage in and how do these discourses and practices relate to their various claims of belonging to certain groups? What kind of local religious, social, economic and political networks do they participate in and how do these networks extend over various ethnic and religious communities in and outside Ambon?

The history of the Hadrami Arabs who migrated to the Malay Archipelago in the late eighteenth up to the early twentieth century is often regarded as a success story in terms of transnational economic, political, and religious engagement. The main factors contributing to this success are related to the maintenance of a distinct cultural identity that touches upon ethnic and religious collectivity. To investigate the situation of present-day descendants of the Hadrami migrants it is crucial to build upon this historical context to understand changes as well as continuities in their ethno-religious identity making and their social relations to a larger society.

To a considerable extent, the relevance of this study lies in the context of Ambon itself that has hardly received any attention so far, especially after the recent communal conflicts between Muslims and Christians (1999-2002). It is important to fill this lacune to investigate how local social structures have shaped the diasporic identity construction of descendants of the Hadrami migrants there.

Another innovative dimension of this study is concerned with gender identity construction. The Hadrami diasporic life and identity have been gendered in specific ways. In order to understand this diasporic trajectory, the female perspective needs to be taken into account. This study therefore aims specifically

to contribute to the production of knowledge and insights into the views and practices of Hadrami women in Ambon as well.

There is a wide ranch of research on Hadrami diaspora, ranging from historical to anthropological studies. The literature cover a broad range of subjects such as Hadrami migration, roles in economy and politics, Islamic role, kinship networks, social integration, renewed links to the homeland and gender (Van den Berg 1886; Freitag and Clarence-Smith 1997; Mobini-Kesheh 1999; Boxberger 2002; De Jong and Kaptein 2002; Freitag 2003; Feener 2004; Clegg 2005; Hafizhah 2005; Fachrudin 2005; Sahab 2005; Slama 2005; Ho 2006; Jacobsen 2009; Siregar 2009; Tridewiyanti 2009; Manger 2010; Sila 2015; Alatas 2008[2016c]; Alatas 2010; Somad 2010; Mandal 2018). An analysis of diasporic identity construction among the Hadramis in the diaspora, thus, has been of much interest

In line with the wide range of the literature, my study discusses the Hadrami diaspora in Ambon from both historical and anthropological perspectives. This study takes diaspora not only as a category of practice, but also a category of analysis to examine the Hadramis' identifications. For this study, diaspora is used as an analytical lens in combination with the intersectionality perspective in order to understand how multiple intersecting social categories such as ethnicity, religion, class, and gender mutually shape the construction of a diasporic Hadrami identity and the positions that individual Hadramis occupy in a particular context.

Building on the wide ranch of research on the Hadrami diaspora, the study thus aims at making a contribution to filling the gap of knowledge on the diaspora of the Hadrami Arabs in the diaspora especially Eastern Indonesia. On a more meta-level, this study relates to the intersectionality of ethnicity, religion, class and gender in the construction of diasporic identity. In order to avoid essentialism and to emphasize ongoing processes of identification, this study adopts a constructivist approach.

This PhD. dissertation is first and foremost based on ethnographic research. Data for this ethnography were mainly gathered through fieldwork consisting of interviews and participant observation. Besides, the data are documented through notes, photos, and audio-visual recording. The fieldwork in Ambon was conducted for nine months, from September 2014 to May 2015.

The fieldwork was mainly based in Ambon. Also, it was carried out in several places (multi-sited fieldwork), such as Seram, Buru, Banda, Kei, and Ternate, as well as Papua (particularly Fak-Fak) and Java, particularly Jakarta, and last but not least Hadramaut, where I joined a group of pilgrims on their pilgrimage to local shrines for two weeks from February 5-21, 2015.

Interviews were carried out in both formal and non-formal settings. In formal interviews, in-depth semi-structured interview formats were used. The interviewees consisted of several key-informants and many other 'ordinary' informants, aged between twenty and eighty belonging (or making claims to belong) to one of the forty Hadrami clans, from second to seventh generation of the

Hadrami migrants. Participant observation was conducted through attending religious gatherings and cultural festivities organized by different Islamic groups, and also through engaging in daily activities.

This dissertation consists of seven chapters. The first chapter presents a problem analysis of the research, my research objectives, questions, methods, a literature review and a theoretical framework, and present the structure of the study. The second chapter describes both history and collective memory of the Hadrami Arabs in Maluku. Chapter three provides a general overview of the present-day Hadrami descendants in Ambon. Chapter four focuses on kinship, marriage, and gender. Chapter five sketches the religious developments within the Hadrami community in Ambon. Chapter six discusses the orientation of the Hadramis toward their ancestral homeland through diasporic-return journeys as well as their impacts on Hadramis' articulations in cultural and religious life. The final chapter presents the findings of the research and suggestions for potential follow-up research.

2. Claims and Maintenance of an Ethnic Identity

Chapter 2 shows that the Dutch colonial policies on racial residential segregation and mobility restrictions contributed significantly to shaping a construction of a distinct cultural identity of the Hadrami migrants and their descendants in Indonesia as part of a specific Arab ethnic group. The sense of Arabness can be observed until today as demonstrated in chapter 3-6. This sense of Arabness is, however, heterogenous in terms of clan and strata claim (Sada and non-Sada). The local context of Ambon has thus enabled shifts in the power relationship between Sada and non-Sada, resulting in a partial breakdown of the traditional social stratification. Chapter 2 also discussed the specific genderedness of how the reproduction of Hadrami identity in general and the Sada non-Sada distinction has been maintained. As it was Hadrami men who migrated to Indonesia and Ambon in particular, they began to build Hadrami communities by marrying local women. This specific intersection of ethnicity, religion, class, and gender in the diasporic identity construction of Hadramis can still be recognized in today's context and how this marriage pattern affects contemporary male and female Hadramis in Ambon differently as exemplified in chapter 4.

Chapter 4 highlights how cultural domains of power operate in Hadramis' social relations. These cultural domains of power are directly related to conceptions on the ideal marriage that provides a basis to create a stable group. A caste-like social hierarchy combined with patrilineal descent reckoning is thus embedded in marriage relations between Sada and non-Sada, and between Hadramis in general and the broader local society, and specifically also between men and women. In this light, marriage is the main factor in defining both internal boundaries within a variety of forms of Hadrami identity, as well as defining

external boundaries with a host-society. Shifting understandings of *kafa'a* between Sada and non-Sada. The result is that non-Sada descendants tend to be more flexible in the application of *kafa'a* principles than Sada ones, and social sanctions and a taboo on breaking the ideal marriage are stronger in the Sada families than in non-Sada families.

As described in chapter 4 marriage and kinship relations operate very much as a societal arena where the Hadramis have maintained their distinct cultural identity as Arabs, while other cultural features, such as dress, dietary, language, art festivals, appear to be very much adapted to local Ambonese culture as described in chapter 3. The Hadramis thus show high adaptability and heterogeneity in their engagement in many domains of public life. Women also engage in the public sphere, a situation which is quite different from that in Hadramaut or other diaspora places. This study thus argues that the reproduction of the multiple identities of individual Hadramis are embedded in different local cultural contexts.

3. Multiple Senses of Belonging and Orientation towards a Homeland

The Hadrami migrants in Ambon often express their multiple senses of belongings by making references to various categories: as Ambonese Arabs, as Arabs only or Ambonese only, or as Ambonese Arab Muslims. Also, these references are in many ways specified in a variety of social status, gender, and ideological orientations, namely as Sada or non-Sada, men or women, Sunni or Shi'ite, traditionalist or Salafi, and others. The 'multicultural competence' of Hadramis is sometimes combined with references to citizenship status as Indonesians. Several chapters of this thesis have demonstrated how this multicultural competence is played out and improvised upon by Hadrami individuals in different contexts and in relation to different webs of social relationships.

These various intersecting categories of ethnicity, religion, class, and gender also have different implications for how Hadrami descendants orient themselves toward Hadramaut. The findings of chapter 6 suggest a variegated dynamics of diasporic-return journeys among present day Hadrami descendants and how Hadramaut as a diasporic return destination is internally contested. Some Hadrami descendants have an orientation toward their forefathers' homeland not only as the place of origin but also as the place to turn to for authoritative sources of religious value and spirituality. In contrast, others only consider Hadramaut to be their place of origin and disregard it as a place of authoritative source of spirituality. Different ideological orientations, such as traditionalism, Salafism (and Wahhabism) and Shi'ism, contribute to this different orientation. Findings of chapter 6 also demonstrated the gendered experiences of return journeys in terms of different sex-segregation and the related full body veiling for women in public spaces between Ambon and Hadramaut.

The findings of the chapter also suggest that diaspora is not only a space of imagined relations but rather one of very concrete relations between diasporic communities and the homeland. For some Hadrami descendants from Ambon and elsewhere in Indonesia, then, diasporic-return journeys are not the kind of 'myth' that Hall (1990) and Gilroy (1997) argue on the basis of their research among African diasporas living in the West, nor are a 'social form' in the sense that Vertovec uses the term to designate the condition of, for instance, the Jewish diaspora (Vertovec 1997, 278-279). Rather, living diasporic lives for Ambonese Hadramis and those elsewhere in the Indonesian Archipelago, means having the opportunity to build social ties with Hadramis elsewhere in the diaspora and in the homeland and beyond, and between the Hadramis and the host-societies.

4. Islamic Discourses and Practices

As one of the crucial dimensions in the formation of a diasporic identity, religion is played out both in individual and collective narratives among the present-day Hadramis in their everyday life practices. On an individual level, Hadrami descendants commonly present themselves as Muslims, thereby sharing their religious identity with other Muslim minority communities in Ambon as well as the majority of the Indonesian population and the global *umma*. Yet, they do not constitute a homogeneous group, but are heterogeneous in practice, beliefs, and in building and participating in organizational structures. As described in chapter 5, religion is played out in the construction and maintenance of the Hadrami descendants' multiple identities, and how the religious field functions as a socio-cultural space to build social networks among the Hadramis themselves, as well as between the Hadramis and the broader local society. The findings of chapter 5 suggest that the religious identity of the Hadramis in the diaspora has been affected by the dynamics of Islamic movements in global, national and local contexts.

Two specific developments in Ambon have affected how some Hadrami practices, beliefs and organizations have persisted while others were created, became contested or were transformed. The first one occurred in the late 19th and early 20th century, when Islamic reformism challenged the traditional authority of the Sada group and affected the institutional building of a Hadrami community reflected in the 'Alawi-Irshadi distinction. The second major religious transformation occurred during and after the communal conflicts between Muslims and Christians in Ambon in 1999-2002. A variety of Islamic movements (neo-Salafism, Shi'ism and neo-traditionalism) has tried to exert their influence on Ambonese Muslims and the Hadramis in particular. During this second religious transformation, new religious elites and new Islamic foundations emerged which contested the old established foundation, al-Hilal.

By mapping these developments, chapter 5 sheds light on the complexity of religious articulations among the Hadrami descendants today and how such articulations are shaped by local contexts. The analysis of religious developments among the Hadramis in Ambon in this study thus illustrates that religion, like ethnicity, is not cultural given, but rather a living tradition that evolves in an of on-going process of construction and reconstruction, reinventing and reinterpretating stories, symbols and practices.

5. Networks Extending beyond Ethnic and Religious Communities

The findings of my research certainly point to dimensions in the lives of contemporary Hadramis in Ambonese society in which claims to ethnic and religious specificities stand out. However, the findings also suggest that such specificities intersect with commonalities shared with other citizens of Ambon and, more generally, citizens of Indonesia, so that no clear-cut boundaries can be drawn between specific Hadrami groups or between Hadramis as a group and other categories within the Indonesian or Ambonese society. Chapter 3 have mapped the engagement of Hadrami descendants in various societal domains such as the educational, economic, political and cultural fields. The picture that emerged indicates that their engagement in various social fields of public life show their multiple senses of belonging that span a myriad of networks extend over different ethno-religious communities within and outside Ambon. Therefore, the active maintenance of diasporic identity among the Hadramis is only partially undertaken through making exclusive claims on boundaries between one's 'own' group and the majority of the population in Ambon and Indonesia through one particular exclusive network, be it cultural, social, religious, or political. More importantly, the Hadramis are able to engage in various social webs of relationships that can accommodate different customs or norms, without fearing to lose their distinct cultural identity. Also, as described in chapter 3-6, Hadrami women participate in all domains of the public sphere in Ambon and they are thus not only passive receivers, but also active participants in strengthening, negotiating, and transforming Hadrami diasporic identities, both on individual and collective levels.

6. Conclusion

This study has adopted an ethnographic approach to document and analyse the practices of different categories of Hadramis and different individual descendants of Hadrami migrants to Ambon in the process of diasporic living and identity construction. It has demonstrated that in different historical and socio-political contexts, the kind of Hadrami actors who play a role in the foreground of various societal arenas are liable to change. Most notable is the recent entering of the stage of female actors who claim their own positions in the public domain. Besides, my

study has argued that the diverse and shifting, contextual alliances of Hadrami descendants shows that the dynamics of diasporic identity construction consists of an interplay between multiple interlocking identities such as ethnicity, religion, class/status, gender. Furthermore, the dynamics of diasporic identity formation and its active maintenance among the Hadramis in Ambon reflect an intricate web of power relations that shape both intra-and interpersonal relations among a variety of Hadrami identities, and between Hadramis and other communities in local society and those in the homeland. This intricate web of power relations is simultaneously shaped by the dynamics of local, national, and global contexts.

One of the limitations of the scope of this study is that the dimensions of power dynamics pertain predominantly to social relations on a micro-level and thus this study does not elaborately address how structures at meso and macro levels influence the construction of diasporic identity of Hadrami descendants today. Another limitation is that the study covers a broad range of Hadrami identities of 'ordinary' people rather than on those in leadership positions. With all these limitations, this study, hopefully can still contribute to Hadrami studies by pointing out commonalities and specificities in the ways that Ambonese Hadramis in comparison to Hadrami diasporic communities elsewhere have constructed their diasporic identity and how they have maintained relations with fellow Hadramis and other categories of people in the country of settlement and beyond. this study attempts to contribute to migration and diaspora studies by combining insights from the study of (post)colonial migration and diasporic communities by adding a South-South migration perspective.

Samenvatting van het proefschrift

1. Probleemanalyse, doelen en onderzoeksvragen

Dit proefschrift is de eerste integrale studie van de levens en identificaties van Hadrami afstammelingen in Ambon. Het is het resultaat van een etnografische studie van hedendaagse nakomelingen van Hadrami Arabische migranten in Ambon. Het doel is inzicht te krijgen in de wisselwerking tussen etniciteit en religie op de constructie van diasporische identiteit en de sociale integratie van de nakomelingen van Hadrami Arabische migranten in Ambon. De overkoepelende onderzoeksvraag die in dit proefschrift wordt beantwoord is hoe etniciteit en religie elkaar wederzijds beïnvloeden in individuele en collectieve constructies van identiteit van hedendaagse Ambonese Hadrami's, en hoe deze wisselwerking zich verhoudt tot hun posities in Ambonese sociaal-economische, politieke en religieuze machtsconstellaties. Om deze vraag te beantwoorden zijn de volgende deelvragen geformuleerd: Hoe claimen en onderhouden Hadrami Arabieren actief hun etniciteit en identiteit in de dagelijkse praktijk? Hoe presenteren ze hun gedeelde identiteit in individuele en collectieve verhalen en welke wensen voor concrete relaties met het land van herkomst hebben ze? Aan wat voor soort religieuze discussies en praktijken nemen ze deel en hoe verhouden deze zich tot hun claim om tot een bepaalde groep te behoren? In wat voor soort lokale religieuze, sociale, economische en politieke netwerken nemen ze deel en hoe spreiden deze netwerken zich uit over verschillende etnische en religieuze gemeenschappen in Ambon en daarbuiten?

De geschiedenis van de Hadrami Arabieren, die eind achttiende eeuw tot aan het begin van de twintigste eeuw naar de Maleisische Archipel migreerden, wordt vaak beschouwd als een succesverhaal in termen van transnationale economische, politieke en religieuze betrokkenheid. De belangrijkste factoren die bijdragen aan dit succes zijn gerelateerd aan het onderhouden van een eigen culturele identiteit op basis van een specifieke etnische en religieuze identiteit. Om de situatie van hedendaagse nakomelingen van de Hadrami migranten te onderzoeken, is het cruciaal om voort te bouwen op deze historische context om zowel verandering als continuïteit in de manier waarop ze hun etno-religieuze identiteit en sociale relaties in een grotere maatschappij vormgeven te begrijpen.

Voor een groot deel ligt de relevantie van deze studie in de Ambonese context zelf, die tot op heden sterk onderbelicht is gebleven in onderzoek naar Hadrami's. Met name de recente publieke conflicten tussen moslims en christenen (1999-2002) spelen een belangrijke rol in hedendaagse identificaties van Hadrami's. Het is van belang deze lacune op te vullen door te onderzoeken hoe lokale sociale structuren de diasporische identiteitsconstructie van de nakomelingen van de Hadrami migranten daar hebben gevormd.

Een andere innovatieve dimensie van deze studie betreft de constructie van genderidentiteit. Het diasporische leven van Ambonese Hadrami's en hun identiteit zijn op specifieke manieren sekse-gebonden. Om dit te begrijpen, is het vrouwelijke perspectief van groot belang. Deze studie heeft dan ook als doel specifiek kennis en inzichten te verschaffen ten aanzien van de opvattingen en gewoonten van de Hadrami vrouwen in Ambon.

Er is veel onderzoek gedaan naar de Hadrami diaspora, variërend van historische tot antropologische studies. De literatuur behandelt een grote verscheidenheid aan onderwerpen, zoals Hadrami migratie, rollen in de economie en politiek, de rol van religie, verwantschapsnetwerken, sociale integratie, vernieuwde banden met het thuisland en gender (Van den Berg 1886; Freitag and Clarence-Smith 1997; Mobini-Kesheh 1999; Boxberger 2002; De Jong and Kaptein 2002; Freitag 2003; Feener 2004; Clegg 2005; Hafizhah 2005; Fachrudin 2005; Sahab 2005; Slama 2005; Ho 2006; Jacobsen 2009; Siregar 2009; Tridewiyanti 2009; Manger 2010; Sila 2015; Alatas 2008[2016c]; Alatas 2010; Somad 2010; Mandal 2018). Een analyse van de diasporische identiteitsconstructie onder de Hadrami's in de diaspora is dus zeer interessant.

In lijn met het grote spectrum aan literatuur, behandelt mijn studie de Hadrami diaspora in Ambon vanuit historisch en antropologisch perspectief. Deze studie gebruikt diaspora als categorie van analyse om de identificaties van de Hadrami's te onderzoeken. Voor deze studie is het concept diaspora gebruikt als analytische lens in combinatie met het intersectionaliteitsperspectief om te begrijpen hoe verschillende sociale categorieën zoals etniciteit, religie, klasse, en gender elkaar doorkruisen en wederzijds vormgeven in de constructie van een diasporische Hadrami identiteit en om te analyseren welke posities individuele Hadrami's innemen in een bepaalde context.

Bouwend op het grote spectrum aan onderzoek van de Hadrami diaspora, heeft deze studie als doel bij te dragen aan het opvullen van de lacune in kennis over de diaspora van de Hadrami Arabieren, voornamelijk in Oost-Indonesië. Op meta-niveau relateert deze studie aan de intersectionaliteit van etniciteit, religie, klasse en gender in de constructie van diasporische identiteit. Om essentialisme te vermijden en om doorlopende processen van identificatie te benadrukken, volgt deze studie een constructivistische aanpak.

Dit proefschrift is voornamelijk gebaseerd op etnografisch onderzoek. Gegevens voor deze etnografie zijn vooral verzameld via veldwerk bestaande uit interviews en participerende observatie. Verder zijn de gegevens opgetekend in de vorm van aantekeningen, foto's en audio-visuele opnames. Het veldwerk in Ambon werd in een periode van negen maanden uitgevoerd, lopend van september 2014 tot en met mei 2015. Het veldwerk werd voor het grootste deel op Ambon gedaan. Daarnaast werd veldwerk verricht op andere plaatsen (zgn. 'multi-sited fieldwork'), zoals Seram, Buru, Banda, Kei en Ternate, en ook op Papua (met name Fak-Fak) en Java, voornamelijk Jakarta, en tot slot Hadramaut, waar ik gedurende

twee weken van februari 5-21, 2015 een groep Hadrami's uit Indonesië vergezelde tijdens hun bedevaarten naar heiligdommen en religieuze onderwijsinstituten bezocht waar Ambonese Hadrami's studeren.

Tijdens het veldwerk heb ik zowel formele als informele interviews afgenomen. Voor de formele interviews werd een semi-gestructureerd diepte-interview formaat gebruikt. Mijn gesprekspartners waren verschillende sleutel-informanten en vele 'gewone' informanten tussen de twintig en tachtig jaar oud, behorend (of claimend te behoren) tot één van de veertig Hadrami clans van de tweede tot de zevende generatie van de Hadrami migranten. Participerende observatie werd uitgevoerd door religieuze bijeenkomsten en culturele festiviteiten georganiseerd door verschillende islamitische groepen te bezoeken, en ook door deel te nemen aan dagelijkse activiteiten.

Dit proefschrift bestaat uit zeven hoofdstukken. Het eerste hoofdstuk beschrijft de probleemanalyse van het onderzoek, mijn onderzoeksdoelen, vragen, methoden, een literatuur onderzoek en een theoretisch kader, en presenteert de structuur van de studie. Het tweede hoofdstuk beschrijft zowel de geschiedenis als het collectief geheugen van de Hadrami Arabieren op de Molukken. Hoofdstuk 3 geeft een algemeen overzicht over de hedendaagse Hadrami afstammelingen in Ambon. Hoofdstuk 4 focust op afkomst, huwelijk en gender. Hoofdstuk 5 schetst de religieuze ontwikkelingen binnen de Hadrami gemeenschap op Ambon. Hoofdstuk 6 bespreekt de oriëntatie van de Hadrami's tegenover hun land van herkomst via diasporische terugreizen alsmede hun impact op de manier waarop Hadrami's hun culturele en religieuze leven vormgeven. Het laatste hoofdstuk presenteert te onderzoeksresultaten en geeft suggesties voor mogelijk vervolgonderzoek.

2. Claims en behoud van een etnische identiteit

Hoofdstuk 2 laat zien dat het Nederlandse koloniale beleid gebaseerd op raciale, residentiële segregatie en de mobiliteits-restricties significant heeft bijgedragen aan de vorming van een constructie van een eigen culturele identiteit van de Hadrami migranten en hun nakomelingen in Indonesië als deel van een specifieke Arabische etnische groep. Het gevoel van Arabier zijn kan tot aan de dag van vandaag worden geobserveerd zoals wordt getoond in hoofdstuk 3-6. Dit gevoel van Arabier zijn is echter heterogeen in termen van clan en klasse claims (Sada en non-Sada). De lokale context van Ambon heeft zo verschuivingen mogelijk gemaakt in de machtsverhouding tussen Sada en non-Sada, resulterend in een gedeeltelijke afbraak van de traditionele sociale stratificatie. Hoofdstuk 2 bespreekt ook de specifieke gendered aard van de reproductie van Hadrami identiteit in het algemeen en het Sada non-Sada onderscheid. Omdat het Hadrami mannen waren die naar Indonesië en met name Ambon migreerden, begonnen zij Hadrami gemeenschappen te bouwen door met lokale vrouwen te trouwen. Deze specifieke overlap van etniciteit, religie, klasse en gender in de diasporische

identiteitsconstructie van de Hadrami's kan nog steeds worden herkend in de context van vandaag, en hoe dit huwelijkspatroon hedendaagse Hadrami mannen en vrouwen verschillend beïnvloed zoals beschreven in hoofdstuk 4.

Hoofdstuk 4 bespreekt hoe culturele machtsdomeinen doorwerken in de sociale relaties van de Hadrami's. Deze culturele machtsdomeinen zijn direct gerelateerd aan opvattingen over het ideale huwelijk dat een basis biedt om een stabiele groep te creëren. Het ideaal van een kaste-achtige sociale hiërarchie gecombineerd met een partilineaire afstamming bepalen het *kafa'a* principe dat leidend is in het aangaan van huwelijksrelaties tussen Sada en non-Sada, en tussen Hadrami's in het algemeen en de bredere lokale gemeenschap, en specifiek ook tussen mannen en vrouwen. In dit licht is het huwelijk de voornaamste factor in het markeren van zowel interne grenzen binnen een verscheidenheid aan vormen van Hadrami identiteit, als de markering van externe grenzen met een gast-maatschappij, waarbij interpretatie van *kafa'a* verschilt tussen Sada en non-Sada. Het resultaat is dat non-Sada nakomelingen ertoe neigen flexibeler te zijn in de toepassing van *kafa'a* principes dan Sada's, en dat sociale sancties en een taboe op het breken van het ideale huwelijk sterker zijn in Sada families dan in non-Sada families.

Zoals in hoofdstuk 4 wordt beschreven, opereren huwelijk en afstammingsrelaties als een sociaal arena waar de Hadrami's hun eigen culturele identiteit als Arabieren hebben behouden, terwijl andere culturele eigenschappen, zoals kleding, voeding, taal, kunst festivals, lijken sterk aangepast te zijn aan de lokale Ambonese cultuur zoals beschreven in hoofdstuk 3. De Hadrami's tonen dus een groot aanpassingsvermogen en hun deelname binnen vele domeinen in het publieke leven wordt gekenmerkt door heterogeniteit. Steeds vaker en nadrukkelijker nemen vrouwen ook deel aan het publieke domein, een situatie die behoorlijk verschilt van die in Hadramaut of andere regio's waar zich Hadrami diaspora bevinden. Deze studie beargumenteert dus dat de reproductie van de vele identiteiten van individuele Hadrami's sterk zijn ingebed in en afgestemd op verschillende lokale culturele contexten.

3. Meervoudige gemeenschapsgevoelens en oriëntatie richting een thuisland

De Hadrami migranten in Ambon tonen hun meervoudige gemeenschapsgevoelens door in uiteenlopende situaties zichzelf ofwel te presenteren als Ambonese Arabieren, als alleen Arabieren of Ambonezen, of als Ambonese Arabische moslims. Ook worden deze zelf-presentaties op vele manieren verder gespecificeerd afhankelijk van sociale status, gender en ideologische oriëntaties, te weten als Sada of non-Sada, man of vrouw, soenniet of shi' iet, traditionalist of Salafi, en zo voort. De 'multiculturele competentie' van Hadrami's wordt soms gecombineerd met zelf-presentaties in termen van Indonesisch burgerschap. Verschillende

hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift hebben gedocumenteerd hoe individuele Hadrami's hun 'multiculturele competentie' improviserend inzetten in verschillende contexten en in relatie tot verschillende netwerken.

De manier waarop de categorieën van etniciteit, religie, klasse en gender elkaar doorkruisen heeft ook verschillende implicaties voor hoe Hadrami's zichzelf positioneren ten opzichte van het land van herkomst; Hadramaut. De bevindingen in hoofstuk 6 laten een gevarieerde dynamiek zien in de manier waarop reizen naar Hadramaut gestalte krijgen onder huidige Hadrami nakomelingen en hoe Hadramaut als diasporisch thuisland intern wordt betwist. Sommigen beschouwen het geboorteland van hun voorvaders niet alleen als plaats van herkomst maar ook als plaats om heen terug te keren op zoek naar gezaghebbende bronnen van religieuze waarde en spiritualiteit. Daarentegen beschouwen anderen Hadramaut slechts als een land van oorsprong en niet als een plek die toegang biedt tot gezaghebbende kennis of spiritualiteit. Verschillende ideologische oriëntaties, zoals traditionalisme, salafisme (en Wahhabisme) en shi'isme, dragen bij aan dit verschil in oriëntatie. Bevindingen van hoofdstuk 6 geven ook inzicht in de manier waarop ervaringen reizen naar het land van herkomst gendered zijn in termen van verschil in het praktiseren van gender-segregatie en daarmee verbonden vormen van lichaamsbedekking voor vrouwen in publieke ruimten tussen Ambon en Hadramaut.

De bevindingen van dit hoofdstuk tonen ook aan dat de diaspora niet alleen een ruimte is van imaginaire relaties maar juist een van zeer concrete relaties tussen diasporische gemeenschappen en het land van herkomst. Voor sommige Hadrami's op Ambon en elders in Indonesië, hebben diasporische reizen naar Hadramaut niet het 'mythische' karakter dat Hall (1990) and Gilroy (1997) ontwaarden in hun onderzoek onder Afrikaanse diaspora's in het Westen, noch zijn zij te karakteriseren als een 'sociale conditie' in de zin waarin Vertovec de term gebruikt om de situatie van bijvoorbeeld de Joodse diaspora aan te duiden (Vertovec 1997, 278-279). Voor Hadrami's in Ambon en elders in het Indonesische archipel betekent het leven in de diaspora eerder de mogelijkheid om sociale banden te onderhouden met Hadrami's elders in de diaspora en met het herkomstland en daarbuiten, naast banden met andere gemeenschappen in Indonesië in het algemeen en Ambon in het bijzonder.

4. Islamitische discoursen en gebruiken

Als één van de cruciale dimensies in de vorming van een diasporische identiteit speelt religie een belangrijke rol in de dagelijkse praktijk van huidige Hadrami's. Op individueel niveau presenteren Hadrami nakomelingen zichzelf vaak als moslims, waarbij ze hun religieuze identiteit delen met andere minderheids-moslim gemeenschappen in Ambon, en de meerderheid van de Indonesische populatie en de globale oemma. Zij vormen echter geen homogene groep, maar zijn

heterogeen in hun praktijken, opvattingen en het deelname in religieuze organisaties. Zoals beschreven in hoofdstuk 5 speelt religie een rol in de constructie en het behoud van de meervoudige identiteiten van de Hadrami nakomelingen. Het religieuze veld functioneert als een sociaal-culturele ruimte om sociale netwerken te onderhouden onder de Hadrami's zelf, en tussen de Hadrami's en de bredere lokale gemeenschap. De bevindingen van hoofdstuk 5 tonen aan dat de religieuze identiteit van de Hadrami's in de diaspora vorm krijgt door middel van de dynamiek tussen islamitische bewegingen in globale, nationale en lokale contexten.

Twee specifieke ontwikkelingen op Ambon zijn van invloed geweest op hoe sommige Hadrami praktijken, opvattingen en organisaties zijn blijven bestaan terwijl andere zijn aangevochten of getransformeerd, dan wel hebben plaats gemaakt voor nieuwe ziens- en handelwijzen. De eerste ontwikkeling speelde zich af 19e en begin 20e eeuw, toen geïnspireerd door een islamitische hervormingsbeweging het traditionele gezag van de Sada groep werd uitgedaagd en de institutionele structuur van de Hadrami gemeenschap zoals tot uitdrukking komen in het 'Alawi-Irshadi onderscheid afbrokkelde. De tweede ingrijpende religieuze transformatie vond plaats tijdens en na de conflicten tussen moslims en christenen op Ambon tussen 1999 en 2002. Verschillende islamitische bewegingen (neo-salafisme, shi'isme en neo-traditionalisme) hebben geprobeerd hun invloed uit te oefenen op Ambonese moslims en op de Hadrami's in het bijzonder. Tijdens deze tweede religieuze transformatie kwamen nieuwe religieuze elites op en verschenen er nieuwe islamitische organisaties ten tonele die de oude gevestigde organisatie al-Hilal, bestreden.

Deze ontwikkelingen die in hoofdstuk 5 in kaart werden gebracht bieden inzicht in de complexiteit van religieuze visies en praktijken onder hedendaagse Ambonese Hadrami's, en in de manier hoe deze in lokale contexten gestalte krijgen. De analyse van religieuze ontwikkelingen onder de Hadrami's op Ambon in deze studie illustreren zodoende dat religie, net als etniciteit, geen cultureel gegeven is, maar eerder een levende traditie die zich ontwikkelt in een voortdurend proces van constructie, reconstructie, herontdekking en herinterpretatie van verhalen, symbolen en gebruiken.

5. Netwerken die zich uitstrekken voorbij etnische en religieuze gemeenschappen

De bevindingen van mijn onderzoek bieden inzicht in dimensies in de levens van hedendaagse Hadrami's in de Ambonese maatschappij waarin claims op etnische en religieuze eigenheid opvallen. Echter, de bevindingen suggereren ook dat dergelijke eigen-aardigheid overlapt met overeenkomsten die worden gedeeld met andere inwoners van Ambon en, algemener, inwoners van Indonesië, zodat geen duidelijke grenzen kunnen worden getrokken tussen specifieke Hadrami groepen

of tussen Hadrami's als groep en andere categorieën binnen de Indonesische en Ambonese maatschappij. Hoofdstuk 3 schetst de participatie van Hadrami nakomelingen in verschillende sociale domeinen, zoals op educatief, economisch, politiek en cultureel gebied. Het beeld dat verschijnt geeft aan dat hun betrokkenheid op verschillende sociale gebieden in het publieke leven meervoudige saamhorigheidsgevoelens laat zien, die uitstrekken over verschillende netwerken en over verschillende etno-religieuze gemeenschappen binnen en buiten Ambon. Actief behoud van diasporische identiteit onder de Hadrami's bestaat dan ook slechts gedeeltelijk uit het maken van claims die de grenzen markeren van een 'eigen' groep en de meerderheid van de populatie van Ambon en Indonesië door middel van exclusieve cultureel, sociale, religieuze of politieke netwerken. Nog belangrijker is dat de Hadrami's zich veelal bewegen in meerdere sociale netwerken waarbij zij verschillende gebruiken en normen in hun eigen leefwijze inpassen zonder te vrezen hun eigen culturele identiteit daardoor te verliezen. Zoals beschreven in de hoofstukken 3 tot en met 6, nemen Hadrami vrouwen deel in alle dimensies van het publieke domein op Ambon en zijn zij dus geenszins passieve ontvangers, maar actieve actoren die hun eigen bijdrage leveren aan het bevestigen en transformeren van Hadrami diasporische identiteiten op zowel individueel als collectief niveau.

6. Conclusie

Voor deze studie is de etnografische benadering gehanteerd om het dagelijkse diasporische leven en de identiteitsconstructie van verschillende categorieën Hadrami's in Ambon op te tekenen en te analyseren. Het onderzoek heeft uitgewezen dat in verschillende historische en sociaal-politieke contexten uiteenlopende Hadrami spelers op de voorgrond traden en dat Hadrami's in verschillende perioden afwisselend in meerdere sociale arena's opereerden. Meest opmerkelijk is het recente betreden van het podium van vrouwelijke spelers die hun eigen posities opeisen in het publieke domein. Daarnaast heeft mijn studie gedocumenteerd hoe de diverse en verschuivende allianties van nakomelingen van Hadrami migranten contextueel gevormd zijn, daarmee aantonend dat de dynamiek van diasporische identiteitsconstructie bestaat uit een samenspel tussen meerdere, met elkaar verweven identiteiten zoals etniciteit, religie, klasse/status en gender. Verder tonen de bevindingen aan dat de diasporische identiteitsconstructie en haar actieve behoud onder de Hadrami's in Ambon het resultaat is van een ingewikkeld samenspel van machtsrelaties welke zowel vormgeeft aan een verscheidenheid aan Hadrami identiteiten, alsook aan relaties tussen Hadrami's en andere gemeenschappen in de lokale samenleving en die in het land van herkomst. Dit ingewikkelde netwerk van machtsrelaties kan alleen worden begrepen in de inbedding van lokale, nationale en globale contexten.

Eén van de beperkingen van de gehanteerde etnografische benadering is dat de bevindingen betrekking hebben op sociale relaties op micro niveau en dat deze studie dus niet uitgebreid behandelt hoe machtstructuren op meso en macro niveaus vandaag de dag de vorming van diasporische identiteit van nakomelingen van Hadrami migranten beïnvloeden. Een andere beperking is dat de studie een breed scala aan Hadrami identiteiten van 'gewone' mensen behandelt en niet inzoomt op personen die leiderschapsposities bekleden. Nochtans hoop ik met deze studie een significante bijdrage te leveren aan het veld van Hadrami studies door inzicht te bieden in overeenkomsten en verschillen tussen de manieren waarop Ambonese Hadrami's in vergelijking tot Hadrami diasporische gemeenschappen elders hun diasporische identiteit hebben vormgegeven en hoe ze relaties met andere Hadrami's en andere categorieën mensen in het land van vestiging en daarbuiten hebben onderhouden. Deze studie probeert ook bij te dragen aan migratie en diaspora studies door inzichten van de bestudering van (post)koloniale migratie en diasporische gemeenschappen te combineren door een Zuid-Zuid migratie perspectief toe te voegen.

Appendix 9: Curriculum Vitae

Born in Kudus on October 24, 1980, Istiqomah received her bachelor degree in Arabic from the faculty of Islamic Education at State Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN) Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta-Indonesia in 2003. Afterwards, she completed her master degree both in State Islamic University (UIN) Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta-Indonesia in 2007, and in the faculty of Humanities in Leiden University in the Netherlands in 2010. Since 2011, she has worked as assistant lecturer at State Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN) in Ambon, where her interest to conduct research on the Arab community began. In 2013, she went to the Netherlands to pursue her PhD at the faculty of Theology and Religious Studies in University of Groningen.